From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Michael Tremer To: development@lists.ipfire.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] Mark recommended ciphers/algorithms Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 14:13:59 +0000 Message-ID: <1450188839.31655.180.camel@ipfire.org> In-Reply-To: <566D8A55.3070402@web.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============7611157121202739194==" List-Id: --===============7611157121202739194== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Sun, 2015-12-13 at 16:10 +0100, IT Superhack wrote: > Hello Michael, > > Michael Tremer: > > Hello, > > > > this patch was line-wrapped and cannot be merged, but nevertheless, > > here are my thoughts: > I am unable to submit patches at the moment, since git send-email > keeps > crashing on every machine I own - sometimes starttls issues, > sometimes > segfault - and TB seems to line-wrap. Weird that that happens. If you are using git on IPFire and experiencing these issues, please open a bug report. > > > > On Mon, 2015-12-07 at 17:35 +0100, IT Superhack wrote: > > > Signed-off-by: Timmothy Wilson > > > --- > > > diff --git a/html/cgi-bin/ovpnmain.cgi b/html/cgi > > > -bin/ovpnmain.cgi > > > index 62af54e..15385f1 100644 > > > --- a/html/cgi-bin/ovpnmain.cgi > > > +++ b/html/cgi-bin/ovpnmain.cgi > > > @@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@ END > > > > > > > > > > > > - > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree, that it is desirable to use longer keys. However, I am not > > sure if it is a good idea to go all the way for 4096 bit and not > > only > > for e.g. 2048 bit. Why not 8192 even? > > > Since the SSLTest server page treats 2048 DH primes as "weak", I > guess > 3072 or better is suitable here. > > I would like to read some justification for the values that are > > picked. > Here is one, for example: > https://netzpolitik.org/2015/kryptographie-open-source-und-gesellscha > ft/ > (german, please see "8."). In this article is also mentioned that 512 > bit hash algorithms should be used. > > > > Furthermore, I think that we the upper bound should be something > > that > > the average IPFire box is able to handle. > I agree with that. Maybe 3072 bits is a good deal between speed and > security, what do you think? That depends entirely on the hardware. We cannot know what people are using. That makes it rather complicated to decide. > > > > > @@ -4687,7 +4687,7 @@ if ($cgiparams{'TYPE'} eq 'net') { > > > > > > > > > > > > - > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > > > I can agree with that since it is already selected by default. This > > makes it just more explicit. > > > > I would have merged this if this was an independent patch in a > > patch > > set. > Thanks, but at the moment, i cannot hand in a patch without wrapped > lines. For now you could push the git branch somewhere and I can pull that. Sending comments is difficult though, hence we do this on this list with patches. > > > > > @@ -4702,7 +4702,7 @@ if ($cgiparams{'TYPE'} eq 'net') { > > > $Lang::tr{'ovpn ha'}: > > > > > > - > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why should IKEv2 be recommended? AFAIK there are no known design > > issues > > with IKEv1. Some algorithms might not be available, but this is not > > an > > issue for now since AES, SHA2, (AKA the strong ones) are supported. > > > > > @@ -2434,7 +2434,7 @@ if(($cgiparams{'ACTION'} eq > > > $Lang::tr{'advanced'}) || > > > > > width="15%">$Lang::tr{'encryption'} > > > > > > > > multiple='multiple' size='6' > > > style='width: 100%'> > > > - > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why are the AES-GCM cipher suites with smaller IVs not recommended? > > > > > @@ -2478,7 +2478,7 @@ if(($cgiparams{'ACTION'} eq > > > $Lang::tr{'advanced'}) || > > > > > width="15%">$Lang::tr{'integrity'} > > > > > > > > multiple='multiple' size='6' > > > style='width: 100%'> > > > - > > > + > > > > > > > > > > > > > Same again. > There seems to be a problem with the word "recommended". In the > patches > submitted, I recommended always the most strongest cipher. However, > as > you said, some of them are simply one step too much. Should then both > be > recommended? I am not sure. Can anyone come up with a more fitting expression? If we mark everything as "recommended" that is strong enough for now after our consideration, we will have most of them tagged with that word. In that case it would make more sense to mark the weak stuff as such to keep readability. Maybe that is the way to go. But does the average Joe know what is meant by "weak"? > In my opinion, this has to be clarified, but since it is a very > subjective thing, it might be difficult. It is not really just subjective. We can say for sure that some ciphers and hashes are broken. We can also say that some are weak and will be considered broken soon. That is pretty much objective since we have sources for that. If only enough people agree that X is broken or weak, that is pretty much a fact. The recommendation though is more complicated because I would like to take into account how feasible it is to use a certain cipher/hash/etc. RSA with 8192 bits long keys is quite nice. We can assume that it is more secure than RSA with a 4096 bits long key if it was generated from true random numbers. However handshakes will take longer. Generating the key will take weeks on some systems. I want this to be reflected by this change. Please feel free to disagree with me on this :) Can we get more people to send their thoughts on this? > > > > > diff --git a/langs/de/cgi-bin/de.pl b/langs/de/cgi-bin/de.pl > > > index 2bca854..b18cace 100644 > > > --- a/langs/de/cgi-bin/de.pl > > > +++ b/langs/de/cgi-bin/de.pl > > > @@ -1914,6 +1914,7 @@ > > > 'rebooting ipfire' => 'Starte IPFire neu', > > > 'reconnect' => 'Neu Verbinden', > > > 'reconnection' => 'Wiederverbindung', > > > +'recommended' => 'empfohlen', > > > 'red' => 'Internet', > > > 'red1' => 'ROT', > > > 'references' => 'Referenzen', > > > > > > > > > > The English translation is missing. > Oh, sorry, I forgot. > > > > Best, > > -Michael > > > Best regards, > Timmothy Wilson > -Michael --===============7611157121202739194== Content-Type: application/pgp-signature Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="signature.asc" MIME-Version: 1.0 LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQR1AgU0lHTkFUVVJFLS0tLS0KVmVyc2lvbjogR251UEcgdjEKCmlRSWNCQUFC Q2dBR0JRSldjQ0FvQUFvSkVJQjU4UDl2a0FrSHNGTVAvMUFDeFR3b2xWMTRSc1JQd2k0VFEvNVkK eWloL0dOQ3hXWTg5b3hXZTNQVTB5NkIyYy9tZTBxQzJXN3lCaGNsTm5xTzlMN2REcldIVzN6QW5t NHlpcktWeApKck5xVVFKblRqV2RObWtycENaK1NhSFNEK2tqSUN1SVVWeGgzZUpFWTk0ZFlzNEM1 bXdDWnRLdXFpNGlObjZLCmUvRUdlTEJZUGF3MWdvRTlnbG9HclNaZUV5cjBQUGcxblljZk5XaWxJ WkFxZ3pnMkI5clV1dkM2T3VBRzl2QjgKZ1FRd09VdzVDeU1yMEFleko3ek8rSitjV2NPZXFaOUlL TkFNSjFaMDZjclpRTUt6OEROSFFDaXQ5RGVSYnErUgpxU01tVnk0ZkVWQm9QKzh6MHZCdGxoL0dr aEVXa1REVGFTUS9hMHlWWkdsNzZDMlU0cytETk5rakVYcit2Sjg2CmhEbklxSkhhbDFjdkxLaEk3 aUR5SE1sdDhYcGtvQVlNT1hnRkdvQUVIVVhUZTdVRDJ3RU9obGozeDNlU0sxYjMKYjNPUzNVMzU2 VWdNUzVlcVdmYS9kV1hpdmhrSk4zWUpxQUhDWXAxVExxbEQ0SXNRdXcrQTlPbERORkZyVEJ1bgp3 TFYwMERNb3JVaWNoaWQ4d0V4a2M5VUxSYXNoRURFVjlZcDhRUG5DbzJQVXlnYlV4T3FlbnBzVU9j cmhJQWoyCi9PU3dHRXlRREFQVzcvQUwyWHNTaXhvd0JaZVpCeW10SFZSbHJpL29rdExsWW9WUmxW UWRGTUtuc2hza1MrTnoKNlhsWmxEejQrcVVVcW1wR0N1blViek9QM0JPMUZXOGJwVm9ad043QmFM dTRUc1pNcUdpTEZrR1BJMEdGQ2VKbwpwbE9jeEpOZExzeDZ4eTltQUo0cAo9Rm5tLwotLS0tLUVO RCBQR1AgU0lHTkFUVVJFLS0tLS0K --===============7611157121202739194==--