On 29.05.2017 18:57, Michael Tremer wrote: > Hi, Hi, > thank you for working on this. No problem - had fun... ;-) > Yes, Arne submitted a patch that at least fixes the security vulnerability. > > However, could you split this patch into two with the two remaining changes so > that we can merge those? Done. I pushed the - hopefully last - remaining patches. Best, Matthias > Best, > -Michael > > On Sun, 2017-05-28 at 11:22 +0200, Matthias Fischer wrote: >> Based on: >> >> https://anonscm.debian.org/cgit/pkg-samba/samba.git/commit/?h=wheezy&id=762a3a >> fd8eb45526e44cd0b2ae8a5b1a058ec647 >> >> https://www.samba.org/samba/history/security.html >> >> https://www.samba.org/samba/samba/ftp/patches/security/ >> >> Fixes current CVE-2017-7494 and some more... >> >> Removed three 'unrecognized' configure-options. >> >> Some 'lfs'-tuning was made, too. >> >> I altered 'PAK_VER' from "64" to "65" - if not necessary, please change back. >> >> Best, >> Matthias >> >> Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer >> --- >> lfs/samba | 22 +- >> .../samba/CVE-2017-2619-race-condition-fix.patch | 1150 >> ++++++++++++++++++++ >> .../CVE-2017-2619-regression-bug-12721-fix.patch | 179 +++ >> src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-tests.patch | 296 +++++ >> src/patches/samba/samba-3.6.25-CVE-2017-7494.patch | 14 + >> .../samba/samba-3.6.25-security-2015-12-16.patch | 255 +++++ >> 6 files changed, 1909 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) >> create mode 100644 src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-race-condition-fix.patch >> create mode 100644 src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-regression-bug-12721- >> fix.patch >> create mode 100644 src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-tests.patch >> create mode 100644 src/patches/samba/samba-3.6.25-CVE-2017-7494.patch >> create mode 100644 src/patches/samba/samba-3.6.25-security-2015-12-16.patch >> >> diff --git a/lfs/samba b/lfs/samba >> index 076152f48..445646464 100644 >> --- a/lfs/samba >> +++ b/lfs/samba >> @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ >> ############################################################################# >> ## >> # >> # >> # IPFire.org - A linux based >> firewall # >> -# Copyright (C) 2007-2016 IPFire Team >> # >> +# Copyright (C) 2007-2017 IPFire Team >> # >> # >> # >> # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or >> modify # >> # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published >> by # >> @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ DL_FROM = $(URL_IPFIRE) >> DIR_APP = $(DIR_SRC)/$(THISAPP) >> TARGET = $(DIR_INFO)/$(THISAPP) >> PROG = samba >> -PAK_VER = 64 >> +PAK_VER = 65 >> >> DEPS = "cups krb5" >> >> @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ download :$(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) >> >> md5 : $(subst %,%_MD5,$(objects)) >> >> -dist: >> +dist: >> @$(PAK) >> >> ############################################################################# >> ## >> @@ -88,6 +88,17 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) >> cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/samba/CVE-2016- >> 2118-v3-6.patch >> cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/samba/CVE-2015- >> 5370-v3-6.patch >> >> + # Apply Debian CVE patches >> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017- >> 2619-race-condition-fix.patch >> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017- >> 2619-regression-bug-12721-fix.patch >> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017- >> 2619-tests.patch >> + >> + # Fixes CVE-2015-5252 - Samba >> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/samba/samba- >> 3.6.25-security-2015-12-16.patch >> + >> + # Fixes CVE-2017-7494 - Samba >> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np0 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/samba/samba- >> 3.6.25-CVE-2017-7494.patch >> + >> cd $(DIR_APP)/source3 && ./autogen.sh >> cd $(DIR_APP)/source3 && ./configure \ >> --prefix=/usr \ >> @@ -102,10 +113,7 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) >> --with-libsmbclient \ >> --with-libsmbsharemodes \ >> --with-sendfile-support \ >> - --without-smbwrapper \ >> - --with-mmap \ >> --with-fhs \ >> - --with-vfs \ >> --with-winbind \ >> --disable-swat \ >> --enable-cups \ >> @@ -119,8 +127,8 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) >> #cd $(DIR_APP)/source3 && install -v -m755 nsswitch/libnss_winbind.so >> /lib >> #cd $(DIR_APP)/source3 && ln -v -sf libnss_winbind.so >> /lib/libnss_winbind.so.2 >> #cd $(DIR_APP)/source3 && ln -v -sf libnss_wins.so >> /lib/libnss_wins.so.2 >> + -mkdir -p /var/ipfire/samba >> cd $(DIR_APP)/source3 && install -v -m644 >> ../examples/smb.conf.default /var/ipfire/samba >> - -mkdir -p /var/ipfire/samba >> cp -vrf $(DIR_SRC)/config/samba/* /var/ipfire/samba/ >> chown nobody:nobody -R /var/ipfire/samba/ >> cp -vfp /var/ipfire/samba/default.global /var/ipfire/samba/global >> diff --git a/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-race-condition-fix.patch >> b/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-race-condition-fix.patch >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000..a96d6be3b >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-race-condition-fix.patch >> @@ -0,0 +1,1150 @@ >> +Description: This patch is a consolidation of several patches described by >> the Git commit summaries below >> +Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-261 >> 9 >> +bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +From ec1bca1d5315549e945c93cbf5e3abdb695de782 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2017 11:32:19 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH 01/15] CVE-2017-2619: s3/smbd: re-open directory after >> + dptr_CloseDir() >> + >> +dptr_CloseDir() will close and invalidate the fsp's file descriptor, we >> +have to reopen it. >> + >> +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Ralph Bohme >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/open.c | 2 +- >> + source3/smbd/proto.h | 2 ++ >> + source3/smbd/smb2_find.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ >> + 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> + >> +From 2bb9a3d35f6a0cc43a30638594969c4860ffd5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Tue, 28 Feb 2017 09:24:07 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 02/15] s3: vfs: dirsort doesn't handle opendir of "." >> + correctly. >> + >> +Needs to store $cwd path for correct sorting. >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12499 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/modules/vfs_dirsort.c | 4 ++++ >> + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) >> + >> +From 327d09ba641046f68daa5b2bb98f09530294cb0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 13:44:42 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH 03/15] s3: VFS: vfs_streams_xattr.c: Make >> streams_xattr_open() >> + store the same path as streams_xattr_recheck(). >> + >> +If the open is changing directories, fsp->fsp_name->base_name >> +will be the full path from the share root, whilst >> +smb_fname will be relative to the $cwd. >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12546 >> + >> +Back-ported from a24ba3e4083200ec9885363efc5769f43183fb6b >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/modules/vfs_streams_xattr.c | 9 ++++++++- >> + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> + >> +From 27871d3bfb0857ad3306aabdce6f9b55e32fff3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2017 13:54:04 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH 04/15] vfs_streams_xattr: use fsp, not base_fsp >> + >> +The base_fsp's fd is always -1 as it's closed after being openend in >> +create_file_unixpath(). >> + >> +Additionally in streams_xattr_open force using of SMB_VFS_FSETXATTR() by >> +sticking the just created fd into the fsp (and removing it afterwards). >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12591 >> + >> +Back-ported from 021189e32ba507832b5e821e5cda8a2889225955. >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/modules/vfs_streams_xattr.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++----------------- >> -- >> + 1 file changed, 99 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-) >> + >> +From a419b277c5994459c956ebdd324679e728ebae10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 11:55:56 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 05/15] s3: smbd: Create wrapper function for OpenDir in >> + preparation for making robust. