Hello Bernhard,

thanks for your reply.

Due to the extra space, Patchwork did not parse it. Therefore, I take the liberty to:

Acked-by: Bernhard Bitsch <bbitsch(a)ipfire.org>

:-)

Thanks, and best regards,
Peter Müller


> Acked-by : Bernhard Bitsch <bbitsch(a)ipfire.org>
> 
> Am 25.09.2021 um 09:53 schrieb Peter Müller:
>> While not inherently malicious, ANY queries are nowadays commonly used
>> in DNS-based DDoS attacks, since nameservers must respond with a _very_
>> large answer to a very small query.
>>
>> In 2015, Cloudflare stopped responding to them altogether (see:
>> https://blog.cloudflare.com/deprecating-dns-any-meta-query-type/), and
>> several discussions took place in various DNS operator working groups,
>> ultimately resulting in RFC 8482 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8482).
>>
>> Aside from - very uncommon - debugging or enumerating purposes, there is
>> little legitimate reason why a client behind IPFire needs to conduct an
>> ANY query. In fact, no up-to-date implementation of some legitimate software
>> has been observed doing so in the recent past.
>>
>> To prevent IPFire from unintentionally participating in a DDoS attack,
>> this patch changes the handling of ANY queries, forbidding them
>> altogether.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org>
>> ---
>>   config/unbound/unbound.conf | 1 +
>>   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/config/unbound/unbound.conf b/config/unbound/unbound.conf
>> index 9d5e840dd..3848b0f71 100644
>> --- a/config/unbound/unbound.conf
>> +++ b/config/unbound/unbound.conf
>> @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ server:
>>       harden-large-queries: yes
>>       harden-referral-path: yes
>>       aggressive-nsec: yes
>> +    deny-any: yes
>>       # TLS
>>       tls-cert-bundle: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt
>>