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From: Adolf Belka <adolf.belka@ipfire.org>
To: development@lists.ipfire.org
Cc: Adolf Belka <adolf.belka@ipfire.org>
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] openssh: Update to version 10.2p1
Date: Tue, 14 Oct 2025 15:07:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251014130807.3469514-6-adolf.belka@ipfire.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251014130807.3469514-1-adolf.belka@ipfire.org>

- Update from version 10.0p1 to 10.2p1
- No change to rootfile
- Changelog
    10.2p1
      Future deprecation warning
	 * A future release of OpenSSH will deprecate support for SHA1 SSHFP
	   records due to weaknesses in the SHA1 hash function. SHA1 SSHFP
	   DNS records will be ignored and ssh-keygen -r will generate only
	   SHA256 SSHFP records.
	   The SHA256 hash algorithm, which has no known weaknesses, has
	   been supported for SSHFP records since OpenSSH 6.1, released in
	   2012.
      Bugfixes
	 * ssh(1): fix mishandling of terminal connections when
	   ControlPersist was active that rendered the session unusable.
	   bz3872
	 * ssh-keygen(1): fix download of keys from PKCS#11 tokens.
	 * ssh-keygen(1): fix CA signing operations when the CA key is held
	   in a ssh-agent(1). bz3877
    10.1p1
      Future deprecation warning
	 * A future release of OpenSSH will deprecate support for SHA1 SSHFP
	   records due to weaknesses in the SHA1 hash function. SHA1 SSHFP
	   DNS records will be ignored and ssh-keygen -r will generate only
	   SHA256 SSHFP records.
	   The SHA256 hash algorithm, which has no known weaknesses, has
	   been supported for SSHFP records since OpenSSH 6.1, released in
	   2012.
      Potentially-incompatible changes
	 * ssh(1): add a warning when the connection negotiates a non-post
	   quantum key agreement algorithm.
	   This warning has been added due to the risk of "store now, decrypt
	   later" attacks. More details at https://openssh.com/pq.html
	   This warning may be controlled via a new WarnWeakCrypto ssh_config
	   option, defaulting to on. This option is likely to control
	   additional weak crypto warnings in the future.
	 * ssh(1), sshd(8): major changes to handling of DSCP marking/IPQoS
	   In both client and server the default DSCP (a.k.a IPQoS) values
	   were revised and the way these values are used during runtime has
	   changed.
	   Interactive traffic is now assigned to the EF (Expedited
	   Forwarding) class by default. This provides more appropriate
	   packet prioritisation information for the intermediate network,
	   such as wireless media (cf. RFC 8325). Non-interactive traffic
	   will now use the operating system default DSCP marking. Both the
	   interactive and non-interactive DSCP values may be overridden via
	   the IPQoS keyword, described in ssh_config(5) and sshd_config(5).
	   The appropriate DSCP marking is now automatically selected and
	   updated as needed over the course of a connection's lifetime.
	   ssh(1) and sshd(8) will switch between the interactive and
	   non-interactive IPQoS values depending on the type of SSH
	   channels open at the time. For example, if an sftp session is
	   using the connection alongside a shell session, then the non-
	   interactive value will be used for the duration of the sftp. A
	   connection which contains only interactive sessions is marked EF.
	 * ssh(1), sshd(8): deprecate support for IPv4 type-of-service (ToS)
	   keywords in the IPQoS configuration directive.
	   Type of Service (ToS) was deprecated in the late nineties and
	   replaced with the Differentiated Services architecture, which
	   has significant advantages for operators because it offers more
	   granularity.
	   OpenSSH switched its default IPQoS from ToS to DSCP values in
	   2018 (openssh-7.7).
	   IPQoS configurations with 'lowdelay', 'reliability', or
	   'throughput' will be ignored and will instead use the system
	   default QoS settings. Additionally, a debug message will be logged
	   about the deprecation with a suggestion to use DSCP QoS instead.
	 * ssh-add(1): when adding certificates to an agent, set the expiry
	   to the certificate expiry time plus a short (5 min) grace period.
	   This will cause the agent to automatically remove certificates
	   shortly after they expire. A new ssh-add -N option disables this
	   behaviour.
	 * All: remove experimental support for XMSS keys. This was never
	   enabled by default. We expect to implement a new post-quantum
	   signature scheme in the near future.
	 * ssh-agent(1), sshd(8): move agent listener sockets from /tmp to
	   under ~/.ssh/agent for both ssh-agent(1) and forwarded sockets
	   in sshd(8).
	   This ensures processes that have restricted filesystem access
	   that includes /tmp do not ambiently have the ability to use keys
	   in an agent.
	   Moving the default directory has the consequence that the OS will
	   no longer clean up stale agent sockets, so ssh-agent now gains
	   this ability.
	   To support $HOME on NFS, the socket path includes a truncated
	   hash of the hostname. ssh-agent will, by default, only clean up
	   sockets from the same hostname.
	   ssh-agent(1) gains some new flags: -U suppresses the automatic
	   cleanup of stale sockets when it starts. -u forces a cleanup
	   without keeping a running agent, -uu forces a cleanup that ignores
	   the hostname. -T makes ssh-agent put the socket back in /tmp.
      Security
	* ssh(1): disallow control characters in usernames passed via the
	  commandline or expanded using %-sequences from the configuration
	  file, and disallow \0 characters in ssh:// URIs.
	  If an ssh(1) commandline was constructed using usernames or URIs
	  obtained from an untrusted source, and if a ProxyCommand that uses
	  the %r expansion was configured, then it may be possible for an
	  attacker to inject shell expressions that may be executed when the
	  proxy command is started.
	  We strongly recommend against using untrusted inputs to construct
	  ssh(1) commandlines.
	  This change also relaxes the validity checks in one small way:
	  usernames supplied via the configuration file as literals (i.e.
	  that have no % expansion characters) are not subject to these
	  validity checks. This allows usernames that contain arbitrary
	  characters to be used, but only via configuration files. This is
	  done on the basis that ssh's configuration is trusted.
      New features
	 * ssh(1), sshd(8): add SIGINFO handlers to log active channel and
