From: IT Superhack <itsuperhack@web.de>
To: development@lists.ipfire.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Mark recommended ciphers/algorithms
Date: Sun, 13 Dec 2015 16:10:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <566D8A55.3070402@web.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1449767773.31655.108.camel@ipfire.org>
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Hello Michael,
Michael Tremer:
> Hello,
>
> this patch was line-wrapped and cannot be merged, but nevertheless,
> here are my thoughts:
I am unable to submit patches at the moment, since git send-email keeps
crashing on every machine I own - sometimes starttls issues, sometimes
segfault - and TB seems to line-wrap.
>
> On Mon, 2015-12-07 at 17:35 +0100, IT Superhack wrote:
>> Signed-off-by: Timmothy Wilson <itsuperhack(a)web.de>
>> ---
>> diff --git a/html/cgi-bin/ovpnmain.cgi b/html/cgi-bin/ovpnmain.cgi
>> index 62af54e..15385f1 100644
>> --- a/html/cgi-bin/ovpnmain.cgi
>> +++ b/html/cgi-bin/ovpnmain.cgi
>> @@ -1316,7 +1316,7 @@ END
>> <option value='1024'
>> $selected{'DHLENGHT'}{'1024'}>1024
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'}</option>
>> <option value='2048'
>> $selected{'DHLENGHT'}{'2048'}>2048
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'}</option>
>> <option value='3072'
>> $selected{'DHLENGHT'}{'3072'}>3072
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'}</option>
>> - <option value='4096'
>> $selected{'DHLENGHT'}{'4096'}>4096
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'}</option>
>> + <option value='4096'
>> $selected{'DHLENGHT'}{'4096'}>4096
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'} ($Lang::tr{'recommended'})</option>
>> </select>
>> </td>
>> </tr>
>
> I agree, that it is desirable to use longer keys. However, I am not
> sure if it is a good idea to go all the way for 4096 bit and not only
> for e.g. 2048 bit. Why not 8192 even?
>
Since the SSLTest server page treats 2048 DH primes as "weak", I guess
3072 or better is suitable here.
> I would like to read some justification for the values that are picked.
Here is one, for example:
https://netzpolitik.org/2015/kryptographie-open-source-und-gesellschaft/
(german, please see "8."). In this article is also mentioned that 512
bit hash algorithms should be used.
>
> Furthermore, I think that we the upper bound should be something that
> the average IPFire box is able to handle.
I agree with that. Maybe 3072 bits is a good deal between speed and
security, what do you think?
>
>> @@ -4687,7 +4687,7 @@ if ($cgiparams{'TYPE'} eq 'net') {
>> <option value='CAMELLIA-256-CBC'
>> $selected{'DCIPHER'}{'CAMELLIA-256-CBC'}>CAMELLIA-CBC (256
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'})</option>
>> <option value='CAMELLIA-192-CBC'
>> $selected{'DCIPHER'}{'CAMELLIA-192-CBC'}>CAMELLIA-CBC (192
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'})</option>
>> <option value='CAMELLIA-128-CBC'
>> $selected{'DCIPHER'}{'CAMELLIA-128-CBC'}>CAMELLIA-CBC (128
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'})</option>
>> - <option value='AES-256-CBC'
>> $selected{'DCIPHER'}{'AES-256-CBC'}>AES-CBC (256 $Lang::tr{'bit'},
>> $Lang::tr{'default'})</option>
>> + <option value='AES-256-CBC'
>> $selected{'DCIPHER'}{'AES-256-CBC'}>AES-CBC (256 $Lang::tr{'bit'},
>> $Lang::tr{'default'}, $Lang::tr{'recommended'})</option>
>> <option value='AES-192-CBC'
>> $selected{'DCIPHER'}{'AES-192-CBC'}>AES-CBC (192
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'})</option>
>> <option value='AES-128-CBC'
>> $selected{'DCIPHER'}{'AES-128-CBC'}>AES-CBC (128
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'})</option>
>> <option value='DES-EDE3-CBC'
>> $selected{'DCIPHER'}{'DES-EDE3-CBC'}>DES-EDE3-CBC (192
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'})</option>
>
> I can agree with that since it is already selected by default. This
> makes it just more explicit.
>
> I would have merged this if this was an independent patch in a patch
> set.
Thanks, but at the moment, i cannot hand in a patch without wrapped lines.