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/dir.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- >> + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> + >> +From e47e3c40b5fc8f52fe70c3e1edf5489ac8b4badf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 16:25:26 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 06/15] s3: smbd: Opendir_internal() early return if >> + SMB_VFS_OPENDIR failed. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/dir.c | 14 +++++++------- >> + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) >> + >> +From 45e41b709b6c2e67acb99f29aa05b61b53091e57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 16:35:00 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 07/15] s3: smbd: Create and use open_dir_safely(). Use from >> + OpenDir(). >> + >> +Hardens OpenDir against TOC/TOU races. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/dir.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- >> ---- >> + 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) >> + >> +From 720abcec65b04fdac1052a14898180c8cc816464 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 12:13:20 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 08/15] s3: smbd: OpenDir_fsp() use early returns. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/dir.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++------------- >> + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) >> + >> +From 5070f319bbb7dda87766621a83691910414d06a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 12:15:59 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 09/15] s3: smbd: OpenDir_fsp() - Fix memory leak on error. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/dir.c | 2 +- >> + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) >> + >> +From 65d37759f8b4979bc0c0833e0a5eecd277dfa604 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 12:32:07 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 10/15] s3: smbd: Move the reference counting and destructor >> + setup to just before retuning success. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/dir.c | 10 +++++----- >> + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) >> + >> +From 5a821d791aba90643ddf7a3c29dad4f6621ef185 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 12:35:32 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 11/15] s3: smbd: Correctly fallback to open_dir_safely if >> + FDOPENDIR not supported on system. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/dir.c | 15 +++++++-------- >> + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) >> + >> +From 597aa3b99a2790133a4839260607b0a8df41c8e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 12:52:13 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 12/15] s3: smbd: Remove O_NOFOLLOW guards. We insist on >> + O_NOFOLLOW existing. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/open.c | 4 +--- >> + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) >> + >> +From 563af2ffec05a2c0b54897e2d28ac7e1adb66e0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 12:56:08 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 13/15] s3: smbd: Move special handling of symlink errno's >> into >> + a utility function. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/open.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- >> + 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> + >> +From b34a67cd3a996804ba7bf90e86cf9e22edf60eb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 13:04:46 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 14/15] s3: smbd: Add the core functions to prevent symlink >> + open races. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/open.c | 242 >> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> + 1 file changed, 242 insertions(+) >> + >> +From 5920309d2f62dd24fc50530c92dd68077f96a6d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Thu, 15 Dec 2016 13:06:31 -0800 >> +Subject: [PATCH 15/15] s3: smbd: Use the new non_widelink_open() function. >> + >> +CVE-2017-2619 >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12496 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/open.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- >> + 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> + >> + >> +--- samba-3.6.6.orig/source3/smbd/open.c >> ++++ samba-3.6.6/source3/smbd/open.c >> +@@ -187,10 +187,277 @@ >> + } >> + >> + >> /**************************************************************************** >> ++ Handle differing symlink errno's >> ++**************************************************************************** >> / >> ++ >> ++static int link_errno_convert(int err) >> ++{ >> ++#if defined(ENOTSUP) && defined(OSF1) >> ++ /* handle special Tru64 errno */ >> ++ if (err == ENOTSUP) { >> ++ err = ELOOP; >> ++ } >> ++#endif /* ENOTSUP */ >> ++#ifdef EFTYPE >> ++ /* fix broken NetBSD errno */ >> ++ if (err == EFTYPE) { >> ++ err = ELOOP; >> ++ } >> ++#endif /* EFTYPE */ >> ++ /* fix broken FreeBSD errno */ >> ++ if (err == EMLINK) { >> ++ err = ELOOP; >> ++ } >> ++ return err; >> ++} >> ++ >> ++static int non_widelink_open(struct connection_struct *conn, >> ++ const char *conn_rootdir, >> ++ files_struct *fsp, >> ++ struct smb_filename *smb_fname, >> ++ int flags, >> ++ mode_t mode, >> ++ unsigned int link_depth); >> ++ >> ++/*************************************************************************** >> * >> ++ Follow a symlink in userspace. >> ++**************************************************************************** >> / >> ++ >> ++static int process_symlink_open(struct connection_struct *conn, >> ++ const char *conn_rootdir, >> ++ files_struct *fsp, >> ++ struct smb_filename *smb_fname, >> ++ int flags, >> ++ mode_t mode, >> ++ unsigned int link_depth) >> ++{ >> ++ int fd = -1; >> ++ char *link_target = NULL; >> ++ int link_len = -1; >> ++ char *oldwd = NULL; >> ++ size_t rootdir_len = 0; >> ++ char *resolved_name = NULL; >> ++ bool matched = false; >> ++ int saved_errno = 0; >> ++ >> ++ /* >> ++ * Ensure we don't get stuck in a symlink loop. >> ++ */ >> ++ link_depth++; >> ++ if (link_depth >= 20) { >> ++ errno = ELOOP; >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* Allocate space for the link target. */ >> ++ link_target = talloc_array(talloc_tos(), char, PATH_MAX); >> ++ if (link_target == NULL) { >> ++ errno = ENOMEM; >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* Read the link target. */ >> ++ link_len = SMB_VFS_READLINK(conn, >> ++ smb_fname->base_name, >> ++ link_target, >> ++ PATH_MAX - 1); >> ++ if (link_len == -1) { >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* Ensure it's at least null terminated. */ >> ++ link_target[link_len] = '\0'; >> ++ >> ++ /* Convert to an absolute path. */ >> ++ resolved_name = SMB_VFS_REALPATH(conn, link_target); >> ++ if (resolved_name == NULL) { >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* >> ++ * We know conn_rootdir starts with '/' and >> ++ * does not end in '/'. FIXME ! Should we >> ++ * smb_assert this ? >> ++ */ >> ++ rootdir_len = strlen(conn_rootdir); >> ++ >> ++ matched = (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name, rootdir_len) == 0); >> ++ if (!matched) { >> ++ errno = EACCES; >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* >> ++ * Turn into a path relative to the share root. >> ++ */ >> ++ if (resolved_name[rootdir_len] == '\0') { >> ++ /* Link to the root of the share. */ >> ++ smb_fname->base_name = talloc_strdup(talloc_tos(), "."); >> ++ if (smb_fname->base_name == NULL) { >> ++ errno = ENOMEM; >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ } else if (resolved_name[rootdir_len] == '/') { >> ++ smb_fname->base_name = &resolved_name[rootdir_len+1]; >> ++ } else { >> ++ errno = EACCES; >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ oldwd = vfs_GetWd(talloc_tos(), conn); >> ++ if (oldwd == NULL) { >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* Ensure we operate from the root of the share. */ >> ++ if (vfs_ChDir(conn, conn_rootdir) == -1) { >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* And do it all again.. */ >> ++ fd = non_widelink_open(conn, >> ++ conn_rootdir, >> ++ fsp, >> ++ smb_fname, >> ++ flags, >> ++ mode, >> ++ link_depth); >> ++ if (fd == -1) { >> ++ saved_errno = errno; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ out: >> ++ >> ++ SAFE_FREE(resolved_name); >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(link_target); >> ++ if (oldwd != NULL) { >> ++ int ret = vfs_ChDir(conn, oldwd); >> ++ if (ret == -1) { >> ++ smb_panic("unable to get back to old directory\n"); >> ++ } >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(oldwd); >> ++ } >> ++ if (saved_errno != 0) { >> ++ errno = saved_errno; >> ++ } >> ++ return fd; >> ++} >> ++ >> ++/*************************************************************************** >> * >> ++ Non-widelink open. >> ++**************************************************************************** >> / >> ++ >> ++static int non_widelink_open(struct connection_struct *conn, >> ++ const char *conn_rootdir, >> ++ files_struct *fsp, >> ++ struct smb_filename *smb_fname, >> ++ int flags, >> ++ mode_t mode, >> ++ unsigned int link_depth) >> ++{ >> ++ NTSTATUS status; >> ++ int fd = -1; >> ++ struct smb_filename *smb_fname_rel = NULL; >> ++ int saved_errno = 0; >> ++ char *oldwd = NULL; >> ++ char *parent_dir = NULL; >> ++ const char *final_component = NULL; >> ++ >> ++ if (!parent_dirname(talloc_tos(), >> ++ smb_fname->base_name, >> ++ &parent_dir, >> ++ &final_component)) { >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ oldwd = vfs_GetWd(talloc_tos(), conn); >> ++ if (oldwd == NULL) { >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* Pin parent directory in place. */ >> ++ if (vfs_ChDir(conn, parent_dir) == -1) { >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* Ensure the relative path is below the share. */ >> ++ status = check_reduced_name(conn, final_component); >> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> ++ saved_errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status); >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ status = create_synthetic_smb_fname(talloc_tos(), >> ++ final_component, >> ++ smb_fname->stream_name, >> ++ &smb_fname->st, >> ++ &smb_fname_rel); >> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> ++ saved_errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status); >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; >> ++ >> ++ { >> ++ struct smb_filename *tmp_name = fsp->fsp_name; >> ++ fsp->fsp_name = smb_fname_rel; >> ++ fd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(conn, smb_fname_rel, fsp, flags, mode); >> ++ fsp->fsp_name = tmp_name; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ if (fd == -1) { >> ++ saved_errno = link_errno_convert(errno); >> ++ if (saved_errno == ELOOP) { >> ++ if (fsp->posix_open) { >> ++ /* Never follow symlinks on posix open. */ >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ if (!lp_symlinks(SNUM(conn))) { >> ++ /* Explicitly no symlinks. */ >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ /* >> ++ * We have a symlink. Follow in userspace >> ++ * to ensure it's under the share definition. >> ++ */ >> ++ fd = process_symlink_open(conn, >> ++ conn_rootdir, >> ++ fsp, >> ++ smb_fname_rel, >> ++ flags, >> ++ mode, >> ++ link_depth); >> ++ if (fd == -1) { >> ++ saved_errno = >> ++ link_errno_convert(errno); >> ++ } >> ++ } >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ out: >> ++ >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(parent_dir); >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname_rel); >> ++ >> ++ if (oldwd != NULL) { >> ++ int ret = vfs_ChDir(conn, oldwd); >> ++ if (ret == -1) { >> ++ smb_panic("unable to get back to old directory\n"); >> ++ } >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(oldwd); >> ++ } >> ++ if (saved_errno != 0) { >> ++ errno = saved_errno; >> ++ } >> ++ return fd; >> ++} >> ++ >> ++/*************************************************************************** >> * >> + fd support routines - attempt to do a dos_open. >> + >> ****************************************************************************/ >> + >> +-static NTSTATUS fd_open(struct connection_struct *conn, >> ++NTSTATUS fd_open(struct connection_struct *conn, >> + files_struct *fsp, >> + int flags, >> + mode_t mode) >> +@@ -198,8 +465,7 @@ >> + struct smb_filename *smb_fname = fsp->fsp_name; >> + NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK; >> + >> +-#ifdef O_NOFOLLOW >> +- /* >> ++ /* >> + * Never follow symlinks on a POSIX client. The >> + * client should be doing this. >> + */ >> +@@ -207,12 +473,33 @@ >> + if (fsp->posix_open || !lp_symlinks(SNUM(conn))) { >> + flags |= O_NOFOLLOW; >> + } >> +-#endif >> + >> +- fsp->fh->fd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(conn, smb_fname, fsp, flags, mode); >> ++ /* Ensure path is below share definition. */ >> ++ if (!lp_widelinks(SNUM(conn))) { >> ++ const char *conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, >> ++ smb_fname->base_name); >> ++ if (conn_rootdir == NULL) { >> ++ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; >> ++ } >> ++ /* >> ++ * Only follow symlinks within a share >> ++ * definition. >> ++ */ >> ++ fsp->fh->fd = non_widelink_open(conn, >> ++ conn_rootdir, >> ++ fsp, >> ++ smb_fname, >> ++ flags, >> ++ mode, >> ++ 0); >> ++ } else { >> ++ fsp->fh->fd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(conn, smb_fname, fsp, flags, >> mode); >> ++ } >> ++ >> + if (fsp->fh->fd == -1) { >> +- status = map_nt_error_from_unix(errno); >> +- if (errno == EMFILE) { >> ++ int posix_errno = link_errno_convert(errno); >> ++ status = map_nt_error_from_unix(posix_errno); >> ++ if (posix_errno == EMFILE) { >> + static time_t last_warned = 0L; >> + >> + if (time((time_t *) NULL) > last_warned) { >> +--- samba-3.6.6.orig/source3/smbd/proto.h >> ++++ samba-3.6.6/source3/smbd/proto.h >> +@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ >> + const struct security_token *token, >> + uint32_t access_desired, >> + uint32_t *access_granted); >> ++NTSTATUS fd_open(struct connection_struct *conn, files_struct *fsp, >> ++ int flags, mode_t mode); >> + NTSTATUS fd_close(files_struct *fsp); >> + void change_file_owner_to_parent(connection_struct *conn, >> + const char *inherit_from_dir, >> +--- samba-3.6.6.orig/source3/smbd/smb2_find.c >> ++++ samba-3.6.6/source3/smbd/smb2_find.c >> +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ >> + #include "../libcli/smb/smb_common.h" >> + #include "trans2.h" >> + #include "../lib/util/tevent_ntstatus.h" >> ++#include "system/filesys.h" >> + >> + static struct tevent_req *smbd_smb2_find_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, >> + struct tevent_context *ev, >> +@@ -300,7 +301,23 @@ >> + } >> + >> + if (in_flags & SMB2_CONTINUE_FLAG_REOPEN) { >> ++ int flags; >> ++ >> + dptr_CloseDir(fsp); >> ++ >> ++ /* >> ++ * dptr_CloseDir() will close and invalidate the fsp's file >> ++ * descriptor, we have to reopen it. >> ++ */ >> ++ >> ++ flags = O_RDONLY; >> ++#ifdef O_DIRECTORY >> ++ flags |= O_DIRECTORY; >> ++#endif >> ++ status = fd_open(conn, fsp, flags, 0); >> ++ if (tevent_req_nterror(req, status)) { >> ++ return tevent_req_post(req, ev); >> ++ } >> + } >> + >> + if (fsp->dptr == NULL) { >> +--- samba-3.6.6.orig/source3/modules/vfs_dirsort.c >> ++++ samba-3.6.6/source3/modules/vfs_dirsort.c >> +@@ -141,6 +141,10 @@ >> + return NULL; >> + } >> + >> ++ if (ISDOT(data->smb_fname->base_name)) { >> ++ data->smb_fname->base_name = vfs_GetWd(data, handle->conn); >> ++ } >> ++ >> + /* Open the underlying directory and count the number of entries */ >> + data->source_directory = SMB_VFS_NEXT_OPENDIR(handle, fname, mask, >> + attr); >> +--- samba-3.6.6.orig/source3/modules/vfs_streams_xattr.c >> ++++ samba-3.6.6/source3/modules/vfs_streams_xattr.c >> +@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ >> + return -1; >> + } >> + >> +- sbuf->st_ex_size = get_xattr_size(handle->conn, fsp->base_fsp, >> ++ sbuf->st_ex_size = get_xattr_size(handle->conn, fsp, >> + io->base, io->xattr_name); >> + if (sbuf->st_ex_size == -1) { >> + return -1; >> +@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ >> + char *xattr_name = NULL; >> + int baseflags; >> + int hostfd = -1; >> ++ int ret; >> + >> + DEBUG(10, ("streams_xattr_open called for %s\n", >> + smb_fname_str_dbg(smb_fname))); >> +@@ -375,133 +376,125 @@ >> + /* If the default stream is requested, just open the base file. */ >> + if (is_ntfs_default_stream_smb_fname(smb_fname)) { >> + char *tmp_stream_name; >> +- int ret; >> + >> + tmp_stream_name = smb_fname->stream_name; >> + smb_fname->stream_name = NULL; >> + >> + ret = SMB_VFS_NEXT_OPEN(handle, smb_fname, fsp, flags, >> mode); >> + >> +- smb_fname->stream_name = tmp_stream_name; >> +- >> +- return ret; >> +- } >> ++ smb_fname->stream_name = tmp_stream_name; >> + >> +- status = streams_xattr_get_name(talloc_tos(), smb_fname- >> >stream_name, >> +- &xattr_name); >> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> +- errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status); >> +- goto fail; >> +- } >> ++ return ret; >> ++ } >> + >> +- /* Create an smb_filename with stream_name == NULL. */ >> +- status = create_synthetic_smb_fname(talloc_tos(), >> +- smb_fname->base_name, >> +- NULL, NULL, >> +- &smb_fname_base); >> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> +- errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status); >> +- goto fail; >> +- } >> ++ status = streams_xattr_get_name(talloc_tos(), smb_fname- >> >stream_name, >> ++ &xattr_name); >> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> ++ errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status); >> ++ goto fail; >> ++ } >> + >> +- /* >> +- * We use baseflags to turn off nasty side-effects when opening the >> +- * underlying file. >> +- */ >> +- baseflags = flags; >> +- baseflags &= ~O_TRUNC; >> +- baseflags &= ~O_EXCL; >> +- baseflags &= ~O_CREAT; >> +- >> +- hostfd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(handle->conn, smb_fname_base, fsp, >> +- baseflags, mode); >> +- >> +- TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname_base); >> +- >> +- /* It is legit to open a stream on a directory, but the base >> +- * fd has to be read-only. >> +- */ >> +- if ((hostfd == -1) && (errno == EISDIR)) { >> +- baseflags &= ~O_ACCMODE; >> +- baseflags |= O_RDONLY; >> +- hostfd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(handle->conn, smb_fname, fsp, >> baseflags, >> +- mode); >> +- } >> ++ /* Create an smb_filename with stream_name == NULL. */ >> ++ status = create_synthetic_smb_fname(talloc_tos(), >> ++ smb_fname->base_name, >> ++ NULL, NULL, >> ++ &smb_fname_base); >> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> ++ errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status); >> ++ goto fail; >> ++ } >> + >> +- if (hostfd == -1) { >> +- goto fail; >> +- } >> ++ /* >> ++ * We use baseflags to turn off nasty side-effects when >> opening the >> ++ * underlying file. >> ++ */ >> ++ baseflags = flags; >> ++ baseflags &= ~O_TRUNC; >> ++ baseflags &= ~O_EXCL; >> ++ baseflags &= ~O_CREAT; >> + >> +- status = get_ea_value(talloc_tos(), handle->conn, NULL, >> +- smb_fname->base_name, xattr_name, &ea); >> ++ hostfd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(handle->conn, smb_fname_base, fsp, >> ++ baseflags, mode); >> + >> +- DEBUG(10, ("get_ea_value returned %s\n", nt_errstr(status))); >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname_base); >> + >> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) >> +- && !NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND)) { >> +- /* >> +- * The base file is not there. This is an error even if we >> got >> +- * O_CREAT, the higher levels should have created the base >> +- * file for us. >> ++ /* It is legit to open a stream on a directory, but the base >> ++ * fd has to be read-only. >> + */ >> +- DEBUG(10, ("streams_xattr_open: base file %s not around, " >> +- "returning ENOENT\n", smb_fname->base_name)); >> +- errno = ENOENT; >> +- goto fail; >> +- } >> ++ if ((hostfd == -1) && (errno == EISDIR)) { >> ++ baseflags &= ~O_ACCMODE; >> ++ baseflags |= O_RDONLY; >> ++ hostfd = SMB_VFS_OPEN(handle->conn, smb_fname, fsp, >> baseflags, >> ++ mode); >> ++ } >> + >> +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> +- /* >> +- * The attribute does not exist >> +- */ >> ++ if (hostfd == -1) { >> ++ goto fail; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ status = get_ea_value(talloc_tos(), handle->conn, NULL, >> ++ smb_fname->base_name, xattr_name, >> &ea); >> + >> +- if (flags & O_CREAT) { >> ++ DEBUG(10, ("get_ea_value returned %s\n", >> nt_errstr(status))); >> ++ >> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) >> ++ && !NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_NOT_FOUND)) { >> + /* >> +- * Darn, xattrs need at least 1 byte >> ++ * The base file is not there. This is an error even >> if we got >> ++ * O_CREAT, the higher levels should have created >> the base >> ++ * file for us. >> + */ >> +- char null = '\0'; >> ++ DEBUG(10, ("streams_xattr_open: base file %s not >> around, " >> ++ "returning ENOENT\n", smb_fname- >> >base_name)); >> ++ errno = ENOENT; >> ++ goto fail; >> ++ } >> + >> +- DEBUG(10, ("creating attribute %s on file %s\n", >> +- xattr_name, smb_fname->base_name)); >> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> ++ /* >> ++ * The attribute does not exist >> ++ */ >> + >> ++ if (flags & O_CREAT) { >> ++ /* >> ++ * Darn, xattrs need at least 1 byte >> ++ */ >> ++ char null = '\0'; >> ++ >> ++ DEBUG(10, ("creating attribute %s on file >> %s\n", >> ++ xattr_name, smb_fname- >> >base_name)); >> ++ >> ++ fsp->fh->fd = hostfd; >> ++ ret = SMB_VFS_FSETXATTR(fsp, xattr_name, >> ++ &null, sizeof(null), >> ++ flags & O_EXCL ? >> XATTR_CREATE : 0); >> ++ fsp->fh->fd = -1; >> ++ if (ret != 0) { >> ++ goto fail; >> ++ } >> ++ } >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ if (flags & O_TRUNC) { >> ++ char null = '\0'; >> + if (fsp->base_fsp->fh->fd != -1) { >> +- if (SMB_VFS_FSETXATTR( >> +- fsp->base_fsp, xattr_name, >> +- &null, sizeof(null), >> +- flags & O_EXCL ? XATTR_CREATE : 0) >> == -1) { >> ++ if (SMB_VFS_FSETXATTR( >> ++ fsp->base_fsp, xattr_name, >> ++ &null, sizeof(null), >> ++ flags & O_EXCL ? >> XATTR_CREATE : 0) == -1) { >> + goto fail; >> + } >> + } else { >> +- if (SMB_VFS_SETXATTR( >> +- handle->conn, smb_fname->base_name, >> +- xattr_name, &null, sizeof(null), >> +- flags & O_EXCL ? XATTR_CREATE : 0) >> == -1) { >> ++ if (SMB_VFS_SETXATTR( >> ++ handle->conn, smb_fname- >> >base_name, >> ++ xattr_name, &null, >> sizeof(null), >> ++ flags & O_EXCL ? >> XATTR_CREATE : 0) == -1) { >> + goto fail; >> + } >> + } >> + } >> +- } >> +- >> +- if (flags & O_TRUNC) { >> +- char null = '\0'; >> +- if (fsp->base_fsp->fh->fd != -1) { >> +- if (SMB_VFS_FSETXATTR( >> +- fsp->base_fsp, xattr_name, >> +- &null, sizeof(null), >> +- flags & O_EXCL ? XATTR_CREATE : 0) >> == -1) { >> +- goto fail; >> +- } >> +- } else { >> +- if (SMB_VFS_SETXATTR( >> +- handle->conn, smb_fname->base_name, >> +- xattr_name, &null, sizeof(null), >> +- flags & O_EXCL ? XATTR_CREATE : 0) >> == -1) { >> +- goto fail; >> +- } >> +- } >> +- } >> + >> +- sio = (struct stream_io *)VFS_ADD_FSP_EXTENSION(handle, fsp, >> ++ sio = (struct stream_io *)VFS_ADD_FSP_EXTENSION(handle, fsp, >> + struct stream_io, >> + NULL); >> + if (sio == NULL) { >> +@@ -511,8 +504,15 @@ >> + >> + sio->xattr_name = talloc_strdup(VFS_MEMCTX_FSP_EXTENSION(handle, >> fsp), >> + xattr_name); >> ++ /* >> ++ * sio->base needs to be a copy of fsp->fsp_name->base_name, >> ++ * making it identical to streams_xattr_recheck(). If the >> ++ * open is changing directories, fsp->fsp_name->base_name >> ++ * will be the full path from the share root, whilst >> ++ * smb_fname will be relative to the $cwd. >> ++ */ >> + sio->base = talloc_strdup(VFS_MEMCTX_FSP_EXTENSION(handle, fsp), >> +- smb_fname->base_name); >> ++ fsp->fsp_name->base_name); >> + sio->fsp_name_ptr = fsp->fsp_name; >> + sio->handle = handle; >> + sio->fsp = fsp; >> +@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ >> + return -1; >> + } >> + >> +- status = get_ea_value(talloc_tos(), handle->conn, fsp->base_fsp, >> ++ status = get_ea_value(talloc_tos(), handle->conn, fsp, >> + sio->base, sio->xattr_name, &ea); >> + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> + return -1; >> +@@ -885,13 +885,13 @@ >> + >> + memcpy(ea.value.data + offset, data, n); >> + >> +- if (fsp->base_fsp->fh->fd != -1) { >> +- ret = SMB_VFS_FSETXATTR(fsp->base_fsp, >> ++ if (fsp->fh->fd != -1) { >> ++ ret = SMB_VFS_FSETXATTR(fsp, >> + sio->xattr_name, >> + ea.value.data, ea.value.length, 0); >> + } else { >> + ret = SMB_VFS_SETXATTR(fsp->conn, >> +- fsp->base_fsp->fsp_name->base_name, >> ++ fsp->fsp_name->base_name, >> + sio->xattr_name, >> + ea.value.data, ea.value.length, 0); >> + } >> +@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ >> + return -1; >> + } >> + >> +- status = get_ea_value(talloc_tos(), handle->conn, fsp->base_fsp, >> ++ status = get_ea_value(talloc_tos(), handle->conn, fsp, >> + sio->base, sio->xattr_name, &ea); >> + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> + return -1; >> +@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ >> + return -1; >> + } >> + >> +- status = get_ea_value(talloc_tos(), handle->conn, fsp->base_fsp, >> ++ status = get_ea_value(talloc_tos(), handle->conn, fsp, >> + sio->base, sio->xattr_name, &ea); >> + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> + return -1; >> +@@ -995,13 +995,13 @@ >> + ea.value.length = offset + 1; >> + ea.value.data[offset] = 0; >> + >> +- if (fsp->base_fsp->fh->fd != -1) { >> +- ret = SMB_VFS_FSETXATTR(fsp->base_fsp, >> ++ if (fsp->fh->fd != -1) { >> ++ ret = SMB_VFS_FSETXATTR(fsp, >> + sio->xattr_name, >> + ea.value.data, ea.value.length, 0); >> + } else { >> + ret = SMB_VFS_SETXATTR(fsp->conn, >> +- fsp->base_fsp->fsp_name->base_name, >> ++ fsp->fsp_name->base_name, >> + sio->xattr_name, >> + ea.value.data, ea.value.length, 0); >> + } >> +--- samba-3.6.6.orig/source3/smbd/dir.c >> ++++ samba-3.6.6/source3/smbd/dir.c >> +@@ -1358,7 +1358,8 @@ >> + Open a directory. >> + ********************************************************************/ >> + >> +-struct smb_Dir *OpenDir(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, >> ++static struct smb_Dir *OpenDir_internal(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, >> ++ connection_struct *conn, >> + const char *name, >> + const char *mask, >> + uint32 attr) >> +@@ -1370,27 +1371,21 @@ >> + return NULL; >> + } >> + >> +- dirp->conn = conn; >> +- dirp->name_cache_size = lp_directory_name_cache_size(SNUM(conn)); >> +- >> +- dirp->dir_path = talloc_strdup(dirp, name); >> +- if (!dirp->dir_path) { >> +- errno = ENOMEM; >> ++ dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_OPENDIR(conn, name, mask, attr); >> ++ if (!dirp->dir) { >> ++ DEBUG(5,("OpenDir: Can't open %s. %s\n", name, >> ++ strerror(errno) )); >> + goto fail; >> + } >> + >> ++ dirp->conn = conn; >> ++ dirp->name_cache_size = lp_directory_name_cache_size(SNUM(conn)); >> ++ >> + if (sconn && !sconn->using_smb2) { >> + sconn->searches.dirhandles_open++; >> + } >> + talloc_set_destructor(dirp, smb_Dir_destructor); >> + >> +- dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_OPENDIR(conn, dirp->dir_path, mask, attr); >> +- if (!dirp->dir) { >> +- DEBUG(5,("OpenDir: Can't open %s. %s\n", dirp->dir_path, >> +- strerror(errno) )); >> +- goto fail; >> +- } >> +- >> + return dirp; >> + >> + fail: >> +@@ -1398,6 +1393,76 @@ >> + return NULL; >> + } >> + >> ++/*************************************************************************** >> * >> ++ Open a directory handle by pathname, ensuring it's under the share path. >> ++**************************************************************************** >> / >> ++ >> ++static struct smb_Dir *open_dir_safely(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, >> ++ connection_struct *conn, >> ++ const char *name, >> ++ const char *wcard, >> ++ uint32_t attr) >> ++{ >> ++ struct smb_Dir *dir_hnd = NULL; >> ++ char *saved_dir = vfs_GetWd(ctx, conn); >> ++ NTSTATUS status; >> ++ >> ++ if (saved_dir == NULL) { >> ++ return NULL; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ if (vfs_ChDir(conn, name) == -1) { >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* >> ++ * Now the directory is pinned, use >> ++ * REALPATH to ensure we can access it. >> ++ */ >> ++ status = check_name(conn, "."); >> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ dir_hnd = OpenDir_internal(ctx, >> ++ conn, >> ++ ".", >> ++ wcard, >> ++ attr); >> ++ >> ++ if (dir_hnd == NULL) { >> ++ goto out; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ /* >> ++ * OpenDir_internal only gets "." as the dir name. >> ++ * Store the real dir name here. >> ++ */ >> ++ >> ++ dir_hnd->dir_path = talloc_strdup(dir_hnd, name); >> ++ if (!dir_hnd->dir_path) { >> ++ errno = ENOMEM; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ out: >> ++ >> ++ vfs_ChDir(conn, saved_dir); >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(saved_dir); >> ++ return dir_hnd; >> ++} >> ++ >> ++struct smb_Dir *OpenDir(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, connection_struct *conn, >> ++ const char *name, >> ++ const char *mask, >> ++ uint32_t attr) >> ++{ >> ++ return open_dir_safely(mem_ctx, >> ++ conn, >> ++ name, >> ++ mask, >> ++ attr); >> ++} >> ++ >> + /******************************************************************* >> + Open a directory from an fsp. >> + ********************************************************************/ >> +@@ -1411,7 +1476,17 @@ >> + struct smbd_server_connection *sconn = conn->sconn; >> + >> + if (!dirp) { >> +- return NULL; >> ++ goto fail; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ if (!fsp->is_directory) { >> ++ errno = EBADF; >> ++ goto fail; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ if (fsp->fh->fd == -1) { >> ++ errno = EBADF; >> ++ goto fail; >> + } >> + >> + dirp->conn = conn; >> +@@ -1423,36 +1498,33 @@ >> + goto fail; >> + } >> + >> +- if (sconn && !sconn->using_smb2) { >> +- sconn->searches.dirhandles_open++; >> +- } >> +- talloc_set_destructor(dirp, smb_Dir_destructor); >> +- >> +- if (fsp->is_directory && fsp->fh->fd != -1) { >> +- dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_FDOPENDIR(fsp, mask, attr); >> +- if (dirp->dir != NULL) { >> +- dirp->fsp = fsp; >> +- } else { >> +- DEBUG(10,("OpenDir_fsp: SMB_VFS_FDOPENDIR on %s >> returned " >> +- "NULL (%s)\n", >> +- dirp->dir_path, >> +- strerror(errno))); >> +- if (errno != ENOSYS) { >> +- return NULL; >> +- } >> ++ dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_FDOPENDIR(fsp, mask, attr); >> ++ if (dirp->dir != NULL) { >> ++ dirp->fsp = fsp; >> ++ } else { >> ++ DEBUG(10,("OpenDir_fsp: SMB_VFS_FDOPENDIR on %s returned " >> ++ "NULL (%s)\n", >> ++ dirp->dir_path, >> ++ strerror(errno))); >> ++ if (errno != ENOSYS) { >> ++ goto fail; >> + } >> + } >> + >> + if (dirp->dir == NULL) { >> +- /* FDOPENDIR didn't work. Use OPENDIR instead. */ >> +- dirp->dir = SMB_VFS_OPENDIR(conn, dirp->dir_path, mask, >> attr); >> ++ /* FDOPENDIR is not supported. Use OPENDIR instead. */ >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(dirp); >> ++ return open_dir_safely(mem_ctx, >> ++ conn, >> ++ fsp->fsp_name->base_name, >> ++ mask, >> ++ attr); >> + } >> + >> +- if (!dirp->dir) { >> +- DEBUG(5,("OpenDir_fsp: Can't open %s. %s\n", dirp->dir_path, >> +- strerror(errno) )); >> +- goto fail; >> ++ if (sconn && !sconn->using_smb2) { >> ++ sconn->searches.dirhandles_open++; >> + } >> ++ talloc_set_destructor(dirp, smb_Dir_destructor); >> + >> + return dirp; >> + >> diff --git a/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-regression-bug-12721-fix.patch >> b/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-regression-bug-12721-fix.patch >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000..cefdd86ea >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-regression-bug-12721-fix.patch >> @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ >> +bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12721 >> +Description: This patch is a consolidation of several patches described by >> the Git commit summaries below >> + >> +From 5d4ef6ff0970c93fed49e51a01e63cb67d49d087 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 10:46:47 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] s3: smbd: Fix incorrect logic exposed by fix for the >> + security bug 12496 (CVE-2017-2619). >> + >> +In a UNIX filesystem, the names "." and ".." by definition can *never* >> +be symlinks - they are already reserved names. >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12721 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +Reviewed-by: Uri Simchoni >> +(cherry picked from commit ae17bebd250bdde5614b2ac17e53512f19fe9b68) >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/vfs.c | 7 +++++-- >> + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> + >> +From 71500662d1098d17657b0148a0aa06cd69482c7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 17:04:58 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] s3: smbd: Fix "follow symlink = no" regression part 2. >> + >> +Add an extra paramter to cwd_name to check_reduced_name(). >> + >> +If cwd_name == NULL then fname is a client given path relative >> +to the root path of the share. >> + >> +If cwd_name != NULL then fname is a client given path relative >> +to cwd_name. cwd_name is relative to the root path of the share. >> + >> +Not yet used, logic added in the next commit. >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12721 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme >> +(cherry picked from commit 83e30cb48859b412b76572b6a3ba84d8fde167af) >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/filename.c | 2 +- >> + source3/smbd/open.c | 2 +- >> + source3/smbd/proto.h | 4 +++- >> + source3/smbd/vfs.c | 10 +++++++++- >> + 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> + >> +From e3fd46264b82ffc22424ee7364b3fd2c0fc14a7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 17:09:38 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] s3: smbd: Fix "follow symlink = no" regression part 2. >> + >> +Use the cwd_name parameter to reconstruct the original >> +client name for symlink testing. >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12721 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme >> +(cherry picked from commit e182a4d39e86c9694e255efdf6ee2ea3ccb9af4a) >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/vfs.