	   session information.
	 * sshd(8): when refusing a certificate for user authentication, log
	   enough information to identify the certificate in addition to the
	   reason why it was being denied. Makes debugging certificate
	   authorisation problems a bit easier.
	 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(1): support ed25519 keys hosted on PKCS#11
	   tokens.
	 * ssh(1): add an ssh_config(5) RefuseConnection option that, when
	   encountered while processing an active section in a
	   configuration, terminates ssh(1) with an error message that
	   contains the argument to the option.
	   This may be useful for expressing reminders or warnings in config
	   files, for example:
	   Match host foo
	            RefuseConnection "foo is deprecated, use splork instead"
	 * sshd(8): make the X11 display number check relative to
	   X11DisplayOffset. This will allow people to use X11DisplayOffset
	   to configure much higher port ranges if they really want, while
	   not changing the default behaviour.
	 * unit tests: the unit test framework now includes some basic
	   benchmarking capabilities. Run with "make UNITTEST_BENCHMARK=yes"
	   on OpenBSD or "make unit-bench" on Portable OpenSSH.
      Bugfixes
	 * sshd(8): fix mistracking of MaxStartups process exits in some
	   situations. At worst, this could cause all MaxStartups slots to
	   fill and sshd to refuse new connections.
	 * ssh(1): fix delay on X client startup when ObscureKeystrokeTiming
	   is enabled. bz#3820
	 * sshd(8): increase the maximum size of the supported configuration
	   from 256KB to 4MB, which ought to be enough for anybody. Fail
	   early and visibly when this limit is breached. bz3808
	 * sftp(1): during sftp uploads, avoid a condition where a failed
	   write could be ignored if a subsequent write succeeded. This is
	   unlikely but technically possible because sftp servers are
	   allowed to reorder requests.
	 * sshd(8): avoid a race condition when the sshd-auth process exits
	   that could cause a spurious error message to be logged.
	 * sshd(8): log at level INFO when PerSourcePenalties actually
	   blocks access to a source address range. Previously this was
	   logged at level VERBOSE, which hid enforcement actions under
	   default config settings.
	 * sshd(8): GssStrictAcceptor was missing from sshd -T output; fix
	 * sshd(8): Make the MaxStartups and PerSourceNetBlockSize options
	   first-match-wins as advertised. bz3859
	 * ssh(1): fix an incorrect return value check in the local forward
	   cancellation path that would cause failed cancellations not to be
	   logged.
	 * sshd(8): make "Match !final" not trigger a second parsing pass
	   of ssh_config (unless hostname canonicalisation or a separate
	   "Match final" does). bz3843
	 * ssh(1): better debug diagnostics when loading keys. Will now list
	   key fingerprint and algorithm (not just algorithm number) as well
	   as making it explicit which keys didn't load.
	 * All: fix a number of memory leaks found by LeakSanitizer,
	   Coverity and manual inspection.
	 * sshd(8): Output the current name for PermitRootLogin's
	   "prohibit-password" in sshd -T instead of its deprecated alias
	   "without-password".  bz#3788
	 * ssh(1): make writing known_hosts lines more atomic by writing
	   the entire line in one operation and using unbuffered stdio.
	   Usually writes to this file are serialised on the "Are you sure
	   you want to continue connecting?" prompt, but if host key
	   checking is disabled and connections were being made with high
	   concurrency then interleaved writes might have been possible.
      Portability
	 * sshd(8): check the username didn't change during the PAM
	   transactions.
	   PAM modules can change the user during their execution, but
	   this is not supported by sshd(8). If such a case was incorrectly
	   configured by the system administrator, then sshd(8) could end up
	   using a different username to the one authorised by PAM.
	 * sshd(8): don't log audit messages with UNKNOWN hostname to avoid
	   slow DNS lookups in the audit subsystem.
	 * All: when making a copy of struct passwd, ensure struct fields are
	   non-NULL. Android libc can return NULL pw_gecos, for example.
	 * All: Remove status bits from OpenSSL >=3 version check.
	 * sshd(8), ssh(1): Use SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF on FreeBSD. Otherwise tun
	   forwarding from other OSes fails as soon as the first IPv6 message
	   is sent by the other side (which is usually a Router Solicitation
	   ICMPv6 message which is sent as soon as the interface is up).
	 * ssh(1), ssh-agent(8): check for nlist function presence before
	   attempting to use it instead of relying on the presence of the
	   nlist.h header.  Mac OS X, for example, has the header but not
	   the function in the 64bit libraries.
	 * All: fill in missing system header files.
	   Create replacement header files inside openbsd-compat for common
	   headers that are missing on a given platform. Usually these are
	   just empty, but in some cases they'll include the equivalent file.
	   This avoids having to wrap those includes in '#ifdef HAVE_FOO_H'
	   and reduces the diff between Portable OpenSSH and OpenBSD.
	 * sshd(8): handle futex_time64 properly in seccomp sandbox
	   Previously we only allowed __NR_futex, but some 32-bit systems
	   apparently support __NR_futex_time64. We had support for this
	   in the sandbox, but because of a macro error only __NR_futex was
	   allowlisted.
	 * Add contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass4 for GNOME 40+ using the GCR API.
	 * sshd(8): let ga_init() fail gracefully if getgrouplist does.
	   Apparently getgrouplist() can fail on OSX when passed a
	   non-existent group name. Other platforms seem to return a group
	   list consisting of the numeric gid passed to the function. bz3848
	 * ssh-agent(1): exit 0 from SIGTERM under systemd socket-activation,
	   preventing a graceful shutdown of an agent via systemd from
	   incorrectly marking the service as "failed".
	 * build: wrap some autoconf macros in AC_CACHE_CHECK.
	   This allows skipping/overriding the OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE and
	   OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK macros used to discover supported compiler
	   or linker flags. E.g.
	     $ ./configure ossh_cv_cflag__fzero_call_used_regs_used=no
	     [...]
	     checking if cc supports compile flag -fzero-call-used-regs=used
	     and linking succeeds... (cached) no

