From: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
To: development@lists.ipfire.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 00/11] Kernel: Improve hardening
Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2022 08:11:03 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4FB151A4-A8DA-4D73-8A3F-D6B146456931@ipfire.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19fb4d3e-4a6d-e9a3-930c-705c81355294@ipfire.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4764 bytes --]
Hello Peter,
Thank you. So for the sensors, we can keep LSM on. Cool.
-Michael
> On 14 Apr 2022, at 07:16, Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> wrote:
>
> For the records: I spoke to Arne regarding this on the phone the other day. He confirmed to
> me that this is by no means a severe issue from his point of view, and will check whether
> firmware flashing continues to work with the hardened kernel.
>
>> Could you please check with Arne how severe this is for the sensors?
>>
>>> On 13 Apr 2022, at 10:18, Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hello Michael,
>>>
>>> thanks for your e-mail.
>>>
>>> This is caused by the kernel lockdown patch, since /dev/ports apparently can be used to alter
>>> the running kernel, hence it is no longer available if LSM runs in "integrity" mode.
>>>
>>> On my testing machine, sensors and sensors-detect continue to work, but any sensor that requires
>>> /dev/ports access is no longer available. On my testing hardware, that does not make a difference,
>>> but I presume it will on other hardware with more or different sensors.
>>>
>>> sensors-detect does not implement any option to probe non-/dev/ports-sensors only, so I guess
>>> there is nothing we can do besides a "> /dev/null 2>&1". I will change the collectd initscript
>>> to reflect that.
>>>
>>> Thanks, and best regards,
>>> Peter Müller
>>>
>>>
>>>> Hello,
>>>>
>>>> I don’t know exactly which patch is responsible for this, but /dev/port is no longer accessible by sensors-detect.
>>>>
>>>> This leads to ugly messages when the system is booting up for the first time. Please see the attached screenshot.
>>>>
>>>> At least the message needs to be silenced, but you should investigate whether sensors will still work and is able to access readings for its hardware sensors.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -Michael
>>>>
>>>>> On 19 Mar 2022, at 21:08, Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> This patchset improves hardening of our Linux kernel configurations for all
>>>>> architectures. Most importantly, it features the activation of the "Linux
>>>>> Security Module", also known as "kernel lockdown" (a phrase coined before the
>>>>> pandemic), or LSM for short.
>>>>>
>>>>> Being set to "integrity" mode for a start, LSM prevents the kernel from being
>>>>> modified by various mechanisms, of which we have some already covered. However,
>>>>> it comes as a more holistic approach, which is why enabling it is desirable
>>>>> for our userbase.
>>>>>
>>>>> Most of this patchset is based on recommendations by the "kconfig-hardened-check"
>>>>> tool (https://github.com/a13xp0p0v/kconfig-hardened-check/), with some inspiration
>>>>> taken directly from KSPP and grsecurity.
>>>>>
>>>>> Being unable to cross-compile IPFire for non-x86_64-architectures on my own,
>>>>> and my VM on the Mustang currently being offline, this patchset does not come
>>>>> with aligned kernel rootfiles for other architectures than x86_64. I am sorry
>>>>> for any inconvenience and extra workload caused by this.
>>>>>
>>>>> Also, for the sake of completeness, the effect of LSM on virtualisation has not
>>>>> been tested due to time constraints, and a lack of oversight _which_ virtualisation
>>>>> features we officially support and which we don't. In doubt, however, I believe
>>>>> the security benefit gained from LSM outweighs a partial functional loss of
>>>>> virtualisation - but that is a highly biased opinion. :-)
>>>>>
>>>>> Peter Müller (11):
>>>>> Kernel: Set CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS to 32 bits
>>>>> Kernel: Disable support for tracing block I/O actions
>>>>> Kernel: Pin loading kernel files to one filesystem
>>>>> Kernel: Enable undefined behaviour sanity checker
>>>>> Kernel: Gate SETID transitions to limit CAP_SET(G|U)ID capabilities
>>>>> Kernel: Enable LSM support and set security level to "integrity"
>>>>> Kernel: Trigger BUG if data corruption is detected
>>>>> Kernel: Do not automatically load TTY line disciplines, only if
>>>>> necessary
>>>>> Kernel: Enable SVA support for both Intel and AMD CPUs
>>>>> Kernel: Disable function and stack tracers
>>>>> Kernel: Update rootfile for x86_64
>>>>>
>>>>> config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire | 47 ++++++++++--------
>>>>> config/kernel/kernel.config.armv6l-ipfire | 47 ++++++++++--------
>>>>> config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire | 47 ++++++++++--------
>>>>> config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire | 57 ++++++++++++----------
>>>>> config/rootfiles/common/x86_64/linux | 33 +++++++------
>>>>> 5 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-)
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> 2.34.1
>>>>
>>>>
>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-14 7:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <265D481E-78F1-4A6D-AAF4-47A5997D5741@ipfire.org>
2022-04-13 9:18 ` Peter Müller
2022-04-13 9:20 ` Michael Tremer
2022-04-14 6:16 ` Peter Müller
2022-04-14 7:11 ` Michael Tremer [this message]
2022-04-14 14:51 ` Peter Müller
2022-03-19 21:08 Peter Müller
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