From: Robin Roevens <robin.roevens@disroot.org>
To: development@lists.ipfire.org
Subject: Re: question about checking for HW RNG support on apu4 appliance
Date: Thu, 08 Sep 2022 22:12:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3f303622a6eecf776b0b3ca5fb3eef3a22856255.camel@sicho.home> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <A9188486-5981-4DC7-99DD-FCF04785130A@ipfire.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 3844 bytes --]
Hi Michael
Thanks for the clear explanation. I will remove the hw rng support and
rngd state checks from my template as those are then indeed quite
useless now.
Robin
Michael Tremer schreef op do 08-09-2022 om 20:31 [+0100]:
> Hello Robin,
>
> > On 8 Sep 2022, at 20:16, Robin Roevens <robin.roevens(a)disroot.org>
> > wrote:
> >
> > Hi all
> >
> > If I understand it correctly, when HW RNG is supported, the Random
> > Number Generator Daemon (rngd) should be running ?
>
> No, not quite.
>
> > So in my Zabbix monitoring template for IPFire, I try to check if
> > HW
> > RNG is available and if so, I monitor the state of the rngd daemon.
> >
> > Previously I had no HW RNG support on the apu4 appliance until a
> > few
> > core updates ago where this was introduced with a firmware update.
> > So
> > now the rngd daemon is automatically started on the appliance.
> >
> > To know if HW RNG is supported, I currently check the contents of
> > /proc/cpuinfo for the occurrence of the string "rdrand" (which
> > seems a
> > correct check on x86_64 machines) but this string was and still is
> > not
> > present on the apu4 appliance.
>
> This is for an extended instruction set which was invented by Intel.
>
> This AMD processor doesn’t have it.
>
> > So I was wondering if anyone knows how to correctly check if HW RNG
> > support is available? So that this check works for all platforms.
>
> This is very hard - if possible at all.
>
> There are different kinds of sources for randomness. The first one is
> RDRAND as you pointed out and it is a processor instruction. Just
> because it is there, does not mean that it is being used.
>
> Then, there are other devices which usually emulate a character
> device that is to be found at /dev/hwrng. rngd has (had - see below)
> the job to copy any entropy from that device into the kernel.
>
> So, the current status quo is that if /dev/hwrng exists, rngd should
> be running.
>
> > Sidenote: This information (HW RNG support / rndg daemon state) was
> > previously also available on the entropy page of the IPFire GUI,
> > but it
> > seems this info is now gone together with the now obsolete entropy
> > graph. Was this intentional ? I assume that information is still
> > relevant even when with the entropy value gone?
>
> No, it is pretty much entirely irrelevant now. Even rngd is.
>
> The reason is that it has been changed how the kernel deals with
> entropy. Many systems do not have very good sources if any at all.
> How can we tell if a source is good? We can’t. So why risk using it?
>
> Problems could be either broken implementations or backdoored RNGs.
>
> So, the kernel is now seeding its pool of randomness once it boots.
> That happens with RDRAND or RDSEED if available, or with any other HW
> RNG and is being mixed together if there are multiple sources.
> Further sources are entropy from disk latency, keyboard strokes and
> so on. On servers, these are generally problematic sources.
>
> The kernel will then use Blake2 and ChaCha20 to generate random data
> when needed based on that pool. The result will be mixed into the
> pool again and occasionally it is being reseeded automatically in the
> same way it was initially seeded.
>
> So, I personally would prefer for us to drop rngd and just trust the
> kernel that it does its job right. This way seems to be the most
> sensical and allows us to ignore any dependencies on (crappy) HW
> RNGs.
>
> All systems will always have the same quality of randomness.
>
> Hope this helps.
>
> -Michael
>
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> > Robin
> >
> > --
> > Dit bericht is gescanned op virussen en andere gevaarlijke
> > inhoud door MailScanner en lijkt schoon te zijn.
> >
>
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-09-08 20:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-09-08 19:16 Robin Roevens
2022-09-08 19:31 ` Michael Tremer
2022-09-08 20:12 ` Robin Roevens [this message]
2022-09-08 21:37 ` Robin Roevens
2022-09-09 8:26 ` Paul Simmons
2022-09-09 10:31 ` Michael Tremer
2022-09-09 11:17 ` Robin Roevens
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