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ >> + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+) >> + >> +--- samba-3.6.6.orig/source3/smbd/vfs.c >> ++++ samba-3.6.6/source3/smbd/vfs.c >> +@@ -894,11 +894,20 @@ >> + /******************************************************************* >> + Reduce a file name, removing .. elements and checking that >> + it is below dir in the heirachy. This uses realpath. >> ++ >> ++ If cwd_name == NULL then fname is a client given path relative >> ++ to the root path of the share. >> ++ >> ++ If cwd_name != NULL then fname is a client given path relative >> ++ to cwd_name. cwd_name is relative to the root path of the share. >> + ********************************************************************/ >> + >> +-NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname) >> ++NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, >> ++ const char *cwd_name, >> ++ const char *fname) >> + { >> + char *resolved_name = NULL; >> ++ char *new_fname = NULL; >> + bool allow_symlinks = true; >> + bool allow_widelinks = false; >> + >> +@@ -1026,8 +1035,11 @@ >> + /* fname can't have changed in resolved_path. */ >> + const char *p = &resolved_name[rootdir_len]; >> + >> +- /* *p can be '\0' if fname was "." */ >> +- if (*p == '\0' && ISDOT(fname)) { >> ++ /* >> ++ * UNIX filesystem semantics, names consisting >> ++ * only of "." or ".." CANNOT be symlinks. >> ++ */ >> ++ if (ISDOT(fname) || ISDOTDOT(fname)) { >> + goto out; >> + } >> + >> +@@ -1041,11 +1053,32 @@ >> + } >> + >> + p++; >> ++ >> ++ /* >> ++ * If cwd_name is present and not ".", >> ++ * then fname is relative to that, not >> ++ * the root of the share. Make sure the >> ++ * path we check is the one the client >> ++ * sent (cwd_name+fname). >> ++ */ >> ++ if (cwd_name != NULL && !ISDOT(cwd_name)) { >> ++ new_fname = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), >> ++ "%s/%s", >> ++ cwd_name, >> ++ fname); >> ++ if (new_fname == NULL) { >> ++ SAFE_FREE(resolved_name); >> ++ return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; >> ++ } >> ++ fname = new_fname; >> ++ } >> ++ >> + if (strcmp(fname, p)!=0) { >> + DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name: Bad access " >> + "attempt: %s is a symlink\n", >> + fname)); >> + SAFE_FREE(resolved_name); >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(new_fname); >> + return NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; >> + } >> + } >> +@@ -1056,6 +1089,7 @@ >> + DEBUG(3,("check_reduced_name: %s reduced to %s\n", fname, >> + resolved_name)); >> + SAFE_FREE(resolved_name); >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(new_fname); >> + return NT_STATUS_OK; >> + } >> + >> +--- samba-3.6.6.orig/source3/smbd/filename.c >> ++++ samba-3.6.6/source3/smbd/filename.c >> +@@ -1009,7 +1009,7 @@ >> + } >> + >> + if (!lp_widelinks(SNUM(conn)) || !lp_symlinks(SNUM(conn))) { >> +- status = check_reduced_name(conn,name); >> ++ status = check_reduced_name(conn, NULL, name); >> + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> + DEBUG(5,("check_name: name %s failed with >> %s\n",name, >> + nt_errstr(status))); >> +--- samba-3.6.6.orig/source3/smbd/open.c >> ++++ samba-3.6.6/source3/smbd/open.c >> +@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ >> + } >> + >> + /* Ensure the relative path is below the share. */ >> +- status = check_reduced_name(conn, final_component); >> ++ status = check_reduced_name(conn, parent_dir, final_component); >> + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> + saved_errno = map_errno_from_nt_status(status); >> + goto out; >> +--- samba-3.6.6.orig/source3/smbd/proto.h >> ++++ samba-3.6.6/source3/smbd/proto.h >> +@@ -1179,7 +1179,9 @@ >> + SMB_STRUCT_STAT *sbuf, char **talloced); >> + int vfs_ChDir(connection_struct *conn, const char *path); >> + char *vfs_GetWd(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, connection_struct *conn); >> +-NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, const char *fname); >> ++NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, >> ++ const char *cwd_name, >> ++ const char *fname); >> + int vfs_stat_smb_fname(struct connection_struct *conn, const char *fname, >> + SMB_STRUCT_STAT *psbuf); >> + int vfs_lstat_smb_fname(struct connection_struct *conn, const char *fname, >> diff --git a/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-tests.patch >> b/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-tests.patch >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000..41c84610e >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/src/patches/samba/CVE-2017-2619-tests.patch >> @@ -0,0 +1,296 @@ >> +Description: Patches to unit tests associated with CVE-2017-2619 regression >> +origin: https://attachments.samba.org/attachment.cgi?id=13130 >> + >> +From 2c6de8584779e413f1e6ff9c933f9281693bfbc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 11:48:25 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH 2/6] s3: Test for CVE-2017-2619 regression with "follow >> + symlinks = no". >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12721 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +Reviewed-by: Uri Simchoni >> + >> +Back-ported from commit 782172a9bef0040981d20e49519b13dd744df6a0 >> +--- >> + selftest/target/Samba3.pm | 7 +++ >> + source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh | 73 >> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> + 2 files changed, 80 insertions(+) >> + >> +diff --git a/selftest/target/Samba3.pm b/selftest/target/Samba3.pm >> +index 01a1c470af0..7765b9efbb2 100644 >> +--- a/selftest/target/Samba3.pm >> ++++ b/selftest/target/Samba3.pm >> +@@ -481,6 +481,9 @@ sub provision($$$$$$) >> + my $msdfs_deeppath="$msdfs_shrdir/deeppath"; >> + push(@dirs,$msdfs_deeppath); >> + >> ++ my $nosymlinks_shrdir="$shrdir/nosymlinks"; >> ++ push(@dirs,$nosymlinks_shrdir); >> ++ >> + # this gets autocreated by winbindd >> + my $wbsockdir="$prefix_abs/winbindd"; >> + my $wbsockprivdir="$lockdir/winbindd_privileged"; >> +@@ -695,6 +698,10 @@ sub provision($$$$$$) >> + copy = print1 >> + [print\$] >> + copy = tmp >> ++[nosymlinks] >> ++ copy = tmp >> ++ path = $nosymlinks_shrdir >> ++ follow symlinks = no >> + "; >> + close(CONF); >> + >> +diff --git a/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> b/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> +index 772802f77b1..57ef87e4949 100755 >> +--- a/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> ++++ b/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> +@@ -401,6 +401,75 @@ done >> + >> + LOGDIR=$(mktemp -d ${PREFIX}/${LOGDIR_PREFIX}_XXXXXX) >> + >> ++# Test follow symlinks can't access symlinks >> ++test_nosymlinks() >> ++{ >> ++# Setup test dirs. >> ++ slink_name="$LOCAL_PATH/nosymlinks/source" >> ++ slink_target="$LOCAL_PATH/nosymlinks/target" >> ++ mkdir_target="$LOCAL_PATH/nosymlinks/a" >> ++ >> ++ rm -f $slink_target >> ++ rm -f $slink_name >> ++ rm -rf $mkdir_target >> ++ >> ++ touch $slink_target >> ++ ln -s $slink_target $slink_name >> ++ >> ++# Getting a file through a symlink name should fail. >> ++ tmpfile=$PREFIX/smbclient_interactive_prompt_commands >> ++ cat > $tmpfile <> ++get source >> ++quit >> ++EOF >> ++ cmd='CLI_FORCE_INTERACTIVE=yes $SMBCLIENT "$@" -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD >> //$SERVER/nosymlinks -I $SERVER_IP $ADDARGS < $tmpfile 2>&1' >> ++ eval echo "$cmd" >> ++ out=`eval $cmd` >> ++ ret=$? >> ++ rm -f $tmpfile >> ++ >> ++ if [ $ret != 0 ] ; then >> ++ echo "$out" >> ++ echo "failed accessing nosymlinks with error $ret" >> ++ false >> ++ return >> ++ fi >> ++ >> ++ echo "$out" | grep 'NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED' >> ++ ret=$? >> ++ if [ $ret != 0 ] ; then >> ++ echo "$out" >> ++ echo "failed - should get NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED getting >> \\nosymlinks\\source" >> ++ false >> ++ fi >> ++ >> ++# But we should be able to create and delete directories. >> ++ cat > $tmpfile <> ++mkdir a >> ++mkdir a\\b >> ++quit >> ++EOF >> ++ cmd='CLI_FORCE_INTERACTIVE=yes $SMBCLIENT "$@" -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD >> //$SERVER/nosymlinks -I $SERVER_IP $ADDARGS < $tmpfile 2>&1' >> ++ eval echo "$cmd" >> ++ out=`eval $cmd` >> ++ ret=$? >> ++ rm -f $tmpfile >> ++ >> ++ if [ $ret != 0 ] ; then >> ++ echo "$out" >> ++ echo "failed accessing nosymlinks with error $ret" >> ++ false >> ++ return >> ++ fi >> ++ >> ++ echo "$out" | grep 'NT_STATUS' >> ++ ret=$? >> ++ if [ $ret == 0 ] ; then >> ++ echo "$out" >> ++ echo "failed - NT_STATUS_XXXX doing mkdir a; mkdir a\\b on >> \\nosymlinks" >> ++ false >> ++ fi >> ++} >> + >> + testit "smbclient -L $SERVER_IP" $SMBCLIENT -L $SERVER_IP -N -p 139 || >> failed=`expr $failed + 1` >> + testit "smbclient -L $SERVER -I $SERVER_IP" $SMBCLIENT -L $SERVER -I >> $SERVER_IP -N -p 139 -c quit || failed=`expr $failed + 1` >> +@@ -445,6 +514,10 @@ testit "ccache access works for smbclient" \ >> + test_ccache_access || \ >> + failed=`expr $failed + 1` >> + >> ++testit "follow symlinks = no" \ >> ++ test_nosymlinks || \ >> ++ failed=`expr $failed + 1` >> ++ >> + testit "rm -rf $LOGDIR" \ >> + rm -rf $LOGDIR || \ >> + failed=`expr $failed + 1` >> +-- >> +2.12.0 >> + >> + >> +From 17865cf188f42850f18f46514643a5b3a43e5707 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 22:07:50 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH 3/6] s3: Fixup test for CVE-2017-2619 regression with "follow >> + symlinks = no" >> + >> +Use correct bash operators (not string operators). >> +Add missing "return". >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12721 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme >> +(cherry picked from commit 037297a1c50e90a0092e3b94f472623f41ccc015) >> +--- >> + source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh | 9 +++++---- >> + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >> + >> +diff --git a/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> b/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> +index 57ef87e4949..bd5714fca6e 100755 >> +--- a/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> ++++ b/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> +@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ EOF >> + ret=$? >> + rm -f $tmpfile >> + >> +- if [ $ret != 0 ] ; then >> ++ if [ $ret -ne 0 ] ; then >> + echo "$out" >> + echo "failed accessing nosymlinks with error $ret" >> + false >> +@@ -437,10 +437,11 @@ EOF >> + >> + echo "$out" | grep 'NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED' >> + ret=$? >> +- if [ $ret != 0 ] ; then >> ++ if [ $ret -ne 0 ] ; then >> + echo "$out" >> + echo "failed - should get NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED getting >> \\nosymlinks\\source" >> + false >> ++ return >> + fi >> + >> + # But we should be able to create and delete directories. >> +@@ -455,7 +456,7 @@ EOF >> + ret=$? >> + rm -f $tmpfile >> + >> +- if [ $ret != 0 ] ; then >> ++ if [ $ret -ne 0 ] ; then >> + echo "$out" >> + echo "failed accessing nosymlinks with error $ret" >> + false >> +@@ -464,7 +465,7 @@ EOF >> + >> + echo "$out" | grep 'NT_STATUS' >> + ret=$? >> +- if [ $ret == 0 ] ; then >> ++ if [ $ret -eq 0 ] ; then >> + echo "$out" >> + echo "failed - NT_STATUS_XXXX doing mkdir a; mkdir a\\b on >> \\nosymlinks" >> + false >> +-- >> +2.12.0 >> + >> + >> +From 9b573af39f3d4995464e30771fa06e0709b5e57b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Mon, 27 Mar 2017 22:10:29 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH 6/6] s3: Test for CVE-2017-2619 regression with "follow >> + symlinks = no" - part 2 >> +MIME-Version: 1.0 >> +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 >> +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit >> + >> +Add tests for regular access. >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=12721 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +Reviewed-by: Ralph Boehme >> + >> +Autobuild-User(master): Ralph Böhme >> +Autobuild-Date(master): Tue Mar 28 17:05:27 CEST 2017 on sn-devel-144 >> + >> +(cherry picked from commit 4e734fcd1bf82c08aa303ce44e9735acccffcf06) >> +--- >> + source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh | 37 >> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> + 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+) >> + >> +diff --git a/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> b/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> +index bd5714fca6e..885766f6c16 100755 >> +--- a/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> ++++ b/source3/script/tests/test_smbclient_s3.sh >> +@@ -408,14 +408,22 @@ test_nosymlinks() >> + slink_name="$LOCAL_PATH/nosymlinks/source" >> + slink_target="$LOCAL_PATH/nosymlinks/target" >> + mkdir_target="$LOCAL_PATH/nosymlinks/a" >> ++ dir1="$LOCAL_PATH/nosymlinks/foo" >> ++ dir2="$LOCAL_PATH/nosymlinks/foo/bar" >> ++ get_target="$LOCAL_PATH/nosymlinks/foo/bar/testfile" >> + >> + rm -f $slink_target >> + rm -f $slink_name >> + rm -rf $mkdir_target >> ++ rm -rf $dir1 >> + >> + touch $slink_target >> + ln -s $slink_target $slink_name >> + >> ++ mkdir $dir1 >> ++ mkdir $dir2 >> ++ touch $get_target >> ++ >> + # Getting a file through a symlink name should fail. >> + tmpfile=$PREFIX/smbclient_interactive_prompt_commands >> + cat > $tmpfile <> +@@ -470,6 +478,35 @@ EOF >> + echo "failed - NT_STATUS_XXXX doing mkdir a; mkdir a\\b on >> \\nosymlinks" >> + false >> + fi >> ++ >> ++# Ensure regular file/directory access also works. >> ++ cat > $tmpfile <> ++cd foo\\bar >> ++ls >> ++get testfile - >> ++quit >> ++EOF >> ++ cmd='CLI_FORCE_INTERACTIVE=yes $SMBCLIENT "$@" -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD >> //$SERVER/nosymlinks -I $SERVER_IP $ADDARGS < $tmpfile 2>&1' >> ++ eval echo "$cmd" >> ++ out=`eval $cmd` >> ++ ret=$? >> ++ rm -f $tmpfile >> ++ >> ++ if [ $ret -ne 0 ] ; then >> ++ echo "$out" >> ++ echo "failed accessing nosymlinks with error $ret" >> ++ false >> ++ return >> ++ fi >> ++ >> ++ echo "$out" | grep 'NT_STATUS' >> ++ ret=$? >> ++ if [ $ret -eq 0 ] ; then >> ++ echo "$out" >> ++ echo "failed - NT_STATUS_XXXX doing cd foo\\bar; get testfile on >> \\nosymlinks" >> ++ false >> ++ return >> ++ fi >> + } >> + >> + testit "smbclient -L $SERVER_IP" $SMBCLIENT -L $SERVER_IP -N -p 139 || >> failed=`expr $failed + 1` >> +-- >> +2.12.0 >> + >> diff --git a/src/patches/samba/samba-3.6.25-CVE-2017-7494.patch >> b/src/patches/samba/samba-3.6.25-CVE-2017-7494.patch >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000..54bb1841b >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/src/patches/samba/samba-3.6.25-CVE-2017-7494.patch >> @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ >> +--- source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c Sun Feb 22 16:11:32 2015 >> ++++ source3/rpc_server/srv_pipe.c Fri May 26 17:28:40 2017 >> +@@ -465,6 +465,11 @@ >> + const char *pipename = cli_filename; >> + NTSTATUS status; >> + >> ++ if (strchr(pipename, '/')) { >> ++ DEBUG(1, ("Refusing open on pipe %s\n", pipename)); >> ++ return false; >> ++ } >> ++ >> + if (strnequal(pipename, "\\PIPE\\", 6)) { >> + pipename += 5; >> + } >> diff --git a/src/patches/samba/samba-3.6.25-security-2015-12-16.patch >> b/src/patches/samba/samba-3.6.25-security-2015-12-16.patch >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000..df1057fea >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/src/patches/samba/samba-3.6.25-security-2015-12-16.patch >> @@ -0,0 +1,255 @@ >> +From 2e94b6ec10f1d15e24867bab3063bb85f173406a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2015 10:58:11 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-5252: s3: smbd: Fix symlink verification (file >> + access outside the share). >> + >> +Ensure matching component ends in '/' or '\0'. >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11395 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +Reviewed-by: Volker Lendecke >> +--- >> + source3/smbd/vfs.c | 7 +++++-- >> + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> + >> +diff --git a/source3/smbd/vfs.c b/source3/smbd/vfs.c >> +index 6c56964..bd93b7f 100644 >> +--- a/source3/smbd/vfs.c >> ++++ b/source3/smbd/vfs.c >> +@@ -982,6 +982,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, >> const