From: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
To: development@lists.ipfire.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] OpenSSL: remove ciphers without Forward Secrecy from default ciphersuite
Date: Tue, 04 Aug 2020 10:35:24 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5566292B-281D-4631-B161-CBFD85E09A13@ipfire.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <108af439-2141-7525-f30a-652822eda6e5@ipfire.org>
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Acked-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>
> On 1 Aug 2020, at 13:13, Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> wrote:
>
> Ciphers not supplying (Perfect) Forward Secrecy are considered dangerous
> since they allow content decryption in retrospect, if an attacker is
> able to gain access to the servers' private key used for the
> corresponding TLS session.
>
> Since IPFire machines establish very few TLS connections by themselves, and
> destinations (IPFire.org infrastructure, mirrors, IPS rule sources, etc.)
> provide support for Forward Secrecy ciphers - some are even enforcing
> them -, it is safe to drop support for anything else.
>
> This patch reduces the OpenSSL default cipher list to:
> TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
> TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
> TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 TLSv1.3 Kx=any Au=any Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
> ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
> ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
> ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384
> ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA384
> ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA384
> ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA384
> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256
> ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA256
> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256
> ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA256
> DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(256) Mac=AEAD
> DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=CHACHA20/POLY1305(256) Mac=AEAD
> DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AESGCM(128) Mac=AEAD
> DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA256
> DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA256
> DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA256
> DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256 TLSv1.2 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA256
> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA TLSv1 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1
> ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA TLSv1 Kx=ECDH Au=ECDSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1
> ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA TLSv1 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1
> ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA TLSv1 Kx=ECDH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1
> DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(256) Mac=SHA1
> DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(256) Mac=SHA1
> DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=AES(128) Mac=SHA1
> DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA SSLv3 Kx=DH Au=RSA Enc=Camellia(128) Mac=SHA1
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org>
> ---
> src/patches/openssl-1.1.1d-default-cipherlist.patch | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/src/patches/openssl-1.1.1d-default-cipherlist.patch b/src/patches/openssl-1.1.1d-default-cipherlist.patch
> index 5ad7829e7..a3a48933e 100644
> --- a/src/patches/openssl-1.1.1d-default-cipherlist.patch
> +++ b/src/patches/openssl-1.1.1d-default-cipherlist.patch
> @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
> * This applies to ciphersuites for TLSv1.2 and below.
> */
> -# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL"
> -+# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "HIGH:+aRSA:+SHA384:+SHA256:+DH:+SHA:+kRSA:!eNULL:!aNULL:!PSK:!SRP:!AESCCM:!DSS"
> ++# define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "HIGH:+aRSA:+SHA384:+SHA256:+DH:+SHA:!kRSA:!eNULL:!aNULL:!PSK:!SRP:!AESCCM:!DSS"
> /* This is the default set of TLSv1.3 ciphersuites */
> # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305)
> # define TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:" \
> --
> 2.26.2
prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-04 9:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-01 12:13 Peter Müller
2020-08-04 9:35 ` Michael Tremer [this message]
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