Signed-off-by: Adolf Belka <adolf.belka@ipfire.org>
---
 lfs/openssh | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/lfs/openssh b/lfs/openssh
index 46151228c..bdaa19c9d 100644
--- a/lfs/openssh
+++ b/lfs/openssh
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 
 include Config
 
-VER        = 10.0p1
+VER        = 10.2p1
 
 THISAPP    = openssh-$(VER)
 DL_FILE    = $(THISAPP).tar.gz
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE)
 
 $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE)
 
-$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 4ce353adf75aade8f4b2a223ad13e2f92cd23d1e60b4ee52bad0eaf036571229438cd9760dfa99c0e10fa09a8ac47b2bfb04eb183fb7b9287ac564ec75316a75
+$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 8c031b10b1642e21b46f7d1db84ba42692e378a54af3d8e5b5c8706c3a0a06d442a02ed8803063121e7ff325ea275cad4432b9eaa6a7f47a4d7cfad504953ab6
 
 install : $(TARGET)
 
-- 
2.51.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-10-14 13:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-14 13:07 [PATCH 1/2] btrfs-progs: Update to version 6.17 Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:07 ` [PATCH] fetchmail: Update to version 6.5.6 Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:07 ` [PATCH 1/2] hwdata: Update to version 0.400 Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:07 ` [PATCH 1/2] kbd: Update to version 2.9.0 Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:07 ` [PATCH 1/2] libgpg-error: Update to version 1.56 Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:07 ` Adolf Belka [this message]
2025-10-14 13:07 ` [PATCH 1/2] p11-kit: Update to version 0.25.10 Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH 1/2] vim: Update to version 9.1.1854 Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH 2/2] core199: Ship btrfs-progs Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH 2/2] core199: Ship hwdata Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH 2/2] core199: Ship kbd Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH 2/2] core199: Ship libgpg-error Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH 2/2] core199: Ship openssh Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH 2/2] core199: Ship p11-kit Adolf Belka
2025-10-14 13:08 ` [PATCH 2/2] core199: Ship vim Adolf Belka

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