From: Adolf Belka <adolf.belka@ipfire.org>
To: development@lists.ipfire.org
Cc: Adolf Belka <adolf.belka@ipfire.org>
Subject: [PATCH] samba: Update to version 4.24.5
Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 22:34:07 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260807203410.1596981-18-adolf.belka@ipfire.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260807203410.1596981-1-adolf.belka@ipfire.org>
- Update from version 4.24.2 to 4.24.5
- No change to the rootfiles
- 6 CVE Fixes in 4.24.5 & 6 in 4.24.3
- Changelog
4.24.5
This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
o CVE-2026-6949: TSIG packet with name compression can crash DNS
Incorrect size calculations when a TSIG record contains
compressed names can lead to a large out-of-bounds write
causing the server to crash.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-6949.html
o CVE-2026-58216: An authenticated user could possibly crash a KDC process
A kpasswd packet that contains malformed ASN.1 might cause
the server to access 6 bytes of unallocated memory. This
memory is not exposed to the user, but in some
circumstances the server could crash.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-58216.html
o CVE-2026-58218: DNS signing DoS via TKEY name cache exhaustion
An unauthenticated user can repeatedly register names TKEY
names, which floods a cache causing legitimate TKEYs to be
expunged. This can practically block the use DNS TSIG
signing.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-58218.html
o CVE-2026-58221: Samba AD authenticated LDAP access domain takeover
Samba AD low-privilege authenticated LDAP access allows
modifications to internal LDB special DNs, which permits a
domain takeover.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-58221.html
o CVE-2026-58222: Samba AD LDAP Compare filter injection and trusted-request
confusion disclose protected attributes
An ordinary authenticated domain user can bypass access
checks and query confidential Active Directory attributes
(such as KDS root keys) via LDAP Compare requests. Due to a
filter injection flaw and trusted execution context, the
LDAP Compare operation can be turned into a
protected-attribute disclosure oracle.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-58222.html
o CVE-2026-58224 The CTDB protocol has bounds checking issues
CTDB fails to do integrity checking of received packets.
This includes failure to check field lengths against packet
lengths when unmarshalling packets.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-58224.html
4.24.4
* BUG 16095: Use-after-free in handling acls with claims and conditions
* BUG 16092: Compilers may ignore overflow checks - Fix tautological-compare
warnings
* BUG 14638: restrict anonymous = 2 breaks RODC functionality
* BUG 16006: warning: assignment discards 'const' qualifier from pointer
target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
* BUG 16067: Require NTLMv2 session security on Windows makes trusts to Samba
unusable
* BUG 16092: Compilers may ignore overflow checks - Fix tautological-compare
warnings
* BUG 16151: winbindd stuck in init_dc_connection_rpc() returning
NT_STATUS_TRUSTED_DOMAIN_FAILURE
* BUG 16006: warning: assignment discards 'const' qualifier from pointer
target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
* BUG 16149: domain\user not split when provided as username in
smbc_set_credentials_with_fallback()
4.24.3
This is a security release in order to address the following defects:
o CVE-2026-1933: Missing access checks on reparse point operations
On a share marked "read only = yes" and
on file handles opened R/O users can set
or delete the reparse point xattrs on files
that the user has write-access in the file
system for.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-1933.html
o CVE-2026-2340: WORM vfs module does not block overwrites
The WORM (Write-Once, Read Many) vfs module
is supposed to lock write access to shared
files, so they cannot be altered after initial
writes. It was allowing files to be overwritten
by renaming a newly created file over a protected
file.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-2340.html
o CVE-2026-3012: auto-enrolment GPO installing CA certificate over http
without verification
To bootstrap a certificate chain a domain member must
fetch a certificate without TLS. It was trusting HTTP
for this when a more secure encrypted LDAP channel
was also available.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-3012.html
o CVE-2026-3238: Denial of service against AD DC WINS server
The WINS server component of the Active
Directory Domain controller code in Samba
is vulnerable to a NULL pointer dereference
and crash caused by a unauthenticated UDP
packet.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-3238.html
o CVE-2026-4408: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Samba DCE/RPC SAMR
server
Samba file servers and classic (non-AD) domain controllers
with samba-dcerpcd started as a system service and with a
"check password script" that has the %u substitution
character are vulnerable to a remote code execution.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-4408.html
o CVE-2026-4480: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Samba printing
subsystem
Samba print servers with a "print command"
that has the %J substitution character
are vulnerable to a Remote Code Execution.
https://www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2026-4480.html
Signed-off-by: Adolf Belka <adolf.belka@ipfire.org>
---
lfs/samba | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lfs/samba b/lfs/samba
index 545faac50..c21e8bbc0 100644
--- a/lfs/samba
+++ b/lfs/samba
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
include Config
-VER = 4.24.2
+VER = 4.24.5
SUMMARY = A SMB/CIFS File, Print, and Authentication Server
THISAPP = samba-$(VER)
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ DL_FROM = $(URL_IPFIRE)
DIR_APP = $(DIR_SRC)/$(THISAPP)
TARGET = $(DIR_INFO)/$(THISAPP)
PROG = samba
-PAK_VER = 122
+PAK_VER = 123
DEPS = avahi libtalloc perl-Parse-Yapp wsdd
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE)
$(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE)
-$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 464b9324b1c4d9e50d70c0d921c65b775f49db9e9b82314cc072ad03087f2d2f3ca4c9cf2925a3628c07c2f4664f58f9a36528078a14666d1fcb20ddb7949b44
+$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 4796e3ae5e70c1d11d9326566677f0909423c5aad140309bfd9b3f8a3dedefe49660d0a0d502a681726ed7a961779587c33c9da29ecf69664b00a2ca958e64af
install : $(TARGET)
--
2.55.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-07 20:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-07 20:33 [PATCH] core205: Ship glib Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:33 ` [PATCH] core205: Ship harfbuzz Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:33 ` [PATCH] core205: Ship hwdata Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:33 ` [PATCH] core205: Ship libarchive Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:33 ` [PATCH] core205: Ship pango Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:33 ` [PATCH] core205: Ship sqlite Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:33 ` [PATCH] core205: Ship systemd Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:33 ` [PATCH] core205: Ship xfsprogs Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:33 ` [PATCH] glib: Update to version 2.89.3 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:33 ` [PATCH] harfbuzz: Update to version 14.3.0 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:34 ` [PATCH] hwdata: Update to version 0.410 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:34 ` [PATCH] libarchive: Update to version 3.8.9 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:34 ` [PATCH] libtalloc: Update to version 2.5.0 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:34 ` [PATCH] nfs: Update to version 2.9.2 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:34 ` [PATCH] nut: Ship nut to pickup updated libusb from CU203 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:34 ` [PATCH] pango: Update to version 1.58.2 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:34 ` [PATCH] postfix: Update to version 3.11.5 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:34 ` Adolf Belka [this message]
2026-08-07 20:34 ` [PATCH] sqlite: Update to version 3530400 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:34 ` [PATCH] systemd: Update to version 261.2 Adolf Belka
2026-08-07 20:34 ` [PATCH] xfsprogs: Update to version 7.1.1 Adolf Belka
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