Hi,

I merged this patch and the one after.

Please give this version a good test as it is a pre-release version.
You can maintain a branch where you integrate all new changes, but I
think it is not required to send every single one to the mailing list.
It creates a bit of noise and I think that unfortunately nobody is
testing every single one any ways. Which is sad.

Can we have maybe one aggregated patch after every release of a Core
Update? So we always have the latest version of dnsmasq in the updates?

Best,
-Michael

On Fri, 2016-02-26 at 18:29 +0100, Matthias Fischer wrote:
> This is 'dnsmasq 2.76test10', based on current 'next', containing
> latest patches.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer <matthias.fischer(a)ipfire.org>
> ---
>  lfs/dnsmasq                                        |   39 +-
>  ...TL_parameter_to_--host-record_and_--cname.patch |  265 +++
>  ...01-include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch |   41 -
>  .../dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch        |  117 ++
>  ...subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch |  271 ---
>  src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch     |   17 +
>  ...h_zones_locally_when_localise_queries_set.patch |   34 -
>  .../dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch        |  136 ++
>  .../004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-option.patch   |   38 -
>  ...ution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch |   50 -
>  ...page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch |   35 -
>  ...gned_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch |   30 -
>  ...6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch |   25 -
>  ...pect_the_--no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch |   47 -
>  ..._5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch |   26 -
>  ...11-Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch |   32 -
>  ...12-Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-priv.patch |   48 -
>  ...y_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch |   43 -
>  ...14-Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch |   39 -
>  .../015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-dir.patch  |   38 -
>  ...ajor_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch | 2209 ----------
> ----------
>  ...hing_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch |  612 ------
>  ...caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch |  269 ---
>  ...lise_RR-filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch |  755 -------
>  .../dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch      |  134 --
>  ...1-Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch |  133 --
>  ..._code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch |  409 ----
>  ...023-Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch |   98 -
>  ...ning_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.patch |  145 --
>  ...EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch |  643 ------
>  ...aks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch |  262 ---
>  ...obscure_off-by-one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch |   27 -
>  .../028-Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch       |   39 -
>  .../dnsmasq/029-NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch |   39 -
>  34 files changed, 542 insertions(+), 6603 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_
> --host-record_and_--cname.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
>  create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-
> ttl_option.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
> enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
>  create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
> dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
> ries_set.patch
>  create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-
> mtu_option.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/004-
> fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-option.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
> suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
> clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
> handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
> DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
> --no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
> Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
> Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/012-
> Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-priv.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
> Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
> Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/015-
> Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-dir.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
> Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
> Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
> Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
> filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/020-
> DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
> Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
> existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
> Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
> Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
> atch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
> Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
> More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/027-
> Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
> Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
>  delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/029-
> NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch
> 
> diff --git a/lfs/dnsmasq b/lfs/dnsmasq
> index 8058663..29d7895 100644
> --- a/lfs/dnsmasq
> +++ b/lfs/dnsmasq
> @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
>  ####################################################################
> ###########
>  #                                                                   
>           #
>  # IPFire.org - A linux based
> firewall                                         #
> -# Copyright (C) 2015  Michael Tremer & Christian
> Schmidt                      #
> +# Copyright (C) 2016  Michael Tremer & Christian
> Schmidt                      #
>  #                                                                   
>           #
>  # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
> modify        #
>  # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
> by        #
> @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
>  
>  include Config
>  
> -VER        = 2.75
> +VER        = 2.76test10
>  
>  THISAPP    = dnsmasq-$(VER)
>  DL_FILE    = $(THISAPP).tar.xz
> @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE)
>  
>  $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE)
>  
> -$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 887236f1ddde6eb57cdb9d01916c9f72
> +$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 4b51474ed6081b18c61407077f254cf7
>  
>  install : $(TARGET)
>  
> @@ -73,35 +73,10 @@ $(subst %,%_MD5,$(objects)) :
>  $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects))
>  	@$(PREBUILD)
>  	@rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar axf
> $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE)
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
> enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
> dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
> ries_set.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
> option.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
> suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
> clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
> handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
> DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
> --no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
> Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
> Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-
> priv.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
> Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
> Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
> dir.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
> Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
> Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
> Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
> filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
> Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
> existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
> Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
> Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
> atch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
> Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
> More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-
> one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
> Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
> -	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch
> +	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-
> record_and_--cname.patch
> +	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
> +	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
> +	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
>  	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq-Add-support-to-read-ISC-DHCP-lease-
> file.patch
>  
>  	cd $(DIR_APP) && sed -i src/config.h \
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-
> record_and_--cname.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-record_and_--cname.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..86fbc9c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-
> record_and_--cname.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
> +From df3d54f776a3c9b60735b45c0b7fd88b66a2d5c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> +From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> +Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 21:03:38 +0000
> +Subject: [PATCH] Add TTL parameter to --host-record and --cname.
> +
> +---
> + man/dnsmasq.8 |   12 ++++++++++--
> + src/cache.c   |    7 +++++++
> + src/dnsmasq.h |    2 ++
> + src/option.c  |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> + src/rfc1035.c |    6 +++++-
> + 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +index b782eaf..7bc1394 100644
> +--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
> ++++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ zone files: the port, weight and priority
> numbers are in a different
> + order. More than one SRV record for a given service/domain is
> allowed,
> + all that match are returned.
> + .TP
> +-.B --host-record=<name>[,<name>....],[<IPv4-address>],[<IPv6-
> address>]
> ++.B --host-record=<name>[,<name>....],[<IPv4-address>],[<IPv6-
> address>][,<TTL>]
> + Add A, AAAA and PTR records to the DNS. This adds one or more names
> to
> + the DNS with associated IPv4 (A) and IPv6 (AAAA) records. A name
> may
> + appear in more than one 
> +@@ -546,6 +546,10 @@ is in effect. Short and long names may appear
> in the same
> + .B host-record,
> + eg. 
> + .B --host-record=laptop,laptop.thekelleys.org,192.168.0.1,1234::100
> ++
> ++If the time-to-live is given, it overrides the default, which is
> zero
> ++or the value of --local-ttl. The value is a positive integer and
> gives 
> ++the time-to-live in seconds.
> + .TP
> + .B \-Y, --txt-record=<name>[[,<text>],<text>]
> + Return a TXT DNS record. The value of TXT record is a set of
> strings,
> +@@ -559,7 +563,7 @@ Return a PTR DNS record.
> + .B --naptr-
> record=<name>,<order>,<preference>,<flags>,<service>,<regexp>[,<repla
> cement>]
> + Return an NAPTR DNS record, as specified in RFC3403.
> + .TP
> +-.B --cname=<cname>,<target>
> ++.B --cname=<cname>,<target>[,<TTL>]
> + Return a CNAME record which indicates that <cname> is really
> + <target>. There are significant limitations on the target; it must
> be a
> + DNS name which is known to dnsmasq from /etc/hosts (or additional
> +@@ -568,6 +572,10 @@ hosts files), from DHCP, from --interface-name
> or from another
> + If the target does not satisfy this
> + criteria, the whole cname is ignored. The cname must be unique, but
> it
> + is permissable to have more than one cname pointing to the same
> target.
> ++
> ++If the time-to-live is given, it overrides the default, which is
> zero
> ++or the value of -local-ttl. The value is a positive integer and
> gives 
> ++the time-to-live in seconds.
> + .TP
> + .B --dns-rr=<name>,<RR-number>,[<hex data>]
> + Return an arbitrary DNS Resource Record. The number is the type of
> the
> +diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
> +index a9eaa65..4ecd535 100644
> +--- a/src/cache.c
> ++++ b/src/cache.c
> +@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ static void add_hosts_cname(struct crec *target)
> + 	(crec = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec))))
> +       {
> + 	crec->flags = F_FORWARD | F_IMMORTAL | F_NAMEP | F_CONFIG |
> F_CNAME;
> ++	crec->ttd = a->ttl;
> + 	crec->name.namep = a->alias;
> + 	crec->addr.cname.target.cache = target;
> + 	crec->addr.cname.uid = target->uid;
> +@@ -981,6 +982,7 @@ int read_hostsfile(char *filename, unsigned int
> index, int cache_size, struct cr
> + 		  strcat(cache->name.sname, ".");
> + 		  strcat(cache->name.sname, domain_suffix);
> + 		  cache->flags = flags;
> ++		  cache->ttd = daemon->local_ttl;
> + 		  add_hosts_entry(cache, &addr, addrlen, index,
> rhash, hashsz);
> + 		  name_count++;
> + 		}
> +@@ -988,6 +990,7 @@ int read_hostsfile(char *filename, unsigned int
> index, int cache_size, struct cr
> + 		{
> + 		  strcpy(cache->name.sname, canon);
> + 		  cache->flags = flags;
> ++		  cache->ttd = daemon->local_ttl;
> + 		  add_hosts_entry(cache, &addr, addrlen, index,
> rhash, hashsz);
> + 		  name_count++;
> + 		}
> +@@ -1057,6 +1060,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
> + 	  ((cache = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec)))))
> + 	{
> + 	  cache->flags = F_FORWARD | F_NAMEP | F_CNAME | F_IMMORTAL
> | F_CONFIG;
> ++	  cache->ttd = a->ttl;
> + 	  cache->name.namep = a->alias;
> + 	  cache->addr.cname.target.int_name = intr;
> + 	  cache->addr.cname.uid = SRC_INTERFACE;
> +@@ -1071,6 +1075,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
> + 	(cache->addr.ds.keydata = blockdata_alloc(ds->digest, ds-
> >digestlen)))
> +       {
> + 	cache->flags = F_FORWARD | F_IMMORTAL | F_DS | F_CONFIG |
> F_NAMEP;
> ++	cache->ttd = daemon->local_ttl;
> + 	cache->name.namep = ds->name;
> + 	cache->addr.ds.keylen = ds->digestlen;
> + 	cache->addr.ds.algo = ds->algo;
> +@@ -1095,6 +1100,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
> + 	    (cache = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec))))
> + 	  {
> + 	    cache->name.namep = nl->name;
> ++	    cache->ttd = hr->ttl;
> + 	    cache->flags = F_HOSTS | F_IMMORTAL | F_FORWARD |
> F_REVERSE | F_IPV4 | F_NAMEP | F_CONFIG;
> + 	    add_hosts_entry(cache, (struct all_addr *)&hr->addr,
> INADDRSZ, SRC_CONFIG, (struct crec **)daemon->packet, revhashsz);
> + 	  }
> +@@ -1103,6 +1109,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
> + 	    (cache = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec))))
> + 	  {
> + 	    cache->name.namep = nl->name;
> ++	    cache->ttd = hr->ttl;
> + 	    cache->flags = F_HOSTS | F_IMMORTAL | F_FORWARD |
> F_REVERSE | F_IPV6 | F_NAMEP | F_CONFIG;
> + 	    add_hosts_entry(cache, (struct all_addr *)&hr->addr6,
> IN6ADDRSZ, SRC_CONFIG, (struct crec **)daemon->packet, revhashsz);
> + 	  }
> +diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +index 6d1c5ae..6344df5 100644
> +--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> ++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +@@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ struct ptr_record {
> + };
> + 
> + struct cname {
> ++  int ttl;
> +   char *alias, *target;
> +   struct cname *next;
> + }; 
> +@@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ struct auth_zone {
> + 
> + 
> + struct host_record {
> ++  int ttl;
> +   struct name_list {
> +     char *name;
> +     struct name_list *next;
> +diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
> +index c98bdc9..7c5e6bc 100644
> +--- a/src/option.c
> ++++ b/src/option.c
> +@@ -448,20 +448,20 @@ static struct {
> +   { LOPT_GEN_NAMES, ARG_DUP, "[=tag:<tag>]", gettext_noop("Generate
> hostnames based on MAC address for nameless clients."), NULL},
> +   { LOPT_PROXY, ARG_DUP, "[=<ipaddr>]...", gettext_noop("Use these
> DHCP relays as full proxies."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_RELAY, ARG_DUP, "<local-addr>,<server>[,<interface>]",
> gettext_noop("Relay DHCP requests to a remote server"), NULL},
> +-  { LOPT_CNAME, ARG_DUP, "<alias>,<target>", gettext_noop("Specify
> alias name for LOCAL DNS name."), NULL },
> ++  { LOPT_CNAME, ARG_DUP, "<alias>,<target>[,<ttl>]",
> gettext_noop("Specify alias name for LOCAL DNS name."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_PXE_PROMT, ARG_DUP, "<prompt>,[<timeout>]",
> gettext_noop("Prompt to send to PXE clients."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_PXE_SERV, ARG_DUP, "<service>", gettext_noop("Boot service
> for PXE menu."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_TEST, 0, NULL, gettext_noop("Check configuration
> syntax."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_ADD_MAC, ARG_DUP, "[=base64|text]", gettext_noop("Add
> requestor's MAC address to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_ADD_SBNET, ARG_ONE, "<v4 pref>[,<v6 pref>]",
> gettext_noop("Add specified IP subnet to forwarded DNS queries."),
> NULL },
> +-   { LOPT_CPE_ID, ARG_ONE, "<text>", gettext_noop("Add client
> identification to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
> ++  { LOPT_CPE_ID, ARG_ONE, "<text>", gettext_noop("Add client
> identification to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_DNSSEC, OPT_DNSSEC_PROXY, NULL, gettext_noop("Proxy DNSSEC
> validation results from upstream nameservers."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_INCR_ADDR, OPT_CONSEC_ADDR, NULL, gettext_noop("Attempt to
> allocate sequential IP addresses to DHCP clients."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_CONNTRACK, OPT_CONNTRACK, NULL, gettext_noop("Copy
> connection-track mark from queries to upstream connections."), NULL
> },
> +   { LOPT_FQDN, OPT_FQDN_UPDATE, NULL, gettext_noop("Allow DHCP
> clients to do their own DDNS updates."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_RA, OPT_RA, NULL, gettext_noop("Send router-advertisements 
> for interfaces doing DHCPv6"), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_DUID, ARG_ONE, "<enterprise>,<duid>",
> gettext_noop("Specify DUID_EN-type DHCPv6 server DUID"), NULL },
> +-  { LOPT_HOST_REC, ARG_DUP, "<name>,<address>",
> gettext_noop("Specify host (A/AAAA and PTR) records"), NULL },
> ++  { LOPT_HOST_REC, ARG_DUP, "<name>,<address>[,<ttl>]",
> gettext_noop("Specify host (A/AAAA and PTR) records"), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_RR, ARG_DUP, "<name>,<RR-number>,[<data>]",
> gettext_noop("Specify arbitrary DNS resource record"), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_CLVERBIND, OPT_CLEVERBIND, NULL, gettext_noop("Bind to
> interfaces in use - check for new interfaces"), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_AUTHSERV, ARG_ONE, "<NS>,<interface>",
> gettext_noop("Export local names to global DNS"), NULL },
> +@@ -3692,12 +3692,15 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> +     case LOPT_CNAME: /* --cname */
> +       {
> + 	struct cname *new;
> +-	char *alias;
> +-	char *target;
> ++	char *alias, *target, *ttls;
> ++	int ttl = -1;
> + 
> + 	if (!(comma = split(arg)))
> + 	  ret_err(gen_err);
> + 	
> ++	if ((ttls = split(comma)) && !atoi_check(ttls, &ttl))
> ++	  ret_err(_("bad TTL"));
> ++	
> + 	alias = canonicalise_opt(arg);
> + 	target = canonicalise_opt(comma);
> + 	    
> +@@ -3713,6 +3716,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char
> *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> + 	    daemon->cnames = new;
> + 	    new->alias = alias;
> + 	    new->target = target;
> ++	    new->ttl = ttl;
> + 	  }
> +       
> + 	break;
> +@@ -3913,14 +3917,22 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> +       {
> + 	struct host_record *new = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct
> host_record));
> + 	memset(new, 0, sizeof(struct host_record));
> +-	
> ++	new->ttl = -1;
> ++
> + 	if (!arg || !(comma = split(arg)))
> + 	  ret_err(_("Bad host-record"));
> + 	
> + 	while (arg)
> + 	  {
> + 	    struct all_addr addr;
> +-	    if (inet_pton(AF_INET, arg, &addr))
> ++	    char *dig;
> ++
> ++	    for (dig = arg; *dig != 0; dig++)
> ++	      if (*dig < '0' || *dig > '9')
> ++		break;
> ++	    if (*dig == 0)
> ++	      new->ttl = atoi(arg);
> ++	    else if (inet_pton(AF_INET, arg, &addr))
> + 	      new->addr = addr.addr.addr4;
> + #ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> + 	    else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, arg, &addr))
> +@@ -4601,7 +4613,25 @@ void read_opts(int argc, char **argv, char
> *compile_opts)
> + 	    }
> + 	} 
> +     }
> +-  
> ++
> ++  if (daemon->host_records)
> ++    {
> ++      struct host_record *hr;
> ++      
> ++      for (hr = daemon->host_records; hr; hr = hr->next)
> ++	if (hr->ttl == -1)
> ++	  hr->ttl = daemon->local_ttl;
> ++    }
> ++
> ++  if (daemon->cnames)
> ++    {
> ++      struct cname *cn;
> ++      
> ++      for (cn = daemon->cnames; cn; cn = cn->next)
> ++	if (cn->ttl == -1)
> ++	  cn->ttl = daemon->local_ttl;
> ++    }
> ++
> +   if (daemon->if_addrs)
> +     {  
> +       struct iname *tmp;
> +diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> +index 9c0ddb5..3535a71 100644
> +--- a/src/rfc1035.c
> ++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> +@@ -1169,9 +1169,13 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec
> *crecp, time_t now)
> +   /* Return 0 ttl for DHCP entries, which might change
> +      before the lease expires. */
> + 
> +-  if  (crecp->flags & (F_IMMORTAL | F_DHCP))
> ++  if (crecp->flags & F_DHCP)
> +     return daemon->local_ttl;
> +   
> ++  /* Immortal entries other than DHCP are local, and hold TTL in
> TTD field. */
> ++  if (crecp->flags & F_IMMORTAL)
> ++    return crecp->ttd;
> ++
> +   /* Return the Max TTL value if it is lower then the actual TTL */
> +   if (daemon->max_ttl == 0 || ((unsigned)(crecp->ttd - now) <
> daemon->max_ttl))
> +     return crecp->ttd - now;
> +-- 
> +1.7.10.4
> +
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 8a2557a..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
> -From d2aa7dfbb6d1088dcbea9fecc61b9293b320eb95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2015 21:52:12 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Include 0.0.0.0/8 in DNS rebind checks.
> -
> ----
> - CHANGELOG     |    7 +++++++
> - src/rfc1035.c |    3 ++-
> - 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> -index 901da47..3f4026d 100644
> ---- a/CHANGELOG
> -+++ b/CHANGELOG
> -@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
> -+version 2.76
> -+            Include 0.0.0.0/8 in DNS rebind checks. This range 
> -+	    translates to hosts on  the local network, or, at 
> -+	    least, 0.0.0.0 accesses the local host, so could
> -+	    be targets for DNS rebinding. See RFC 5735 section 3 
> -+	    for details. Thanks to Stephen Röttger for the bug
> report.
> -+	    
> - version 2.75
> -             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
> - 	    dhcp-script is configured. Thanks to Adrian Davey for
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index 56647b0..29e9e65 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -728,7 +728,8 @@ int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int
> ban_localhost)
> -   in_addr_t ip_addr = ntohl(addr.s_addr);
> - 
> -   return
> --    (((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000) && ban_localhost)  /*
> 127.0.0.0/8    (loopback) */ || 
> -+    (((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000) && ban_localhost)  /*
> 127.0.0.0/8    (loopback) */ ||
> -+    ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x00000000)  /* RFC 5735 section 3.
> "here" network */ ||
> -     ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xC0A80000)  /* 192.168.0.0/16
> (private)  */ ||
> -     ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x0A000000)  /*
> 10.0.0.0/8     (private)  */ ||
> -     ((ip_addr & 0xFFF00000) == 0xAC100000)  /*
> 172.16.0.0/12  (private)  */ ||
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..45e3b9b
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
> +From 832e47beab95c2918b5264f0504f2fe6fe523e4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> +From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> +Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 21:24:45 +0000
> +Subject: [PATCH] Add --dhcp-ttl option.
> +
> +---
> + man/dnsmasq.8 |    5 ++++-
> + src/dnsmasq.h |    2 +-
> + src/option.c  |   13 +++++++++++--
> + src/rfc1035.c |    2 +-
> + 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +index 7bc1394..2bcce20 100644
> +--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
> ++++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ in the same way as for DHCP-derived names. Note
> that this does not
> + apply to domain names in cnames, PTR records, TXT records etc.
> + .TP
> + .B \-T, --local-ttl=<time>
> +-When replying with information from /etc/hosts or the DHCP leases
> ++When replying with information from /etc/hosts or configuration or
> the DHCP leases
> + file dnsmasq by default sets the time-to-live field to zero,
> meaning
> + that the requester should not itself cache the information. This is
> + the correct thing to do in almost all situations. This option
> allows a
> +@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ time-to-live (in seconds) to be given for these
> replies. This will
> + reduce the load on the server at the expense of clients using stale
> + data under some circumstances.
> + .TP
> ++.B --dhcp-ttl=<time>
> ++As for --local-ttl, but affects only replies with information from
> DHCP leases. If both are given, --dhcp-ttl applies for DHCP
> information, and --local-ttl for others. Setting this to zero
> eliminates the effect of --local-ttl for DHCP.
> ++.TP
> + .B --neg-ttl=<time>
> + Negative replies from upstream servers normally contain time-to-
> live
> + information in SOA records which dnsmasq uses for caching. If the
> +diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +index 6344df5..9f73c3b 100644
> +--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> ++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
> +   int max_logs;  /* queue limit */
> +   int cachesize, ftabsize;
> +   int port, query_port, min_port, max_port;
> +-  unsigned long local_ttl, neg_ttl, max_ttl, min_cache_ttl,
> max_cache_ttl, auth_ttl;
> ++  unsigned long local_ttl, neg_ttl, max_ttl, min_cache_ttl,
> max_cache_ttl, auth_ttl, dhcp_ttl, use_dhcp_ttl;
> +   char *dns_client_id;
> +   struct hostsfile *addn_hosts;
> +   struct dhcp_context *dhcp, *dhcp6;
> +diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
> +index 7c5e6bc..3f6d162 100644
> +--- a/src/option.c
> ++++ b/src/option.c
> +@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ struct myoption {
> + #define LOPT_MAXPORT       345
> + #define LOPT_CPE_ID        346
> + #define LOPT_SCRIPT_ARP    347
> ++#define LOPT_DHCPTTL       348
> + 
> + #ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG
> + static const struct option opts[] =  
> +@@ -319,6 +320,7 @@ static const struct myoption opts[] =
> +     { "quiet-ra", 0, 0, LOPT_QUIET_RA },
> +     { "dns-loop-detect", 0, 0, LOPT_LOOP_DETECT },
> +     { "script-arp", 0, 0, LOPT_SCRIPT_ARP },
> ++    { "dhcp-ttl", 1, 0 , LOPT_DHCPTTL },
> +     { NULL, 0, 0, 0 }
> +   };
> + 
> +@@ -485,9 +487,10 @@ static struct {
> +   { LOPT_QUIET_DHCP, OPT_QUIET_DHCP, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log
> routine DHCP."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_QUIET_DHCP6, OPT_QUIET_DHCP6, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not
> log routine DHCPv6."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_QUIET_RA, OPT_QUIET_RA, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log
> RA."), NULL },
> +-  { LOPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, OPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, NULL,
> gettext_noop("Accept queries only from directly-connected networks"),
> NULL },
> +-  { LOPT_LOOP_DETECT, OPT_LOOP_DETECT, NULL, gettext_noop("Detect
> and remove DNS forwarding loops"), NULL },
> ++  { LOPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, OPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, NULL,
> gettext_noop("Accept queries only from directly-connected
> networks."), NULL },
> ++  { LOPT_LOOP_DETECT, OPT_LOOP_DETECT, NULL, gettext_noop("Detect
> and remove DNS forwarding loops."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_IGNORE_ADDR, ARG_DUP, "<ipaddr>", gettext_noop("Ignore DNS
> responses containing ipaddr."), NULL }, 
> ++  { LOPT_DHCPTTL, ARG_ONE, "<ttl>", gettext_noop("Set TTL in DNS
> responses with DHCP-derived addresses."), NULL }, 
> +   { 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL }
> + }; 
> + 
> +@@ -2580,6 +2583,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char
> *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> +     case LOPT_MINCTTL: /* --min-cache-ttl */
> +     case LOPT_MAXCTTL: /* --max-cache-ttl */
> +     case LOPT_AUTHTTL: /* --auth-ttl */
> ++    case LOPT_DHCPTTL: /* --dhcp-ttl */
> +       {
> + 	int ttl;
> + 	if (!atoi_check(arg, &ttl))
> +@@ -2598,6 +2602,11 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> + 	  daemon->max_cache_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
> + 	else if (option == LOPT_AUTHTTL)
> + 	  daemon->auth_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
> ++	else if (option == LOPT_DHCPTTL)
> ++	  {
> ++	    daemon->dhcp_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
> ++	    daemon->use_dhcp_ttl = 1;
> ++	  }
> + 	else
> + 	  daemon->local_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
> + 	break;
> +diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> +index 3535a71..8f1e3b4 100644
> +--- a/src/rfc1035.c
> ++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> +@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec
> *crecp, time_t now)
> +      before the lease expires. */
> + 
> +   if (crecp->flags & F_DHCP)
> +-    return daemon->local_ttl;
> ++    return daemon->use_dhcp_ttl ? daemon->dhcp_ttl : daemon-
> >local_ttl;
> +   
> +   /* Immortal entries other than DHCP are local, and hold TTL in
> TTD field. */
> +   if (crecp->flags & F_IMMORTAL)
> +-- 
> +1.7.10.4
> +
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
> enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
> enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 2d3d6e4..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
> enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
> -From a7369bef8abd241c3d85633fa9c870943f091e76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Ed Bardsley <ebardsley(a)google.com>
> -Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2015 21:17:18 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Enhance --add-subnet to allow arbitary subnet
> addresses.
> -
> ----
> - CHANGELOG     |    4 ++++
> - man/dnsmasq.8 |   32 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> - src/dnsmasq.h |   13 ++++++++++---
> - src/option.c  |   59
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> - src/rfc1035.c |   39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> - 5 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> -index 3f4026d..bbc2834 100644
> ---- a/CHANGELOG
> -+++ b/CHANGELOG
> -@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ version 2.76
> - 	    least, 0.0.0.0 accesses the local host, so could
> - 	    be targets for DNS rebinding. See RFC 5735 section 3 
> - 	    for details. Thanks to Stephen Röttger for the bug
> report.
> -+
> -+	    Enhance --add-subnet to allow arbitrary subnet
> addresses.
> -+            Thanks to Ed Barsley for the patch.
> -+	
> - 	    
> - version 2.75
> -             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
> -diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
> -index c8913b5..a23c898 100644
> ---- a/man/dnsmasq.8
> -+++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
> -@@ -604,17 +604,27 @@ experimental. Also note that exposing MAC
> addresses in this way may
> - have security and privacy implications. The warning about caching
> - given for --add-subnet applies to --add-mac too.
> - .TP 
> --.B --add-subnet[[=<IPv4 prefix length>],<IPv6 prefix length>]
> --Add the subnet address of the requestor to the DNS queries which
> are
> --forwarded upstream. The amount of the address forwarded depends on
> the
> --prefix length parameter: 32 (128 for IPv6) forwards the whole
> address,
> --zero forwards none of it but still marks the request so that no
> --upstream nameserver will add client address information either. The
> --default is zero for both IPv4 and IPv6. Note that upstream
> nameservers
> --may be configured to return different results based on this
> --information, but the dnsmasq cache does not take account. If a
> dnsmasq
> --instance is configured such that different results may be
> encountered,
> --caching should be disabled.
> -+.B --add-subnet[[=[<IPv4 address>/]<IPv4 prefix length>][,[<IPv6
> address>/]<IPv6 prefix length>]]
> -+Add a subnet address to the DNS queries which are forwarded
> -+upstream. If an address is specified in the flag, it will be used,
> -+otherwise, the address of the requestor will be used. The amount of
> -+the address forwarded depends on the prefix length parameter: 32
> (128
> -+for IPv6) forwards the whole address, zero forwards none of it but
> -+still marks the request so that no upstream nameserver will add
> client
> -+address information either. The default is zero for both IPv4 and
> -+IPv6. Note that upstream nameservers may be configured to return
> -+different results based on this information, but the dnsmasq cache
> -+does not take account. If a dnsmasq instance is configured such
> that
> -+different results may be encountered, caching should be disabled.
> -+
> -+For example,
> -+.B --add-subnet=24,96
> -+will add the /24 and /96 subnets of the requestor for IPv4 and IPv6
> requestors, respectively.
> -+.B --add-subnet=1.2.3.4/24
> -+will add 1.2.3.0/24 for IPv4 requestors and ::/0 for IPv6
> requestors.
> -+.B --add-subnet=1.2.3.4/24,1.2.3.4/24
> -+will add 1.2.3.0/24 for both IPv4 and IPv6 requestors.
> -+
> - .TP
> - .B \-c, --cache-size=<cachesize>
> - Set the size of dnsmasq's cache. The default is 150 names. Setting
> the cache size to zero disables caching.
