* Core Update 138 (testing) report
@ 2019-11-17 18:15 Peter Müller
2019-11-17 21:29 ` Arne Fitzenreiter
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Peter Müller @ 2019-11-17 18:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: development
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Hello Arne, hello *,
Core Update 138 (testing, see: https://blog.ipfire.org/post/ipfire-2-23-core-update-138-is-available-for-testing)
is running here for about 24 hours without any unexpected behaviour so far.
Since the CPU of my testing machine (Intel Celeron N3150) is not vulnerable
to the attacks recently published, I am unable to confirm mitigations against these:
> [root(a)maverick ~]# grep . /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/*
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit:Not affected
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf:Not affected
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers; SMT disabled
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown:Mitigation: PTI
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass:Not affected
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1:Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2:Mitigation: Full generic retpoline, IBPB: conditional, IBRS_FW, STIBP: disabled, RSB filling
> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Not affected
The updated vulnerabilities.cgi shows the same situation (I still wonder
whether the vulnerability listing follows any sort criterion).
@Arne: I observed multiple rootfile and symbolic link patches for the
intel-microcode patch of mine (thank you for this). However, they seem to
be deleted - are you sure the microcodes were built and shipped the right way?
This log output suggests an older version to be in place on my machine:
> [root(a)maverick ~]# grep microcode /var/log/bootlog
> [ 0.000000] microcode: microcode updated early to revision 0x368, date = 2019-04-23
> [ 1.966329] microcode: sig=0x406c3, pf=0x1, revision=0x368
> [ 1.966409] microcode: Microcode Update Driver: v2.2.
Output of "uname -a" for reference purposes:
> [root(a)maverick ~]# uname -a
> Linux maverick 4.14.154-ipfire #1 SMP Fri Nov 15 07:27:41 GMT 2019 x86_64 Intel(R) Celeron(R) CPU N3150 @ 1.60GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux
As far as I am concerned, this emergency Core Update is ready for release
if the core developers (Arne et al.) are able to confirm the correct behaviour
of the microcodes on affected systems or fix these to be reliably loaded.
Thanks, and best regards,
Peter Müller
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: Core Update 138 (testing) report
2019-11-17 18:15 Core Update 138 (testing) report Peter Müller
@ 2019-11-17 21:29 ` Arne Fitzenreiter
2019-11-17 21:41 ` Peter Müller
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Arne Fitzenreiter @ 2019-11-17 21:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: development
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I have also not found any affected system but im sure that the microcode
links are
recreatad by the last commit of core138.
https://git.ipfire.org/?p=ipfire-2.x.git;a=commitdiff;h=699381b6993b9428e99a0055dae03e7a222ea9f9
Sometimes git cherry-pick does not the inteded thing if a patch was
renamed.
Arne
Am 2019-11-17 19:15, schrieb Peter Müller:
> Hello Arne, hello *,
>
> Core Update 138 (testing, see:
> https://blog.ipfire.org/post/ipfire-2-23-core-update-138-is-available-for-testing)
> is running here for about 24 hours without any unexpected behaviour so
> far.
>
> Since the CPU of my testing machine (Intel Celeron N3150) is not
> vulnerable
> to the attacks recently published, I am unable to confirm mitigations
> against these:
>> [root(a)maverick ~]# grep . /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/*
>> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit:Not affected
>> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf:Not affected
>> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds:Mitigation: Clear CPU
>> buffers; SMT disabled
>> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown:Mitigation: PTI
>> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass:Not affected
>> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1:Mitigation:
>> usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization
>> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2:Mitigation: Full
>> generic retpoline, IBPB: conditional, IBRS_FW, STIBP: disabled, RSB
>> filling
>> /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort:Not affected
>
> The updated vulnerabilities.cgi shows the same situation (I still
> wonder
> whether the vulnerability listing follows any sort criterion).
>
> @Arne: I observed multiple rootfile and symbolic link patches for the
> intel-microcode patch of mine (thank you for this). However, they seem
> to
> be deleted - are you sure the microcodes were built and shipped the
> right way?
>
> This log output suggests an older version to be in place on my machine:
>> [root(a)maverick ~]# grep microcode /var/log/bootlog
>> [ 0.000000] microcode: microcode updated early to revision 0x368,
>> date = 2019-04-23
>> [ 1.966329] microcode: sig=0x406c3, pf=0x1, revision=0x368
>> [ 1.966409] microcode: Microcode Update Driver: v2.2.
>
> Output of "uname -a" for reference purposes:
>> [root(a)maverick ~]# uname -a
>> Linux maverick 4.14.154-ipfire #1 SMP Fri Nov 15 07:27:41 GMT 2019
>> x86_64 Intel(R) Celeron(R) CPU N3150 @ 1.60GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux
>
> As far as I am concerned, this emergency Core Update is ready for
> release
> if the core developers (Arne et al.) are able to confirm the correct
> behaviour
> of the microcodes on affected systems or fix these to be reliably
> loaded.
>
> Thanks, and best regards,
> Peter Müller
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-11-18 8:24 UTC | newest]
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2019-11-17 18:15 Core Update 138 (testing) report Peter Müller
2019-11-17 21:29 ` Arne Fitzenreiter
2019-11-17 21:41 ` Peter Müller
2019-11-18 8:24 ` Arne Fitzenreiter
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