>
>> @@ -4702,7 +4702,7 @@ if ($cgiparams{'TYPE'} eq 'net') {
>> <td class='boldbase'>$Lang::tr{'ovpn ha'}:</td>
>> <td><select name='DAUTH'>
>> <option value='whirlpool'
>> $selected{'DAUTH'}{'whirlpool'}>Whirlpool (512
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'})</option>
>> - <option value='SHA512'
>> $selected{'DAUTH'}{'SHA512'}>SHA2 (512
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'})</option>
>> + <option value='SHA512'
>> $selected{'DAUTH'}{'SHA512'}>SHA2 (512
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'}, $Lang::tr{'recommended'})</option>
>> <option value='SHA384'
>> $selected{'DAUTH'}{'SHA384'}>SHA2 (384
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'})</option>
>> <option value='SHA256'
>> $selected{'DAUTH'}{'SHA256'}>SHA2 (256
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'})</option>
>> <option value='SHA1'
>> $selected{'DAUTH'}{'SHA1'}>SHA1 (160
>> $Lang::tr{'bit'} Default)</option>
>
> Same as above. SHA2 is considered to be "secure enough for now". Why is
> 256 bit not enough? This has also a rather huge performance impact.
> Things like these should also be mentioned in the commit message.
>
>> diff --git a/html/cgi-bin/vpnmain.cgi b/html/cgi-bin/vpnmain.cgi
>> index f1cffb8..9aa50f5 100644
>> --- a/html/cgi-bin/vpnmain.cgi
>> +++ b/html/cgi-bin/vpnmain.cgi
>> @@ -2424,7 +2424,7 @@ if(($cgiparams{'ACTION'} eq
>> $Lang::tr{'advanced'}) ||
>> <td>$Lang::tr{'vpn keyexchange'}:</td>
>> <td>
>> <select name='IKE_VERSION'>
>> - <option value='ikev2'
>> $selected{'IKE_VERSION'}{'ikev2'}>IKEv2</option>
>> + <option value='ikev2'
>> $selected{'IKE_VERSION'}{'ikev2'}>IKEv2
>> ($Lang::tr{'recommended'})</option>
>> <option value='ikev1'
>> $selected{'IKE_VERSION'}{'ikev1'}>IKEv1</option>
>> </select>
>> </td>
>
> Why should IKEv2 be recommended? AFAIK there are no known design issues
> with IKEv1. Some algorithms might not be available, but this is not an
> issue for now since AES, SHA2, (AKA the strong ones) are supported.
>
>> @@ -2434,7 +2434,7 @@ if(($cgiparams{'ACTION'} eq
>> $Lang::tr{'advanced'}) ||
>> <td class='boldbase'
>> width="15%">$Lang::tr{'encryption'}</td>
>> <td class='boldbase'>
>> <select name='IKE_ENCRYPTION'
>> multiple='multiple' size='6'
>> style='width: 100%'>
>> - <option value='aes256gcm128'
>> $checked{'IKE_ENCRYPTION'}{'aes256gcm128'}>256 bit AES-GCM/128 bit
>> ICV</option>
>> + <option value='aes256gcm128'
>> $checked{'IKE_ENCRYPTION'}{'aes256gcm128'}>256 bit AES-GCM/128 bit
>> ICV
>> ($Lang::tr{'recommended'})</option>
>> <option value='aes256gcm96'
>> $checked{'IKE_ENCRYPTION'}{'aes256gcm96'}>256 bit AES-GCM/96 bit
>> ICV</option>
>> <option value='aes256gcm64'
>> $checked{'IKE_ENCRYPTION'}{'aes256gcm64'}>256 bit AES-GCM/64 bit
>> ICV</option>
>> <option value='aes256'
>> $checked{'IKE_ENCRYPTION'}{'aes256'}>256
>> bit AES-CBC</option>
>> @@ -2454,7 +2454,7 @@ if(($cgiparams{'ACTION'} eq
>> $Lang::tr{'advanced'}) ||
>> </td>
>> <td class='boldbase'>
>> <select name='ESP_ENCRYPTION'
>> multiple='multiple' size='6'
>> style='width: 100%'>
>> - <option value='aes256gcm128'
>> $checked{'ESP_ENCRYPTION'}{'aes256gcm128'}>256 bit AES-GCM/128 bit
>> ICV</option>
>> + <option value='aes256gcm128'
>> $checked{'ESP_ENCRYPTION'}{'aes256gcm128'}>256 bit AES-GCM/128 bit
>> ICV
>> ($Lang::tr{'recommended'})</option>
>> <option value='aes256gcm96'
>> $checked{'ESP_ENCRYPTION'}{'aes256gcm96'}>256 bit AES-GCM/96 bit
>> ICV</option>
>> <option value='aes256gcm64'
>> $checked{'ESP_ENCRYPTION'}{'aes256gcm64'}>256 bit AES-GCM/64 bit
>> ICV</option>
>> <option value='aes256'
>> $checked{'ESP_ENCRYPTION'}{'aes256'}>256
>> bit AES-CBC</option>
>
> Why are the AES-GCM cipher suites with smaller IVs not recommended?