> -diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -index cf1a782..f42acdb 100644
> ---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> -+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -@@ -541,6 +541,13 @@ struct iname {
> -   struct iname *next;
> - };
> - 
> -+/* subnet parameters from command line */
> -+struct mysubnet {
> -+  union mysockaddr addr;
> -+  int addr_used;
> -+  int mask;
> -+};
> -+
> - /* resolv-file parms from command-line */
> - struct resolvc {
> -   struct resolvc *next;
> -@@ -935,9 +942,9 @@ extern struct daemon {
> -   struct auth_zone *auth_zones;
> -   struct interface_name *int_names;
> -   char *mxtarget;
> --  int addr4_netmask;
> --  int addr6_netmask;
> --  char *lease_file; 
> -+  struct mysubnet *add_subnet4;
> -+  struct mysubnet *add_subnet6;
> -+  char *lease_file;
> -   char *username, *groupname, *scriptuser;
> -   char *luascript;
> -   char *authserver, *hostmaster;
> -diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
> -index ecc2619..746cd11 100644
> ---- a/src/option.c
> -+++ b/src/option.c
> -@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static struct {
> -   { LOPT_PXE_SERV, ARG_DUP, "<service>", gettext_noop("Boot service
> for PXE menu."), NULL },
> -   { LOPT_TEST, 0, NULL, gettext_noop("Check configuration
> syntax."), NULL },
> -   { LOPT_ADD_MAC, OPT_ADD_MAC, NULL, gettext_noop("Add requestor's
> MAC address to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
> --  { LOPT_ADD_SBNET, ARG_ONE, "<v4 pref>[,<v6 pref>]",
> gettext_noop("Add requestor's IP subnet to forwarded DNS queries."),
> NULL },
> -+  { LOPT_ADD_SBNET, ARG_ONE, "<v4 pref>[,<v6 pref>]",
> gettext_noop("Add specified IP subnet to forwarded DNS queries."),
> NULL },
> -   { LOPT_DNSSEC, OPT_DNSSEC_PROXY, NULL, gettext_noop("Proxy DNSSEC
> validation results from upstream nameservers."), NULL },
> -   { LOPT_INCR_ADDR, OPT_CONSEC_ADDR, NULL, gettext_noop("Attempt to
> allocate sequential IP addresses to DHCP clients."), NULL },
> -   { LOPT_CONNTRACK, OPT_CONNTRACK, NULL, gettext_noop("Copy
> connection-track mark from queries to upstream connections."), NULL
> },
> -@@ -722,6 +722,20 @@ static void do_usage(void)
> - 
> - #define ret_err(x) do { strcpy(errstr, (x)); return 0; } while (0)
> - 
> -+static char *parse_mysockaddr(char *arg, union mysockaddr *addr) 
> -+{
> -+  if (inet_pton(AF_INET, arg, &addr->in.sin_addr) > 0)
> -+    addr->sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
> -+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -+  else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, arg, &addr->in6.sin6_addr) > 0)
> -+    addr->sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
> -+#endif
> -+  else
> -+    return _("bad address");
> -+   
> -+  return NULL;
> -+}
> -+
> - char *parse_server(char *arg, union mysockaddr *addr, union
> mysockaddr *source_addr, char *interface, int *flags)
> - {
> -   int source_port = 0, serv_port = NAMESERVER_PORT;
> -@@ -1585,7 +1599,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char
> *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> - 	    li = match_suffix->next;
> - 	    free(match_suffix->suffix);
> - 	    free(match_suffix);
> --	  }    
> -+	  }
> - 	break;
> -       }
> - 
> -@@ -1593,10 +1607,45 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> -       set_option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET);
> -       if (arg)
> - 	{
> -+          char *err, *end;
> - 	  comma = split(arg);
> --	  if (!atoi_check(arg, &daemon->addr4_netmask) || 
> --	      (comma && !atoi_check(comma, &daemon-
> >addr6_netmask)))
> --	     ret_err(gen_err);
> -+
> -+          struct mysubnet* new = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct
> mysubnet));
> -+          if ((end = split_chr(arg, '/')))
> -+	    {
> -+	      /* has subnet+len */
> -+	      err = parse_mysockaddr(arg, &new->addr);
> -+	      if (err)
> -+		ret_err(err);
> -+	      if (!atoi_check(end, &new->mask))
> -+		ret_err(gen_err);
> -+	      new->addr_used = 1;
> -+	    } 
> -+	  else if (!atoi_check(arg, &new->mask))
> -+	    ret_err(gen_err);
> -+	    
> -+          daemon->add_subnet4 = new;
> -+
> -+          new = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct mysubnet));
> -+          if (comma)
> -+            {
> -+              if ((end = split_chr(comma, '/')))
> -+                {
> -+                  /* has subnet+len */
> -+                  err = parse_mysockaddr(comma, &new->addr);
> -+                  if (err)
> -+                    ret_err(err);
> -+                  if (!atoi_check(end, &new->mask))
> -+                    ret_err(gen_err);
> -+                  new->addr_used = 1;
> -+                }
> -+              else
> -+                {
> -+                  if (!atoi_check(comma, &new->mask))
> -+                    ret_err(gen_err);
> -+                }
> -+            }
> -+          daemon->add_subnet6 = new;
> - 	}
> -       break;
> - 
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index 29e9e65..6a51b30 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -629,26 +629,47 @@ struct subnet_opt {
> - #endif
> - };
> - 
> -+static void *get_addrp(union mysockaddr *addr, const short family) 
> -+{
> -+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -+  if (family == AF_INET6)
> -+    return &addr->in6.sin6_addr;
> -+#endif
> -+
> -+  return &addr->in.sin_addr;
> -+}
> -+
> - static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct subnet_opt *opt, union
> mysockaddr *source)
> - {
> -   /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subne
> t-02 */
> -   
> -   int len;
> -   void *addrp;
> -+  int sa_family = source->sa.sa_family;
> - 
> - #ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -   if (source->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
> -     {
> --      opt->family = htons(2);
> --      opt->source_netmask = daemon->addr6_netmask;
> --      addrp = &source->in6.sin6_addr;
> -+      opt->source_netmask = daemon->add_subnet6->mask;
> -+      if (daemon->add_subnet6->addr_used) 
> -+	{
> -+	  sa_family = daemon->add_subnet6->addr.sa.sa_family;
> -+	  addrp = get_addrp(&daemon->add_subnet6->addr, sa_family);
> -+	} 
> -+      else 
> -+	addrp = &source->in6.sin6_addr;
> -     }
> -   else
> - #endif
> -     {
> --      opt->family = htons(1);
> --      opt->source_netmask = daemon->addr4_netmask;
> --      addrp = &source->in.sin_addr;
> -+      opt->source_netmask = daemon->add_subnet4->mask;
> -+      if (daemon->add_subnet4->addr_used)
> -+	{
> -+	  sa_family = daemon->add_subnet4->addr.sa.sa_family;
> -+	  addrp = get_addrp(&daemon->add_subnet4->addr, sa_family);
> -+	} 
> -+      else 
> -+	addrp = &source->in.sin_addr;
> -     }
> -   
> -   opt->scope_netmask = 0;
> -@@ -656,6 +677,11 @@ static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct subnet_opt
> *opt, union mysockaddr *source)
> -   
> -   if (opt->source_netmask != 0)
> -     {
> -+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -+      opt->family = htons(sa_family == AF_INET6 ? 2 : 1);
> -+#else
> -+      opt->family = htons(1);
> -+#endif
> -       len = ((opt->source_netmask - 1) >> 3) + 1;
> -       memcpy(opt->addr, addrp, len);
> -       if (opt->source_netmask & 7)
> -@@ -2335,4 +2361,3 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -   
> -   return len;
> - }
> --
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..f04f943
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
> +X-Git-Url: http://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=blobdiff
> _plain;f=CHANGELOG;h=6d9ba490488f80ef565f459cef3c110bdf31212c;hp=1435
> 4f2506a7fbf8360cd32c96e1d7ce1bfeb3f9;hb=e06e6e34bffd781b7cefa49b25fb8
> ae863654ca2;hpb=832e47beab95c2918b5264f0504f2fe6fe523e4c
> +
> +diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> +index 14354f2..6d9ba49 100644
> +--- a/CHANGELOG
> ++++ b/CHANGELOG
> +@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ version 2.76
> + 	    (ie xx::0 to xx::ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff) 
> + 	    Thanks to Laurent Bendel for spotting this problem.
> + 
> ++	    Add support for a TTL parameter in --host-record and
> ++	    --cname.
> ++
> ++	    Add --dhcp-ttl option.
> + 
> + version 2.75
> +             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
> dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
> ries_set.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
> dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
> ries_set.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index cfbcdfb..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
> dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
> ries_set.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
> -From 3a3965ac21b1b759eab8799b6edb09195b671306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 17:45:06 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Don't answer non-auth queries for auth zones
> locally when
> - --localise-queries set.
> -
> ----
> - src/forward.c |    4 ++--
> - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
> -index 2731b90..b76a974 100644
> ---- a/src/forward.c
> -+++ b/src/forward.c
> -@@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> - 
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> -       /* find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer
> them directly */
> --      if (!auth_dns)
> -+      if (!auth_dns && !option_bool(OPT_LOCALISE))
> - 	for (zone = daemon->auth_zones; zone; zone = zone->next)
> - 	  if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
> - 	    {
> -@@ -1904,7 +1904,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> - 	  
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> - 	  /* find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and
> answer them directly */
> --	  if (!auth_dns)
> -+	  if (!auth_dns && !option_bool(OPT_LOCALISE))
> - 	    for (zone = daemon->auth_zones; zone; zone = zone-
> >next)
> - 	      if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
> - 		{
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..c06705a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
> +From bec366b4041df72b559e713f1c924177676e6eb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> +From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> +Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 22:03:26 +0000
> +Subject: [PATCH] Add --tftp-mtu option.
> +
> +---
> + CHANGELOG     |    4 ++++
> + man/dnsmasq.8 |    4 ++++
> + src/dnsmasq.h |    2 +-
> + src/option.c  |   10 +++++++++-
> + src/tftp.c    |   14 ++++++++++++--
> + 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> +index 6d9ba49..9218b8c 100644
> +--- a/CHANGELOG
> ++++ b/CHANGELOG
> +@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ version 2.76
> + 
> + 	    Add --dhcp-ttl option.
> + 
> ++	    Add --tftp-mtu option. Thanks to Patrick McLean for
> the 
> ++	    initial patch.
> ++
> ++
> + version 2.75
> +             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
> + 	    dhcp-script is configured. Thanks to Adrian Davey for
> +diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +index 2bcce20..3cf48cd 100644
> +--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
> ++++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +@@ -1810,6 +1810,10 @@ require about (2*n) + 10 descriptors. If
> + .B --tftp-port-range
> + is given, that can affect the number of concurrent connections.
> + .TP
> ++.B --tftp-mtu=<mtu size>
> ++Use size as the ceiling of the MTU supported by the intervening
> network when 
> ++negotiating TFTP blocksize, overriding the MTU setting of the local
> interface  if it is larger.
> ++.TP
> + .B --tftp-no-blocksize
> + Stop the TFTP server from negotiating the "blocksize" option with a
> + client. Some buggy clients request this option but then behave
> badly
> +diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +index 9f73c3b..280ad9d 100644
> +--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> ++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
> +   struct dhcp_netid_list *dhcp_ignore, *dhcp_ignore_names,
> *dhcp_gen_names; 
> +   struct dhcp_netid_list *force_broadcast, *bootp_dynamic;
> +   struct hostsfile *dhcp_hosts_file, *dhcp_opts_file,
> *dynamic_dirs;
> +-  int dhcp_max, tftp_max;
> ++  int dhcp_max, tftp_max, tftp_mtu;
> +   int dhcp_server_port, dhcp_client_port;
> +   int start_tftp_port, end_tftp_port; 
> +   unsigned int min_leasetime;
> +diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
> +index 3f6d162..765965f 100644
> +--- a/src/option.c
> ++++ b/src/option.c
> +@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ struct myoption {
> + #define LOPT_CPE_ID        346
> + #define LOPT_SCRIPT_ARP    347
> + #define LOPT_DHCPTTL       348
> +-
> ++#define LOPT_TFTP_MTU      349
> ++ 
> + #ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG
> + static const struct option opts[] =  
> + #else
> +@@ -244,6 +245,7 @@ static const struct myoption opts[] =
> +     { "tftp-unique-root", 0, 0, LOPT_APREF },
> +     { "tftp-root", 1, 0, LOPT_PREFIX },
> +     { "tftp-max", 1, 0, LOPT_TFTP_MAX },
> ++    { "tftp-mtu", 1, 0, LOPT_TFTP_MTU },
> +     { "tftp-lowercase", 0, 0, LOPT_TFTP_LC },
> +     { "ptr-record", 1, 0, LOPT_PTR },
> +     { "naptr-record", 1, 0, LOPT_NAPTR },
> +@@ -432,6 +434,7 @@ static struct {
> +   { LOPT_SECURE, OPT_TFTP_SECURE, NULL, gettext_noop("Allow access
> only to files owned by the user running dnsmasq."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_TFTP_NO_FAIL, OPT_TFTP_NO_FAIL, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not
> terminate the service if TFTP directories are inaccessible."), NULL
> },
> +   { LOPT_TFTP_MAX, ARG_ONE, "<integer>", gettext_noop("Maximum
> number of conncurrent TFTP transfers (defaults to %s)."), "#" },
> ++  { LOPT_TFTP_MTU, ARG_ONE, "<integer>", gettext_noop("Maximum MTU
> to use for TFTP transfers."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_NOBLOCK, OPT_TFTP_NOBLOCK, NULL, gettext_noop("Disable the
> TFTP blocksize extension."), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_TFTP_LC, OPT_TFTP_LC, NULL, gettext_noop("Convert TFTP
> filenames to lowercase"), NULL },
> +   { LOPT_TFTPPORTS, ARG_ONE, "<start>,<end>",
> gettext_noop("Ephemeral port range for use by TFTP transfers."), NULL
> },
> +@@ -2625,6 +2628,11 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> + 	ret_err(gen_err);
> +       break;  
> + 
> ++    case LOPT_TFTP_MTU:  /*  --tftp-mtu */
> ++      if (!atoi_check(arg, &daemon->tftp_mtu))
> ++	ret_err(gen_err);
> ++      break;
> ++
> +     case LOPT_PREFIX: /* --tftp-prefix */
> +       comma = split(arg);
> +       if (comma)
> +diff --git a/src/tftp.c b/src/tftp.c
> +index 00ed2fc..dc4aa85 100644
> +--- a/src/tftp.c
> ++++ b/src/tftp.c
> +@@ -103,8 +103,10 @@ void tftp_request(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> +       if (listen->iface)
> + 	{
> + 	  addr = listen->iface->addr;
> +-	  mtu = listen->iface->mtu;
> + 	  name = listen->iface->name;
> ++	  mtu = listen->iface->mtu;
> ++	  if (daemon->tftp_mtu != 0 && daemon->tftp_mtu < mtu)
> ++	    mtu = daemon->tftp_mtu;
> + 	}
> +       else
> + 	{
> +@@ -234,9 +236,17 @@ void tftp_request(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> + 
> +       strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, name, IF_NAMESIZE);
> +       if (ioctl(listen->tftpfd, SIOCGIFMTU, &ifr) != -1)
> +-	mtu = ifr.ifr_mtu;      
> ++	{
> ++	  mtu = ifr.ifr_mtu;  
> ++	  if (daemon->tftp_mtu != 0 && daemon->tftp_mtu < mtu)
> ++	    mtu = daemon->tftp_mtu;    
> ++	}
> +     }
> + 
> ++  /* Failed to get interface mtu - can use configured value. */
> ++  if (mtu == 0)
> ++    mtu = daemon->tftp_mtu;
> ++
> +   if (name)
> +     {
> +       /* check for per-interface prefix */ 
> +-- 
> +1.7.10.4
> +
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
> option.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
> option.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 492ada9..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
> option.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
> -From 5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 23:08:39 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Fix behaviour of empty dhcp-option=option6:dns-
> server, which
> - should inhibit sending option.
> -
> ----
> - src/rfc3315.c |    9 +++++----
> - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
> -index 2665d0d..3f1f9ee 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc3315.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc3315.c
> -@@ -1320,15 +1320,16 @@ static struct dhcp_netid *add_options(struct
> state *state, int do_refresh)
> -       
> -       if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_REFRESH_TIME)
> - 	done_refresh = 1;
> -+       
> -+      if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
> -+	done_dns = 1;
> -       
> --      if (opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6)
> -+      /* Empty DNS_SERVER option will not set DHOPT_ADDR6 */
> -+      if ((opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6) || opt_cfg->opt ==
> OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
> - 	{
> - 	  int len, j;
> - 	  struct in6_addr *a;
> - 	  
> --	  if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
> --	    done_dns = 1;
> --	  
> - 	  for (a = (struct in6_addr *)opt_cfg->val, len = opt_cfg-
> >len, j = 0; 
> - 	       j < opt_cfg->len; j += IN6ADDRSZ, a++)
> - 	    if ((IN6_IS_ADDR_ULA_ZERO(a) &&
> IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(state->ula_addr)) ||
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
> suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
> suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index c7cee60..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
> suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
> -From 9cdcfe9f19ffd45bac4e5b459879bf7c50a287ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2015 22:38:08 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Suggest solution to ENOMEM error with IPv6
> multicast.
> -
> ----
> - src/network.c |   13 ++++++++++---
> - 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/network.c b/src/network.c
> -index a1d90c8..819302f 100644
> ---- a/src/network.c
> -+++ b/src/network.c
> -@@ -1076,23 +1076,30 @@ void join_multicast(int dienow)
> - 	    
> - 	    if ((daemon->doing_dhcp6 || daemon->relay6) &&
> - 		setsockopt(daemon->dhcp6fd, IPPROTO_IPV6,
> IPV6_JOIN_GROUP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) == -1)
> --	      err = 1;
> -+	      err = errno;
> - 	    
> - 	    inet_pton(AF_INET6, ALL_SERVERS,
> &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
> - 	    
> - 	    if (daemon->doing_dhcp6 && 
> - 		setsockopt(daemon->dhcp6fd, IPPROTO_IPV6,
> IPV6_JOIN_GROUP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) == -1)
> --	      err = 1;
> -+	      err = errno;
> - 	    
> - 	    inet_pton(AF_INET6, ALL_ROUTERS,
> &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
> - 	    
> - 	    if (daemon->doing_ra &&
> - 		setsockopt(daemon->icmp6fd, IPPROTO_IPV6,
> IPV6_JOIN_GROUP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) == -1)
> --	      err = 1;
> -+	      err = errno;
> - 	    
> - 	    if (err)
> - 	      {
> - 		char *s = _("interface %s failed to join DHCPv6
> multicast group: %s");
> -+		errno = err;
> -+
> -+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
> -+		if (errno == ENOMEM)
> -+		  my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("try increasing
> /proc/sys/net/core/optmem_max"));
> -+#endif
> -+
> - 		if (dienow)
> - 		  die(s, iface->name, EC_BADNET);
> - 		else
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
> clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
> clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 19c76e6..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
> clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
> -From 20fd11e11a9d09edcea94de135396ae1541fbbab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2015 22:48:13 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Clarify man page on RDNSS set in router
> advertisement.
> -
> ----
> - man/dnsmasq.8 |    6 +++---
> - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
> -index a23c898..d51b10f 100644
> ---- a/man/dnsmasq.8
> -+++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
> -@@ -1687,15 +1687,15 @@ creation are handled by a different
> protocol. When DHCP is in use,
> - only a subset of this is needed, and dnsmasq can handle it, using
> - existing DHCP configuration to provide most data. When RA is
> enabled,
> - dnsmasq will advertise a prefix for each dhcp-range, with default
> --router and recursive DNS server as the relevant link-local address
> on 
> --the machine running dnsmasq. By default, he "managed address" bits
> are set, and
> -+router  as the relevant link-local address on 
> -+the machine running dnsmasq. By default, the "managed address" bits
> are set, and
> - the "use SLAAC" bit is reset. This can be changed for individual
> - subnets with the mode keywords described in
> - .B --dhcp-range.
> - RFC6106 DNS parameters are included in the advertisements. By
> default,
> - the relevant link-local address of the machine running dnsmasq is
> sent
> - as recursive DNS server. If provided, the DHCPv6 options dns-server 
> and
> --domain-search are used for RDNSS and DNSSL.
> -+domain-search are used for the DNS server (RDNSS) and the domain
> serach list (DNSSL).
> - .TP
> - .B --ra-param=<interface>,[high|low],[[<ra-interval>],<router
> lifetime>]
> - Set non-default values for router advertisements sent via an
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
> handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
> handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 832a22e..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
> handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
> -From 6de81f1250fd323c9155de065d5a9dc200a6f20b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2015 22:51:13 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Handle signed dangling CNAME replies to DS queries.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |    7 ++-----
> - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 4deda24..67ce486 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1232,11 +1232,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> -    
> -   /* If we return STAT_NO_SIG, name contains the name of the DS
> query */
> -   if (val == STAT_NO_SIG)
> --    {
> --      *keyname = 0;
> --      return val;
> --    }  
> --
> -+    return val;
> -+  
> -   /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as
> the DS, we'll
> -      loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS
> answer comes
> -      from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
> DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
> DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index fdccd0e..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
> DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
> -From 102208df695e886a3086754d32bf7f8c541fbe46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 21:50:00 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] DHCPv6 option 56 does not hold an address list.
> (RFC 5908).
> -
> ----
> - src/dhcp-common.c |    2 +-
> - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dhcp-common.c b/src/dhcp-common.c
> -index bc48f41..8fc171a 100644
> ---- a/src/dhcp-common.c
> -+++ b/src/dhcp-common.c
> -@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ static const struct opttab_t opttab6[] = {
> -   { "sntp-server", 31,  OT_ADDR_LIST },
> -   { "information-refresh-time", 32, OT_TIME },
> -   { "FQDN", 39, OT_INTERNAL | OT_RFC1035_NAME },
> --  { "ntp-server", 56,  OT_ADDR_LIST },
> -+  { "ntp-server", 56,  0 },
> -   { "bootfile-url", 59, OT_NAME },
> -   { "bootfile-param", 60, OT_CSTRING },
> -   { NULL, 0, 0 }
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
> --no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-
> Respect_the_--no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 2014fdb..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
> --no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
> -From 77607cbea0ad0f876dfb79c8b2c121ee400d57d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 23:08:43 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Respect the --no-resolv flag in inotify code.
> -
> ----
> - CHANGELOG        |    7 ++++++-
> - debian/changelog |    6 ++++++
> - src/inotify.c    |    3 +++
> - 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> -index bbc2834..d6e309f 100644
> ---- a/CHANGELOG
> -+++ b/CHANGELOG
> -@@ -7,8 +7,13 @@ version 2.76
> - 
> - 	    Enhance --add-subnet to allow arbitrary subnet
> addresses.
> -             Thanks to Ed Barsley for the patch.
> -+
> -+	    Respect the --no-resolv flag in inotify code. Fixes bug
> -+	    which caused dnsmasq to fail to start if a resolv-file 
> -+	    was a dangling symbolic link, even of --no-resolv set.
> -+	    Thanks to Alexander Kurtz for spotting the problem.
> -+
> - 	
> --	    
> - version 2.75
> -             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
> - 	    dhcp-script is configured. Thanks to Adrian Davey for
> -diff --git a/src/inotify.c b/src/inotify.c
> -index 52d412f..ef05c58 100644
> ---- a/src/inotify.c
> -+++ b/src/inotify.c
> -@@ -90,6 +90,9 @@ void inotify_dnsmasq_init()
> -   
> -   if (daemon->inotifyfd == -1)
> -     die(_("failed to create inotify: %s"), NULL, EC_MISC);
> -+
> -+  if (option_bool(OPT_NO_RESOLV))
> -+    return;
> -   
> -   for (res = daemon->resolv_files; res; res = res->next)
> -     {
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
> Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
> Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 281697f..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
> Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
> -From 27b78d990b7cd901866ad6f1a17b9d633a95fdce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2015 21:40:45 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Rationalise
> 5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca
> -
> ----
> - src/rfc3315.c |    3 +--
> - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
> -index 3f1f9ee..3ed8623 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc3315.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc3315.c
> -@@ -1324,8 +1324,7 @@ static struct dhcp_netid *add_options(struct
> state *state, int do_refresh)
> -       if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
> - 	done_dns = 1;
> -       
> --      /* Empty DNS_SERVER option will not set DHOPT_ADDR6 */
> --      if ((opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6) || opt_cfg->opt ==
> OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
> -+      if (opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6)
> - 	{
> - 	  int len, j;
> - 	  struct in6_addr *a;
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
> Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
> Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 631495f..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
> Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
> -From 98079ea89851da1df4966dfdfa1852a98da02912 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 20:30:32 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Catch errors from sendmsg in DHCP code.  Logs,
> eg,  iptables
> - DROPS of dest 255.255.255.255
> -
> ----
> - src/dhcp.c |    7 ++++++-
> - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dhcp.c b/src/dhcp.c
> -index e6fceb1..1c85e42 100644
> ---- a/src/dhcp.c
> -+++ b/src/dhcp.c
> -@@ -452,8 +452,13 @@ void dhcp_packet(time_t now, int pxe_fd)
> - #endif
> -   
> -   while(retry_send(sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0)));
> -+
> -+  /* This can fail when, eg, iptables DROPS destination
> 255.255.255.255 */
> -+  if (errno != 0)
> -+    my_syslog(MS_DHCP | LOG_WARNING, _("Error sending DHCP packet
> to %s: %s"),
> -+	      inet_ntoa(dest.sin_addr), strerror(errno));
> - }
> -- 
> -+
> - /* check against secondary interface addresses */
> - static int check_listen_addrs(struct in_addr local, int if_index,
> char *label,
> - 			      struct in_addr netmask, struct
> in_addr broadcast, void *vparam)
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-Update_list_of_subnet_for_
> --bogus-priv.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-
> Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-priv.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 3ba98fc..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-
> priv.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
> -From 90477fb79420a34124b66ebd808c578817a30e4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 21:21:32 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Update list of subnet for --bogus-priv
> -
> -RFC6303 specifies & recommends following zones not be forwarded
> -to globally facing servers.
> -+------------------------------+-----------------------+
> -| Zone                         | Description           |
> -+------------------------------+-----------------------+
> -| 0.IN-ADDR.ARPA               | IPv4 "THIS" NETWORK   |
> -| 127.IN-ADDR.ARPA             | IPv4 Loopback NETWORK |
> -| 254.169.IN-ADDR.ARPA         | IPv4 LINK LOCAL       |
> -| 2.0.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA         | IPv4 TEST-NET-1       |
> -| 100.51.198.IN-ADDR.ARPA      | IPv4 TEST-NET-2       |
> -| 113.0.203.IN-ADDR.ARPA       | IPv4 TEST-NET-3       |
> -| 255.255.255.255.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 BROADCAST        |
> -+------------------------------+-----------------------+
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <kevin(a)darbyshire-bryant.me.u
> k>
> ----
> - src/rfc1035.c |    8 ++++++--
> - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index 6a51b30..4eb1772 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -756,10 +756,14 @@ int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int
> ban_localhost)
> -   return
> -     (((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000) && ban_localhost)  /*
> 127.0.0.0/8    (loopback) */ ||
> -     ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x00000000)  /* RFC 5735 section 3.
> "here" network */ ||
> --    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xC0A80000)  /* 192.168.0.0/16
> (private)  */ ||
> -     ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x0A000000)  /*
> 10.0.0.0/8     (private)  */ ||
> -     ((ip_addr & 0xFFF00000) == 0xAC100000)  /*
> 172.16.0.0/12  (private)  */ ||
> --    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xA9FE0000)  /* 169.254.0.0/16
> (zeroconf) */ ;
> -+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xC0A80000)  /* 192.168.0.0/16
> (private)  */ ||
> -+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xA9FE0000)  /* 169.254.0.0/16
> (zeroconf) */ ||
> -+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xC0000200)  /*
> 192.0.2.0/24   (test-net) */ ||
> -+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xC6336400)  /*
> 198.51.100.0/24(test-net) */ ||
> -+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xCB007100)  /* 203.0.113.0/24
> (test-net) */ ||
> -+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFFFF) == 0xFFFFFFFF)  /* 255.255.255.255/32
> (broadcast)*/ ;
> - }
> - 
> - static unsigned char *do_doctor(unsigned char *p, int count, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, int *doctored)
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
> Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
> Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 736cf38..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
> Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
> -From 41a8d9e99be9f2cc8b02051dd322cb45e0faac87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: =?utf8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edwin+ml-cerowrt(a)etorok.ne
> t>
> -Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2015 17:45:48 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Fix crash when empty address from DNS overlays A
> record from
> - hosts.
> -
> ----
> - CHANGELOG   |    5 +++++
> - src/cache.c |    2 +-
> - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> -index d6e309f..93c73d0 100644
> ---- a/CHANGELOG
> -+++ b/CHANGELOG
> -@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ version 2.76
> - 	    was a dangling symbolic link, even of --no-resolv set.
> - 	    Thanks to Alexander Kurtz for spotting the problem.
> - 
> -+	    Fix crash when an A or AAAA record is defined locally,
> -+	    in a hosts file, and an upstream server sends a reply
> -+	    that the same name is empty. Thanks to Edwin Török
> for
> -+	    the patch.
> -+
> - 	
> - version 2.75
> -             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
> -diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
> -index 178d654..1b76b67 100644
> ---- a/src/cache.c
> -+++ b/src/cache.c
> -@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ struct crec *cache_insert(char *name, struct
> all_addr *addr,
> - 	 existing record is for an A or AAAA and
> - 	 the record we're trying to insert is the same, 
> - 	 just drop the insert, but don't error the whole process.
> */
> --      if ((flags & (F_IPV4 | F_IPV6)) && (flags & F_FORWARD))
> -+      if ((flags & (F_IPV4 | F_IPV6)) && (flags & F_FORWARD) &&
> addr)
> - 	{
> - 	  if ((flags & F_IPV4) && (new->flags & F_IPV4) &&
> - 	      new->addr.addr.addr.addr4.s_addr == addr-
> >addr.addr4.s_addr)
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
> Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
> Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 8b17431..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
> Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
> -From 67ab3285b5d9a1b1e20e034cf272867fdab8a0f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 23:20:47 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Handle unknown DS hash algos correctly.
> -
> -When we can validate a DS RRset, but don't speak the hash algo it
> -contains, treat that the same as an NSEC/3 proving that the DS
> -doesn't exist. 4025 5.2
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |   13 +++++++++++++
> - 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 67ce486..b4dc14e 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1005,6 +1005,19 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -   if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -     return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -   
> -+  /* 4035 5.2 
> -+     If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed
> in an
> -+     authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported
> -+     authentication path leading from the parent to the child.  The
> -+     resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an
> -+     authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists,  */
> -+  for (recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1,
> name, now, F_DS))
> -+    if (hash_find(ds_digest_name(recp1->addr.ds.digest)))
> -+      break;
> -+  
> -+  if (!recp1)
> -+    return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -+
> -   /* NOTE, we need to find ONE DNSKEY which matches the DS */
> -   for (valid = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0 && !valid; j
> --) 
> -     {
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
> dir.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
> dir.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index a9102c1..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
> dir.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
> -From 0007ee90646a5a78a96ee729932e89d31c69513a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2015 21:47:41 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Fix crash at start up with conf-dir=/path,*
> -
> -Thanks to Brian Carpenter and American Fuzzy Lop for finding the
> bug.
> ----
> - src/option.c |   14 ++++++++++----
> - 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
> -index 746cd11..71beb98 100644
> ---- a/src/option.c
> -+++ b/src/option.c
> -@@ -1515,10 +1515,16 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> - 		li = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct list));
> - 		if (*arg == '*')
> - 		  {
> --		    li->next = match_suffix;
> --		    match_suffix = li;
> --		    /* Have to copy: buffer is overwritten */
> --		    li->suffix = opt_string_alloc(arg+1);
> -+		    /* "*" with no suffix is a no-op */
> -+		    if (arg[1] == 0)
> -+		      free(li);
> -+		    else
> -+		      {
> -+			li->next = match_suffix;
> -+			match_suffix = li;
> -+			/* Have to copy: buffer is overwritten */
> -+			li->suffix = opt_string_alloc(arg+1);
> -+		      }
> - 		  }
> - 		else
> - 		  {
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
> Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
> Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 7f25066..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
> Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,2209 +0,0 @@
> -From 9a31b68b59adcac01016d4026d906b69c4216c01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 10:20:39 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Major rationalisation of DNSSEC validation.
> -
> -Much gnarly special-case code removed and replaced with correct
> -general implementaion. Checking of zone-status moved to DNSSEC code,
> -where it should be, vastly simplifying query-forwarding code.