char *fname) >> + if (!allow_widelinks || !allow_symlinks) { >> + const char *conn_rootdir; >> + size_t rootdir_len; >> ++ bool matched; >> + >> + conn_rootdir = SMB_VFS_CONNECTPATH(conn, fname); >> + if (conn_rootdir == NULL) { >> +@@ -992,8 +993,10 @@ NTSTATUS check_reduced_name(connection_struct *conn, >> const char *fname) >> + } >> + >> + rootdir_len = strlen(conn_rootdir); >> +- if (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name, >> +- rootdir_len) != 0) { >> ++ matched = (strncmp(conn_rootdir, resolved_name, >> ++ rootdir_len) == 0); >> ++ if (!matched || (resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '/' && >> ++ resolved_name[rootdir_len] != '\0')) { >> + DEBUG(2, ("check_reduced_name: Bad access " >> + "attempt: %s is a symlink outside the " >> + "share path\n", fname)); >> +-- >> +2.5.0 >> + >> +From 25139116756cc285a3a5534834cc276ef1b7baaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Stefan Metzmacher >> +Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200 >> +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring >> + encryption in do_connect() >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher >> +Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/libsmb/clidfs.c | 7 ++++++- >> + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> + >> +diff --git a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c >> +index 23e1471..f153b6b 100644 >> +--- a/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c >> ++++ b/source3/libsmb/clidfs.c >> +@@ -98,6 +98,11 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, >> + const char *username; >> + const char *password; >> + NTSTATUS status; >> ++ int signing_state = get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info); >> ++ >> ++ if (force_encrypt) { >> ++ signing_state = Required; >> ++ } >> + >> + /* make a copy so we don't modify the global string 'service' */ >> + servicename = talloc_strdup(ctx,share); >> +@@ -132,7 +137,7 @@ static struct cli_state *do_connect(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, >> + zero_sockaddr(&ss); >> + >> + /* have to open a new connection */ >> +- c = >> cli_initialise_ex(get_cmdline_auth_info_signing_state(auth_info)); >> ++ c = cli_initialise_ex(signing_state); >> + if (c == NULL) { >> + d_printf("Connection to %s failed\n", server_n); >> + return NULL; >> +-- >> +2.5.0 >> + >> + >> +From 060adb0abdeda51b8b622c6020b5dea0c8dde1cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Stefan Metzmacher >> +Date: Wed, 30 Sep 2015 21:17:02 +0200 >> +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] CVE-2015-5296: s3:libsmb: force signing when requiring >> + encryption in SMBC_server_internal() >> + >> +BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11536 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher >> +Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison >> +--- >> + source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c | 13 +++++++++++-- >> + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> + >> +diff --git a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c >> +index 45be660..167f2c9 100644 >> +--- a/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c >> ++++ b/source3/libsmb/libsmb_server.c >> +@@ -258,6 +258,7 @@ SMBC_server_internal(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, >> + const char *username_used; >> + NTSTATUS status; >> + char *newserver, *newshare; >> ++ int signing_state = Undefined; >> + >> + zero_sockaddr(&ss); >> + ZERO_STRUCT(c); >> +@@ -404,8 +405,12 @@ again: >> + >> + zero_sockaddr(&ss); >> + >> ++ if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != >> SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) { >> ++ signing_state = Required; >> ++ } >> ++ >> + /* have to open a new connection */ >> +- if ((c = cli_initialise()) == NULL) { >> ++ if ((c = cli_initialise_ex(signing_state)) == NULL) { >> + errno = ENOMEM; >> + return NULL; >> + } >> +@@ -750,6 +755,7 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, >> + ipc_srv = SMBC_find_server(ctx, context, server, "*IPC$", >> + pp_workgroup, pp_username, pp_password); >> + if (!ipc_srv) { >> ++ int signing_state = Undefined; >> + >> + /* We didn't find a cached connection. Get the password */ >> + if (!*pp_password || (*pp_password)[0] == '\0') { >> +@@ -771,6 +777,9 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, >> + if (smbc_getOptionUseCCache(context)) { >> + flags |= CLI_FULL_CONNECTION_USE_CCACHE; >> + } >> ++ if (context->internal->smb_encryption_level != >> SMBC_ENCRYPTLEVEL_NONE) { >> ++ signing_state = Required; >> ++ } >> + >> + zero_sockaddr(&ss); >> + nt_status = cli_full_connection(&ipc_cli, >> +@@ -780,7 +789,7 @@ SMBC_attr_server(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, >> + *pp_workgroup, >> + *pp_password, >> + flags, >> +- Undefined); >> ++ signing_state); >> + if (! NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { >> + DEBUG(1,("cli_full_connection failed! (%s)\n", >> + nt_errstr(nt_status))); >> +-- >> +2.5.0 >> + >> +From 8e49de7754f7171a58a1f94dee0f1138dbee3c60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> +From: Jeremy Allison >> +Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2015 14:54:31 -0700 >> +Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2015-5299: s3-shadow-copy2: fix missing access check on >> + snapdir >> + >> +Fix originally from >> + >> +https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11529 >> + >> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison >> +Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp >> +--- >> + source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c | 47 >> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> + 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+) >> + >> +diff --git a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c >> b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c >> +index fedfb53..16c1ed7 100644 >> +--- a/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c >> ++++ b/source3/modules/vfs_shadow_copy2.c >> +@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ >> + >> + #include "includes.h" >> + #include "smbd/smbd.h" >> ++#include "smbd/globals.h" >> ++#include "../libcli/security/security.h" >> + #include "system/filesys.h" >> + #include "ntioctl.h" >> + >> +@@ -764,6 +766,43 @@ static int shadow_copy2_mkdir(vfs_handle_struct >> *handle, const char *fname, mod >> + SHADOW2_NEXT(MKDIR, (handle, name, mode), int, -1); >> + } >> + >> ++static bool check_access_snapdir(struct vfs_handle_struct *handle, >> ++ const char *path) >> ++{ >> ++ struct smb_filename smb_fname; >> ++ int ret; >> ++ NTSTATUS status; >> ++ uint32_t access_granted = 0; >> ++ >> ++ ZERO_STRUCT(smb_fname); >> ++ smb_fname.base_name = talloc_asprintf(talloc_tos(), >> ++ "%s", >> ++ path); >> ++ if (smb_fname.base_name == NULL) { >> ++ return false; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ ret = SMB_VFS_NEXT_STAT(handle, &smb_fname); >> ++ if (ret != 0 || !S_ISDIR(smb_fname.st.st_ex_mode)) { >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name); >> ++ return false; >> ++ } >> ++ >> ++ status = smbd_check_open_rights(handle->conn, >> ++ &smb_fname, >> ++ SEC_DIR_LIST, >> ++ &access_granted); >> ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { >> ++ DEBUG(0,("user does not have list permission " >> ++ "on snapdir %s\n", >> ++ smb_fname.base_name)); >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name); >> ++ return false; >> ++ } >> ++ TALLOC_FREE(smb_fname.base_name); >> ++ return true; >> ++} >> ++ >> + static int shadow_copy2_rmdir(vfs_handle_struct *handle, const char *fname) >> + { >> + SHADOW2_NEXT(RMDIR, (handle, name), int, -1); >> +@@ -877,6 +916,7 @@ static int >> shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle, >> + SMB_STRUCT_DIRENT *d; >> + TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx = talloc_new(handle->data); >> + char *snapshot; >> ++ bool ret; >> + >> + snapdir = shadow_copy2_find_snapdir(tmp_ctx, handle); >> + if (snapdir == NULL) { >> +@@ -886,6 +926,13 @@ static int >> shadow_copy2_get_shadow_copy2_data(vfs_handle_struct *handle, >> + talloc_free(tmp_ctx); >> + return -1; >> + } >> ++ ret = check_access_snapdir(handle, snapdir); >> ++ if (!ret) { >> ++ DEBUG(0,("access denied on listing snapdir %s\n", snapdir)); >> ++ errno = EACCES; >> ++ talloc_free(tmp_ctx); >> ++ return -1; >> ++ } >> + >> + p = SMB_VFS_NEXT_OPENDIR(handle, snapdir, NULL, 0); >> + >> +-- >> +2.5.0 >> + >