>
>> @@ -2478,7 +2478,7 @@ if(($cgiparams{'ACTION'} eq
>> $Lang::tr{'advanced'}) ||
>> <td class='boldbase'
>> width="15%">$Lang::tr{'integrity'}</td>
>> <td class='boldbase'>
>> <select name='IKE_INTEGRITY'
>> multiple='multiple' size='6'
>> style='width: 100%'>
>> - <option value='sha2_512'
>> $checked{'IKE_INTEGRITY'}{'sha2_512'}>SHA2 512 bit</option>
>> + <option value='sha2_512'
>> $checked{'IKE_INTEGRITY'}{'sha2_512'}>SHA2 512 bit
>> ($Lang::tr{'recommended'})</option>
>> <option value='sha2_384'
>> $checked{'IKE_INTEGRITY'}{'sha2_384'}>SHA2 384 bit</option>
>> <option value='sha2_256'
>> $checked{'IKE_INTEGRITY'}{'sha2_256'}>SHA2 256 bit</option>
>> <option value='aesxcbc'
>> $checked{'IKE_INTEGRITY'}{'aesxcbc'}>AES
>> XCBC</option>
>
> Same as above.
>
>> @@ -2488,7 +2488,7 @@ if(($cgiparams{'ACTION'} eq
>> $Lang::tr{'advanced'}) ||
>> </td>
>> <td class='boldbase'>
>> <select name='ESP_INTEGRITY'
>> multiple='multiple' size='6'
>> style='width: 100%'>
>> - <option value='sha2_512'
>> $checked{'ESP_INTEGRITY'}{'sha2_512'}>SHA2 512 bit</option>
>> + <option value='sha2_512'
>> $checked{'ESP_INTEGRITY'}{'sha2_512'}>SHA2 512 bit
>> ($Lang::tr{'recommended'})</option>
>> <option value='sha2_384'
>> $checked{'ESP_INTEGRITY'}{'sha2_384'}>SHA2 384 bit</option>
>> <option value='sha2_256'
>> $checked{'ESP_INTEGRITY'}{'sha2_256'}>SHA2 256 bit</option>
>> <option value='aesxcbc'
>> $checked{'ESP_INTEGRITY'}{'aesxcbc'}>AES
>> XCBC</option>
>
> Same again.
There seems to be a problem with the word "recommended". In the patches
submitted, I recommended always the most strongest cipher. However, as
you said, some of them are simply one step too much. Should then both be
recommended?
In my opinion, this has to be clarified, but since it is a very
subjective thing, it might be difficult.
>
>> diff --git a/langs/de/cgi-bin/de.pl b/langs/de/cgi-bin/de.pl
>> index 2bca854..b18cace 100644
>> --- a/langs/de/cgi-bin/de.pl
>> +++ b/langs/de/cgi-bin/de.pl
>> @@ -1914,6 +1914,7 @@
>> 'rebooting ipfire' => 'Starte IPFire neu',
>> 'reconnect' => 'Neu Verbinden',
>> 'reconnection' => 'Wiederverbindung',
>> +'recommended' => 'empfohlen',
>> 'red' => 'Internet',
>> 'red1' => 'ROT',
>> 'references' => 'Referenzen',
>>
>>
>
> The English translation is missing.
Oh, sorry, I forgot.
>
> Best,
> -Michael
>
Best regards,
Timmothy Wilson
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-12-13 15:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-11-23 14:18 [PATCH] Disallow OpenVPN DH params less than 1024 bits IT Superhack
2015-11-24 14:14 ` ue
2015-12-01 22:58 ` Michael Tremer
2015-12-02 9:07 ` IT Superhack
2015-12-02 10:47 ` Michael Tremer
2015-12-02 18:19 ` IT Superhack
2015-12-07 16:35 ` [PATCH] Mark recommended ciphers/algorithms IT Superhack
2015-12-10 17:16 ` Michael Tremer
2015-12-13 15:10 ` IT Superhack [this message]
2015-12-13 17:47 ` Larsen
2015-12-15 14:13 ` Michael Tremer
2015-12-15 15:03 ` Larsen
2015-12-15 21:18 ` Michael Tremer
2015-12-16 8:06 ` Larsen
2015-12-18 16:12 ` IT Superhack
2016-01-01 16:54 ` IT Superhack
2016-01-04 16:31 ` Michael Tremer
2016-01-10 16:29 ` IT Superhack
2016-01-10 22:22 ` Michael Tremer
2016-01-02 13:03 ` ue
2016-01-04 16:36 ` Michael Tremer
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