> ----
> - src/dnsmasq.h |   19 +-
> - src/dnssec.c  |  926 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
> -------------
> - src/forward.c |  741 ++++++++++-----------------------------------
> - 3 files changed, 653 insertions(+), 1033 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -index f42acdb..023a1cf 100644
> ---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> -+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -@@ -586,12 +586,8 @@ struct hostsfile {
> - #define STAT_NEED_KEY           5
> - #define STAT_TRUNCATED          6
> - #define STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD    7
> --#define STAT_NO_SIG             8
> --#define STAT_NO_DS              9
> --#define STAT_NO_NS             10
> --#define STAT_NEED_DS_NEG       11
> --#define STAT_CHASE_CNAME       12
> --#define STAT_INSECURE_DS       13
> -+#define STAT_OK                 8
> -+#define STAT_ABANDONED          9
> - 
> - #define FREC_NOREBIND           1
> - #define FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED  2
> -@@ -601,8 +597,7 @@ struct hostsfile {
> - #define FREC_AD_QUESTION       32
> - #define FREC_DO_QUESTION       64
> - #define FREC_ADDED_PHEADER    128
> --#define FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN     256
> --#define FREC_TEST_PKTSZ       512
> -+#define FREC_TEST_PKTSZ       256
> - 
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> - #define HASH_SIZE 20 /* SHA-1 digest size */
> -@@ -626,9 +621,7 @@ struct frec {
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC 
> -   int class, work_counter;
> -   struct blockdata *stash; /* Saved reply, whilst we validate */
> --  struct blockdata *orig_domain; /* domain of original query,
> whilst
> --				    we're seeing is if in unsigned
> domain */
> --  size_t stash_len, name_start, name_len;
> -+  size_t stash_len;
> -   struct frec *dependent; /* Query awaiting internally-generated
> DNSKEY or DS query */
> -   struct frec *blocking_query; /* Query which is blocking us. */
> - #endif
> -@@ -1162,8 +1155,8 @@ int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char
> *name, char **cut);
> - size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, char *end,
> char *name, int class, int type, union mysockaddr *addr, int
> edns_pktsz);
> - int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t n, char *name, char *keyname, int class);
> - int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class);
> --int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int *class, int *neganswer,
> int *nons);
> --int dnssec_chase_cname(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname);
> -+int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int *class,
> -+			  int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int
> *nons);
> - int dnskey_keytag(int alg, int flags, unsigned char *rdata, int
> rdlen);
> - size_t filter_rrsigs(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
> - unsigned char* hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, char *name);
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index b4dc14e..de7b335 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -65,8 +65,10 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
> -     case 8: return "sha256";
> -     case 10: return "sha512";
> -     case 12: return "gosthash94";
> -+#ifndef NO_NETTLE_ECC
> -     case 13: return "sha256";
> -     case 14: return "sha384";
> -+#endif
> -     default: return NULL;
> -     }
> - }
> -@@ -592,30 +594,30 @@ static int get_rdata(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *end,
> -     }
> - }
> - 
> --static int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *sz, int
> new)
> -+static int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int
> new)
> - {
> -   unsigned char **p;
> --  int new_sz = *sz;
> --  
> --  if (new_sz > new)
> -+  int old = *szp;
> -+
> -+  if (old >= new+1)
> -     return 1;
> - 
> -   if (new >= 100)
> -     return 0;
> - 
> --  new_sz += 5;
> -+  new += 5;
> -   
> --  if (!(p = whine_malloc((new_sz) * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
> -+  if (!(p = whine_malloc(new * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
> -     return 0;  
> -   
> --  if (*wkspc)
> -+  if (old != 0 && *wkspc)
> -     {
> --      memcpy(p, *wkspc, *sz * sizeof(unsigned char **));
> -+      memcpy(p, *wkspc, old * sizeof(unsigned char **));
> -       free(*wkspc);
> -     }
> -   
> -   *wkspc = p;
> --  *sz = new_sz;
> -+  *szp = new;
> - 
> -   return 1;
> - }
> -@@ -706,47 +708,28 @@ static void sort_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, u16 *rr_desc, int
> -     } while (swap);
> - }
> - 
> --/* Validate a single RRset (class, type, name) in the supplied DNS
> reply 
> --   Return code:
> --   STAT_SECURE   if it validates.
> --   STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD if it validates and is the result of
> wildcard expansion.
> --   (In this case *wildcard_out points to the "body" of the wildcard
> within name.) 
> --   STAT_NO_SIG no RRsigs found.
> --   STAT_INSECURE RRset empty.
> --   STAT_BOGUS    signature is wrong, bad packet.
> --   STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
> returned in keyname)
> --
> --   if key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
> given in the params of those names,
> --   otherwise find the key in the cache.
> -+static unsigned char **rrset = NULL, **sigs = NULL;
> - 
> --   name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
> trashed.
> --*/
> --static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, int class, int type, 
> --			  char *name, char *keyname, char
> **wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen, int algo_in, int
> keytag_in)
> -+/* Get pointers to RRset menbers and signature(s) for same.
> -+   Check signatures, and return keyname associated in keyname. */
> -+static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> int class, int type, 
> -+			 char *name, char *keyname, int *sigcnt,
> int *rrcnt)
> - {
> --  static unsigned char **rrset = NULL, **sigs = NULL;
> --  static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0;
> --  
> -+  static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0; 
> -   unsigned char *p;
> --  int rrsetidx, sigidx, res, rdlen, j, name_labels;
> --  struct crec *crecp = NULL;
> --  int type_covered, algo, labels, orig_ttl, sig_expiration,
> sig_inception, key_tag;
> --  u16 *rr_desc = get_desc(type);
> -- 
> --  if (wildcard_out)
> --    *wildcard_out = NULL;
> --  
> -+  int rrsetidx, sigidx, j, rdlen, res;
> -+  int name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
> -+  int gotkey = 0;
> -+
> -   if (!(p = skip_questions(header, plen)))
> -     return STAT_BOGUS;
> --  
> --  name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
> - 
> --  /* look for RRSIGs for this RRset and get pointers to each RR in
> the set. */
> -+   /* look for RRSIGs for this RRset and get pointers to each RR in
> the set. */
> -   for (rrsetidx = 0, sigidx = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount) +
> ntohs(header->nscount); 
> -        j != 0; j--) 
> -     {
> -       unsigned char *pstart, *pdata;
> --      int stype, sclass;
> -+      int stype, sclass, algo, type_covered, labels,
> sig_expiration, sig_inception;
> - 
> -       pstart = p;
> -       
> -@@ -762,14 +745,14 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> -       GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -       
> -       if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS; 
> -+	return 0; 
> -       
> -       if (res == 1 && sclass == class)
> - 	{
> - 	  if (stype == type)
> - 	    {
> - 	      if (!expand_workspace(&rrset, &rrset_sz, rrsetidx))
> --		return STAT_BOGUS; 
> -+		return 0; 
> - 	      
> - 	      rrset[rrsetidx++] = pstart;
> - 	    }
> -@@ -777,14 +760,54 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - 	  if (stype == T_RRSIG)
> - 	    {
> - 	      if (rdlen < 18)
> --		return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ 
> -+		return 0; /* bad packet */ 
> - 	      
> - 	      GETSHORT(type_covered, p);
> -+	      algo = *p++;
> -+	      labels = *p++;
> -+	      p += 4; /* orig_ttl */
> -+	      GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
> -+	      GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
> -+	      p += 2; /* key_tag */
> - 	      
> --	      if (type_covered == type)
> -+	      if (gotkey)
> -+		{
> -+		  /* If there's more than one SIG, ensure they all
> have same keyname */
> -+		  if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 0, 0)
> != 1)
> -+		    return 0;
> -+		}
> -+	      else
> -+		{
> -+		  gotkey = 1;
> -+		  
> -+		  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1,
> 0))
> -+		    return 0;
> -+		  
> -+		  /* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name
> field MUST equal
> -+		     the name of the zone containing the RRset. We
> can't tell that
> -+		     for certain, but we can check that  the RRset
> name is equal to
> -+		     or encloses the signers name, which should be
> enough to stop 
> -+		     an attacker using signatures made with the key
> of an unrelated 
> -+		     zone he controls. Note that the root key is
> always allowed. */
> -+		  if (*keyname != 0)
> -+		    {
> -+		      char *name_start;
> -+		      for (name_start = name;
> !hostname_isequal(name_start, keyname); )
> -+			if ((name_start = strchr(name_start, '.')))
> -+			  name_start++; /* chop a label off and try
> again */
> -+			else
> -+			  return 0;
> -+		    }
> -+		}
> -+		  
> -+	      /* Don't count signatures for algos we don't support
> */
> -+	      if (check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration)
> &&
> -+		  labels <= name_labels &&
> -+		  type_covered == type && 
> -+		  algo_digest_name(algo))
> - 		{
> - 		  if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx))
> --		    return STAT_BOGUS; 
> -+		    return 0; 
> - 		  
> - 		  sigs[sigidx++] = pdata;
> - 		} 
> -@@ -794,17 +817,45 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - 	}
> -       
> -       if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	return 0;
> -     }
> -   
> --  /* RRset empty */
> --  if (rrsetidx == 0)
> --    return STAT_INSECURE; 
> -+  *sigcnt = sigidx;
> -+  *rrcnt = rrsetidx;
> -+
> -+  return 1;
> -+}
> -+
> -+/* Validate a single RRset (class, type, name) in the supplied DNS
> reply 
> -+   Return code:
> -+   STAT_SECURE   if it validates.
> -+   STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD if it validates and is the result of
> wildcard expansion.
> -+   (In this case *wildcard_out points to the "body" of the wildcard
> within name.) 
> -+   STAT_BOGUS    signature is wrong, bad packet.
> -+   STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
> returned in keyname)
> -+   STAT_NEED_DS  need DS to complete validation (name is returned
> in keyname)
> -+
> -+   if key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
> given in the params of those names,
> -+   otherwise find the key in the cache.
> - 
> --  /* no RRSIGs */
> --  if (sigidx == 0)
> --    return STAT_NO_SIG; 
> -+   name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
> trashed.
> -+
> -+   Call explore_rrset first to find and count RRs and sigs.
> -+*/
> -+static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, int class, int type, int sigidx, int rrsetidx, 
> -+			  char *name, char *keyname, char
> **wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen, int algo_in, int
> keytag_in)
> -+{
> -+  unsigned char *p;
> -+  int rdlen, j, name_labels;
> -+  struct crec *crecp = NULL;
> -+  int algo, labels, orig_ttl, key_tag;
> -+  u16 *rr_desc = get_desc(type);
> -+ 
> -+  if (wildcard_out)
> -+    *wildcard_out = NULL;
> -   
> -+  name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
> -+
> -   /* Sort RRset records into canonical order. 
> -      Note that at this point keyname and daemon->workspacename
> buffs are
> -      unused, and used as workspace by the sort. */
> -@@ -828,44 +879,16 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> -       algo = *p++;
> -       labels = *p++;
> -       GETLONG(orig_ttl, p);
> --      GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
> --      GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
> -+      p += 8; /* sig_expiration, sig_inception already checked */
> -       GETSHORT(key_tag, p);
> -       
> -       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
> - 	return STAT_BOGUS;
> - 
> --      /* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name field MUST
> equal
> --	 the name of the zone containing the RRset. We can't tell
> that
> --	 for certain, but we can check that  the RRset name is
> equal to
> --	 or encloses the signers name, which should be enough to
> stop 
> --	 an attacker using signatures made with the key of an
> unrelated 
> --	 zone he controls. Note that the root key is always
> allowed. */
> --      if (*keyname != 0)
> --	{
> --	  int failed = 0;
> --	  
> --	  for (name_start = name; !hostname_isequal(name_start,
> keyname); )
> --	    if ((name_start = strchr(name_start, '.')))
> --	      name_start++; /* chop a label off and try again */
> --	    else
> --	      {
> --		failed = 1;
> --		break;
> --	      }
> --
> --	  /* Bad sig, try another */
> --	  if (failed)
> --	    continue;
> --	}
> --      
> --      /* Other 5.3.1 checks */
> --      if (!check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration) ||
> --	  labels > name_labels ||
> --	  !(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
> -+      if (!(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
> - 	  !hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
> - 	continue;
> --	
> -+      
> -       /* OK, we have the signature record, see if the relevant
> DNSKEY is in the cache. */
> -       if (!key && !(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)))
> - 	return STAT_NEED_KEY;
> -@@ -971,10 +994,11 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - /* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY
> query.
> -    Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
> -    return codes:
> --         STAT_SECURE   At least one valid DNSKEY found and in
> cache.
> --	 STAT_BOGUS    No DNSKEYs found, which  can be validated
> with DS,
> --	               or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not valid,
> bad packet.
> --	 STAT_NEED_DS  DS records to validate a key not found, name
> in keyname 
> -+         STAT_OK           Done, key(s) in cache.
> -+	 STAT_BOGUS        No DNSKEYs found, which  can be
> validated with DS,
> -+	                   or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not
> valid, bad packet.
> -+	 STAT_NEED_DS      DS records to validate a key not found,
> name in keyname 
> -+	 STAT_NEED_DNSKEY  DNSKEY records to validate a key not
> found, name in keyname 
> - */
> - int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
> - {
> -@@ -1001,23 +1025,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -       return STAT_NEED_DS;
> -     }
> -   
> --  /* If we've cached that DS provably doesn't exist, result must be
> INSECURE */
> --  if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> --    return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --  
> --  /* 4035 5.2 
> --     If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed
> in an
> --     authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported
> --     authentication path leading from the parent to the child.  The
> --     resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an
> --     authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists,  */
> --  for (recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1,
> name, now, F_DS))
> --    if (hash_find(ds_digest_name(recp1->addr.ds.digest)))
> --      break;
> --  
> --  if (!recp1)
> --    return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --
> -   /* NOTE, we need to find ONE DNSKEY which matches the DS */
> -   for (valid = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0 && !valid; j
> --) 
> -     {
> -@@ -1070,7 +1077,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	  void *ctx;
> - 	  unsigned char *digest, *ds_digest;
> - 	  const struct nettle_hash *hash;
> --	  
> -+	  int sigcnt, rrcnt;
> -+
> - 	  if (recp1->addr.ds.algo == algo && 
> - 	      recp1->addr.ds.keytag == keytag &&
> - 	      recp1->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> -@@ -1088,10 +1096,14 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	      
> - 	      from_wire(name);
> - 	      
> --	      if (recp1->addr.ds.keylen == (int)hash->digest_size
> &&
> -+	      if (!(recp1->flags & F_NEG) &&
> -+		  recp1->addr.ds.keylen == (int)hash->digest_size
> &&
> - 		  (ds_digest = blockdata_retrieve(recp1-
> >addr.key.keydata, recp1->addr.ds.keylen, NULL)) &&
> - 		  memcmp(ds_digest, digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen)
> == 0 &&
> --		  validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class,
> T_DNSKEY, name, keyname, NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo, keytag) ==
> STAT_SECURE)
> -+		  explore_rrset(header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY,
> name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt) &&
> -+		  sigcnt != 0 && rrcnt != 0 &&
> -+		  validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class,
> T_DNSKEY, sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname, 
> -+				 NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo,
> keytag) == STAT_SECURE)
> - 		{
> - 		  valid = 1;
> - 		  break;
> -@@ -1112,7 +1124,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	{
> - 	  /* Ensure we have type, class  TTL and length */
> - 	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
> --	    return STAT_INSECURE; /* bad packet */
> -+	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> - 	  
> - 	  GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
> - 	  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> -@@ -1198,7 +1210,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -       
> -       /* commit cache insert. */
> -       cache_end_insert();
> --      return STAT_SECURE;
> -+      return STAT_OK;
> -     }
> - 
> -   log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DNSKEY");
> -@@ -1207,12 +1219,14 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 
> - /* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DS query
> -    Put all DSs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
> -+   Also handles replies which prove that there's no DS at this
> location, 
> -+   either because the zone is unsigned or this isn't a zone cut.
> These are
> -+   cached too.
> -    return codes:
> --   STAT_SECURE      At least one valid DS found and in cache.
> --   STAT_NO_DS       It's proved there's no DS here.
> --   STAT_NO_NS       It's proved there's no DS _or_ NS here.
> -+   STAT_OK          At least one valid DS found and in cache.
> -    STAT_BOGUS       no DS in reply or not signed, fails validation,
> bad packet.
> -    STAT_NEED_KEY    DNSKEY records to validate a DS not found, name
> in keyname
> -+   STAT_NEED_DS     DS record needed.
> - */
> - 
> - int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
> -@@ -1230,7 +1244,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> -   if (qtype != T_DS || qclass != class)
> -     val = STAT_BOGUS;
> -   else
> --    val = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
> NULL, &neganswer, &nons);
> -+    val = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
> NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons);
> -   /* Note dnssec_validate_reply() will have cached positive answers
> */
> -   
> -   if (val == STAT_INSECURE)
> -@@ -1242,22 +1256,21 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> -   
> -   if (!(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
> -     val = STAT_BOGUS;
> --   
> --  /* If we return STAT_NO_SIG, name contains the name of the DS
> query */
> --  if (val == STAT_NO_SIG)
> --    return val;
> -   
> -   /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as
> the DS, we'll
> -      loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS
> answer comes
> -      from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
> --  if (val == STAT_BOGUS ||  (val == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
> hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
> -+  if (val == STAT_BOGUS || (val == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
> hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
> -     {
> -       log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS");
> -       return STAT_BOGUS;
> -     }
> -+  
> -+  if (val != STAT_SECURE)
> -+    return val;
> - 
> -   /* By here, the answer is proved secure, and a positive answer
> has been cached. */
> --  if (val == STAT_SECURE && neganswer)
> -+  if (neganswer)
> -     {
> -       int rdlen, flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK;
> -       unsigned long ttl, minttl = ULONG_MAX;
> -@@ -1317,15 +1330,14 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - 	  
> - 	  cache_end_insert();  
> - 	  
> --	  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, nons ? "no
> delegation" : "no DS");
> -+	  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "no DS");
> - 	}
> --
> --      return nons ? STAT_NO_NS : STAT_NO_DS; 
> -     }
> - 
> --  return val;
> -+  return STAT_OK;
> - }
> - 
> -+
> - /* 4034 6.1 */
> - static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const char *b)
> - {
> -@@ -1452,7 +1464,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> -   int mask = 0x80 >> (type & 0x07);
> - 
> -   if (nons)
> --    *nons = 0;
> -+    *nons = 1;
> -   
> -   /* Find NSEC record that proves name doesn't exist */
> -   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> -@@ -1480,9 +1492,22 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> - 	  /* rdlen is now length of type map, and p points to it */
> - 	  
> - 	  /* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that
> information. */
> --	  if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] & (0x80 >>
> T_NS)) == 0)
> --	    *nons = 1;
> -+	  if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] & (0x80 >>
> T_NS)) != 0)
> -+	    *nons = 0;
> - 	  
> -+	  if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
> -+	    {
> -+	      /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's
> a CNAME is should 
> -+		 have been returned. */
> -+	      if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
> -+		return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	      
> -+	      /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we
> have the
> -+		 DS from the wrong side of the delegation. */
> -+	      if (type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) != 0)
> -+		return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	    }
> -+
> - 	  while (rdlen >= 2)
> - 	    {
> - 	      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -@@ -1586,7 +1611,7 @@ static int base32_decode(char *in, unsigned
> char *out)
> - static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, int digest_len, unsigned char *digest, int type,
> - 				char *workspace1, char *workspace2,
> unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count, int *nons)
> - {
> --  int i, hash_len, salt_len, base32_len, rdlen;
> -+  int i, hash_len, salt_len, base32_len, rdlen, flags;
> -   unsigned char *p, *psave;
> - 
> -   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> -@@ -1599,7 +1624,9 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
> - 	p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
> - 	GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> - 	psave = p;
> --	p += 4; /* algo, flags, iterations */
> -+	p++; /* algo */
> -+	flags = *p++; /* flags */
> -+	p += 2; /* iterations */
> - 	salt_len = *p++; /* salt_len */
> - 	p += salt_len; /* salt */
> - 	hash_len = *p++; /* p now points to next hashed name */
> -@@ -1626,16 +1653,29 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
> - 		  return 0;
> - 		
> - 		/* If we can prove that there's no NS record,
> return that information. */
> --		if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] &
> (0x80 >> T_NS)) == 0)
> --		  *nons = 1;
> -+		if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] &
> (0x80 >> T_NS)) != 0)
> -+		  *nons = 0;
> - 		
> -+		if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
> -+		  {
> -+		    /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if
> there's a CNAME is should 
> -+		       have been returned. */
> -+		    if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
> -+		      return 0;
> -+		    
> -+		    /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then
> we have the
> -+		       DS from the wrong side of the delegation. */
> -+		    if (type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) !=
> 0)
> -+		      return 0;
> -+		  }
> -+
> - 		while (rdlen >= 2)
> - 		  {
> - 		    if (p[0] == type >> 8)
> - 		      {
> - 			/* Does the NSEC3 say our type exists? */
> - 			if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask)
> != 0)
> --			  return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+			  return 0;
> - 			
> - 			break; /* finshed checking */
> - 		      }
> -@@ -1643,7 +1683,7 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
> - 		    rdlen -= p[1];
> - 		    p +=  p[1];
> - 		  }
> --
> -+		
> - 		return 1;
> - 	      }
> - 	    else if (rc < 0)
> -@@ -1651,16 +1691,27 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
> - 		/* Normal case, hash falls between NSEC3 name-hash
> and next domain name-hash,
> - 		   wrap around case, name-hash falls between NSEC3
> name-hash and end */
> - 		if (memcmp(p, digest, digest_len) >= 0 ||
> memcmp(workspace2, p, digest_len) >= 0)
> --		  return 1;
> -+		  {
> -+		    if ((flags & 0x01) && nons) /* opt out */
> -+		      *nons = 0;
> -+
> -+		    return 1;
> -+		  }
> - 	      }
> - 	    else 
> - 	      {
> - 		/* wrap around case, name falls between start and
> next domain name */
> - 		if (memcmp(workspace2, p, digest_len) >= 0 &&
> memcmp(p, digest, digest_len) >= 0)
> --		  return 1;
> -+		  {
> -+		    if ((flags & 0x01) && nons) /* opt out */
> -+		      *nons = 0;
> -+
> -+		    return 1;
> -+		  }
> - 	      }
> - 	  }
> -       }
> -+
> -   return 0;
> - }
> - 
> -@@ -1673,7 +1724,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -   char *closest_encloser, *next_closest, *wildcard;
> -   
> -   if (nons)
> --    *nons = 0;
> -+    *nons = 1;
> -   
> -   /* Look though the NSEC3 records to find the first one with 
> -      an algorithm we support (currently only algo == 1).
> -@@ -1813,16 +1864,81 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -   
> -   return STAT_SECURE;
> - }
> --    
> --/* Validate all the RRsets in the answer and authority sections of
> the reply (4035:3.2.3) */
> --/* Returns are the same as validate_rrset, plus the class if the
> missing key is in *class */
> -+
> -+/* Check signing status of name.
> -+   returns:
> -+   STAT_SECURE zone is signed.
> -+   STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
> -+   STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname.
> -+   
> -+   name returned unaltered.
> -+*/
> -+static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t
> now)
> -+{
> -+  int name_start = strlen(name);
> -+  struct crec *crecp;
> -+  char *p;
> -+  
> -+  while (1)
> -+    {
> -+      strcpy(keyname, &name[name_start]);
> -+      
> -+      if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
> -+	return STAT_NEED_DS;
> -+      else
> -+	do 
> -+	  {
> -+	    if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
> -+	      {
> -+		/* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
> existance of NS record.
> -+		   F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
> there's no DS record here,
> -+		   but that's because there's no NS record either,
> ie this isn't the start
> -+		   of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below
> a node is unsigned when
> -+		   we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no
> DS record.
> -+		*/	  
> -+		if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -+		  {
> -+		    if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -+		      return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */
> -+		  }
> -+		else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest) ||
> !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -+		  return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
> insecure */
> -+	      }
> -+	  }
> -+	while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DS)));
> -+      
> -+      if (name_start == 0)
> -+	break;
> -+
> -+      for (p = &name[name_start-2]; (*p != '.') && (p != name); p
> --);
> -+      
> -+      if (p != name)
> -+        p++;
> -+      
> -+      name_start = p - name;
> -+    } 
> -+
> -+  return STAT_SECURE;
> -+}
> -+       
> -+/* Validate all the RRsets in the answer and authority sections of
> the reply (4035:3.2.3) 
> -+   Return code:
> -+   STAT_SECURE   if it validates.
> -+   STAT_INSECURE at least one RRset not validated, because in
> unsigned zone.
> -+   STAT_BOGUS    signature is wrong, bad packet, no validation
> where there should be.
> -+   STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
> returned in keyname, class in *class)
> -+   STAT_NEED_DS  need DS to complete validation (name is returned
> in keyname) 
> -+*/
> - int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, 
> --			  int *class, int *neganswer, int *nons)
> -+			  int *class, int check_unsigned, int
> *neganswer, int *nons)
> - {
> --  unsigned char *ans_start, *qname, *p1, *p2, **nsecs;
> --  int type1, class1, rdlen1, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype;
> --  int i, j, rc, nsec_count, cname_count = CNAME_CHAIN;
> --  int nsec_type = 0, have_answer = 0;
> -+  static unsigned char **targets = NULL;
> -+  static int target_sz = 0;
> -+
> -+  unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2, **nsecs;
> -+  int type1, class1, rdlen1, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype,
> targetidx;
> -+  int i, j, rc, nsec_count;
> -+  int nsec_type;
> - 
> -   if (neganswer)
> -     *neganswer = 0;
> -@@ -1833,70 +1949,51 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -   if (RCODE(header) != NXDOMAIN && RCODE(header) != NOERROR)
> -     return STAT_INSECURE;
> - 
> --  qname = p1 = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -+  p1 = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -   
> -+   /* Find all the targets we're looking for answers to.
> -+     The zeroth array element is for the query, subsequent ones
> -+     for CNAME targets, unless the query is for a CNAME. */
> -+
> -+  if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, 0))
> -+    return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+  
> -+  targets[0] = p1;
> -+  targetidx = 1;
> -+   
> -   if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 4))
> -     return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -+  
> -   GETSHORT(qtype, p1);
> -   GETSHORT(qclass, p1);
> -   ans_start = p1;
> --
> --  if (qtype == T_ANY)
> --    have_answer = 1;
> -  
> --  /* Can't validate an RRISG query */
> -+  /* Can't validate an RRSIG query */
> -   if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
> -     return STAT_INSECURE;
> -- 
> -- cname_loop:
> --  for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) 
> --    {
> --      /* leave pointer to missing name in qname */
> --           
> --      if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 0, 10)))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --      
> --      GETSHORT(type2, p1); 
> --      GETSHORT(class2, p1);
> --      p1 += 4; /* TTL */
> --      GETSHORT(rdlen2, p1);
> --
> --      if (rc == 1 && qclass == class2)
> --	{
> --	  /* Do we have an answer for the question? */
> --	  if (type2 == qtype)
> --	    {
> --	      have_answer = 1;
> --	      break;
> --	    }
> --	  else if (type2 == T_CNAME)
> --	    {
> --	      qname = p1;
> --	      
> --	      /* looped CNAMES */
> --	      if (!cname_count-- || !extract_name(header, plen,
> &p1, name, 1, 0))
> --		return STAT_BOGUS;
> --	       
> --	      p1 = ans_start;
> --	      goto cname_loop;
> --	    }
> --	} 
> --
> --      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen2))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> --    }
> --   
> --  if (neganswer && !have_answer)
> --    *neganswer = 1;
> -   
> --  /* No data, therefore no sigs */
> --  if (ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) == 0)
> --    {
> --      *keyname = 0;
> --      return STAT_NO_SIG;
> --    }
> --
> -+  if (qtype != T_CNAME)
> -+    for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) 
> -+      {
> -+	if (!(p1 = skip_name(p1, header, plen, 10)))
> -+	  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+	
> -+	GETSHORT(type2, p1); 
> -+	p1 += 6; /* class, TTL */
> -+	GETSHORT(rdlen2, p1);  
> -+	
> -+	if (type2 == T_CNAME)
> -+	  {
> -+	    if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, targetidx))
> -+	      return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	    
> -+	    targets[targetidx++] = p1; /* pointer to target name */
> -+	  }
> -+	
> -+	if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen2))
> -+	  return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+      }
> -+  
> -   for (p1 = ans_start, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) +
> ntohs(header->nscount); i++)
> -     {
> -       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 10))
> -@@ -1931,7 +2028,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	  /* Not done, validate now */
> - 	  if (j == i)
> - 	    {
> --	      int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, type_covered;
> -+	      int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, type_covered, sigcnt,
> rrcnt;
> - 	      unsigned char *psave;
> - 	      struct all_addr a;
> - 	      struct blockdata *key;
> -@@ -1939,143 +2036,186 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now,
> struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	      char *wildname;
> - 	      int have_wildcard = 0;
> - 
> --	      rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class1, type1,
> name, keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
> --	      
> --	      if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> --		{
> --		  have_wildcard = 1;
> --
> --		  /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with a
> different
> --		     answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove this
> --		     hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
> --		     the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check that
> here. */
> --		  if (!nsec_type && !(nsec_type =
> find_nsec_records(header, plen, &nsecs, &nsec_count, class1)))
> --		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad packet */
> --		  
> --		  if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> --		    rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen,
> nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type1,
> NULL);
> --		  else
> --		    rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen,
> nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, 
> --						   keyname, name,
> type1, wildname, NULL);
> --		  
> --		  if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> --		    return rc;
> --		} 
> --	      else if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> --		{
> --		  if (class)
> --		    *class = class1; /* Class for DS or DNSKEY */
> -+	      if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name,
> keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt))
> -+		return STAT_BOGUS;
> - 
> --		  if (rc == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -+	      /* No signatures for RRset. We can be configured to
> assume this is OK and return a INSECURE result. */
> -+	      if (sigcnt == 0)
> -+		{
> -+		  if (check_unsigned)
> - 		    {
> --		      /* If we dropped off the end of a CNAME
> chain, return
> --			 STAT_NO_SIG and the last name is keyname.
> This is used for proving non-existence
> --			 if DS records in CNAME chains. */
> --		      if (cname_count == CNAME_CHAIN || i <
> ntohs(header->ancount)) 
> --			/* No CNAME chain, or no sig in answer
> section, return empty name. */
> --			*keyname = 0;
> --		      else if (!extract_name(header, plen, &qname,
> keyname, 1, 0))
> --			return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+		      rc = zone_status(name, class1, keyname, now);
> -+		      if (rc == STAT_SECURE)
> -+			rc = STAT_BOGUS;
> -+		       if (class)
> -+			 *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> - 		    }
> -- 
> -+		  else 
> -+		    rc = STAT_INSECURE; 
> -+		  
> - 		  return rc;
> - 		}
> - 	      
> --	      /* Cache RRsigs in answer section, and if we just
> validated a DS RRset, cache it */
> --	      cache_start_insert();
> -+	      /* explore_rrset() gives us key name from sigs in
> keyname.
