From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Matthias Fischer To: development@lists.ipfire.org Subject: [PATCH] apache: Update to 2.4.56 Date: Thu, 09 Mar 2023 17:59:25 +0100 Message-ID: <20230309165925.22876-1-matthias.fischer@ipfire.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============3610320604534995513==" List-Id: --===============3610320604534995513== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable For details see: https://dlcdn.apache.org/httpd/CHANGES_2.4.56 "Changes with Apache 2.4.56 *) SECURITY: CVE-2023-27522: Apache HTTP Server: mod_proxy_uwsgi HTTP response splitting (cve.mitre.org) HTTP Response Smuggling vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server via mod_proxy_uwsgi. This issue affects Apache HTTP Server: from 2.4.30 through 2.4.55. Special characters in the origin response header can truncate/split the response forwarded to the client. Credits: Dimas Fariski Setyawan Putra (nyxsorcerer) *) SECURITY: CVE-2023-25690: HTTP request splitting with mod_rewrite and mod_proxy (cve.mitre.org) Some mod_proxy configurations on Apache HTTP Server versions 2.4.0 through 2.4.55 allow a HTTP Request Smuggling attack. Configurations are affected when mod_proxy is enabled along with some form of RewriteRule or ProxyPassMatch in which a non-specific pattern matches some portion of the user-supplied request-target (URL) data and is then re-inserted into the proxied request-target using variable substitution. For example, something like: RewriteEngine on RewriteRule "^/here/(.*)" " http://example.com:8080/elsewhere?$1" http://example.com:8080/elsewhere ; [P] ProxyPassReverse /here/ http://example.com:8080/ http://example.com:8080/ Request splitting/smuggling could result in bypass of access controls in the proxy server, proxying unintended URLs to existing origin servers, and cache poisoning. Credits: Lars Krapf of Adobe *) rotatelogs: Add -T flag to allow subsequent rotated logfiles to be truncated without the initial logfile being truncated. [Eric Covener] *) mod_ldap: LDAPConnectionPoolTTL should accept negative values in order to allow connections of any age to be reused. Up to now, a negative value was handled as an error when parsing the configuration file. PR 66421. [nailyk , Christophe Jaillet] *) mod_proxy_ajp: Report an error if the AJP backend sends an invalid number of headers. [Ruediger Pluem] *) mod_md: - Enabling ED25519 support and certificate transparency information when building with libressl v3.5.0 and newer. Thanks to Giovanni Bechis. - MDChallengeDns01 can now be configured for individual domains. Thanks to J=C3=83=C2=A9r=C3=83=C2=B4me Billiras (@bilhackmac) for the = initial PR. - Fixed a bug found by J=C3=83=C2=A9r=C3=83=C2=B4me Billiras (@bilhackma= c) that caused the challenge teardown not being invoked as it should. [Stefan Eissing] *) mod_http2: client resets of HTTP/2 streams led to unwanted 500 errors reported in access logs and error documents. The processing of the reset was correct, only unneccesary reporting was caused. [Stefan Eissing] *) mod_proxy_uwsgi: Stricter backend HTTP response parsing/validation. [Yann Ylavic]" Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer --- lfs/apache2 | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/lfs/apache2 b/lfs/apache2 index 7e1ef7911..402aa8567 100644 --- a/lfs/apache2 +++ b/lfs/apache2 @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ =20 include Config =20 -VER =3D 2.4.55 +VER =3D 2.4.56 =20 THISAPP =3D httpd-$(VER) DL_FILE =3D $(THISAPP).tar.bz2 @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ objects =3D $(DL_FILE) =20 $(DL_FILE) =3D $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE) =20 -$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 =3D 98e9ec41aa3ccbbe533672ba6de8421e1f0cb5a4b4a06d0cf26c67= 6945bcd5ebe66a1fd21d941ad8ff2c9183565ce542a5643730bbee5972934008652924945b +$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 =3D f9aaf5038543aeec79d5b8615b1b2120fe321966280574c685070f= 2356f8f1dba1d55a9a25f46cb5ecdd6e3f03785fe7a4e1b965506896cb889720728aa18101 =20 install : $(TARGET) =20 --=20 2.34.1 --===============3610320604534995513==--