> -+		 Can't overwrite name here. */
> -+	      strcpy(daemon->workspacename, keyname);
> -+	      rc = zone_status(daemon->workspacename, class1,
> keyname, now);
> -+	      if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+		{
> -+		  /* Zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset
> */
> -+		  if (class)
> -+		    *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -+		  return rc;
> -+		} 
> -+	      
> -+	      rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class1, type1,
> sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
> - 	      
> --	      for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header-
> >ancount); j++)
> -+	      if (rc == STAT_BOGUS || rc == STAT_NEED_KEY || rc ==
> STAT_NEED_DS)
> - 		{
> --		  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name,
> 0, 10)))
> --		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+		  if (class)
> -+		    *class = class1; /* Class for DS or DNSKEY */
> -+		  return rc;
> -+		} 
> -+	      else 
> -+		{
> -+		  /* rc is now STAT_SECURE or STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD
> */
> -+		 
> -+		  /* Note if we've validated either the answer to
> the question
> -+		     or the target of a CNAME. Any not noted will
> need NSEC or
> -+		     to be in unsigned space. */
> -+
> -+		  for (j = 0; j <targetidx; j++)
> -+		    if ((p2 = targets[j]))
> -+		      {
> -+			if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2,
> name, 0, 10)))
> -+			  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+			
> -+			if (class1 == qclass && rc == 1 && (type1
> == T_CNAME || type1 == qtype || qtype == T_ANY ))
> -+			  targets[j] = NULL;
> -+		      }
> -+			    
> -+		  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> -+		    {
> -+		      have_wildcard = 1;
> - 		      
> --		  GETSHORT(type2, p2);
> --		  GETSHORT(class2, p2);
> --		  GETLONG(ttl, p2);
> --		  GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
> --		       
> --		  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> --		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --		  
> --		  if (class2 == class1 && rc == 1)
> --		    { 
> --		      psave = p2;
> -+		      /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with
> a different
> -+			 answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
> this
> -+			 hasn't happened, the answer must prove
> that
> -+			 the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check
> that here. */
> -+		      if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header,
> plen, &nsecs, &nsec_count, class1)))
> -+			return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad
> packet */
> -+		      
> -+		      /* Note that we may not yet have validated
> the NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets. Since the check
> -+			 below returns either SECURE or BOGUS,
> that's not a problem. If the RRsets later fail
> -+			 we'll return BOGUS then. */
> - 
> --		      if (type1 == T_DS && type2 == T_DS)
> --			{
> --			  if (rdlen2 < 4)
> --			    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --			  
> --			  GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
> --			  algo = *p2++;
> --			  digest = *p2++;
> --			  
> --			  /* Cache needs to known class for DNSSEC
> stuff */
> --			  a.addr.dnssec.class = class2;
> --			  
> --			  if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p2,
> rdlen2 - 4)))
> --			    {
> --			      if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name, &a,
> now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
> --				blockdata_free(key);
> --			      else
> --				{
> --				  a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> --				  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> --				  crecp->addr.ds.digest = digest;
> --				  crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
> --				  crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
> --				  crecp->addr.ds.keytag = keytag;
> --				  crecp->addr.ds.keylen = rdlen2 -
> 4; 
> --				} 
> --			    }
> --			}
> --		      else if (type2 == T_RRSIG)
> --			{
> --			  if (rdlen2 < 18)
> --			    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+		      if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -+			rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen,
> nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type1,
> NULL);
> -+		      else
> -+			rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header,
> plen, nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, 
> -+						       keyname,
> name, type1, wildname, NULL);
> -+		      
> -+		      if (rc == STAT_BOGUS)
> -+			return rc;
> -+		    } 
> -+		  
> -+		  /* Cache RRsigs in answer section, and if we just
> validated a DS RRset, cache it */
> -+		  /* Also note if the RRset is the answer to the
> question, or the target of a CNAME */
> -+		  cache_start_insert();
> -+		  
> -+		  for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header-
> >ancount); j++)
> -+		    {
> -+		      if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2,
> name, 0, 10)))
> -+			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+		      
> -+		      GETSHORT(type2, p2);
> -+		      GETSHORT(class2, p2);
> -+		      GETLONG(ttl, p2);
> -+		      GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
> -+		      
> -+		      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> -+			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+		      
> -+		      if (class2 == class1 && rc == 1)
> -+			{ 
> -+			  psave = p2;
> - 			  
> --			  GETSHORT(type_covered, p2);
> --
> --			  if (type_covered == type1 && 
> --			      (type_covered == T_A || type_covered
> == T_AAAA ||
> --			       type_covered == T_CNAME ||
> type_covered == T_DS || 
> --			       type_covered == T_DNSKEY ||
> type_covered == T_PTR)) 
> -+			  if (type1 == T_DS && type2 == T_DS)
> - 			    {
> --			      a.addr.dnssec.type = type_covered;
> --			      a.addr.dnssec.class = class1;
> -+			      if (rdlen2 < 4)
> -+				return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> - 			      
> --			      algo = *p2++;
> --			      p2 += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl,
> expiration, inception */
> - 			      GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
> -+			      algo = *p2++;
> -+			      digest = *p2++;
> -+			      
> -+			      /* Cache needs to known class for
> DNSSEC stuff */
> -+			      a.addr.dnssec.class = class2;
> - 			      
> --			      /* We don't cache sigs for wildcard
> answers, because to reproduce the
> --				 answer from the cache will require
> one or more NSEC/NSEC3 records 
> --				 which we don't cache. The lack of
> the RRSIG ensures that a query for
> --				 this RRset asking for a secure
> answer will always be forwarded. */
> --			      if (!have_wildcard && (key =
> blockdata_alloc((char*)psave, rdlen2)))
> -+			      if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p2,
> rdlen2 - 4)))
> - 				{
> --				  if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name,
> &a, now, ttl,  F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> -+				  if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name,
> &a, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
> - 				    blockdata_free(key);
> - 				  else
> - 				    {
> --				      crecp->addr.sig.keydata =
> key;
> --				      crecp->addr.sig.keylen =
> rdlen2;
> --				      crecp->addr.sig.keytag =
> keytag;
> --				      crecp->addr.sig.type_covered
> = type_covered;
> --				      crecp->addr.sig.algo = algo;
> -+				      a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> -+				      log_query(F_NOEXTRA |
> F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -+				      crecp->addr.ds.digest =
> digest;
> -+				      crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
> -+				      crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
> -+				      crecp->addr.ds.keytag =
> keytag;
> -+				      crecp->addr.ds.keylen =
> rdlen2 - 4; 
> -+				    } 
> -+				}
> -+			    }
> -+			  else if (type2 == T_RRSIG)
> -+			    {
> -+			      if (rdlen2 < 18)
> -+				return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+			      
> -+			      GETSHORT(type_covered, p2);
> -+			      
> -+			      if (type_covered == type1 && 
> -+				  (type_covered == T_A ||
> type_covered == T_AAAA ||
> -+				   type_covered == T_CNAME ||
> type_covered == T_DS || 
> -+				   type_covered == T_DNSKEY ||
> type_covered == T_PTR)) 
> -+				{
> -+				  a.addr.dnssec.type =
> type_covered;
> -+				  a.addr.dnssec.class = class1;
> -+				  
> -+				  algo = *p2++;
> -+				  p2 += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl,
> expiration, inception */
> -+				  GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
> -+				  
> -+				  /* We don't cache sigs for
> wildcard answers, because to reproduce the
> -+				     answer from the cache will
> require one or more NSEC/NSEC3 records 
> -+				     which we don't cache. The lack
> of the RRSIG ensures that a query for
> -+				     this RRset asking for a secure
> answer will always be forwarded. */
> -+				  if (!have_wildcard && (key =
> blockdata_alloc((char*)psave, rdlen2)))
> -+				    {
> -+				      if (!(crecp =
> cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl,  F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> -+					blockdata_free(key);
> -+				      else
> -+					{
> -+					  crecp->addr.sig.keydata =
> key;
> -+					  crecp->addr.sig.keylen =
> rdlen2;
> -+					  crecp->addr.sig.keytag =
> keytag;
> -+					  crecp-
> >addr.sig.type_covered = type_covered;
> -+					  crecp->addr.sig.algo =
> algo;
> -+					}
> - 				    }
> - 				}
> - 			    }
> -+			  
> -+			  p2 = psave;
> - 			}
> - 		      
> --		      p2 = psave;
> -+		      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> -+			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> - 		    }
> - 		  
> --		  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> --		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+		  cache_end_insert();
> - 		}
> --		  
> --	      cache_end_insert();
> - 	    }
> - 	}
> - 
> -@@ -2083,143 +2223,49 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now,
> struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	return STAT_BOGUS;
> -     }
> - 
> --  /* OK, all the RRsets validate, now see if we have a NODATA or
> NXDOMAIN reply */
> --  if (have_answer)
> --    return STAT_SECURE;
> --     
> --  /* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, prove that (name, class1, type1)
> can't exist */
> --  /* First marshall the NSEC records, if we've not done it
> previously */
> --  if (!nsec_type && !(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen,
> &nsecs, &nsec_count, qclass)))
> --    {
> --      /* No NSEC records. If we dropped off the end of a CNAME
> chain, return
> --	 STAT_NO_SIG and the last name is keyname. This is used for
> proving non-existence
> --	 if DS records in CNAME chains. */
> --      if (cname_count == CNAME_CHAIN) /* No CNAME chain, return
> empty name. */
> --	*keyname = 0;
> --      else if (!extract_name(header, plen, &qname, keyname, 1, 0))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> --      return STAT_NO_SIG; /* No NSECs, this is probably a dangling
> CNAME pointing into
> --			     an unsigned zone. Return STAT_NO_SIG
> to cause this to be proved. */
> --    }
> --   
> --  /* Get name of missing answer */
> --  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &qname, name, 1, 0))
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> --  
> --  if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> --    return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
> --  else
> --    return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, NULL, nons);
> --}
> --
> --/* Chase the CNAME chain in the packet until the first record which
> _doesn't validate.
> --   Needed for proving answer in unsigned space.
> --   Return STAT_NEED_* 
> --          STAT_BOGUS - error
> --          STAT_INSECURE - name of first non-secure record in name 
> --*/
> --int dnssec_chase_cname(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname)
> --{
> --  unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> --  int type, class, qclass, rdlen, j, rc;
> --  int cname_count = CNAME_CHAIN;
> --  char *wildname;
> --
> --  /* Get question */
> --  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> --  
> --  p +=2; /* type */
> --  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> --
> --  while (1)
> --    {
> --      for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) 
> --	{
> --	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
> --	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --	  
> --	  GETSHORT(type, p); 
> --	  GETSHORT(class, p);
> --	  p += 4; /* TTL */
> --	  GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> --
> --	  /* Not target, loop */
> --	  if (rc == 2 || qclass != class)
> --	    {
> --	      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> --		return STAT_BOGUS;
> --	      continue;
> --	    }
> --	  
> --	  /* Got to end of CNAME chain. */
> --	  if (type != T_CNAME)
> --	    return STAT_INSECURE;
> --	  
> --	  /* validate CNAME chain, return if insecure or need more
> data */
> --	  rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class, type, name,
> keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
> --	   
> --	  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> --	    {
> --	      int nsec_type, nsec_count, i;
> --	      unsigned char **nsecs;
> --
> --	      /* An attacker can replay a wildcard answer with a
> different
> --		 answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove this
> --		 hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
> --		 the genuine record doesn't exist. Check that here.
> */
> --	      if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen,
> &nsecs, &nsec_count, class)))
> --		return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad packet */
> --	      
> --	      /* Note that we're called here because something
> didn't validate in validate_reply,
> --		 so we can't assume that any NSEC records have been
> validated. We do them by steam here */
> --
> --	      for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> --		{
> --		  unsigned char *p1 = nsecs[i];
> --		  
> --		  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon-
> >workspacename, 1, 0))
> --		    return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> --		  rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class,
> nsec_type, daemon->workspacename, keyname, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
> -+  /* OK, all the RRsets validate, now see if we have a missing
> answer or CNAME target. */
> -+  for (j = 0; j <targetidx; j++)
> -+    if ((p2 = targets[j]))
> -+      {
> -+	if (neganswer)
> -+	  *neganswer = 1;
> - 
> --		  /* NSECs can't be wildcards. */
> --		  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> --		    rc = STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 1, 10))
> -+	  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+	    
> -+	/* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, unanswered question is (name,
> qclass, qtype) */
> - 
> --		  if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+	/* For anything other than a DS record, this situation is
> OK if either
> -+	   the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's a NSEC
> records. */
> -+	if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen, &nsecs,
> &nsec_count, qclass)))
> -+	  {
> -+	    /* Empty DS without NSECS */
> -+	    if (qtype == T_DS)
> -+	      return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	    else
> -+	      {
> -+		rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
> -+		if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+		  {
> -+		    if (class)
> -+		      *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> - 		    return rc;
> --		}
> --
> --	      if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> --		rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type, NULL);
> --	      else
> --		rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, 
> --					       keyname, name, type,
> wildname, NULL);
> --	      
> --	      if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> --		return rc;
> --	    }
> --	  
> --	  if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> --	    {
> --	      if (rc == STAT_NO_SIG)
> --		rc = STAT_INSECURE;
> --	      return rc;
> --	    }
> -+		  } 
> -+		
> -+		return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
> -+	      }
> -+	  }
> - 
> --	  /* Loop down CNAME chain/ */
> --	  if (!cname_count-- || 
> --	      !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 0) ||
> --	      !(p = skip_questions(header, plen)))
> --	    return STAT_BOGUS;
> --	  
> --	  break;
> --	}
> -+	  if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -+	  rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
> -+	else
> -+	  rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, NULL, nons);
> - 
> --      /* End of CNAME chain */
> --      return STAT_INSECURE;	
> --    }
> -+	if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+	  return rc;
> -+      }
> -+  
> -+  return STAT_SECURE;
> - }
> - 
> - 
> -diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
> -index b76a974..dd22a62 100644
> ---- a/src/forward.c
> -+++ b/src/forward.c
> -@@ -23,15 +23,6 @@ static struct frec
> *lookup_frec_by_sender(unsigned short id,
> - static unsigned short get_id(void);
> - static void free_frec(struct frec *f);
> - 
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int status, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t n, 
> --			   int class, char *name, char *keyname,
> struct server *server, int *keycount);
> --static int do_check_sign(struct frec *forward, int status, time_t
> now, char *name, char *keyname);
> --static int send_check_sign(struct frec *forward, time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, 
> --			   char *name, char *keyname);
> --#endif
> --
> --
> - /* Send a UDP packet with its source address set as "source" 
> -    unless nowild is true, when we just send it with the kernel
> default */
> - int send_from(int fd, int nowild, char *packet, size_t len, 
> -@@ -825,236 +816,142 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
> now)
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -       if (server && option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(forward-
> >flags & FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED))
> - 	{
> --	  int status;
> -+	  int status = 0;
> - 
> - 	  /* We've had a reply already, which we're validating.
> Ignore this duplicate */
> - 	  if (forward->blocking_query)
> - 	    return;
> --
> --	  if (header->hb3 & HB3_TC)
> --	    {
> --	      /* Truncated answer can't be validated.
> -+	  
> -+	   /* Truncated answer can't be validated.
> - 		 If this is an answer to a DNSSEC-generated query,
> we still
> - 		 need to get the client to retry over TCP, so
> return
> - 		 an answer with the TC bit set, even if the actual
> answer fits.
> - 	      */
> --	      status = STAT_TRUNCATED;
> --	    }
> --	  else if (forward->flags & FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY)
> --	    status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, daemon-
> >namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> --	  else if (forward->flags & FREC_DS_QUERY)
> --	    {
> --	      status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, daemon-
> >namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> --	      /* Provably no DS, everything below is insecure, even
> if signatures are offered */
> --	      if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
> --		/* We only cache sigs when we've validated a reply.
> --		   Avoid caching a reply with sigs if there's a
> vaildated break in the 
> --		   DS chain, so we don't return replies from cache
> missing sigs. */
> --              	status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --	      else if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> --                {
> --                  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> --                    {
> --		      status = send_check_sign(forward, now,
> header, n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> --		      if (status == STAT_INSECURE)
> --			status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --		    }
> --		  else
> --		    status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --		}
> --              else if (status == STAT_NO_NS)
> --		status = STAT_BOGUS;
> --	    }
> --	  else if (forward->flags & FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN)
> --	    {
> --	      status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, daemon-
> >namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> --	      if (status != STAT_NEED_KEY)
> --		status = do_check_sign(forward, status, now,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> --	    }
> --	  else
> -+	  if (header->hb3 & HB3_TC)
> -+	    status = STAT_TRUNCATED;
> -+	  
> -+	  while (1)
> - 	    {
> --	      status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class, NULL, NULL);
> --	      if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -+	      /* As soon as anything returns BOGUS, we stop and
> unwind, to do otherwise
> -+		 would invite infinite loops, since the answers to
> DNSKEY and DS queries
> -+		 will not be cached, so they'll be repeated. */
> -+	      if (status != STAT_BOGUS && status != STAT_TRUNCATED
> && status != STAT_ABANDONED)
> - 		{
> --		  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> --		    status = send_check_sign(forward, now, header,
> n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> -+		  if (forward->flags & FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY)
> -+		    status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> -+		  else if (forward->flags & FREC_DS_QUERY)
> -+		    status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> - 		  else
> --		    status = STAT_INSECURE;
> -+		    status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class, 
> -+						   option_bool(OPT_
> DNSSEC_NO_SIGN), NULL, NULL);
> - 		}
> --	    }
> --	  /* Can't validate, as we're missing key data. Put this
> --	     answer aside, whilst we get that. */     
> --	  if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status == STAT_NEED_DS_NEG
> || status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> --	    {
> --	      struct frec *new, *orig;
> --	      
> --	      /* Free any saved query */
> --	      if (forward->stash)
> --		blockdata_free(forward->stash);
> --	      
> --	      /* Now save reply pending receipt of key data */
> --	      if (!(forward->stash = blockdata_alloc((char
> *)header, n)))
> --		return;
> --	      forward->stash_len = n;
> - 	      
> --	    anotherkey:	      
> --	      /* Find the original query that started it all.... */
> --	      for (orig = forward; orig->dependent; orig = orig-
> >dependent);
> --
> --	      if (--orig->work_counter == 0 || !(new =
> get_new_frec(now, NULL, 1)))
> --		status = STAT_INSECURE;
> --	      else
> -+	      /* Can't validate, as we're missing key data. Put
> this
> -+		 answer aside, whilst we get that. */     
> -+	      if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status ==
> STAT_NEED_KEY)
> - 		{
> --		  int fd;
> --		  struct frec *next = new->next;
> --		  *new = *forward; /* copy everything, then
> overwrite */
> --		  new->next = next;
> --		  new->blocking_query = NULL;
> --		  new->sentto = server;
> --		  new->rfd4 = NULL;
> --		  new->orig_domain = NULL;
> --#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> --		  new->rfd6 = NULL;
> --#endif
> --		  new->flags &= ~(FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY
> | FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN);
> -+		  struct frec *new, *orig;
> - 		  
> --		  new->dependent = forward; /* to find query
> awaiting new one. */
> --		  forward->blocking_query = new; /* for garbage
> cleaning */
> --		  /* validate routines leave name of required
> record in daemon->keyname */
> --		  if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> --		    {
> --		      new->flags |= FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY; 
> --		      nn = dnssec_generate_query(header, ((char *)
> header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
> --						 daemon->keyname,
> forward->class, T_DNSKEY, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
> --		    }
> --		  else 
> --		    {
> --		      if (status == STAT_NEED_DS_NEG)
> --			new->flags |= FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN;
> --		      else
> --			new->flags |= FREC_DS_QUERY;
> --		      nn = dnssec_generate_query(header,((char *)
> header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
> --						 daemon->keyname,
> forward->class, T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
> --		    }
> --		  if ((hash = hash_questions(header, nn, daemon-
> >namebuff)))
> --		    memcpy(new->hash, hash, HASH_SIZE);
> --		  new->new_id = get_id();
> --		  header->id = htons(new->new_id);
> --		  /* Save query for retransmission */
> --		  if (!(new->stash = blockdata_alloc((char
> *)header, nn)))
> -+		  /* Free any saved query */
> -+		  if (forward->stash)
> -+		    blockdata_free(forward->stash);
> -+		  
> -+		  /* Now save reply pending receipt of key data */
> -+		  if (!(forward->stash = blockdata_alloc((char
> *)header, n)))
> - 		    return;
> --		      
> --		  new->stash_len = nn;
> -+		  forward->stash_len = n;
> - 		  
> --		  /* Don't resend this. */
> --		  daemon->srv_save = NULL;
> -+		  /* Find the original query that started it
> all.... */
> -+		  for (orig = forward; orig->dependent; orig =
> orig->dependent);
> - 		  
> --		  if (server->sfd)
> --		    fd = server->sfd->fd;
> -+		  if (--orig->work_counter == 0 || !(new =
> get_new_frec(now, NULL, 1)))
> -+		    status = STAT_ABANDONED;
> - 		  else
> - 		    {
> --		      fd = -1;
> -+		      int fd;
> -+		      struct frec *next = new->next;
> -+		      *new = *forward; /* copy everything, then
> overwrite */
> -+		      new->next = next;
> -+		      new->blocking_query = NULL;
> -+		      new->sentto = server;
> -+		      new->rfd4 = NULL;
> - #ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> --		      if (server->addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
> -+		      new->rfd6 = NULL;
> -+#endif
> -+		      new->flags &= ~(FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY |
> FREC_DS_QUERY);
> -+		      
> -+		      new->dependent = forward; /* to find query
> awaiting new one. */
> -+		      forward->blocking_query = new; /* for garbage
> cleaning */
> -+		      /* validate routines leave name of required
> record in daemon->keyname */
> -+		      if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -+			{
> -+			  new->flags |= FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY; 
> -+			  nn = dnssec_generate_query(header, ((char
> *) header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
> -+						     daemon-
> >keyname, forward->class, T_DNSKEY, &server->addr, server-
> >edns_pktsz);
> -+			}
> -+		      else 
> - 			{
> --			  if (new->rfd6 || (new->rfd6 =
> allocate_rfd(AF_INET6)))
> --			    fd = new->rfd6->fd;
> -+			  new->flags |= FREC_DS_QUERY;
> -+			  nn = dnssec_generate_query(header,((char
> *) header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
> -+						     daemon-
> >keyname, forward->class, T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
> - 			}
> -+		      if ((hash = hash_questions(header, nn,
> daemon->namebuff)))
> -+			memcpy(new->hash, hash, HASH_SIZE);
> -+		      new->new_id = get_id();
> -+		      header->id = htons(new->new_id);
> -+		      /* Save query for retransmission */
> -+		      new->stash = blockdata_alloc((char *)header,
> nn);
> -+		      new->stash_len = nn;
> -+		      
> -+		      /* Don't resend this. */
> -+		      daemon->srv_save = NULL;
> -+		      
> -+		      if (server->sfd)
> -+			fd = server->sfd->fd;
> - 		      else
> -+			{
> -+			  fd = -1;
> -+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -+			  if (server->addr.sa.sa_family ==
> AF_INET6)
> -+			    {
> -+			      if (new->rfd6 || (new->rfd6 =
> allocate_rfd(AF_INET6)))
> -+				fd = new->rfd6->fd;
> -+			    }
> -+			  else
> - #endif
> -+			    {
> -+			      if (new->rfd4 || (new->rfd4 =
> allocate_rfd(AF_INET)))
> -+				fd = new->rfd4->fd;
> -+			    }
> -+			}
> -+		      
> -+		      if (fd != -1)
> - 			{
> --			  if (new->rfd4 || (new->rfd4 =
> allocate_rfd(AF_INET)))
> --			    fd = new->rfd4->fd;
> -+			  while (retry_send(sendto(fd, (char
> *)header, nn, 0, 
> -+						   &server-
> >addr.sa, 
> -+						   sa_len(&server-
> >addr)))); 
> -+			  server->queries++;
> - 			}
> --		    }
> --		  
> --		  if (fd != -1)
> --		    {
> --		      while (retry_send(sendto(fd, (char *)header,
> nn, 0, 
> --					       &server->addr.sa, 
> --					       sa_len(&server-
> >addr)))); 
> --		      server->queries++;
> --		    }
> --		  
> -+		    }		  
> - 		  return;
> - 		}
> --	    }
> - 	  
> --	  /* Ok, we reached far enough up the chain-of-trust that
> we can validate something.
> --	     Now wind back down, pulling back answers which
> wouldn't previously validate
> --	     and validate them with the new data. Note that if an
> answer needs multiple
> --	     keys to validate, we may find another key is needed,
> in which case we set off
> --	     down another branch of the tree. Once we get to the
> original answer 
> --	     (FREC_DNSSEC_QUERY not set) and it validates, return
> it to the original requestor. */
> --	  while (forward->dependent)
> --	    {
> -+	      /* Validated original answer, all done. */
> -+	      if (!forward->dependent)
> -+		break;
> -+	      
> -+	      /* validated subsdiary query, (and cached result)
> -+		 pop that and return to the previous query we were
> working on. */
> - 	      struct frec *prev = forward->dependent;
> - 	      free_frec(forward);
> - 	      forward = prev;
> - 	      forward->blocking_query = NULL; /* already gone */
> - 	      blockdata_retrieve(forward->stash, forward-
> >stash_len, (void *)header);
> - 	      n = forward->stash_len;
> --	      
> --	      if (status == STAT_SECURE)
> --		{
> --		  if (forward->flags & FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY)
> --		    status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> --		  else if (forward->flags & FREC_DS_QUERY)
> --		    {
> --		      status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> --		       /* Provably no DS, everything below is
> insecure, even if signatures are offered */
> --		      if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
> --			/* We only cache sigs when we've validated
> a reply.
> --			   Avoid caching a reply with sigs if
> there's a vaildated break in the 
> --			   DS chain, so we don't return replies
> from cache missing sigs. */
> --			status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --		       else if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> --			 {
> --			   if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> --			     {
> --			       status = send_check_sign(forward,
> now, header, n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname); 
> --			       if (status == STAT_INSECURE)
> --				 status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --			     }
> --			   else
> --			     status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --			 }
> --		       else if (status == STAT_NO_NS)
> --			 status = STAT_BOGUS;
> --		    }
> --		  else if (forward->flags & FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN)
> --		    {
> --		      status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> --		      if (status != STAT_NEED_KEY)
> --			status = do_check_sign(forward, status,
> now, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> --		    }
> --		  else
> --		    {
> --		      status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header,
> n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class, NULL, NULL);	
> --		      if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> --			{
> --			  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> --			    status = send_check_sign(forward, now,
> header, n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> --			  else
> --			    status = STAT_INSECURE;
> --			}
> --		    }
> --	       
> --		  if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status ==
> STAT_NEED_DS_NEG || status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> --		    goto anotherkey;
> --		}
> - 	    }
> -+	
> - 	  
> - 	  no_cache_dnssec = 0;
> --
> --	  if (status == STAT_INSECURE_DS)
> --	    {
> --	      /* We only cache sigs when we've validated a reply.
> --		 Avoid caching a reply with sigs if there's a
> vaildated break in the 
> --		 DS chain, so we don't return replies from cache
> missing sigs. */
> --	      status = STAT_INSECURE;
> --	      no_cache_dnssec = 1;
> --	    }
> - 	  
> - 	  if (status == STAT_TRUNCATED)
> - 	    header->hb3 |= HB3_TC;
> -@@ -1062,7 +959,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
> now)
> - 	    {
> - 	      char *result, *domain = "result";
> - 	      
> --	      if (forward->work_counter == 0)
> -+	      if (status == STAT_ABANDONED)
> - 		{
> - 		  result = "ABANDONED";
> - 		  status = STAT_BOGUS;
> -@@ -1072,7 +969,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
> now)
> - 	      
> - 	      if (status == STAT_BOGUS && extract_request(header,
> n, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
> - 		domain = daemon->namebuff;
> --
> -+	      
> - 	      log_query(F_KEYTAG | F_SECSTAT, domain, NULL,
> result);
> - 	    }
> - 	  
> -@@ -1415,315 +1312,49 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> - }
> - 
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --
> --/* UDP: we've got an unsigned answer, return STAT_INSECURE if we
> can prove there's no DS
> --   and therefore the answer shouldn't be signed, or STAT_BOGUS if
> it should be, or 
> --   STAT_NEED_DS_NEG and keyname if we need to do the query. */
> --static int send_check_sign(struct frec *forward, time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, 
> --			   char *name, char *keyname)
> --{
> --  int status = dnssec_chase_cname(now, header, plen, name,
> keyname);
> --  
> --  if (status != STAT_INSECURE)
> --    return status;
> --
> --  /* Store the domain we're trying to check. */
> --  forward->name_start = strlen(name);
> --  forward->name_len = forward->name_start + 1;
> --  if (!(forward->orig_domain = blockdata_alloc(name, forward-
> >name_len)))
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> --  
> --  return do_check_sign(forward, 0, now, name, keyname);
> --}
> -- 
> --/* We either have a a reply (header non-NULL, or we need to start
> by looking in the cache */ 
> --static int do_check_sign(struct frec *forward, int status, time_t
> now, char *name, char *keyname)
> --{
> --  /* get domain we're checking back from blockdata store, it's
> stored on the original query. */
> --  while (forward->dependent && !forward->orig_domain)
> --    forward = forward->dependent;
> --
> --  blockdata_retrieve(forward->orig_domain, forward->name_len,
> name);
> --  
> --  while (1)
> --    {
> --      char *p; 
> --
> --      if (status == 0)
> --	{
> --	  struct crec *crecp;
> --
> --	  /* Haven't received answer, see if in cache */
> --	  if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, &name[forward-
> >name_start], now, F_DS)))
> --	    {
> --	      /* put name of DS record we're missing into keyname
> */
> --	      strcpy(keyname, &name[forward->name_start]);
> --	      /* and wait for reply to arrive */
> --	      return STAT_NEED_DS_NEG;
> --	    }
> --
> --	  /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
> existance of NS record */ 
> --	  if (!(crecp->flags & F_NEG))
> --	    status = STAT_SECURE;
> --	  else if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> --	    status = STAT_NO_DS;
> --	  else
> --	    status = STAT_NO_NS;
> --	}
> --      
> --      /* Have entered non-signed part of DNS tree. */ 
> --      if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
> --	return forward->dependent ? STAT_INSECURE_DS :
> STAT_INSECURE;
> --
> --      if (status == STAT_BOGUS)
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> --      if (status == STAT_NO_SIG && *keyname != 0)
> --	{
> --	  /* There is a validated CNAME chain that doesn't end in a
> DS record. Start 
> --	     the search again in that domain. */
> --	  blockdata_free(forward->orig_domain);
> --	  forward->name_start = strlen(keyname);
> --	  forward->name_len = forward->name_start + 1;
> --	  if (!(forward->orig_domain = blockdata_alloc(keyname,
> forward->name_len)))
> --	    return STAT_BOGUS;
> --	  
> --	  strcpy(name, keyname);
> --	  status = 0; /* force to cache when we iterate. */
> --	  continue;
> --	}
> --      
> --      /* There's a proven DS record, or we're within a zone, where
> there doesn't need
> --	 to be a DS record. Add a name and try again. 
> --	 If we've already tried the whole name, then fail */
> --
> --      if (forward->name_start == 0)
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> --      
> --      for (p = &name[forward->name_start-2]; (*p != '.') && (p !=
> name); p--);
> --      
> --      if (p != name)
> --	p++;
> --      
> --      forward->name_start = p - name;
> --      status = 0; /* force to cache when we iterate. */
> --    }
> --}
> --
> --/* Move down from the root, until we find a signed non-existance of
> a DS, in which case
> --   an unsigned answer is OK, or we find a signed DS, in which case
> there should be 
> --   a signature, and the answer is BOGUS */
> --static int  tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, char *name, 
> --					char *keyname, struct
> server *server, int *keycount)
> --{
> --  size_t m;
> --  unsigned char *packet, *payload;
> --  u16 *length;
> --  int status, name_len;
> --  struct blockdata *block;
> --
> --  char *name_start;
> --
> --  /* Get first insecure entry in CNAME chain */
> --  status = tcp_key_recurse(now, STAT_CHASE_CNAME, header, plen,
> class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> --  if (status == STAT_BOGUS)
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> --  
> --  if (!(packet = whine_malloc(65536 + MAXDNAME + RRFIXEDSZ +
> sizeof(u16))))
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> --  
> --  payload = &packet[2];
> --  header = (struct dns_header *)payload;
> --  length = (u16 *)packet;
> --
> --  /* Stash the name away, since the buffer will be trashed when we
> recurse */
> --  name_len = strlen(name) + 1;
> --  name_start = name + name_len - 1;
> --  
> --  if (!(block = blockdata_alloc(name, name_len)))
> --    {
> --      free(packet);
> --      return STAT_BOGUS;
> --    }
> --
> --  while (1)
> --    {
> --      unsigned char c1, c2;
> --      struct crec *crecp;
> --
> --      if (--(*keycount) == 0)
> --	{
> --	  free(packet);
> --	  blockdata_free(block);
> --	  return STAT_BOGUS;    
> --	}
> --      
> --      while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name_start, now,
> F_DS)))
> --	{      
> --	  if ((crecp->flags & F_NEG) && (crecp->flags &
> F_DNSSECOK))
> --	    {
> --	      /* Found a secure denial of DS - delegation is indeed
> insecure */
> --	      free(packet);
> --	      blockdata_free(block);
> --	      return STAT_INSECURE;
> --	    }
> --      
> --	  /* Here, either there's a secure DS, or no NS and no DS,
> and therefore no delegation.
> --	     Add another label and continue. */
> -- 
> --	  if (name_start == name)
> --	    {
> --	      free(packet);
> --	      blockdata_free(block);
> --	      return STAT_BOGUS; /* run out of labels */
> --	    }
> --	  
> --	  name_start -= 2;
> --	  while (*name_start != '.' && name_start != name) 
> --	    name_start--;
> --	  if (name_start != name)
> --	    name_start++;
> --	}
> --      
> --      /* Can't find it in the cache, have to send a query */
> --
> --      m = dnssec_generate_query(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
> name_start, class, T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
> --      
> --      *length = htons(m);
> --      
> --      if (read_write(server->tcpfd, packet, m + sizeof(u16), 0) &&
> --	  read_write(server->tcpfd, &c1, 1, 1) &&
> --	  read_write(server->tcpfd, &c2, 1, 1) &&
> --	  read_write(server->tcpfd, payload, (c1 << 8) | c2, 1))
> --	{
> --	  m = (c1 << 8) | c2;
> --	  
> --	  /* Note this trashes all three name workspaces */
> --	  status = tcp_key_recurse(now, STAT_NEED_DS_NEG, header,
> m, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> --	  
> --	  if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
> --	    {
> --	      /* Found a secure denial of DS - delegation is indeed
> insecure */
> --	      free(packet);
> --	      blockdata_free(block);
> --	      return STAT_INSECURE;
> --	    }
> --	  
> --	  if (status == STAT_NO_SIG && *keyname != 0)
> --	    {
> --	      /* There is a validated CNAME chain that doesn't end
> in a DS record. Start 
> --		 the search again in that domain. */
> --	      blockdata_free(block);
> --	      name_len = strlen(keyname) + 1;
> --	      name_start = name + name_len - 1;
> --	      
> --	      if (!(block = blockdata_alloc(keyname, name_len)))
> --		return STAT_BOGUS;
> --	      
> --	      strcpy(name, keyname);
> --	      continue;
> --	    }
> --	  
> --	  if (status == STAT_BOGUS)
> --	    {
> --	      free(packet);
> --	      blockdata_free(block);
> --	      return STAT_BOGUS;
> --	    }
> --	  
> --	  /* Here, either there's a secure DS, or no NS and no DS,
> and therefore no delegation.
> --	     Add another label and continue. */
> --	  
> --	  /* Get name we're checking back. */
> --	  blockdata_retrieve(block, name_len, name);
> --	  
> --	  if (name_start == name)
> --	    {
> --	      free(packet);
> --	      blockdata_free(block);
> --	      return STAT_BOGUS; /* run out of labels */
> --	    }
> --	  
> --	  name_start -= 2;
> --	  while (*name_start != '.' && name_start != name) 
> --	    name_start--;
> --	  if (name_start != name)
> --	    name_start++;
> --	}
> --      else
> --	{
> --	  /* IO failure */
> --	  free(packet);
> --	  blockdata_free(block);
> --	  return STAT_BOGUS; /* run out of labels */
> --	}
> --    }
> --}
> --
> - static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int status, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t n, 
> - 			   int class, char *name, char *keyname,
> struct server *server, int *keycount)
> - {
> -   /* Recurse up the key heirarchy */
> -   int new_status;
> -+  unsigned char *packet = NULL;
> -+  size_t m; 
> -+  unsigned char *payload = NULL;
> -+  struct dns_header *new_header = NULL;
> -+  u16 *length = NULL;
> -+  unsigned char c1, c2;
> - 
> --  /* limit the amount of work we do, to avoid cycling forever on
> loops in the DNS */
> --  if (--(*keycount) == 0)
> --    return STAT_INSECURE;
> --  
> --  if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> --    new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, class);
> --  else if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status == STAT_NEED_DS_NEG)
> -+  while (1)
> -     {
> --      new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, class);
> --      if (status == STAT_NEED_DS)
> -+      /* limit the amount of work we do, to avoid cycling forever
> on loops in the DNS */
> -+      if (--(*keycount) == 0)
> -+	new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
> -+      else if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -+	new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, class);
> -+      else if (status == STAT_NEED_DS)
> -+	new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, class);
> -+      else 
> -+	new_status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, &class, option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN), NULL, NULL);
> -+      
> -+      if (new_status != STAT_NEED_DS && new_status !=
> STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -+	break;
> -+
> -+      /* Can't validate because we need a key/DS whose name now in
> keyname.
> -+	 Make query for same, and recurse to validate */
> -+      if (!packet)
> - 	{
> --	  if (new_status == STAT_NO_DS)
> --	    new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --	  if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> --	   {
> --	     if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> --	       {
> --		 new_status = tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now,
> header, n, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> --		 if (new_status == STAT_INSECURE)
> --		   new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --	       }
> --	     else
> --	       new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --	   }
> --	  else if (new_status == STAT_NO_NS)
> --	    new_status = STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	  packet = whine_malloc(65536 + MAXDNAME + RRFIXEDSZ +
> sizeof(u16));
> -+	  payload = &packet[2];
> -+	  new_header = (struct dns_header *)payload;
> -+	  length = (u16 *)packet;
> - 	}
> --    }
> --  else if (status == STAT_CHASE_CNAME)
> --    new_status = dnssec_chase_cname(now, header, n, name, keyname);
> --  else 
> --    {
> --      new_status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, &class, NULL, NULL);
> -       
> --      if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -+      if (!packet)
> - 	{
> --	  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> --	    new_status = tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now, header,
> n, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> --	  else
> --	    new_status = STAT_INSECURE;
> -+	  new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
> -+	  break;
> - 	}
> --    }
> --
> --  /* Can't validate because we need a key/DS whose name now in
> keyname.
> --     Make query for same, and recurse to validate */
> --  if (new_status == STAT_NEED_DS || new_status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> --    {
> --      size_t m; 
> --      unsigned char *packet = whine_malloc(65536 + MAXDNAME +
> RRFIXEDSZ + sizeof(u16));
> --      unsigned char *payload = &packet[2];
> --      struct dns_header *new_header = (struct dns_header *)payload;
> --      u16 *length = (u16 *)packet;
> --      unsigned char c1, c2;
> --       
> --      if (!packet)
> --	return STAT_INSECURE;
> --
> --    another_tcp_key:
> -+	 
> -       m = dnssec_generate_query(new_header, ((char *) new_header) +
> 65536, keyname, class, 
> - 				new_status == STAT_NEED_KEY ?
> T_DNSKEY : T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
> -       
> -@@ -1733,65 +1364,22 @@ static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int
> status, struct dns_header *header, si
> - 	  !read_write(server->tcpfd, &c1, 1, 1) ||
> - 	  !read_write(server->tcpfd, &c2, 1, 1) ||
> - 	  !read_write(server->tcpfd, payload, (c1 << 8) | c2, 1))
> --	new_status = STAT_INSECURE;
> --      else
> - 	{
> --	  m = (c1 << 8) | c2;
> --	  
> --	  new_status = tcp_key_recurse(now, new_status, new_header,
> m, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> --	  
> --	  if (new_status == STAT_SECURE)
> --	    {
> --	      /* Reached a validated record, now try again at this
> level.
> --		 Note that we may get ANOTHER NEED_* if an answer
> needs more than one key.
> --		 If so, go round again. */
> --	      
> --	      if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> --		new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n,
> name, keyname, class);
> --	      else if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status ==
> STAT_NEED_DS_NEG)
> --		{
> --		  new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
> name, keyname, class);
> --		  if (status == STAT_NEED_DS)
> --		    {
> --		      if (new_status == STAT_NO_DS)
> --			new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --		      else if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> --			{
> --			  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> --			    {
> --			      new_status =
> tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now, header, n, class, name, keyname,
> server, keycount); 
> --			      if (new_status == STAT_INSECURE)
> --				new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --			    }
> --			  else
> --			    new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --			}
> --		      else if (new_status == STAT_NO_NS)
> --			new_status = STAT_BOGUS;
> --		    }
> --		}
> --	      else if (status == STAT_CHASE_CNAME)
> --		new_status = dnssec_chase_cname(now, header, n,
> name, keyname);
> --	      else 
> --		{
> --		  new_status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header,
> n, name, keyname, &class, NULL, NULL);
> --		  
> --		  if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> --		    {
> --		      if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> --			new_status =
> tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now, header, n, class, name, keyname,
> server, keycount);
> --		      else
> --			new_status = STAT_INSECURE;
> --		    }
> --		}
> --	      
> --	      if (new_status == STAT_NEED_DS || new_status ==
> STAT_NEED_KEY)
> --		goto another_tcp_key;
> --	    }
> -+	  new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
> -+	  break;
> - 	}
> -+
> -+      m = (c1 << 8) | c2;
> -       
> --      free(packet);
> -+      new_status = tcp_key_recurse(now, new_status, new_header, m,
> class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> -+      
> -+      if (new_status != STAT_OK)
> -+	break;
> -     }
> -+
> -+  if (packet)
> -+    free(packet);
> -+    
> -   return new_status;
> - }
> - #endif
> -@@ -2075,19 +1663,10 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> - 		      if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) &&
> !checking_disabled)
> - 			{
> - 			  int keycount = DNSSEC_WORK; /* Limit to
> number of DNSSEC questions, to catch loops and avoid filling cache.
> */
> --			  int status = tcp_key_recurse(now,
> STAT_TRUNCATED, header, m, 0, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname,
> last_server, &keycount);
> -+			  int status = tcp_key_recurse(now,
> STAT_OK, header, m, 0, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname,
> last_server, &keycount);
> - 			  char *result, *domain = "result";
> --
> --			  if (status == STAT_INSECURE_DS)
> --			    {
> --			      /* We only cache sigs when we've
> validated a reply.
> --				 Avoid caching a reply with sigs if
> there's a vaildated break in the 
> --				 DS chain, so we don't return
> replies from cache missing sigs. */
> --			      status = STAT_INSECURE;
> --			      no_cache_dnssec = 1;
> --			    }
> - 			  
> --			  if (keycount == 0)
> -+			  if (status == STAT_ABANDONED)
> - 			    {
> - 			      result = "ABANDONED";
> - 			      status = STAT_BOGUS;
> -@@ -2179,7 +1758,6 @@ static struct frec *allocate_frec(time_t now)
> -       f->dependent = NULL;
> -       f->blocking_query = NULL;
> -       f->stash = NULL;
> --      f->orig_domain = NULL;
> - #endif
> -       daemon->frec_list = f;
> -     }
> -@@ -2248,12 +1826,6 @@ static void free_frec(struct frec *f)
> -       f->stash = NULL;
> -     }
> - 
> --  if (f->orig_domain)
> --    {
> --      blockdata_free(f->orig_domain);
> --      f->orig_domain = NULL;
> --    }
> --
> -   /* Anything we're waiting on is pointless now, too */
> -   if (f->blocking_query)
> -     free_frec(f->blocking_query);
> -@@ -2281,14 +1853,23 @@ struct frec *get_new_frec(time_t now, int
> *wait, int force)
> -       target = f;
> -     else 
> -       {
> --	if (difftime(now, f->time) >= 4*TIMEOUT)
> --	  {
> --	    free_frec(f);
> --	    target = f;
> --	  }
> --	
> --	if (!oldest || difftime(f->time, oldest->time) <= 0)
> --	  oldest = f;
> -+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -+	    /* Don't free DNSSEC sub-queries here, as we may end up
> with
> -+	       dangling references to them. They'll go when their
> "real" query 
> -+	       is freed. */
> -+	    if (!f->dependent)
> -+#endif
> -+	      {
> -+		if (difftime(now, f->time) >= 4*TIMEOUT)
> -+		  {
> -+		    free_frec(f);
> -+		    target = f;
> -+		  }
> -+	     
> -+	    
> -+		if (!oldest || difftime(f->time, oldest->time) <=
> 0)
> -+		  oldest = f;
> -+	      }
> -       }
> - 
> -   if (target)
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
> Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
> Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 5ffaf97..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
> Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,612 +0,0 @@
> -From 93be5b1e023b0c661e1ec2cd6d811a8ec9055c49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 12:04:40 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Abandon caching RRSIGs and returning them from
> cache.
> -
> -The list of exceptions to being able to locally answer
> -cached data for validated records when DNSSEC data is requested
> -was getting too long, so don't ever do that. This means
> -that the cache no longer has to hold RRSIGS and allows
> -us to lose lots of code. Note that cached validated
> -answers are still returned as long as do=0
> ----
> - src/cache.c   |   38 ++---------
> - src/dnsmasq.h |   10 +--
> - src/dnssec.c  |   94 ++++-----------------------
> - src/rfc1035.c |  197 ++++++--------------------------------------
> -------------
> - 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 297 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
> -index 1b76b67..51ba7cc 100644
> ---- a/src/cache.c
> -+++ b/src/cache.c
> -@@ -189,12 +189,7 @@ static void cache_hash(struct crec *crecp)
> - static void cache_blockdata_free(struct crec *crecp)
> - {
> -   if (crecp->flags & F_DNSKEY)
> --    {
> --      if (crecp->flags & F_DS)
> --	blockdata_free(crecp->addr.sig.keydata);
> --      else
> --	blockdata_free(crecp->addr.key.keydata);
> --    }
> -+    blockdata_free(crecp->addr.key.keydata);
> -   else if ((crecp->flags & F_DS) && !(crecp->flags & F_NEG))
> -     blockdata_free(crecp->addr.ds.keydata);
> - }
> -@@ -369,13 +364,8 @@ static struct crec *cache_scan_free(char *name,
> struct all_addr *addr, time_t no
> - 		}
> - 	      
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --	      /* Deletion has to be class-sensitive for DS, DNSKEY,
> RRSIG, also 
> --		 type-covered sensitive for  RRSIG */
> --	      if ((flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) &&
> --		  (flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) == (crecp->flags &
> (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) &&
> --		  crecp->uid == addr->addr.dnssec.class &&
> --		  (!((flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY)) == (F_DS |
> F_DNSKEY)) || 
> --		   crecp->addr.sig.type_covered == addr-
> >addr.dnssec.type))
> -+	      /* Deletion has to be class-sensitive for DS and
> DNSKEY */
> -+	      if ((flags & crecp->flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) &&
> crecp->uid == addr->addr.dnssec.class)
> - 		{
> - 		  if (crecp->flags & F_CONFIG)
> - 		    return crecp;
> -@@ -532,13 +522,9 @@ struct crec *cache_insert(char *name, struct
> all_addr *addr,
> - 	    struct all_addr free_addr = new->addr.addr;;
> - 
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --	    /* For DNSSEC records, addr holds class and
> type_covered for RRSIG */
> -+	    /* For DNSSEC records, addr holds class. */
> - 	    if (new->flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY))
> --	      {
> --		free_addr.addr.dnssec.class = new->uid;
> --		if ((new->flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY)) == (F_DS |
> F_DNSKEY))
> --		  free_addr.addr.dnssec.type = new-
> >addr.sig.type_covered;
> --	      }
> -+	      free_addr.addr.dnssec.class = new->uid;
> - #endif
> - 	    
> - 	    free_avail = 1; /* Must be free space now. */
> -@@ -653,9 +639,6 @@ struct crec *cache_find_by_name(struct crec
> *crecp, char *name, time_t now, unsi
> - 	  if (!is_expired(now, crecp) &&
> !is_outdated_cname_pointer(crecp))
> - 	    {
> - 	      if ((crecp->flags & F_FORWARD) && 
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --		  (((crecp->flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) == (prot &
> (F_DNSKEY | F_DS))) || (prot & F_NSIGMATCH)) &&
> --#endif
> - 		  (crecp->flags & prot) &&
> - 		  hostname_isequal(cache_get_name(crecp), name))
> - 		{
> -@@ -713,9 +696,6 @@ struct crec *cache_find_by_name(struct crec
> *crecp, char *name, time_t now, unsi
> - 
> -   if (ans && 
> -       (ans->flags & F_FORWARD) &&
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --      (((ans->flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) == (prot & (F_DNSKEY |
> F_DS))) || (prot & F_NSIGMATCH)) &&
> --#endif
> -       (ans->flags & prot) &&     
> -       hostname_isequal(cache_get_name(ans), name))
> -     return ans;
> -@@ -1472,11 +1452,7 @@ void dump_cache(time_t now)
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> - 	    else if (cache->flags & F_DS)
> - 	      {
> --		if (cache->flags & F_DNSKEY)
> --		  /* RRSIG */
> --		  sprintf(a, "%5u %3u %s", cache->addr.sig.keytag,
> --			  cache->addr.sig.algo, querystr("", cache-
> >addr.sig.type_covered));
> --		else if (!(cache->flags & F_NEG))
> -+		if (!(cache->flags & F_NEG))
> - 		  sprintf(a, "%5u %3u %3u", cache->addr.ds.keytag,
> - 			  cache->addr.ds.algo, cache-
> >addr.ds.digest);
> - 	      }
> -@@ -1502,8 +1478,6 @@ void dump_cache(time_t now)
> - 	    else if (cache->flags & F_CNAME)
> - 	      t = "C";
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --	    else if ((cache->flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY)) == (F_DS |
> F_DNSKEY))
> --	      t = "G"; /* DNSKEY and DS set -> RRISG */
> - 	    else if (cache->flags & F_DS)
> - 	      t = "S";
> - 	    else if (cache->flags & F_DNSKEY)
> -diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -index 023a1cf..4344cae 100644
> ---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> -+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -@@ -398,14 +398,9 @@ struct crec {
> -       unsigned char algo;
> -       unsigned char digest; 
> -     } ds; 
> --    struct {
> --      struct blockdata *keydata;
> --      unsigned short keylen, type_covered, keytag;
> --      char algo;
> --    } sig;
> -   } addr;
> -   time_t ttd; /* time to die */
> --  /* used as class if DNSKEY/DS/RRSIG, index to source for F_HOSTS
> */
> -+  /* used as class if DNSKEY/DS, index to source for F_HOSTS */
> -   unsigned int uid; 
> -   unsigned short flags;
> -   union {
> -@@ -445,8 +440,7 @@ struct crec {
> - #define F_SECSTAT   (1u<<24)
> - #define F_NO_RR     (1u<<25)
> - #define F_IPSET     (1u<<26)
> --#define F_NSIGMATCH (1u<<27)
> --#define F_NOEXTRA   (1u<<28)
> -+#define F_NOEXTRA   (1u<<27)
> - 
> - /* Values of uid in crecs with F_CONFIG bit set. */
> - #define SRC_INTERFACE 0
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index de7b335..1ae03a6 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - {
> -   unsigned char *psave, *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -   struct crec *crecp, *recp1;
> --  int rc, j, qtype, qclass, ttl, rdlen, flags, algo, valid, keytag,
> type_covered;
> -+  int rc, j, qtype, qclass, ttl, rdlen, flags, algo, valid, keytag;
> -   struct blockdata *key;
> -   struct all_addr a;
> - 
> -@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 
> -   if (valid)
> -     {
> --      /* DNSKEY RRset determined to be OK, now cache it and the
> RRsigs that sign it. */
> -+      /* DNSKEY RRset determined to be OK, now cache it. */
> -       cache_start_insert();
> -       
> -       p = skip_questions(header, plen);
> -@@ -1155,7 +1155,10 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 		  if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
> - 		    {
> - 		      if (!(recp1 = cache_insert(name, &a, now,
> ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DNSSECOK)))
> --			blockdata_free(key);
> -+			{
> -+			  blockdata_free(key);
> -+			  return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+			}
> - 		      else
> - 			{
> - 			  a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> -@@ -1169,38 +1172,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 			}
> - 		    }
> - 		}
> --	      else if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
> --		{
> --		  /* RRSIG, cache if covers DNSKEY RRset */
> --		  if (rdlen < 18)
> --		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --		  
> --		  GETSHORT(type_covered, p);
> --		  
> --		  if (type_covered == T_DNSKEY)
> --		    {
> --		      a.addr.dnssec.class = class;
> --		      a.addr.dnssec.type = type_covered;
> --		      
> --		      algo = *p++;
> --		      p += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl, expiration,
> inception */
> --		      GETSHORT(keytag, p);	
> --		      if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)psave,
> rdlen)))
> --			{
> --			  if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name, &a, now,
> ttl,  F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> --			    blockdata_free(key);
> --			  else
> --			    {
> --			      crecp->addr.sig.keydata = key;
> --			      crecp->addr.sig.keylen = rdlen;
> --			      crecp->addr.sig.keytag = keytag;
> --			      crecp->addr.sig.type_covered =
> type_covered;
> --			      crecp->addr.sig.algo = algo;
> --			    }
> --			}
> --		    }
> --		}
> --	      
> -+	      	      
> - 	      p = psave;
> - 	    }
> - 
> -@@ -1326,7 +1298,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - 	  cache_start_insert();
> - 	  
> - 	  a.addr.dnssec.class = class;
> --	  cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl, flags);
> -+	  if (!cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl, flags))
> -+	    return STAT_BOGUS;
> - 	  
> - 	  cache_end_insert();  
> - 	  
> -@@ -2028,14 +2001,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	  /* Not done, validate now */
> - 	  if (j == i)
> - 	    {
> --	      int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, type_covered, sigcnt,
> rrcnt;
> -+	      int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, sigcnt, rrcnt;
> - 	      unsigned char *psave;
> - 	      struct all_addr a;
> - 	      struct blockdata *key;
> - 	      struct crec *crecp;
> - 	      char *wildname;
> --	      int have_wildcard = 0;
> --
> -+	      
> - 	      if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name,
> keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt))
> - 		return STAT_BOGUS;
> - 
> -@@ -2096,8 +2068,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 			    
> - 		  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> - 		    {
> --		      have_wildcard = 1;
> --		      
> - 		      /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with
> a different
> - 			 answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
> this
> - 			 hasn't happened, the answer must prove
> that
> -@@ -2119,7 +2089,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 			return rc;
> - 		    } 
> - 		  
> --		  /* Cache RRsigs in answer section, and if we just
> validated a DS RRset, cache it */
> -+		  /* If we just validated a DS RRset, cache it */
> - 		  /* Also note if the RRset is the answer to the
> question, or the target of a CNAME */
> - 		  cache_start_insert();
> - 		  
> -@@ -2168,45 +2138,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 				    } 
> - 				}
> - 			    }
> --			  else if (type2 == T_RRSIG)
> --			    {
> --			      if (rdlen2 < 18)
> --				return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --			      
> --			      GETSHORT(type_covered, p2);
> --			      
> --			      if (type_covered == type1 && 
> --				  (type_covered == T_A ||
> type_covered == T_AAAA ||
> --				   type_covered == T_CNAME ||
> type_covered == T_DS || 
> --				   type_covered == T_DNSKEY ||
> type_covered == T_PTR)) 
> --				{
> --				  a.addr.dnssec.type =
> type_covered;
> --				  a.addr.dnssec.class = class1;
> --				  
> --				  algo = *p2++;
> --				  p2 += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl,
> expiration, inception */
> --				  GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
> --				  
> --				  /* We don't cache sigs for
> wildcard answers, because to reproduce the
> --				     answer from the cache will
> require one or more NSEC/NSEC3 records 
> --				     which we don't cache. The lack
> of the RRSIG ensures that a query for
> --				     this RRset asking for a secure
> answer will always be forwarded. */
> --				  if (!have_wildcard && (key =
> blockdata_alloc((char*)psave, rdlen2)))
> --				    {
> --				      if (!(crecp =
> cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl,  F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> --					blockdata_free(key);
> --				      else
> --					{
> --					  crecp->addr.sig.keydata =
> key;
> --					  crecp->addr.sig.keylen =
> rdlen2;
> --					  crecp->addr.sig.keytag =
> keytag;
> --					  crecp-
> >addr.sig.type_covered = type_covered;
> --					  crecp->addr.sig.algo =
> algo;
> --					}
> --				    }
> --				}
> --			    }
> --			  
> -+
> - 			  p2 = psave;
> - 			}
> - 		      
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index 4eb1772..def8fa0 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -1275,11 +1275,9 @@ int check_for_local_domain(char *name, time_t
> now)
> -   struct naptr *naptr;
> - 
> -   /* Note: the call to cache_find_by_name is intended to find any
> record which matches
> --     ie A, AAAA, CNAME, DS. Because RRSIG records are marked by
> setting both F_DS and F_DNSKEY,
> --     cache_find_by name ordinarily only returns records with an
> exact match on those bits (ie
> --     for the call below, only DS records). The F_NSIGMATCH bit
> changes this behaviour */
> -+     ie A, AAAA, CNAME. */
> - 
> --  if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_IPV4 | F_IPV6
> | F_CNAME | F_DS | F_NO_RR | F_NSIGMATCH)) &&
> -+  if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_IPV4 | F_IPV6
> | F_CNAME |F_NO_RR)) &&
> -       (crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)))
> -     return 1;
> -   
> -@@ -1566,9 +1564,11 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -       GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> -       
> -       if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
> --	*do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
> -+	{
> -+	  *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
> -+	  *ad_reqd = 1;
> -+	}
> - 
> --      *ad_reqd = 1;
> -       dryrun = 1;
> -     }
> - 
> -@@ -1636,98 +1636,6 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 	    }
> - 	}
> - 
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --      if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && (qtype == T_DNSKEY ||
> qtype == T_DS))
> --	{
> --	  int gotone = 0;
> --	  struct blockdata *keydata;
> --
> --	  /* Do we have RRSIG? Can't do DS or DNSKEY otherwise. */
> --	  if (sec_reqd)
> --	    {
> --	      crecp = NULL;
> --	      while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name, now,
> F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> --		if (crecp->uid == qclass && crecp-
> >addr.sig.type_covered == qtype)
> --		  break;
> --	    }
> --	  
> --	  if (!sec_reqd || crecp)
> --	    {
> --	      if (qtype == T_DS)
> --		{
> --		  crecp = NULL;
> --		  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name,
> now, F_DS)))
> --		    if (crecp->uid == qclass)
> --		      {
> --			gotone = 1; 
> --			if (!dryrun)
> --			  {
> --			    if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> --			      {
> --				if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
> --				  nxdomain = 1;
> --				log_query(F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL,
> "no DS");	
> --			      }
> --			    else if ((keydata =
> blockdata_retrieve(crecp->addr.ds.keydata, crecp->addr.ds.keylen,
> NULL)))
> --			      {			     	
> 		      
> --				struct all_addr a;
> --				a.addr.keytag =  crecp-
> >addr.ds.keytag;
> --				log_query(F_KEYTAG | (crecp->flags
> & F_CONFIG), name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> --				if (add_resource_record(header,
> limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp, 
> --							crec_ttl(cr
> ecp, now), &nameoffset,
> --							T_DS,
> qclass, "sbbt", 
> --							crecp-
> >addr.ds.keytag, crecp->addr.ds.algo, 
> --							crecp-
> >addr.ds.digest, crecp->addr.ds.keylen, keydata))
> --				  anscount++;
> --				
> --			      } 
> --			  }
> --		      }
> --		}
> --	      else /* DNSKEY */
> --		{
> --		  crecp = NULL;
> --		  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name,
> now, F_DNSKEY)))
> --		    if (crecp->uid == qclass)
> --		      {
> --			gotone = 1;
> --			if (!dryrun && (keydata =
> blockdata_retrieve(crecp->addr.key.keydata, crecp->addr.key.keylen,
> NULL)))
> --			  {			     		
> 	      
> --			    struct all_addr a;
> --			    a.addr.keytag =  crecp-
> >addr.key.keytag;
> --			    log_query(F_KEYTAG | (crecp->flags &
> F_CONFIG), name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u");
> --			    if (add_resource_record(header, limit,
> &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp, 
> --						    crec_ttl(crecp,
> now), &nameoffset,
> --						    T_DNSKEY,
> qclass, "sbbt", 
> --						    crecp-
> >addr.key.flags, 3, crecp->addr.key.algo, crecp->addr.key.keylen,
> keydata))
> --			      anscount++;
> --			  }
> --		      }
> --		}
> --	    }
> --	  
> --	  /* Now do RRSIGs */
> --	  if (gotone)
> --	    {
> --	      ans = 1;
> --	      auth = 0;
> --	      if (!dryrun && sec_reqd)
> --		{
> --		  crecp = NULL;
> --		  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name,
> now, F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> --		    if (crecp->uid == qclass && crecp-
> >addr.sig.type_covered == qtype &&
> --			(keydata = blockdata_retrieve(crecp-
> >addr.sig.keydata, crecp->addr.sig.keylen, NULL)))
> --		      {
> --			add_resource_record(header, limit, &trunc,
> nameoffset, &ansp, 
> --					    crec_ttl(crecp, now),
> &nameoffset,
> --					    T_RRSIG, qclass, "t",
> crecp->addr.sig.keylen, keydata);
> --			anscount++;
> --		      }
> --		}
> --	    }
> --	}
> --#endif	     
> --      
> -       if (qclass == C_IN)
> - 	{
> - 	  struct txt_record *t;
> -@@ -1736,6 +1644,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 	    if ((t->class == qtype || qtype == T_ANY) &&
> hostname_isequal(name, t->name))
> - 	      {
> - 		ans = 1;
> -+		sec_data = 0;
> - 		if (!dryrun)
> - 		  {
> - 		    log_query(F_CONFIG | F_RRNAME, name, NULL,
> "<RR>");
> -@@ -1792,6 +1701,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 	      
> - 	      if (intr)
> - 		{
> -+		  sec_data = 0;
> - 		  ans = 1;
> - 		  if (!dryrun)
> - 		    {
> -@@ -1805,6 +1715,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 	      else if (ptr)
> - 		{
> - 		  ans = 1;
> -+		  sec_data = 0;
> - 		  if (!dryrun)
> - 		    {
> - 		      log_query(F_CONFIG | F_RRNAME, name, NULL,
> "<PTR>");
> -@@ -1819,38 +1730,8 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 		}
> - 	      else if ((crecp = cache_find_by_addr(NULL, &addr,
> now, is_arpa)))
> - 		{
> --		  if (!(crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) && sec_reqd)
> --		    {
> --		      if (!option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) ||
> ((crecp->flags & F_NEG) && (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
> --			crecp = NULL;
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --		      else if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> --			{
> --			  int gotsig = 0;
> --			  struct crec *rr_crec = NULL;
> --
> --			  while ((rr_crec =
> cache_find_by_name(rr_crec, name, now, F_DS | F_DNSKEY)))
> --			    {
> --			      if (rr_crec->addr.sig.type_covered ==
> T_PTR && rr_crec->uid == C_IN)
> --				{
> --				  char *sigdata =
> blockdata_retrieve(rr_crec->addr.sig.keydata, rr_crec-
> >addr.sig.keylen, NULL);
> --				  gotsig = 1;
> --				  
> --				  if (!dryrun && 
> --				      add_resource_record(header,
> limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp, 
> --							  rr_crec-
> >ttd - now, &nameoffset,
> --							  T_RRSIG,
> C_IN, "t", crecp->addr.sig.keylen, sigdata))
> --				    anscount++;
> --				}
> --			    } 
> --			  
> --			  if (!gotsig)
> --			    crecp = NULL;
> --			}
> --#endif
> --		    }
> --
> --		  if (crecp)
> -+		  /* Don't use cache when DNSSEC data required. */
> -+		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> - 		    {
> - 		      do 
> - 			{ 
> -@@ -1860,19 +1741,19 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 			  
> - 			  if (!(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> - 			    sec_data = 0;
> --			  
> -+			   
> -+			  ans = 1;
> -+			   
> - 			  if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> - 			    {
> --			      ans = 1;
> - 			      auth = 0;
> - 			      if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
> - 				nxdomain = 1;
> - 			      if (!dryrun)
> - 				log_query(crecp->flags &
> ~F_FORWARD, name, &addr, NULL);
> - 			    }
> --			  else if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS |
> F_DHCP)) || !sec_reqd || option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
> -+			  else
> - 			    {
> --			      ans = 1;
> - 			      if (!(crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS |
> F_DHCP)))
> - 				auth = 0;
> - 			      if (!dryrun)
> -@@ -1892,6 +1773,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 	      else if (is_rev_synth(is_arpa, &addr, name))
> - 		{
> - 		  ans = 1;
> -+		  sec_data = 0;
> - 		  if (!dryrun)
> - 		    {
> - 		      log_query(F_CONFIG | F_REVERSE | is_arpa,
> name, &addr, NULL); 
> -@@ -1908,6 +1790,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 		{
> - 		  /* if not in cache, enabled and private IPV4
> address, return NXDOMAIN */
> - 		  ans = 1;
> -+		  sec_data = 0;
> - 		  nxdomain = 1;
> - 		  if (!dryrun)
> - 		    log_query(F_CONFIG | F_REVERSE | F_IPV4 | F_NEG
> | F_NXDOMAIN, 
> -@@ -1955,6 +1838,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 		  if (i == 4)
> - 		    {
> - 		      ans = 1;
> -+		      sec_data = 0;
> - 		      if (!dryrun)
> - 			{
> - 			  addr.addr.addr4.s_addr = htonl(a);
> -@@ -1993,6 +1877,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 				continue;
> - #endif	
> - 			      ans = 1;	
> -+			      sec_data = 0;
> - 			      if (!dryrun)
> - 				{
> - 				  gotit = 1;
> -@@ -2032,48 +1917,8 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 		      crecp = save;
> - 		    }
> - 
> --		  /* If the client asked for DNSSEC and we can't
> provide RRSIGs, either
> --		     because we've not doing DNSSEC or the cached
> answer is signed by negative,
> --		     don't answer from the cache, forward instead.
> */
> --		  if (!(crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) && sec_reqd)
> --		    {
> --		      if (!option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) ||
> ((crecp->flags & F_NEG) && (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
> --			crecp = NULL;
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --		      else if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> --			{
> --			  /* We're returning validated data, need
> to return the RRSIG too. */
> --			  struct crec *rr_crec = NULL;
> --			  int sigtype = type;
> --			  /* The signature may have expired even
> though the data is still in cache, 
> --			     forward instead of answering from
> cache if so. */
> --			  int gotsig = 0;
> --			  
> --			  if (crecp->flags & F_CNAME)
> --			    sigtype = T_CNAME;
> --			  
> --			  while ((rr_crec =
> cache_find_by_name(rr_crec, name, now, F_DS | F_DNSKEY)))
> --			    {
> --			      if (rr_crec->addr.sig.type_covered ==
> sigtype && rr_crec->uid == C_IN)
> --				{
> --				  char *sigdata =
> blockdata_retrieve(rr_crec->addr.sig.keydata, rr_crec-
> >addr.sig.keylen, NULL);
> --				  gotsig = 1;
> --				  
> --				  if (!dryrun && 
> --				      add_resource_record(header,
> limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp, 
> --							  rr_crec-
> >ttd - now, &nameoffset,
> --							  T_RRSIG,
> C_IN, "t", rr_crec->addr.sig.keylen, sigdata))
> --				    anscount++;
> --				}
> --			    }
> --			  
> --			  if (!gotsig)
> --			    crecp = NULL;
> --			}
> --#endif
> --		    }		 
> --
> --		  if (crecp)
> -+		  /* If the client asked for DNSSEC  don't use
> cached data. */
> -+		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> - 		    do
> - 		      { 
> - 			/* don't answer wildcard queries with data
> not from /etc/hosts
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
> Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
> Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index ff055f7..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
> Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,269 +0,0 @@
> -From d64c81fff7faf4392b688223ef3a617c5c07e7dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 16:11:06 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Move code which caches DS records to a more logical
> place.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |  179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> -------------
> - 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 1ae03a6..359231f 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1204,7 +1204,10 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
> - {
> -   unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> --  int qtype, qclass, val, i, neganswer, nons;
> -+  int qtype, qclass, rc, i, neganswer, nons;
> -+  int aclass, atype, rdlen;
> -+  unsigned long ttl;
> -+  struct all_addr a;
> - 
> -   if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
> -       !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
> -@@ -1214,40 +1217,100 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> -   GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> - 
> -   if (qtype != T_DS || qclass != class)
> --    val = STAT_BOGUS;
> -+    rc = STAT_BOGUS;
> -   else
> --    val = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
> NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons);
> -+    rc = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
> NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons);
> -   /* Note dnssec_validate_reply() will have cached positive answers
> */
> -   
> --  if (val == STAT_INSECURE)
> --    val = STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -+  if (rc == STAT_INSECURE)
> -+    rc = STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ 
> -   p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -   extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4);
> -   p += 4; /* qtype, qclass */
> -   
> --  if (!(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
> --    val = STAT_BOGUS;
> --  
> -   /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as
> the DS, we'll
> -      loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS
> answer comes
> -      from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
> --  if (val == STAT_BOGUS || (val == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
> hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
> -+  if (rc == STAT_BOGUS || (rc == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
> hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
> -     {
> -       log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS");
> -       return STAT_BOGUS;
> -     }
> -   
> --  if (val != STAT_SECURE)
> --    return val;
> --
> --  /* By here, the answer is proved secure, and a positive answer
> has been cached. */
> --  if (neganswer)
> -+  if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+    return rc;
> -+   
> -+  if (!neganswer)
> -     {
> --      int rdlen, flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK;
> --      unsigned long ttl, minttl = ULONG_MAX;
> --      struct all_addr a;
> -+      cache_start_insert();
> -+      
> -+      for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++)
> -+	{
> -+	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
> -+	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+	  
> -+	  GETSHORT(atype, p);
> -+	  GETSHORT(aclass, p);
> -+	  GETLONG(ttl, p);
> -+	  GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -+	  
> -+	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+	  
> -+	  if (aclass == class && atype == T_DS && rc == 1)
> -+	    { 
> -+	      int algo, digest, keytag;
> -+	      unsigned char *psave = p;
> -+	      struct blockdata *key;
> -+	      struct crec *crecp;
> - 
> -+	      if (rdlen < 4)
> -+		return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+	      
> -+	      GETSHORT(keytag, p);
> -+	      algo = *p++;
> -+	      digest = *p++;
> -+	      
> -+	      /* Cache needs to known class for DNSSEC stuff */
> -+	      a.addr.dnssec.class = class;
> -+	      
> -+	      if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
> -+		{
> -+		  if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl,
> F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
> -+		    {
> -+		      blockdata_free(key);
> -+		      return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+		    }
> -+		  else
> -+		    {
> -+		      a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> -+		      log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM,
> name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -+		      crecp->addr.ds.digest = digest;
> -+		      crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
> -+		      crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
> -+		      crecp->addr.ds.keytag = keytag;
> -+		      crecp->addr.ds.keylen = rdlen - 4; 
> -+		    } 
> -+		}
> -+	      
> -+	      p = psave;
> -+	      
> -+	      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+		return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+	    }
> -+	  
> -+	  cache_end_insert();
> -+	}
> -+    }
> -+  else
> -+    {
> -+      int flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK;
> -+      unsigned long minttl = ULONG_MAX;
> -+      
> -+      if (!(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header,
> plen)))
> -+	return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+      
> -       if (RCODE(header) == NXDOMAIN)
> - 	flags |= F_NXDOMAIN;
> -       
> -@@ -1261,20 +1324,20 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - 	  if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 0)))
> - 	    return STAT_BOGUS;
> - 	  
> --	  GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
> --	  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> -+	  GETSHORT(atype, p); 
> -+	  GETSHORT(aclass, p);
> - 	  GETLONG(ttl, p);
> - 	  GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> --
> -+	  
> - 	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> - 	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --	    
> --	  if (qclass != class || qtype != T_SOA)
> -+	  
> -+	  if (aclass != class || atype != T_SOA)
> - 	    {
> - 	      p += rdlen;
> - 	      continue;
> - 	    }
> --           
> -+	  
> - 	  if (ttl < minttl)
> - 	    minttl = ttl;
> - 	  
> -@@ -1306,7 +1369,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - 	  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "no DS");
> - 	}
> -     }
> --
> -+      
> -   return STAT_OK;
> - }
> - 
> -@@ -2001,11 +2064,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	  /* Not done, validate now */
> - 	  if (j == i)
> - 	    {
> --	      int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, sigcnt, rrcnt;
> --	      unsigned char *psave;
> --	      struct all_addr a;
> --	      struct blockdata *key;
> --	      struct crec *crecp;
> -+	      int sigcnt, rrcnt;
> - 	      char *wildname;
> - 	      
> - 	      if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name,
> keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt))
> -@@ -2032,6 +2091,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 		 Can't overwrite name here. */
> - 	      strcpy(daemon->workspacename, keyname);
> - 	      rc = zone_status(daemon->workspacename, class1,
> keyname, now);
> -+
> - 	      if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> - 		{
> - 		  /* Zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset
> */
> -@@ -2088,65 +2148,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 		      if (rc == STAT_BOGUS)
> - 			return rc;
> - 		    } 
> --		  
> --		  /* If we just validated a DS RRset, cache it */
> --		  /* Also note if the RRset is the answer to the
> question, or the target of a CNAME */
> --		  cache_start_insert();
> --		  
> --		  for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header-
> >ancount); j++)
> --		    {
> --		      if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2,
> name, 0, 10)))
> --			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --		      
> --		      GETSHORT(type2, p2);
> --		      GETSHORT(class2, p2);
> --		      GETLONG(ttl, p2);
> --		      GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
> --		      
> --		      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> --			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --		      
> --		      if (class2 == class1 && rc == 1)
> --			{ 
> --			  psave = p2;
> --			  
> --			  if (type1 == T_DS && type2 == T_DS)
> --			    {
> --			      if (rdlen2 < 4)
> --				return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --			      
> --			      GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
> --			      algo = *p2++;
> --			      digest = *p2++;
> --			      
> --			      /* Cache needs to known class for
> DNSSEC stuff */
> --			      a.addr.dnssec.class = class2;
> --			      
> --			      if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p2,
> rdlen2 - 4)))
> --				{
> --				  if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name,
> &a, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
> --				    blockdata_free(key);
> --				  else
> --				    {
> --				      a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> --				      log_query(F_NOEXTRA |
> F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> --				      crecp->addr.ds.digest =
> digest;
> --				      crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
> --				      crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
> --				      crecp->addr.ds.keytag =
> keytag;
> --				      crecp->addr.ds.keylen =
> rdlen2 - 4; 
> --				    } 
> --				}
> --			    }
> --
> --			  p2 = psave;
> --			}
> --		      
> --		      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> --			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --		    }
> --		  
> --		  cache_end_insert();
> - 		}
> - 	    }
> - 	}
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
> filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-
> Generalise_RR-filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 0a4942a..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
> filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,755 +0,0 @@
> -From c2bcd1e183bcc5fdd63811c045355fc57e36ecfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 17:25:21 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Generalise RR-filtering code, for use with EDNS0.
> -
> ----
> - Makefile       |    3 +-
> - bld/Android.mk |    2 +-
> - src/dnsmasq.h  |    5 +
> - src/dnssec.c   |  307 +------------------------------------------
> -------
> - src/forward.c  |    2 +-
> - src/rrfilter.c |  339
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> - 6 files changed, 349 insertions(+), 309 deletions(-)
> - create mode 100644 src/rrfilter.c
> -
> -diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
> -index 4c87ea9..b664160 100644
> ---- a/Makefile
> -+++ b/Makefile
> -@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ objs = cache.o rfc1035.o util.o option.o forward.o
> network.o \
> -        dnsmasq.o dhcp.o lease.o rfc2131.o netlink.o dbus.o bpf.o \
> -        helper.o tftp.o log.o conntrack.o dhcp6.o rfc3315.o \
> -        dhcp-common.o outpacket.o radv.o slaac.o auth.o ipset.o \
> --       domain.o dnssec.o blockdata.o tables.o loop.o inotify.o
> poll.o
> -+       domain.o dnssec.o blockdata.o tables.o loop.o inotify.o \
> -+       poll.o rrfilter.o
> - 
> - hdrs = dnsmasq.h config.h dhcp-protocol.h dhcp6-protocol.h \
> -        dns-protocol.h radv-protocol.h ip6addr.h
> -diff --git a/bld/Android.mk b/bld/Android.mk
> -index 5364ee7..67b9c4b 100644
> ---- a/bld/Android.mk
> -+++ b/bld/Android.mk
> -@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ LOCAL_SRC_FILES :=  bpf.c cache.c dbus.c dhcp.c
> dnsmasq.c \
> - 		    dhcp6.c rfc3315.c dhcp-common.c outpacket.c \
> - 		    radv.c slaac.c auth.c ipset.c domain.c \
> - 	            dnssec.c dnssec-openssl.c blockdata.c tables.c
> \
> --		    loop.c inotify.c poll.c
> -+		    loop.c inotify.c poll.c rrfilter.c
> - 
> - LOCAL_MODULE := dnsmasq
> - 
> -diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -index 4344cae..39a930c 100644
> ---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> -+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -@@ -1513,3 +1513,8 @@ int poll_check(int fd, short event);
> - void poll_listen(int fd, short event);
> - int do_poll(int timeout);
> - 
> -+/* rrfilter.c */
> -+size_t rrfilter(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int mode);
> -+u16 *rrfilter_desc(int type);
> -+int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int new);
> -+
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 359231f..fa3eb81 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -507,50 +507,6 @@ static int check_date_range(unsigned long
> date_start, unsigned long date_end)
> -     && serial_compare_32(curtime, date_end) == SERIAL_LT;
> - }
> - 
> --static u16 *get_desc(int type)
> --{
> --  /* List of RRtypes which include domains in the data.
> --     0 -> domain
> --     integer -> no of plain bytes
> --     -1 -> end
> --
> --     zero is not a valid RRtype, so the final entry is returned for
> --     anything which needs no mangling.
> --  */
> --  
> --  static u16 rr_desc[] = 
> --    { 
> --      T_NS, 0, -1, 
> --      T_MD, 0, -1,
> --      T_MF, 0, -1,
> --      T_CNAME, 0, -1,
> --      T_SOA, 0, 0, -1,
> --      T_MB, 0, -1,
> --      T_MG, 0, -1,
> --      T_MR, 0, -1,
> --      T_PTR, 0, -1,
> --      T_MINFO, 0, 0, -1,
> --      T_MX, 2, 0, -1,
> --      T_RP, 0, 0, -1,
> --      T_AFSDB, 2, 0, -1,
> --      T_RT, 2, 0, -1,
> --      T_SIG, 18, 0, -1,
> --      T_PX, 2, 0, 0, -1,
> --      T_NXT, 0, -1,
> --      T_KX, 2, 0, -1,
> --      T_SRV, 6, 0, -1,
> --      T_DNAME, 0, -1,
> --      0, -1 /* wildcard/catchall */
> --    }; 
> --  
> --  u16 *p = rr_desc;
> --  
> --  while (*p != type && *p != 0)
> --    while (*p++ != (u16)-1);
> --
> --  return p+1;
> --}
> --
> - /* Return bytes of canonicalised rdata, when the return value is
> zero, the remaining 
> -    data, pointed to by *p, should be used raw. */
> - static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> unsigned char *end, char *buff, int bufflen,
> -@@ -594,34 +550,6 @@ static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, unsigned char *end,
> -     }
> - }
> - 
> --static int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int
> new)
> --{
> --  unsigned char **p;
> --  int old = *szp;
> --
> --  if (old >= new+1)
> --    return 1;
> --
> --  if (new >= 100)
> --    return 0;
> --
> --  new += 5;
> --  
> --  if (!(p = whine_malloc(new * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
> --    return 0;  
> --  
> --  if (old != 0 && *wkspc)
> --    {
> --      memcpy(p, *wkspc, old * sizeof(unsigned char **));
> --      free(*wkspc);
> --    }
> --  
> --  *wkspc = p;
> --  *szp = new;
> --
> --  return 1;
> --}
> --
> - /* Bubble sort the RRset into the canonical order. 
> -    Note that the byte-streams from two RRs may get unsynced:
> consider 
> -    RRs which have two domain-names at the start and then other
> data.
> -@@ -849,7 +777,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> -   int rdlen, j, name_labels;
> -   struct crec *crecp = NULL;
> -   int algo, labels, orig_ttl, key_tag;
> --  u16 *rr_desc = get_desc(type);
> -+  u16 *rr_desc = rrfilter_desc(type);
> -  
> -   if (wildcard_out)
> -     *wildcard_out = NULL;
> -@@ -2266,239 +2194,6 @@ size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct
> dns_header *header, char *end, char *name, i
> -   return ret;
> - }
> - 
> --/* Go through a domain name, find "pointers" and fix them up based
> on how many bytes
> --   we've chopped out of the packet, or check they don't point into
> an elided part.  */
> --static int check_name(unsigned char **namep, struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
> --{
> --  unsigned char *ansp = *namep;
> --
> --  while(1)
> --    {
> --      unsigned int label_type;
> --      
> --      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 1))
> --	return 0;
> --      
> --      label_type = (*ansp) & 0xc0;
> --
> --      if (label_type == 0xc0)
> --	{
> --	  /* pointer for compression. */
> --	  unsigned int offset;
> --	  int i;
> --	  unsigned char *p;
> --	  
> --	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
> --	    return 0;
> --
> --	  offset = ((*ansp++) & 0x3f) << 8;
> --	  offset |= *ansp++;
> --
> --	  p = offset + (unsigned char *)header;
> --	  
> --	  for (i = 0; i < rr_count; i++)
> --	    if (p < rrs[i])
> --	      break;
> --	    else
> --	      if (i & 1)
> --		offset -= rrs[i] - rrs[i-1];
> --
> --	  /* does the pointer end up in an elided RR? */
> --	  if (i & 1)
> --	    return 0;
> --
> --	  /* No, scale the pointer */
> --	  if (fixup)
> --	    {
> --	      ansp -= 2;
> --	      *ansp++ = (offset >> 8) | 0xc0;
> --	      *ansp++ = offset & 0xff;
> --	    }
> --	  break;
> --	}
> --      else if (label_type == 0x80)
> --	return 0; /* reserved */
> --      else if (label_type == 0x40)
> --	{
> --	  /* Extended label type */
> --	  unsigned int count;
> --	  
> --	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
> --	    return 0;
> --	  
> --	  if (((*ansp++) & 0x3f) != 1)
> --	    return 0; /* we only understand bitstrings */
> --	  
> --	  count = *(ansp++); /* Bits in bitstring */
> --	  
> --	  if (count == 0) /* count == 0 means 256 bits */
> --	    ansp += 32;
> --	  else
> --	    ansp += ((count-1)>>3)+1;
> --	}
> --      else
> --	{ /* label type == 0 Bottom six bits is length */
> --	  unsigned int len = (*ansp++) & 0x3f;
> --	  
> --	  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, ansp, plen, len))
> --	    return 0;
> --
> --	  if (len == 0)
> --	    break; /* zero length label marks the end. */
> --	}
> --    }
> --
> --  *namep = ansp;
> --
> --  return 1;
> --}
> --
> --/* Go through RRs and check or fixup the domain names contained
> within */
> --static int check_rrs(unsigned char *p, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
> --{
> --  int i, type, class, rdlen;
> --  unsigned char *pp;
> --  
> --  for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
> ntohs(header->arcount); i++)
> --    {
> --      pp = p;
> --
> --      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> --	return 0;
> --      
> --      GETSHORT(type, p); 
> --      GETSHORT(class, p);
> --      p += 4; /* TTL */
> --      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> --
> --      if (type != T_NSEC && type != T_NSEC3 && type != T_RRSIG)
> --	{
> --	  /* fixup name of RR */
> --	  if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup, rrs, rr_count))
> --	    return 0;
> --	  
> --	  if (class == C_IN)
> --	    {
> --	      u16 *d;
> -- 
> --	      for (pp = p, d = get_desc(type); *d != (u16)-1; d++)
> --		{
> --		  if (*d != 0)
> --		    pp += *d;
> --		  else if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup,
> rrs, rr_count))
> --		    return 0;
> --		}
> --	    }
> --	}
> --      
> --      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> --	return 0;
> --    }
> --  
> --  return 1;
> --}
> --	
> --
> --size_t filter_rrsigs(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen)
> --{
> --  static unsigned char **rrs;
> --  static int rr_sz = 0;
> --  
> --  unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> --  int i, rdlen, qtype, qclass, rr_found, chop_an, chop_ns, chop_ar;
> --
> --  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
> --      !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
> --    return plen;
> --  
> --  GETSHORT(qtype, p);
> --  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> --
> --  /* First pass, find pointers to start and end of all the records
> we wish to elide:
> --     records added for DNSSEC, unless explicity queried for */
> --  for (rr_found = 0, chop_ns = 0, chop_an = 0, chop_ar = 0, i = 0; 
> --       i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
> ntohs(header->arcount);
> --       i++)
> --    {
> --      unsigned char *pstart = p;
> --      int type, class;
> --
> --      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> --	return plen;
> --      
> --      GETSHORT(type, p); 
> --      GETSHORT(class, p);
> --      p += 4; /* TTL */
> --      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> --      
> --      if ((type == T_NSEC || type == T_NSEC3 || type == T_RRSIG)
> && 
> --	  (type != qtype || class != qclass))
> --	{
> --	  if (!expand_workspace(&rrs, &rr_sz, rr_found + 1))
> --	    return plen; 
> --	  
> --	  rrs[rr_found++] = pstart;
> --
> --	  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> --	    return plen;
> --	  
> --	  rrs[rr_found++] = p;
> --	  
> --	  if (i < ntohs(header->ancount))
> --	    chop_an++;
> --	  else if (i < (ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header-
> >ancount)))
> --	    chop_ns++;
> --	  else
> --	    chop_ar++;
> --	}
> --      else if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> --	return plen;
> --    }
> --  
> --  /* Nothing to do. */
> --  if (rr_found == 0)
> --    return plen;
> --
> --  /* Second pass, look for pointers in names in the records we're
> keeping and make sure they don't
> --     point to records we're going to elide. This is theoretically
> possible, but unlikely. If
> --     it happens, we give up and leave the answer unchanged. */
> --  p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> --  
> --  /* question first */
> --  if (!check_name(&p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
> --    return plen;
> --  p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
> --  
> --  /* Now answers and NS */
> --  if (!check_rrs(p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
> --    return plen;
> --  
> --  /* Third pass, elide records */
> --  for (p = rrs[0], i = 1; i < rr_found; i += 2)
> --    {
> --      unsigned char *start = rrs[i];
> --      unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
> ((unsigned char *)(header+1)) + plen;
> --      
> --      memmove(p, start, end-start);
> --      p += end-start;
> --    }
> --     
> --  plen = p - (unsigned char *)header;
> --  header->ancount = htons(ntohs(header->ancount) - chop_an);
> --  header->nscount = htons(ntohs(header->nscount) - chop_ns);
> --  header->arcount = htons(ntohs(header->arcount) - chop_ar);
> --
> --  /* Fourth pass, fix up pointers in the remaining records */
> --  p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> --  
> --  check_name(&p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
> --  p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
> --  
> --  check_rrs(p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
> --  
> --  return plen;
> --}
> --
> - unsigned char* hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, char *name)
> - {
> -   int q;
> -diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
> -index dd22a62..3e801c8 100644
> ---- a/src/forward.c
> -+++ b/src/forward.c
> -@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header
> *header, time_t now, struct server
> - 
> -   /* If the requestor didn't set the DO bit, don't return DNSSEC
> info. */
> -   if (!do_bit)
> --    n = filter_rrsigs(header, n);
> -+    n = rrfilter(header, n, 1);
> - #endif
> - 
> -   /* do this after extract_addresses. Ensure NODATA reply and
> remove
> -diff --git a/src/rrfilter.c b/src/rrfilter.c
> -new file mode 100644
> -index 0000000..ae12261
> ---- /dev/null
> -+++ b/src/rrfilter.c
> -@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
> -+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2015 Simon Kelley
> -+
> -+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
> modify
> -+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
> published by
> -+   the Free Software Foundation; version 2 dated June, 1991, or
> -+   (at your option) version 3 dated 29 June, 2007.
> -+ 
> -+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> -+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> -+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
> -+   GNU General Public License for more details.
> -+     
> -+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
> License
> -+   along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licens
> es/>.
> -+*/
> -+
> -+/* Code to safely remove RRs from an DNS answer */ 
> -+
> -+#include "dnsmasq.h"
> -+
> -+/* Go through a domain name, find "pointers" and fix them up based
> on how many bytes
> -+   we've chopped out of the packet, or check they don't point into
> an elided part.  */
> -+static int check_name(unsigned char **namep, struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
> -+{
> -+  unsigned char *ansp = *namep;
> -+
> -+  while(1)
> -+    {
> -+      unsigned int label_type;
> -+      
> -+      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 1))
> -+	return 0;
> -+      
> -+      label_type = (*ansp) & 0xc0;
> -+
> -+      if (label_type == 0xc0)
> -+	{
> -+	  /* pointer for compression. */
> -+	  unsigned int offset;
> -+	  int i;
> -+	  unsigned char *p;
> -+	  
> -+	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
> -+	    return 0;
> -+
> -+	  offset = ((*ansp++) & 0x3f) << 8;
> -+	  offset |= *ansp++;
> -+
> -+	  p = offset + (unsigned char *)header;
> -+	  
> -+	  for (i = 0; i < rr_count; i++)
> -+	    if (p < rrs[i])
> -+	      break;
> -+	    else
> -+	      if (i & 1)
> -+		offset -= rrs[i] - rrs[i-1];
> -+
> -+	  /* does the pointer end up in an elided RR? */
> -+	  if (i & 1)
> -+	    return 0;
> -+
> -+	  /* No, scale the pointer */
> -+	  if (fixup)
> -+	    {
> -+	      ansp -= 2;
> -+	      *ansp++ = (offset >> 8) | 0xc0;
> -+	      *ansp++ = offset & 0xff;
> -+	    }
> -+	  break;
> -+	}
> -+      else if (label_type == 0x80)
> -+	return 0; /* reserved */
> -+      else if (label_type == 0x40)
> -+	{
> -+	  /* Extended label type */
> -+	  unsigned int count;
> -+	  
> -+	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
> -+	    return 0;
> -+	  
> -+	  if (((*ansp++) & 0x3f) != 1)
> -+	    return 0; /* we only understand bitstrings */
> -+	  
> -+	  count = *(ansp++); /* Bits in bitstring */
> -+	  
> -+	  if (count == 0) /* count == 0 means 256 bits */
> -+	    ansp += 32;
> -+	  else
> -+	    ansp += ((count-1)>>3)+1;
> -+	}
> -+      else
> -+	{ /* label type == 0 Bottom six bits is length */
> -+	  unsigned int len = (*ansp++) & 0x3f;
> -+	  
> -+	  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, ansp, plen, len))
> -+	    return 0;
> -+
> -+	  if (len == 0)
> -+	    break; /* zero length label marks the end. */
> -+	}
> -+    }
> -+
> -+  *namep = ansp;
> -+
> -+  return 1;
> -+}
> -+
> -+/* Go through RRs and check or fixup the domain names contained
> within */
> -+static int check_rrs(unsigned char *p, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
> -+{
> -+  int i, j, type, class, rdlen;
> -+  unsigned char *pp;
> -+  
> -+  for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
> ntohs(header->arcount); i++)
> -+    {
> -+      pp = p;
> -+
> -+      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> -+	return 0;
> -+      
> -+      GETSHORT(type, p); 
> -+      GETSHORT(class, p);
> -+      p += 4; /* TTL */
> -+      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -+
> -+      /* If this RR is to be elided, don't fix up its contents */
> -+      for (j = 0; j < rr_count; j += 2)
> -+	if (rrs[j] == pp)
> -+	  break;
> -+
> -+      if (j >= rr_count)
> -+	{
> -+	  /* fixup name of RR */
> -+	  if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup, rrs, rr_count))
> -+	    return 0;
> -+	  
> -+	  if (class == C_IN)
> -+	    {
> -+	      u16 *d;
> -+ 
> -+	      for (pp = p, d = rrfilter_desc(type); *d != (u16)-1;
> d++)
> -+		{
> -+		  if (*d != 0)
> -+		    pp += *d;
> -+		  else if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup,
> rrs, rr_count))
> -+		    return 0;
> -+		}
> -+	    }
> -+	}
> -+      
> -+      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+	return 0;
> -+    }
> -+  
> -+  return 1;
> -+}
> -+	
> -+
> -+/* mode is 0 to remove EDNS0, 1 to filter DNSSEC RRs */
> -+size_t rrfilter(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int mode)
> -+{
> -+  static unsigned char **rrs;
> -+  static int rr_sz = 0;
> -+
> -+  unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -+  int i, rdlen, qtype, qclass, rr_found, chop_an, chop_ns, chop_ar;
> -+
> -+  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
> -+      !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
> -+    return plen;
> -+  
> -+  GETSHORT(qtype, p);
> -+  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> -+
> -+  /* First pass, find pointers to start and end of all the records
> we wish to elide:
> -+     records added for DNSSEC, unless explicity queried for */
> -+  for (rr_found = 0, chop_ns = 0, chop_an = 0, chop_ar = 0, i = 0; 
> -+       i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
> ntohs(header->arcount);
> -+       i++)
> -+    {
> -+      unsigned char *pstart = p;
> -+      int type, class;
> -+
> -+      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> -+	return plen;
> -+      
> -+      GETSHORT(type, p); 
> -+      GETSHORT(class, p);
> -+      p += 4; /* TTL */
> -+      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -+        
> -+      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+	return plen;
> -+
> -+      /* Don't remove the answer. */
> -+      if (i < ntohs(header->ancount) && type == qtype && class ==
> qclass)
> -+	continue;
> -+      
> -+      if (mode == 0) /* EDNS */
> -+	{
> -+	  /* EDNS mode, remove T_OPT from additional section only
> */
> -+	  if (i < (ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header->ancount)) 
> || type != T_OPT)
> -+	    continue;
> -+	}
> -+      else if (type != T_NSEC && type != T_NSEC3 && type !=
> T_RRSIG)
> -+	/* DNSSEC mode, remove SIGs and NSECs from all three
> sections. */
> -+	continue;
> -+      
> -+      
> -+      if (!expand_workspace(&rrs, &rr_sz, rr_found + 1))
> -+	return plen; 
> -+      
> -+      rrs[rr_found++] = pstart;
> -+      rrs[rr_found++] = p;
> -+      
> -+      if (i < ntohs(header->ancount))
> -+	chop_an++;
> -+      else if (i < (ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header-
> >ancount)))
> -+	chop_ns++;
> -+      else
> -+	chop_ar++;
> -+    }
> -+  
> -+  /* Nothing to do. */
> -+  if (rr_found == 0)
> -+    return plen;
> -+
> -+  /* Second pass, look for pointers in names in the records we're
> keeping and make sure they don't
> -+     point to records we're going to elide. This is theoretically
> possible, but unlikely. If
> -+     it happens, we give up and leave the answer unchanged. */
> -+  p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -+  
> -+  /* question first */
> -+  if (!check_name(&p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
> -+    return plen;
> -+  p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
> -+  
> -+  /* Now answers and NS */
> -+  if (!check_rrs(p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
> -+    return plen;
> -+  
> -+  /* Third pass, elide records */
> -+  for (p = rrs[0], i = 1; i < rr_found; i += 2)
> -+    {
> -+      unsigned char *start = rrs[i];
> -+      unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
> ((unsigned char *)(header+1)) + plen;
> -+      
> -+      memmove(p, start, end-start);
> -+      p += end-start;
> -+    }
> -+     
> -+  plen = p - (unsigned char *)header;
> -+  header->ancount = htons(ntohs(header->ancount) - chop_an);
> -+  header->nscount = htons(ntohs(header->nscount) - chop_ns);
> -+  header->arcount = htons(ntohs(header->arcount) - chop_ar);
> -+
> -+  /* Fourth pass, fix up pointers in the remaining records */
> -+  p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -+  
> -+  check_name(&p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
> -+  p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
> -+  
> -+  check_rrs(p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
> -+  
> -+  return plen;
> -+}
> -+
> -+/* This is used in the DNSSEC code too, hence it's exported */
> -+u16 *rrfilter_desc(int type)
> -+{
> -+  /* List of RRtypes which include domains in the data.
> -+     0 -> domain
> -+     integer -> no of plain bytes
> -+     -1 -> end
> -+
> -+     zero is not a valid RRtype, so the final entry is returned for
> -+     anything which needs no mangling.
> -+  */
> -+  
> -+  static u16 rr_desc[] = 
> -+    { 
> -+      T_NS, 0, -1, 
> -+      T_MD, 0, -1,
> -+      T_MF, 0, -1,
> -+      T_CNAME, 0, -1,
> -+      T_SOA, 0, 0, -1,
> -+      T_MB, 0, -1,
> -+      T_MG, 0, -1,
> -+      T_MR, 0, -1,
> -+      T_PTR, 0, -1,
> -+      T_MINFO, 0, 0, -1,
> -+      T_MX, 2, 0, -1,
> -+      T_RP, 0, 0, -1,
> -+      T_AFSDB, 2, 0, -1,
> -+      T_RT, 2, 0, -1,
> -+      T_SIG, 18, 0, -1,
> -+      T_PX, 2, 0, 0, -1,
> -+      T_NXT, 0, -1,
> -+      T_KX, 2, 0, -1,
> -+      T_SRV, 6, 0, -1,
> -+      T_DNAME, 0, -1,
> -+      0, -1 /* wildcard/catchall */
> -+    }; 
> -+  
> -+  u16 *p = rr_desc;
> -+  
> -+  while (*p != type && *p != 0)
> -+    while (*p++ != (u16)-1);
> -+
> -+  return p+1;
> -+}
> -+
> -+int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int new)
> -+{
> -+  unsigned char **p;
> -+  int old = *szp;
> -+
> -+  if (old >= new+1)
> -+    return 1;
> -+
> -+  if (new >= 100)
> -+    return 0;
> -+
> -+  new += 5;
> -+  
> -+  if (!(p = whine_malloc(new * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
> -+    return 0;  
> -+  
> -+  if (old != 0 && *wkspc)
> -+    {
> -+      memcpy(p, *wkspc, old * sizeof(unsigned char **));
> -+      free(*wkspc);
> -+    }
> -+  
> -+  *wkspc = p;
> -+  *szp = new;
> -+
> -+  return 1;
> -+}
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index ffb412b..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
> -From 2dbba34b2c1289a108f876c78b84889f2a93115d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2015 13:41:58 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] DNSSEC validation tweak.
> -
> -A zone which has at least one key with an algorithm we don't
> -support should be considered as insecure.
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |   82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> -----------
> - 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index fa3eb81..dc563e0 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -763,10 +763,10 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> -    STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
> returned in keyname)
> -    STAT_NEED_DS  need DS to complete validation (name is returned
> in keyname)
> - 
> --   if key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
> given in the params of those names,
> -+   If key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
> given in the params of those names,
> -    otherwise find the key in the cache.
> - 
> --   name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
> trashed.
> -+   Name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
> trashed.
> - 
> -    Call explore_rrset first to find and count RRs and sigs.
> - */
> -@@ -919,6 +919,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> -   return STAT_BOGUS;
> - }
> -  
> -+
> - /* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY
> query.
> -    Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
> -    return codes:
> -@@ -1831,15 +1832,15 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - 
> - /* Check signing status of name.
> -    returns:
> --   STAT_SECURE zone is signed.
> --   STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
> --   STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname.
> --   
> -+   STAT_SECURE      zone is signed.
> -+   STAT_INSECURE    zone proved unsigned.
> -+   STAT_NEED_DS     require DS record of name returned in keyname.
> -+   STAT_NEED_DNSKEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in
> keyname.
> -    name returned unaltered.
> - */
> - static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t
> now)
> - {
> --  int name_start = strlen(name);
> -+  int secure_ds, name_start = strlen(name);
> -   struct crec *crecp;
> -   char *p;
> -   
> -@@ -1850,27 +1851,52 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int
> class, char *keyname, time_t now)
> -       if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
> - 	return STAT_NEED_DS;
> -       else
> --	do 
> --	  {
> --	    if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
> --	      {
> --		/* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
> existance of NS record.
> --		   F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
> there's no DS record here,
> --		   but that's because there's no NS record either,
> ie this isn't the start
> --		   of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below
> a node is unsigned when
> --		   we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no
> DS record.
> --		*/	  
> --		if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> --		  {
> --		    if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> --		      return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */
> --		  }
> --		else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest) ||
> !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> --		  return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
> insecure */
> --	      }
> --	  }
> --	while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DS)));
> --      
> -+	{
> -+	  secure_ds = 0;
> -+	  
> -+	  do 
> -+	    {
> -+	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
> -+		{
> -+		  /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
> existance of NS record.
> -+		     F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
> there's no DS record here,
> -+		     but that's because there's no NS record
> either, ie this isn't the start
> -+		     of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree
> below a node is unsigned when
> -+		     we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's
> no DS record.
> -+		  */	  
> -+		  if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -+		    {
> -+		      if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -+			return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here
> */
> -+		    }
> -+		  else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest)
> || !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -+		    return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
> insecure */
> -+		  else
> -+		    secure_ds = 1;
> -+		}
> -+	    }
> -+	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DS)));
> -+	}
> -+
> -+      if (secure_ds)
> -+	{
> -+	  /* We've found only DS records that attest to the DNSKEY
> RRset in the zone, so we believe
> -+	     that RRset is good. Furthermore the DNSKEY whose hash
> is proved by the DS record is
> -+	     one we can use. However the DNSKEY RRset may contain
> more than one key and
> -+	     one of the other keys may use an algorithm we don't
> support. If that's 
> -+	     the case the zone is insecure for us. */
> -+	  
> -+	  if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)))
> -+	    return STAT_NEED_KEY;
> -+
> -+	  do 
> -+	    {
> -+	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.key.algo))
> -+		return STAT_INSECURE;
> -+	    }
> -+	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)));
> -+	}
> -+
> -       if (name_start == 0)
> - 	break;
> - 
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
> Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
> Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index c3c74cc..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
> Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
> -From dd4ad9ac7ea6d51dcc34a1f2cd2da14efbb87714 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:44:58 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Tweaks to EDNS0 handling in DNS replies.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c  |   20 +++++++++-----------
> - src/rfc1035.c |   57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> -----------
> - 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index dc563e0..012b2a6 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -2129,18 +2129,16 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	    /* Empty DS without NSECS */
> - 	    if (qtype == T_DS)
> - 	      return STAT_BOGUS;
> --	    else
> -+	    
> -+	    rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
> -+	    if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> - 	      {
> --		rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
> --		if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> --		  {
> --		    if (class)
> --		      *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> --		    return rc;
> --		  } 
> --		
> --		return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
> --	      }
> -+		if (class)
> -+		  *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -+		return rc;
> -+	      } 
> -+	    
> -+	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
> - 	  }
> - 
> - 	  if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index def8fa0..188d05f 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -1539,7 +1539,13 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -   int nxdomain = 0, auth = 1, trunc = 0, sec_data = 1;
> -   struct mx_srv_record *rec;
> -   size_t len;
> -- 
> -+  
> -+  if (ntohs(header->ancount) != 0 ||
> -+      ntohs(header->nscount) != 0 ||
> -+      ntohs(header->qdcount) == 0 || 
> -+      OPCODE(header) != QUERY )
> -+    return 0;
> -+  
> -   /* Don't return AD set if checking disabled. */
> -   if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
> -     sec_data = 0;
> -@@ -1548,33 +1554,32 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -   *ad_reqd = header->hb4 & HB4_AD;
> -   *do_bit = 0;
> - 
> --  /* If there is an RFC2671 pseudoheader then it will be
> overwritten by
> -+  /* If there is an  additional data section then it will be
> overwritten by
> -      partial replies, so we have to do a dry run to see if we can
> answer
> --     the query. We check to see if the do bit is set, if so we
> always
> --     forward rather than answering from the cache, which doesn't
> include
> --     security information, unless we're in DNSSEC validation mode.
> */
> -+     the query. */
> - 
> --  if (find_pseudoheader(header, qlen, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
> --    { 
> --      unsigned short flags;
> --      
> --      have_pseudoheader = 1;
> -+  if (ntohs(header->arcount) != 0)
> -+    {
> -+      dryrun = 1;
> - 
> --      pheader += 4; /* udp size, ext_rcode */
> --      GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> --      
> --      if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
> --	{
> --	  *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
> --	  *ad_reqd = 1;
> -+      /* If there's an additional section, there might be an
> EDNS(0) pseudoheader */
> -+      if (find_pseudoheader(header, qlen, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
> -+	{ 
> -+	  unsigned short flags;
> -+	  
> -+	  have_pseudoheader = 1;
> -+	  
> -+	  pheader += 4; /* udp size, ext_rcode */
> -+	  GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> -+	  
> -+	  if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
> -+	    {
> -+	      *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
> -+	      *ad_reqd = 1;
> -+	    }
> - 	}
> --
> --      dryrun = 1;
> -     }
> - 
> --  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) == 0 || OPCODE(header) != QUERY )
> --    return 0;
> --  
> -   for (rec = daemon->mxnames; rec; rec = rec->next)
> -     rec->offset = 0;
> -   
> -@@ -1730,8 +1735,12 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 		}
> - 	      else if ((crecp = cache_find_by_addr(NULL, &addr,
> now, is_arpa)))
> - 		{
> --		  /* Don't use cache when DNSSEC data required. */
> --		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> -+		  /* Don't use cache when DNSSEC data required,
> unless we know that
> -+		     the zone is unsigned, which implies that we're
> doing
> -+		     validation. */
> -+		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || 
> -+		      !sec_reqd || 
> -+		      (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(crecp-
> >flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
> - 		    {
> - 		      do 
> - 			{ 
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
> existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
> existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 60503e9..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
> existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,409 +0,0 @@
> -From b40f26c0199235073abc37e1e1d6ed93bed372f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 11:57:26 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Tidy up DNSSEC non-existence code. Check zone
> status is NSEC
> - proof bad.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |  207 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
> -------------
> - 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 012b2a6..ddae497 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1367,59 +1367,6 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const
> char *b)
> -     }
> - }
> - 
> --/* Find all the NSEC or NSEC3 records in a reply.
> --   return an array of pointers to them. */
> --static int find_nsec_records(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, unsigned char ***nsecsetp, int *nsecsetl, int class_reqd)
> --{
> --  static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL;
> --  static int nsecset_sz = 0;
> --  
> --  int type_found = 0;
> --  unsigned char *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
> --  int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found;
> --
> --  /* Move to NS section */
> --  if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header,
> plen)))
> --    return 0;
> --  
> --  for (nsecs_found = 0, i = ntohs(header->nscount); i != 0; i--)
> --    {
> --      unsigned char *pstart = p;
> --      
> --      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> --	return 0;
> --      
> --      GETSHORT(type, p); 
> --      GETSHORT(class, p);
> --      p += 4; /* TTL */
> --      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> --
> --      if (class == class_reqd && (type == T_NSEC || type ==
> T_NSEC3))
> --	{
> --	  /* No mixed NSECing 'round here, thankyouverymuch */
> --	  if (type_found == T_NSEC && type == T_NSEC3)
> --	    return 0;
> --	  if (type_found == T_NSEC3 && type == T_NSEC)
> --	    return 0;
> --
> --	  type_found = type;
> --
> --	  if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz,
> nsecs_found))
> --	    return 0; 
> --	  
> --	  nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
> --	}
> --      
> --      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> --	return 0;
> --    }
> --  
> --  *nsecsetp = nsecset;
> --  *nsecsetl = nsecs_found;
> --  
> --  return type_found;
> --}
> --
> - static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count,
> - 				    char *workspace1, char
> *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)
> - {
> -@@ -1436,12 +1383,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> -     {
> -       p = nsecs[i];
> -       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	return 0;
> -       p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
> -       GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -       psave = p;
> -       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 10))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	return 0;
> -       
> -       rc = hostname_cmp(workspace1, name);
> -       
> -@@ -1449,7 +1396,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> - 	{
> - 	  /* 4035 para 5.4. Last sentence */
> - 	  if (type == T_NSEC || type == T_RRSIG)
> --	    return STAT_SECURE;
> -+	    return 1;
> - 
> - 	  /* NSEC with the same name as the RR we're testing, check
> - 	     that the type in question doesn't appear in the type
> map */
> -@@ -1465,24 +1412,24 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> - 	      /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's
> a CNAME is should 
> - 		 have been returned. */
> - 	      if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
> --		return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+		return 0;
> - 	      
> - 	      /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we
> have the
> - 		 DS from the wrong side of the delegation. */
> - 	      if (type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) != 0)
> --		return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+		return 0;
> - 	    }
> - 
> - 	  while (rdlen >= 2)
> - 	    {
> - 	      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> --		return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+		return 0;
> - 	      
> - 	      if (p[0] == type >> 8)
> - 		{
> - 		  /* Does the NSEC say our type exists? */
> - 		  if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask) != 0)
> --		    return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+		    return 0;
> - 		  
> - 		  break; /* finshed checking */
> - 		}
> -@@ -1491,24 +1438,24 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> - 	      p +=  p[1];
> - 	    }
> - 	  
> --	  return STAT_SECURE;
> -+	  return 1;
> - 	}
> -       else if (rc == -1)
> - 	{
> - 	  /* Normal case, name falls between NSEC name and next
> domain name,
> - 	     wrap around case, name falls between NSEC name (rc ==
> -1) and end */
> - 	  if (hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >= 0 ||
> hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0)
> --	    return STAT_SECURE;
> -+	    return 1;
> - 	}
> -       else 
> - 	{
> - 	  /* wrap around case, name falls between start and next
> domain name */
> - 	  if (hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0 &&
> hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >=0 )
> --	    return STAT_SECURE;
> -+	    return 1;
> - 	}
> -     }
> -   
> --  return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+  return 0;
> - }
> - 
> - /* return digest length, or zero on error */
> -@@ -1701,7 +1648,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> -     {
> -       if (!(p = skip_name(nsecs[i], header, plen, 15)))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+	return 0; /* bad packet */
> -       
> -       p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
> -       algo = *p++;
> -@@ -1712,14 +1659,14 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - 
> -   /* No usable NSEC3s */
> -   if (i == nsec_count)
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+    return 0;
> - 
> -   p++; /* flags */
> -   GETSHORT (iterations, p);
> -   salt_len = *p++;
> -   salt = p;
> -   if (!CHECK_LEN(header, salt, plen, salt_len))
> --    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+    return 0; /* bad packet */
> -     
> -   /* Now prune so we only have NSEC3 records with same iterations,
> salt and algo */
> -   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> -@@ -1730,7 +1677,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -       nsecs[i] = NULL; /* Speculative, will be restored if OK. */
> -       
> -       if (!(p = skip_name(nsec3p, header, plen, 15)))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+	return 0; /* bad packet */
> -       
> -       p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
> -       
> -@@ -1747,7 +1694,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - 	continue;
> -       
> -       if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, salt_len))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+	return 0; /* bad packet */
> - 
> -       if (memcmp(p, salt, salt_len) != 0)
> - 	continue;
> -@@ -1758,13 +1705,13 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - 
> -   /* Algo is checked as 1 above */
> -   if (!(hash = hash_find("sha1")))
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+    return 0;
> - 
> -   if ((digest_len = hash_name(name, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len,
> iterations)) == 0)
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+    return 0;
> -   
> -   if (check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type,
> workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, nons))
> --    return STAT_SECURE;
> -+    return 1;
> - 
> -   /* Can't find an NSEC3 which covers the name directly, we need
> the "closest encloser NSEC3" 
> -      or an answer inferred from a wildcard record. */
> -@@ -1780,14 +1727,14 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - 	break;
> - 
> -       if ((digest_len = hash_name(closest_encloser, &digest, hash,
> salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	return 0;
> -       
> -       for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> - 	if ((p = nsecs[i]))
> - 	  {
> - 	    if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0)
> ||
> - 		!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned
> char *)workspace2)))
> --	      return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	      return 0;
> - 	  
> - 	    if (digest_len == base32_len &&
> - 		memcmp(digest, workspace2, digest_len) == 0)
> -@@ -1802,32 +1749,81 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -   while ((closest_encloser = strchr(closest_encloser, '.')));
> -   
> -   if (!closest_encloser)
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+    return 0;
> -   
> -   /* Look for NSEC3 that proves the non-existence of the next-
> closest encloser */
> -   if ((digest_len = hash_name(next_closest, &digest, hash, salt,
> salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+    return 0;
> - 
> -   if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type,
> workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL))
> --    return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+    return 0;
> -   
> -   /* Finally, check that there's no seat of wildcard synthesis */
> -   if (!wildname)
> -     {
> -       if (!(wildcard = strchr(next_closest, '.')) || wildcard ==
> next_closest)
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	return 0;
> -       
> -       wildcard--;
> -       *wildcard = '*';
> -       
> -       if ((digest_len = hash_name(wildcard, &digest, hash, salt,
> salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	return 0;
> -       
> -       if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest,
> type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL))
> --	return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+	return 0;
> -     }
> -   
> --  return STAT_SECURE;
> -+  return 1;
> -+}
> -+
> -+static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass, char
> *wildname, int *nons)
> -+{
> -+  static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL;
> -+  static int nsecset_sz = 0;
> -+  
> -+  int type_found = 0;
> -+  unsigned char *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
> -+  int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found;
> -+  
> -+  /* Move to NS section */
> -+  if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header,
> plen)))
> -+    return 0;
> -+  
> -+  for (nsecs_found = 0, i = ntohs(header->nscount); i != 0; i--)
> -+    {
> -+      unsigned char *pstart = p;
> -+      
> -+      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> -+	return 0;
> -+      
> -+      GETSHORT(type, p); 
> -+      GETSHORT(class, p);
> -+      p += 4; /* TTL */
> -+      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -+
> -+      if (class == qclass && (type == T_NSEC || type == T_NSEC3))
> -+	{
> -+	  /* No mixed NSECing 'round here, thankyouverymuch */
> -+	  if (type_found != 0 && type_found != type)
> -+	    return 0;
> -+
> -+	  type_found = type;
> -+
> -+	  if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz,
> nsecs_found))
> -+	    return 0; 
> -+	  
> -+	  nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
> -+	}
> -+      
> -+      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+	return 0;
> -+    }
> -+  
> -+  if (type_found == T_NSEC)
> -+    return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset,
> nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
> -+  else
> -+    return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset,
> nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname,
> nons);
> - }
> - 
> - /* Check signing status of name.
> -@@ -1925,10 +1921,9 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -   static unsigned char **targets = NULL;
> -   static int target_sz = 0;
> - 
> --  unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2, **nsecs;
> -+  unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2;
> -   int type1, class1, rdlen1, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype,
> targetidx;
> --  int i, j, rc, nsec_count;
> --  int nsec_type;
> -+  int i, j, rc;
> - 
> -   if (neganswer)
> -     *neganswer = 0;
> -@@ -2080,28 +2075,15 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 			  targets[j] = NULL;
> - 		      }
> - 			    
> --		  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> --		    {
> --		      /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with
> a different
> --			 answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
> this
> --			 hasn't happened, the answer must prove
> that
> --			 the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check
> that here. */
> --		      if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header,
> plen, &nsecs, &nsec_count, class1)))
> --			return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad
> packet */
> --		      
> --		      /* Note that we may not yet have validated
> the NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets. Since the check
> --			 below returns either SECURE or BOGUS,
> that's not a problem. If the RRsets later fail
> --			 we'll return BOGUS then. */
> --
> --		      if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> --			rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen,
> nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type1,
> NULL);
> --		      else
> --			rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header,
> plen, nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, 
> --						       keyname,
> name, type1, wildname, NULL);
> --		      
> --		      if (rc == STAT_BOGUS)
> --			return rc;
> --		    } 
> -+		   /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with a
> different
> -+		      answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
> this
> -+		      hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
> -+		      the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check that
> here. 
> -+		      Note that we may not yet have validated the
> NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets. 
> -+		      That's not a problem since if the RRsets
> later fail
> -+		      we'll return BOGUS then. */
> -+		  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD &&
> !prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, type1, class1,
> wildname, NULL))
> -+		    return STAT_BOGUS;
> - 		}
> - 	    }
> - 	}
> -@@ -2124,14 +2106,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 
> - 	/* For anything other than a DS record, this situation is
> OK if either
> - 	   the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's a NSEC
> records. */
> --	if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen, &nsecs,
> &nsec_count, qclass)))
> -+	if (!prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name,
> qtype, qclass, NULL, nons))
> - 	  {
> - 	    /* Empty DS without NSECS */
> - 	    if (qtype == T_DS)
> - 	      return STAT_BOGUS;
> - 	    
> --	    rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
> --	    if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+	    if ((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)) !=
> STAT_SECURE)
> - 	      {
> - 		if (class)
> - 		  *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -@@ -2140,14 +2121,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	    
> - 	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
> - 	  }
> --
> --	  if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> --	  rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
> --	else
> --	  rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, NULL, nons);
> --
> --	if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> --	  return rc;
> -       }
> -   
> -   return STAT_SECURE;
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
> Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index eda6fbd..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
> Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
> -From 3b799c826db05fc2da1c6d15cbe372e394209d27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 16:58:04 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Fix brace botch in dnssec_validate_ds()
> -MIME-Version: 1.0
> -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8
> -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
> -
> -Thanks to Michał Kępień for spotting this.
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |   34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
> - 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index ddae497..1f8c954 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -923,11 +923,11 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - /* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY
> query.
> -    Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
> -    return codes:
> --         STAT_OK           Done, key(s) in cache.
> --	 STAT_BOGUS        No DNSKEYs found, which  can be
> validated with DS,
> --	                   or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not
> valid, bad packet.
> --	 STAT_NEED_DS      DS records to validate a key not found,
> name in keyname 
> --	 STAT_NEED_DNSKEY  DNSKEY records to validate a key not
> found, name in keyname 
> -+         STAT_OK        Done, key(s) in cache.
> -+	 STAT_BOGUS     No DNSKEYs found, which  can be validated
> with DS,
> -+	                or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not valid,
> bad packet.
> -+	 STAT_NEED_DS   DS records to validate a key not found,
> name in keyname 
> -+	 STAT_NEED_KEY  DNSKEY records to validate a key not found,
> name in keyname 
> - */
> - int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
> - {
> -@@ -1224,13 +1224,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - 		}
> - 	      
> - 	      p = psave;
> --	      
> --	      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> --		return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> - 	    }
> --	  
> --	  cache_end_insert();
> -+	  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> - 	}
> -+
> -+      cache_end_insert();
> -+
> -     }
> -   else
> -     {
> -@@ -1828,10 +1828,10 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
> - 
> - /* Check signing status of name.
> -    returns:
> --   STAT_SECURE      zone is signed.
> --   STAT_INSECURE    zone proved unsigned.
> --   STAT_NEED_DS     require DS record of name returned in keyname.
> --   STAT_NEED_DNSKEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in
> keyname.
> -+   STAT_SECURE   zone is signed.
> -+   STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
> -+   STAT_NEED_DS  require DS record of name returned in keyname.
> -+   STAT_NEED_KEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in keyname.
> -    name returned unaltered.
> - */
> - static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t
> now)
> -@@ -2028,7 +2028,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 		      if (rc == STAT_SECURE)
> - 			rc = STAT_BOGUS;
> - 		       if (class)
> --			 *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -+			 *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_KEY */
> - 		    }
> - 		  else 
> - 		    rc = STAT_INSECURE; 
> -@@ -2045,7 +2045,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 		{
> - 		  /* Zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset
> */
> - 		  if (class)
> --		    *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -+		    *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_KEY */
> - 		  return rc;
> - 		} 
> - 	      
> -@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 	    if ((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)) !=
> STAT_SECURE)
> - 	      {
> - 		if (class)
> --		  *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -+		  *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or NEED_KEY
> */
> - 		return rc;
> - 	      } 
> - 	    
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
> Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
> atch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
> Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
> atch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index abcae5c..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
> Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
> atch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
> -From 14a4ae883d51130d33da7133287e8867c64bab65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 17:23:03 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Do a better job of determining which DNSSEC sig
> algos are
> - supported.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |   52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> -------
> - 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 1f8c954..82394ee 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -65,10 +65,9 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
> -     case 8: return "sha256";
> -     case 10: return "sha512";
> -     case 12: return "gosthash94";
> --#ifndef NO_NETTLE_ECC
> -     case 13: return "sha256";
> -     case 14: return "sha384";
> --#endif
> -+
> -     default: return NULL;
> -     }
> - }
> -@@ -129,13 +128,15 @@ static int hash_init(const struct nettle_hash
> *hash, void **ctxp, unsigned char
> - }
> -   
> - static int dnsmasq_rsa_verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned
> int key_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> --			      unsigned char *digest, int algo)
> -+			      unsigned char *digest, size_t
> digest_len, int algo)
> - {
> -   unsigned char *p;
> -   size_t exp_len;
> -   
> -   static struct rsa_public_key *key = NULL;
> -   static mpz_t sig_mpz;
> -+
> -+  (void)digest_len;
> -   
> -   if (key == NULL)
> -     {
> -@@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ static int dnsmasq_rsa_verify(struct blockdata
> *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
> - }  
> - 
> - static int dnsmasq_dsa_verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned
> int key_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> --			      unsigned char *digest, int algo)
> -+			      unsigned char *digest, size_t
> digest_len, int algo)
> - {
> -   unsigned char *p;
> -   unsigned int t;
> -@@ -189,6 +190,8 @@ static int dnsmasq_dsa_verify(struct blockdata
> *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
> -   static struct dsa_public_key *key = NULL;
> -   static struct dsa_signature *sig_struct;
> -   
> -+  (void)digest_len;
> -+
> -   if (key == NULL)
> -     {
> -       if (!(sig_struct = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct
> dsa_signature))) || 
> -@@ -292,26 +295,45 @@ static int dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify(struct
> blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len
> - } 
> - #endif 
> - 
> --static int verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
> unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> --		  unsigned char *digest, size_t digest_len, int
> algo)
> -+static int (*verify_func(int algo))(struct blockdata *key_data,
> unsigned int key_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> -+				    unsigned char *digest, size_t
> digest_len, int algo)
> - {
> --  (void)digest_len;
> --
> -+    
> -+  /* Enure at runtime that we have support for this digest */
> -+  if (!hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo)))
> -+    return NULL;
> -+  
> -+  /* This switch defines which sig algorithms we support, can't
> introspect Nettle for that. */
> -   switch (algo)
> -     {
> -     case 1: case 5: case 7: case 8: case 10:
> --      return dnsmasq_rsa_verify(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len,
> digest, algo);
> -+      return dnsmasq_rsa_verify;
> -       
> -     case 3: case 6: 
> --      return dnsmasq_dsa_verify(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len,
> digest, algo);
> -+      return dnsmasq_dsa_verify;
> -  
> - #ifndef NO_NETTLE_ECC   
> -     case 13: case 14:
> --      return dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len,
> digest, digest_len, algo);
> -+      return dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify;
> - #endif
> -     }
> -   
> --  return 0;
> -+  return NULL;
> -+}
> -+
> -+static int verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
> unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> -+		  unsigned char *digest, size_t digest_len, int
> algo)
> -+{
> -+
> -+  int (*func)(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
> unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> -+	      unsigned char *digest, size_t digest_len, int algo);
> -+  
> -+  func = verify_func(algo);
> -+  
> -+  if (!func)
> -+    return 0;
> -+
> -+  return (*func)(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len, digest,
> digest_len, algo);
> - }
> - 
> - /* Convert from presentation format to wire format, in place.
> -@@ -732,7 +754,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> - 	      if (check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration)
> &&
> - 		  labels <= name_labels &&
> - 		  type_covered == type && 
> --		  algo_digest_name(algo))
> -+		  verify_func(algo))
> - 		{
> - 		  if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx))
> - 		    return 0; 
> -@@ -1865,7 +1887,7 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class,
> char *keyname, time_t now)
> - 		      if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> - 			return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here
> */
> - 		    }
> --		  else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest)
> || !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -+		  else if (!hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp-
> >addr.ds.digest)) || !verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> - 		    return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
> insecure */
> - 		  else
> - 		    secure_ds = 1;
> -@@ -1887,7 +1909,7 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class,
> char *keyname, time_t now)
> - 
> - 	  do 
> - 	    {
> --	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.key.algo))
> -+	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> !verify_func(crecp->addr.key.algo))
> - 		return STAT_INSECURE;
> - 	    }
> - 	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)));
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
> Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
> Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index c016e73..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
> Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,643 +0,0 @@
> -From fa14bec83b2db010fd076910fddab56957b9375d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 17:12:16 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Major tidy up of EDNS0 handling and computation/use
> of udp
> - packet size.
> -
> ----
> - src/auth.c     |    8 ++-
> - src/dnsmasq.h  |    7 ++-
> - src/dnssec.c   |    1 -
> - src/forward.c  |  184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> -----------
> - src/netlink.c  |    3 +-
> - src/rfc1035.c  |   81 +++++++------------------
> - src/rrfilter.c |    2 +-
> - 7 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/auth.c b/src/auth.c
> -index 2b0b7d6..85bd5e7 100644
> ---- a/src/auth.c
> -+++ b/src/auth.c
> -@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char *name,
> char **cut)
> - }
> - 
> - 
> --size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t
> qlen, time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, int local_query) 
> -+size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t
> qlen, time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, 
> -+		   int local_query, int do_bit, int
> have_pseudoheader) 
> - {
> -   char *name = daemon->namebuff;
> -   unsigned char *p, *ansp;
> -@@ -820,6 +821,11 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header,
> char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
> -   header->ancount = htons(anscount);
> -   header->nscount = htons(authcount);
> -   header->arcount = htons(0);
> -+
> -+  /* Advertise our packet size limit in our reply */
> -+  if (have_pseudoheader)
> -+    return add_pseudoheader(header,  ansp - (unsigned char
> *)header, (unsigned char *)limit, daemon->edns_pktsz, 0, NULL, 0,
> do_bit);
> -+
> -   return ansp - (unsigned char *)header;
> - }
> -   
> -diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -index 39a930c..abb34c5 100644
> ---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> -+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t qlen, char *namebuff,
> - 		      int no_cache, int secure, int *doctored);
> - size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit,
> size_t qlen,  
> - 		      struct in_addr local_addr, struct in_addr
> local_netmask, 
> --		      time_t now, int *ad_reqd, int *do_bit);
> -+		      time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int
> have_pseudoheader);
> - int check_for_bogus_wildcard(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> qlen, char *name, 
> - 			     struct bogus_addr *addr, time_t now);
> - int check_for_ignored_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> qlen, struct bogus_addr *baddr);
> -@@ -1123,6 +1123,8 @@ int check_for_local_domain(char *name, time_t
> now);
> - unsigned int questions_crc(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> char *buff);
> - size_t resize_packet(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, 
> - 		  unsigned char *pheader, size_t hlen);
> -+size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> unsigned char *limit, 
> -+			unsigned short udp_sz, int optno, unsigned
> char *opt, size_t optlen, int set_do);
> - size_t add_mac(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *limit,
> union mysockaddr *l3);
> - size_t add_source_addr(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> *limit, union mysockaddr *source);
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -@@ -1141,7 +1143,8 @@ int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int
> ban_localhost);
> - /* auth.c */
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> - size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t
> qlen, 
> --		   time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, int
> local_query);
> -+		   time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, int
> local_query,
> -+		   int do_bit, int have_pseudoheader);
> - int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char *name, char **cut);
> - #endif
> - 
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 82394ee..299ca64 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
> -     case 12: return "gosthash94";
> -     case 13: return "sha256";
> -     case 14: return "sha384";
> --
> -     default: return NULL;
> -     }
> - }
> -diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
> -index 3e801c8..041353c 100644
> ---- a/src/forward.c
> -+++ b/src/forward.c
> -@@ -244,7 +244,6 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
> mysockaddr *udpaddr,
> -   void *hash = &crc;
> - #endif
> -  unsigned int gotname = extract_request(header, plen, daemon-
> >namebuff, NULL);
> -- unsigned char *pheader;
> - 
> -  (void)do_bit;
> - 
> -@@ -264,7 +263,8 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
> mysockaddr *udpaddr,
> - 	 there's no point retrying the query, retry the key query
> instead...... */
> -       if (forward->blocking_query)
> - 	{
> --	  int fd;
> -+	  int fd, is_sign;
> -+	  unsigned char *pheader;
> - 	  
> - 	  forward->flags &= ~FREC_TEST_PKTSZ;
> - 	  
> -@@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
> mysockaddr *udpaddr,
> - 	  blockdata_retrieve(forward->stash, forward->stash_len,
> (void *)header);
> - 	  plen = forward->stash_len;
> - 	  
> --	  if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, &pheader,
> NULL))
> --	    PUTSHORT((forward->flags & FREC_TEST_PKTSZ) ?
> SAFE_PKTSZ : forward->sentto->edns_pktsz, pheader);
> -+	  if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, &pheader,
> &is_sign) && !is_sign)
> -+	    PUTSHORT(SAFE_PKTSZ, pheader);
> - 
> - 	  if (forward->sentto->addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) 
> - 	    log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_DNSSEC | F_IPV4, "retry",
> (struct all_addr *)&forward->sentto->addr.in.sin_addr, "dnssec");
> -@@ -394,32 +394,40 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
> mysockaddr *udpaddr,
> -       forward->log_id = daemon->log_id;
> -       
> -       if (option_bool(OPT_ADD_MAC))
> --	plen = add_mac(header, plen, ((char *) header) + daemon-
> >packet_buff_sz, &forward->source);
> --      
> -+	{
> -+	  size_t new = add_mac(header, plen, ((char *) header) +
> daemon->packet_buff_sz, &forward->source);
> -+	  if (new != plen)
> -+	    {
> -+	      plen = new;
> -+	      forward->flags |= FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
> -+	    }
> -+	}
> -+
> -       if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET))
> - 	{
> - 	  size_t new = add_source_addr(header, plen, ((char *)
> header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz, &forward->source); 
> - 	  if (new != plen)
> - 	    {
> - 	      plen = new;
> --	      forward->flags |= FREC_HAS_SUBNET;
> -+	      forward->flags |= FREC_HAS_SUBNET |
> FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
> - 	    }
> - 	}
> - 
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -       if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
> - 	{
> --	  size_t new_plen = add_do_bit(header, plen, ((char *)
> header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz);
> -+	  size_t new = add_do_bit(header, plen, ((char *) header) +
> daemon->packet_buff_sz);
> - 	 
> -+	  if (new != plen)
> -+	    forward->flags |= FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
> -+
> -+	  plen = new;
> -+	      
> - 	  /* For debugging, set Checking Disabled, otherwise, have
> the upstream check too,
> - 	     this allows it to select auth servers when one is
> returning bad data. */
> - 	  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG))
> - 	    header->hb4 |= HB4_CD;
> - 
> --	  if (new_plen != plen)
> --	    forward->flags |= FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
> --
> --	  plen = new_plen;
> - 	}
> - #endif
> -       
> -@@ -469,10 +477,23 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
> mysockaddr *udpaddr,
> - 		    }
> - #endif
> - 		}
> --
> --	      if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, &pheader,
> NULL))
> --		PUTSHORT((forward->flags & FREC_TEST_PKTSZ) ?
> SAFE_PKTSZ : start->edns_pktsz, pheader);
> - 	      
> -+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -+	      if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !do_bit)
> -+		{
> -+		  /* Difficult one here. If our client didn't send
> EDNS0, we will have set the UDP
> -+		     packet size to 512. But that won't provide
> space for the RRSIGS in many cases.
> -+		     The RRSIGS will be stripped out before the
> answer goes back, so the packet should
> -+		     shrink again. So, if we added a do-bit, bump
> the udp packet size to the value
> -+		     known to be OK for this server. Maybe check
> returned size after stripping and set
> -+		     the truncated bit? */		  
> -+		  unsigned char *pheader;
> -+		  int is_sign;
> -+		  if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL,
> &pheader, &is_sign))
> -+		    PUTSHORT(start->edns_pktsz, pheader);
> -+		}
> -+#endif
> -+
> - 	      if (retry_send(sendto(fd, (char *)header, plen, 0,
> - 				    &start->addr.sa,
> - 				    sa_len(&start->addr))))
> -@@ -563,30 +584,34 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header
> *header, time_t now, struct server
> -     }
> - #endif
> -   
> --  /* If upstream is advertising a larger UDP packet size
> --     than we allow, trim it so that we don't get overlarge
> --     requests for the client. We can't do this for signed packets.
> */
> --
> -   if ((pheader = find_pseudoheader(header, n, &plen, &sizep,
> &is_sign)))
> -     {
> --      unsigned short udpsz;
> --      unsigned char *psave = sizep;
> --      
> --      GETSHORT(udpsz, sizep);
> --
> --      if (!is_sign && udpsz > daemon->edns_pktsz)
> --	PUTSHORT(daemon->edns_pktsz, psave);
> --      
> -       if (check_subnet && !check_source(header, plen, pheader,
> query_source))
> - 	{
> - 	  my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("discarding DNS reply: subnet
> option mismatch"));
> - 	  return 0;
> - 	}
> -       
> --      if (added_pheader)
> -+      if (!is_sign)
> - 	{
> --	  pheader = 0; 
> --	  header->arcount = htons(0);
> -+	  if (added_pheader)
> -+	    {
> -+	      /* client didn't send EDNS0, we added one, strip it
> off before returning answer. */
> -+	      n = rrfilter(header, n, 0);
> -+	      pheader = NULL;
> -+	    }
> -+	  else
> -+	    {
> -+	      /* If upstream is advertising a larger UDP packet
> size
> -+		 than we allow, trim it so that we don't get
> overlarge
> -+		 requests for the client. We can't do this for
> signed packets. */
> -+	      unsigned short udpsz;
> -+	      unsigned char *psave = sizep;
> -+	      
> -+	      GETSHORT(udpsz, sizep);
> -+	      if (udpsz > daemon->edns_pktsz)
> -+		PUTSHORT(daemon->edns_pktsz, psave);
> -+	    }
> - 	}
> -     }
> -   
> -@@ -655,14 +680,16 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header
> *header, time_t now, struct server
> -     }
> - 
> -   if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
> --    header->hb4 &= ~HB4_AD;
> --  
> --  if (!(header->hb4 & HB4_CD) && ad_reqd && cache_secure)
> --    header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
> --
> --  /* If the requestor didn't set the DO bit, don't return DNSSEC
> info. */
> --  if (!do_bit)
> --    n = rrfilter(header, n, 1);
> -+    {
> -+      header->hb4 &= ~HB4_AD;
> -+      
> -+      if (!(header->hb4 & HB4_CD) && ad_reqd && cache_secure)
> -+	header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
> -+      
> -+      /* If the requestor didn't set the DO bit, don't return
> DNSSEC info. */
> -+      if (!do_bit)
> -+	n = rrfilter(header, n, 1);
> -+    }
> - #endif
> - 
> -   /* do this after extract_addresses. Ensure NODATA reply and
> remove
> -@@ -761,8 +788,14 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
> now)
> - 	  if ((nn = resize_packet(header, (size_t)n, pheader,
> plen)))
> - 	    {
> - 	      header->hb3 &= ~(HB3_QR | HB3_AA | HB3_TC);
> --	      header->hb4 &= ~(HB4_RA | HB4_RCODE);
> --	      forward_query(-1, NULL, NULL, 0, header, nn, now,
> forward, 0, 0);
> -+	      header->hb4 &= ~(HB4_RA | HB4_RCODE | HB4_CD |
> HB4_AD);
> -+	      if (forward->flags |= FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED)
> -+		header->hb4 |= HB4_CD;
> -+	      if (forward->flags |= FREC_AD_QUESTION)
> -+		header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
> -+	      if (forward->flags & FREC_DO_QUESTION)
> -+		add_do_bit(header, nn,  (char *)pheader + plen);
> -+	      forward_query(-1, NULL, NULL, 0, header, nn, now,
> forward, forward->flags & FREC_AD_QUESTION, forward->flags &
> FREC_DO_QUESTION);
> - 	      return;
> - 	    }
> - 	}
> -@@ -1007,12 +1040,13 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> - {
> -   struct dns_header *header = (struct dns_header *)daemon->packet;
> -   union mysockaddr source_addr;
> --  unsigned short type;
> -+  unsigned char *pheader;
> -+  unsigned short type, udp_size = PACKETSZ; /* default if no EDNS0
> */
> -   struct all_addr dst_addr;
> -   struct in_addr netmask, dst_addr_4;
> -   size_t m;
> -   ssize_t n;
> --  int if_index = 0, auth_dns = 0;
> -+  int if_index = 0, auth_dns = 0, do_bit = 0, have_pseudoheader =
> 0;
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> -   int local_auth = 0;
> - #endif
> -@@ -1279,10 +1313,30 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> - #endif
> -     }
> -   
> -+  if (find_pseudoheader(header, (size_t)n, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
> -+    { 
> -+      unsigned short flags;
> -+      
> -+      have_pseudoheader = 1;
> -+      GETSHORT(udp_size, pheader);
> -+      pheader += 2; /* ext_rcode */
> -+      GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> -+      
> -+      if (flags & 0x8000)
> -+	do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
> -+	
> -+      /* If the client provides an EDNS0 UDP size, use that to
> limit our reply.
> -+	 (bounded by the maximum configured). If no EDNS0, then it
> -+	 defaults to 512 */
> -+      if (udp_size > daemon->edns_pktsz)
> -+	udp_size = daemon->edns_pktsz;
> -+    }
> -+
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> -   if (auth_dns)
> -     {
> --      m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + daemon-
> >packet_buff_sz, (size_t)n, now, &source_addr, local_auth);
> -+      m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + udp_size,
> (size_t)n, now, &source_addr, 
> -+		      local_auth, do_bit, have_pseudoheader);
> -       if (m >= 1)
> - 	{
> - 	  send_from(listen->fd, option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) ||
> option_bool(OPT_CLEVERBIND),
> -@@ -1293,9 +1347,13 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> -   else
> - #endif
> -     {
> --      int ad_reqd, do_bit;
> --      m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + daemon-
> >packet_buff_sz, (size_t)n, 
> --			 dst_addr_4, netmask, now, &ad_reqd,
> &do_bit);
> -+      int ad_reqd = do_bit;
> -+       /* RFC 6840 5.7 */
> -+      if (header->hb4 & HB4_AD)
> -+	ad_reqd = 1;
> -+
> -+      m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + udp_size,
> (size_t)n, 
> -+			 dst_addr_4, netmask, now, ad_reqd, do_bit,
> have_pseudoheader);
> -       
> -       if (m >= 1)
> - 	{
> -@@ -1397,7 +1455,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> -   int local_auth = 0;
> - #endif
> --  int checking_disabled, ad_question, do_bit, added_pheader = 0;
> -+  int checking_disabled, do_bit, added_pheader = 0,
> have_pseudoheader = 0;
> -   int check_subnet, no_cache_dnssec = 0, cache_secure = 0,
> bogusanswer = 0;
> -   size_t m;
> -   unsigned short qtype;
> -@@ -1414,6 +1472,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> -   union mysockaddr peer_addr;
> -   socklen_t peer_len = sizeof(union mysockaddr);
> -   int query_count = 0;
> -+  unsigned char *pheader;
> - 
> -   if (getpeername(confd, (struct sockaddr *)&peer_addr, &peer_len)
> == -1)
> -     return packet;
> -@@ -1508,15 +1567,35 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> -       else
> - 	dst_addr_4.s_addr = 0;
> -       
> -+      do_bit = 0;
> -+
> -+      if (find_pseudoheader(header, (size_t)size, NULL, &pheader,
> NULL))
> -+	{ 
> -+	  unsigned short flags;
> -+	  
> -+	  have_pseudoheader = 1;
> -+	  pheader += 4; /* udp_size, ext_rcode */
> -+	  GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> -+      
> -+	  if (flags & 0x8000)
> -+	    do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
> -+	}
> -+
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> -       if (auth_dns)
> --	m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
> (size_t)size, now, &peer_addr, local_auth);
> -+	m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
> (size_t)size, now, &peer_addr, 
> -+			local_auth, do_bit, have_pseudoheader);
> -       else
> - #endif
> - 	{
> --	  /* m > 0 if answered from cache */
> --	  m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
> (size_t)size, 
> --			     dst_addr_4, netmask, now,
> &ad_question, &do_bit);
> -+	   int ad_reqd = do_bit;
> -+	   /* RFC 6840 5.7 */
> -+	   if (header->hb4 & HB4_AD)
> -+	     ad_reqd = 1;
> -+	   
> -+	   /* m > 0 if answered from cache */
> -+	   m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
> (size_t)size, 
> -+			      dst_addr_4, netmask, now, ad_reqd,
> do_bit, have_pseudoheader);
> - 	  
> - 	  /* Do this by steam now we're not in the select() loop */
> - 	  check_log_writer(1); 
> -@@ -1615,6 +1694,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> - 			    }
> - 			  
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -+			  added_pheader = 0;			
>   
> - 			  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
> - 			    {
> - 			      size_t new_size = add_do_bit(header,
> size, ((char *) header) + 65536);
> -@@ -1719,7 +1799,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> - 
> - 		      m = process_reply(header, now, last_server,
> (unsigned int)m, 
> - 					option_bool(OPT_NO_REBIND)
> && !norebind, no_cache_dnssec, cache_secure, bogusanswer,
> --					ad_question, do_bit,
> added_pheader, check_subnet, &peer_addr); 
> -+					ad_reqd, do_bit,
> added_pheader, check_subnet, &peer_addr); 
> - 		      
> - 		      break;
> - 		    }
> -diff --git a/src/netlink.c b/src/netlink.c
> -index 753784d..3376d68 100644
> ---- a/src/netlink.c
> -+++ b/src/netlink.c
> -@@ -288,7 +288,8 @@ int iface_enumerate(int family, void *parm, int
> (*callback)())
> - 		rta = RTA_NEXT(rta, len1);
> - 	      }
> - 
> --	    if (inaddr && mac && callback_ok)
> -+	    if (!(neigh->ndm_state & (NUD_NOARP | NUD_INCOMPLETE |
> NUD_FAILED)) &&
> -+		inaddr && mac && callback_ok)
> - 	      if (!((*callback)(neigh->ndm_family, inaddr, mac,
> maclen, parm)))
> - 		callback_ok = 0;
> - 	  }
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index 188d05f..18858a8 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ struct macparm {
> -   union mysockaddr *l3;
> - };
> -  
> --static size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, unsigned char *limit, 
> --			       int optno, unsigned char *opt,
> size_t optlen, int set_do)
> -+size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> unsigned char *limit, 
> -+			unsigned short udp_sz, int optno, unsigned
> char *opt, size_t optlen, int set_do)
> - { 
> -   unsigned char *lenp, *datap, *p;
> -   int rdlen, is_sign;
> -@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ static size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, unsigned
> - 	return plen;
> -       *p++ = 0; /* empty name */
> -       PUTSHORT(T_OPT, p);
> --      PUTSHORT(SAFE_PKTSZ, p); /* max packet length, this will be
> overwritten */
> -+      PUTSHORT(udp_sz, p); /* max packet length, 512 if not given
> in EDNS0 header */
> -       PUTSHORT(0, p);    /* extended RCODE and version */
> -       PUTSHORT(set_do ? 0x8000 : 0, p); /* DO flag */
> -       lenp = p;
> -@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static int filter_mac(int family, char *addrp,
> char *mac, size_t maclen, void *p
> -   if (!match)
> -     return 1; /* continue */
> - 
> --  parm->plen = add_pseudoheader(parm->header, parm->plen, parm-
> >limit,  EDNS0_OPTION_MAC, (unsigned char *)mac, maclen, 0);
> -+  parm->plen = add_pseudoheader(parm->header, parm->plen, parm-
> >limit, PACKETSZ, EDNS0_OPTION_MAC, (unsigned char *)mac, maclen, 0);
> -   
> -   return 0; /* done */
> - }	      
> -@@ -603,12 +603,6 @@ size_t add_mac(struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *limit, union mysock
> - {
> -   struct macparm parm;
> -      
> --/* Must have an existing pseudoheader as the only ar-record, 
> --   or have no ar-records. Must also not be signed */
> --   
> --  if (ntohs(header->arcount) > 1)
> --    return plen;
> --
> -   parm.header = header;
> -   parm.limit = (unsigned char *)limit;
> -   parm.plen = plen;
> -@@ -699,13 +693,13 @@ size_t add_source_addr(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, char *limit, unio
> -   struct subnet_opt opt;
> -   
> -   len = calc_subnet_opt(&opt, source);
> --  return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit,
> EDNS0_OPTION_CLIENT_SUBNET, (unsigned char *)&opt, len, 0);
> -+  return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit,
> PACKETSZ, EDNS0_OPTION_CLIENT_SUBNET, (unsigned char *)&opt, len, 0);
> - }
> - 
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> - size_t add_do_bit(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> *limit)
> - {
> --  return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit, 0,
> NULL, 0, 1);
> -+  return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit,
> PACKETSZ, 0, NULL, 0, 1);
> - }
> - #endif
> - 
> -@@ -1525,16 +1519,16 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec
> *crecp, time_t now)
> - /* return zero if we can't answer from cache, or packet size if we
> can */
> - size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit,
> size_t qlen,  
> - 		      struct in_addr local_addr, struct in_addr
> local_netmask, 
> --		      time_t now, int *ad_reqd, int *do_bit) 
> -+		      time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int
> have_pseudoheader) 
> - {
> -   char *name = daemon->namebuff;
> --  unsigned char *p, *ansp, *pheader;
> -+  unsigned char *p, *ansp;
> -   unsigned int qtype, qclass;
> -   struct all_addr addr;
> -   int nameoffset;
> -   unsigned short flag;
> -   int q, ans, anscount = 0, addncount = 0;
> --  int dryrun = 0, sec_reqd = 0, have_pseudoheader = 0;
> -+  int dryrun = 0;
> -   struct crec *crecp;
> -   int nxdomain = 0, auth = 1, trunc = 0, sec_data = 1;
> -   struct mx_srv_record *rec;
> -@@ -1550,35 +1544,11 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -   if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
> -     sec_data = 0;
> -   
> --  /* RFC 6840 5.7 */
> --  *ad_reqd = header->hb4 & HB4_AD;
> --  *do_bit = 0;
> --
> -   /* If there is an  additional data section then it will be
> overwritten by
> -      partial replies, so we have to do a dry run to see if we can
> answer
> -      the query. */
> --
> -   if (ntohs(header->arcount) != 0)
> --    {
> --      dryrun = 1;
> --
> --      /* If there's an additional section, there might be an
> EDNS(0) pseudoheader */
> --      if (find_pseudoheader(header, qlen, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
> --	{ 
> --	  unsigned short flags;
> --	  
> --	  have_pseudoheader = 1;
> --	  
> --	  pheader += 4; /* udp size, ext_rcode */
> --	  GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> --	  
> --	  if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
> --	    {
> --	      *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
> --	      *ad_reqd = 1;
> --	    }
> --	}
> --    }
> -+    dryrun = 1;
> - 
> -   for (rec = daemon->mxnames; rec; rec = rec->next)
> -     rec->offset = 0;
> -@@ -1603,11 +1573,6 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -       GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
> -       GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> - 
> --      /* Don't filter RRSIGS from answers to ANY queries, even if
> do-bit
> --	 not set. */
> --      if (qtype == T_ANY)
> --	*do_bit = 1;
> --
> -       ans = 0; /* have we answered this question */
> -       
> -       if (qtype == T_TXT || qtype == T_ANY)
> -@@ -1739,7 +1704,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 		     the zone is unsigned, which implies that we're
> doing
> - 		     validation. */
> - 		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || 
> --		      !sec_reqd || 
> -+		      !do_bit || 
> - 		      (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(crecp-
> >flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
> - 		    {
> - 		      do 
> -@@ -1927,7 +1892,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 		    }
> - 
> - 		  /* If the client asked for DNSSEC  don't use
> cached data. */
> --		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> -+		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || !do_bit || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> - 		    do
> - 		      { 
> - 			/* don't answer wildcard queries with data
> not from /etc/hosts
> -@@ -1961,17 +1926,12 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 			
> - 			if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> - 			  {
> --			    /* We don't cache NSEC records, so if a
> DNSSEC-validated negative answer
> --			       is cached and the client wants
> DNSSEC, forward rather than answering from the cache */
> --			    if (!sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags &
> F_DNSSECOK))
> --			      {
> --				ans = 1;
> --				auth = 0;
> --				if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
> --				  nxdomain = 1;
> --				if (!dryrun)
> --				  log_query(crecp->flags, name,
> NULL, NULL);
> --			      }
> -+			    ans = 1;
> -+			    auth = 0;
> -+			    if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
> -+			      nxdomain = 1;
> -+			    if (!dryrun)
> -+			      log_query(crecp->flags, name, NULL,
> NULL);
> - 			  }
> - 			else 
> - 			  {
> -@@ -2209,10 +2169,11 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - 
> -   len = ansp - (unsigned char *)header;
> -   
> -+  /* Advertise our packet size limit in our reply */
> -   if (have_pseudoheader)
> --    len = add_pseudoheader(header, len, (unsigned char *)limit, 0,
> NULL, 0, sec_reqd);
> -+    len = add_pseudoheader(header, len, (unsigned char *)limit,
> daemon->edns_pktsz, 0, NULL, 0, do_bit);
> -   
> --  if (*ad_reqd && sec_data)
> -+  if (ad_reqd && sec_data)
> -     header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
> -   else
> -     header->hb4 &= ~HB4_AD;
> -diff --git a/src/rrfilter.c b/src/rrfilter.c
> -index ae12261..b26b39f 100644
> ---- a/src/rrfilter.c
> -+++ b/src/rrfilter.c
> -@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ size_t rrfilter(struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, int mode)
> -   for (p = rrs[0], i = 1; i < rr_found; i += 2)
> -     {
> -       unsigned char *start = rrs[i];
> --      unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
> ((unsigned char *)(header+1)) + plen;
> -+      unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
> ((unsigned char *)header) + plen;
> -       
> -       memmove(p, start, end-start);
> -       p += end-start;
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
> More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
> More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 910921b..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
> More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
> -From d67ecac59d58f249707d26e38d49c29b552af4d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 20:44:23 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] More tweaks in handling unknown DNSSEC algorithms.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |  128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> -------------
> - 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 299ca64..e09f304 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -70,7 +70,17 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
> -     default: return NULL;
> -     }
> - }
> --      
> -+  
> -+/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/dnssec-nsec3-parameters/dnssec-n
> sec3-parameters.xhtml */
> -+static char *nsec3_digest_name(int digest)
> -+{
> -+  switch (digest)
> -+    {
> -+    case 1: return "sha1";
> -+    default: return NULL;
> -+    }
> -+}
> -+ 
> - /* Find pointer to correct hash function in nettle library */
> - static const struct nettle_hash *hash_find(char *name)
> - {
> -@@ -667,7 +677,6 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> -   static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0; 
> -   unsigned char *p;
> -   int rrsetidx, sigidx, j, rdlen, res;
> --  int name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
> -   int gotkey = 0;
> - 
> -   if (!(p = skip_questions(header, plen)))
> -@@ -678,7 +687,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> -        j != 0; j--) 
> -     {
> -       unsigned char *pstart, *pdata;
> --      int stype, sclass, algo, type_covered, labels,
> sig_expiration, sig_inception;
> -+      int stype, sclass, type_covered;
> - 
> -       pstart = p;
> -       
> -@@ -712,12 +721,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> - 		return 0; /* bad packet */ 
> - 	      
> - 	      GETSHORT(type_covered, p);
> --	      algo = *p++;
> --	      labels = *p++;
> --	      p += 4; /* orig_ttl */
> --	      GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
> --	      GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
> --	      p += 2; /* key_tag */
> -+	      p += 16; /* algo, labels, orig_ttl, sig_expiration,
> sig_inception, key_tag */
> - 	      
> - 	      if (gotkey)
> - 		{
> -@@ -749,11 +753,8 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> - 		    }
> - 		}
> - 		  
> --	      /* Don't count signatures for algos we don't support
> */
> --	      if (check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration)
> &&
> --		  labels <= name_labels &&
> --		  type_covered == type && 
> --		  verify_func(algo))
> -+	      
> -+	      if (type_covered == type)
> - 		{
> - 		  if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx))
> - 		    return 0; 
> -@@ -795,7 +796,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - 			  char *name, char *keyname, char
> **wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen, int algo_in, int
> keytag_in)
> - {
> -   unsigned char *p;
> --  int rdlen, j, name_labels;
> -+  int rdlen, j, name_labels, sig_expiration, sig_inception;
> -   struct crec *crecp = NULL;
> -   int algo, labels, orig_ttl, key_tag;
> -   u16 *rr_desc = rrfilter_desc(type);
> -@@ -828,13 +829,16 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> -       algo = *p++;
> -       labels = *p++;
> -       GETLONG(orig_ttl, p);
> --      p += 8; /* sig_expiration, sig_inception already checked */
> -+      GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
> -+      GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
> -       GETSHORT(key_tag, p);
> -       
> -       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
> - 	return STAT_BOGUS;
> - 
> --      if (!(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
> -+      if (!check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration) ||
> -+	  labels > name_labels ||
> -+	  !(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
> - 	  !hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
> - 	continue;
> -       
> -@@ -1112,7 +1116,10 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - 		      else
> - 			{
> - 			  a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> --			  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u");
> -+			  if (verify_func(algo))
> -+			    log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u");
> -+			  else
> -+			    log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u (not supported)");
> - 			  
> - 			  recp1->addr.key.keylen = rdlen - 4;
> - 			  recp1->addr.key.keydata = key;
> -@@ -1235,7 +1242,11 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - 		  else
> - 		    {
> - 		      a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> --		      log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM,
> name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -+		      if (hash_find(ds_digest_name(digest)) &&
> verify_func(algo))
> -+			log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -+		      else
> -+			log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u (not supported)");
> -+		      
> - 		      crecp->addr.ds.digest = digest;
> - 		      crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
> - 		      crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
> -@@ -1660,7 +1671,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -     *nons = 1;
> -   
> -   /* Look though the NSEC3 records to find the first one with 
> --     an algorithm we support (currently only algo == 1).
> -+     an algorithm we support.
> - 
> -      Take the algo, iterations, and salt of that record
> -      as the ones we're going to use, and prune any 
> -@@ -1674,7 +1685,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -       p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
> -       algo = *p++;
> -       
> --      if (algo == 1)
> -+      if ((hash = hash_find(nsec3_digest_name(algo))))
> - 	break; /* known algo */
> -     }
> - 
> -@@ -1724,10 +1735,6 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -       nsecs[i] = nsec3p;
> -     }
> - 
> --  /* Algo is checked as 1 above */
> --  if (!(hash = hash_find("sha1")))
> --    return 0;
> --
> -   if ((digest_len = hash_name(name, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len,
> iterations)) == 0)
> -     return 0;
> -   
> -@@ -1843,8 +1850,10 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
> -   
> -   if (type_found == T_NSEC)
> -     return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset,
> nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
> --  else
> -+  else if (type_found == T_NSEC3)
> -     return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset,
> nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname,
> nons);
> -+  else
> -+    return 0;
> - }
> - 
> - /* Check signing status of name.
> -@@ -1857,7 +1866,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
> - */
> - static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t
> now)
> - {
> --  int secure_ds, name_start = strlen(name);
> -+  int name_start = strlen(name);
> -   struct crec *crecp;
> -   char *p;
> -   
> -@@ -1867,51 +1876,40 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int
> class, char *keyname, time_t now)
> -       
> -       if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
> - 	return STAT_NEED_DS;
> -+      
> -+       /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-existance
> of NS record.
> -+	  F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved there's no
> DS record here,
> -+	  but that's because there's no NS record either, ie this
> isn't the start
> -+	  of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below a node
> is unsigned when
> -+	  we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no DS
> record. */
> -+      if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -+	{
> -+	  if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -+	    return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */
> -+	}
> -       else
> - 	{
> --	  secure_ds = 0;
> --	  
> -+	  int gotone = 0;
> -+
> -+	  /* If all the DS records have digest and/or sig algos we
> don't support,
> -+	     then the zone is insecure. Note that if an algo
> -+	     appears in the DS, then RRSIGs for that algo MUST
> -+	     exist for each RRset: 4035 para 2.2  So if we find
> -+	     a DS here with digest and sig we can do, we're
> entitled
> -+	     to assume we can validate the zone and if we can't
> later,
> -+	     because an RRSIG is missing we return BOGUS.
> -+	  */
> - 	  do 
> - 	    {
> --	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
> --		{
> --		  /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
> existance of NS record.
> --		     F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
> there's no DS record here,
> --		     but that's because there's no NS record
> either, ie this isn't the start
> --		     of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree
> below a node is unsigned when
> --		     we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's
> no DS record.
> --		  */	  
> --		  if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> --		    {
> --		      if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> --			return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here
> */
> --		    }
> --		  else if (!hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp-
> >addr.ds.digest)) || !verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> --		    return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
> insecure */
> --		  else
> --		    secure_ds = 1;
> --		}
> -+	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> -+		  hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest))
> &&
> -+		  verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -+		gotone = 1;
> - 	    }
> - 	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DS)));
> --	}
> --
> --      if (secure_ds)
> --	{
> --	  /* We've found only DS records that attest to the DNSKEY
> RRset in the zone, so we believe
> --	     that RRset is good. Furthermore the DNSKEY whose hash
> is proved by the DS record is
> --	     one we can use. However the DNSKEY RRset may contain
> more than one key and
> --	     one of the other keys may use an algorithm we don't
> support. If that's 
> --	     the case the zone is insecure for us. */
> --	  
> --	  if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)))
> --	    return STAT_NEED_KEY;
> - 
> --	  do 
> --	    {
> --	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> !verify_func(crecp->addr.key.algo))
> --		return STAT_INSECURE;
> --	    }
> --	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)));
> -+	  if (!gotone)
> -+	    return STAT_INSECURE;
> - 	}
> - 
> -       if (name_start == 0)
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-
> one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-
> Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 031339e..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-
> one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
> -From 3e86d316c4bb406ed813aa5256615c8a95cac6d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 20:50:05 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Nasty, rare and obscure off-by-one in DNSSEC
> hostname_cmp().
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |    4 ++--
> - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index e09f304..29848e1 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1394,8 +1394,8 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const
> char *b)
> -       if (sb == b)
> - 	return 1;
> -       
> --      ea = sa--;
> --      eb = sb--;
> -+      ea = --sa;
> -+      eb = --sb;
> -     }
> - }
> - 
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
> Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
> Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index f3758fc..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
> -From a86fdf437ecc29398f9715ceb5240442a17ac014 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 21:19:20 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Minor tweak to previous commit.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |    6 ++----
> - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 29848e1..9fa64b6 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1889,8 +1889,6 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class,
> char *keyname, time_t now)
> - 	}
> -       else
> - 	{
> --	  int gotone = 0;
> --
> - 	  /* If all the DS records have digest and/or sig algos we
> don't support,
> - 	     then the zone is insecure. Note that if an algo
> - 	     appears in the DS, then RRSIGs for that algo MUST
> -@@ -1904,11 +1902,11 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int
> class, char *keyname, time_t now)
> - 	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> - 		  hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest))
> &&
> - 		  verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> --		gotone = 1;
> -+		break;
> - 	    }
> - 	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DS)));
> - 
> --	  if (!gotone)
> -+	  if (!crecp)
> - 	    return STAT_INSECURE;
> - 	}
> - 
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-
> NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-
> NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 33219d2..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
> -From ce5732e84fc46d7f99c152f736cfb4ef5ec98a01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 21:39:19 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] NSEC3 check: RFC5155 para 8.2
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c |    8 ++++++--
> - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 9fa64b6..486e422 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1704,7 +1704,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> -     {
> -       unsigned char *nsec3p = nsecs[i];
> --      int this_iter;
> -+      int this_iter, flags;
> - 
> -       nsecs[i] = NULL; /* Speculative, will be restored if OK. */
> -       
> -@@ -1716,8 +1716,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -       if (*p++ != algo)
> - 	continue;
> -  
> --      p++; /* flags */
> -+      flags = *p++; /* flags */
> -       
> -+      /* 5155 8.2 */
> -+      if (flags != 0 && flags != 1)
> -+	continue;
> -+
> -       GETSHORT(this_iter, p);
> -       if (this_iter != iterations)
> - 	continue;
> --- 
> -1.7.10.4
> -