Hello Michael,

it seems as the kernel folks backported this into 4.14.x by now:

> [root(a)maverick ~]# uname -a
> Linux maverick 4.14.212-ipfire #1 SMP Wed Dec 16 12:01:25 GMT 2020 x86_64 Intel(R) Celeron(R) CPU N3150 @ 1.60GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux
> [root(a)maverick ~]# sysctl dev.tty.ldisc_autoload
> dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 1

Therefore, I would like to see this patch being merged - that is, if it is still applicable. :-)

Thanks, and best regards,
Peter Müller


> Hello Michael,
> 
> grmpf, overlooked some patched distribution kernel again. :-/
> 
> Sorry for the noise - I will keep the patch queued and wait for kernel 5.9 ...
> 
> Thanks, and best regards,
> Peter Müller
> 
> 
>> This does not exist before kernel 5.1.
>>
>> -Michael
>>
>>> On 5 Oct 2020, at 20:45, Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> Malicious/vulnerable TTY line disciplines have been subject of some
>>> kernel exploits such as CVE-2017-2636, and since - to put it in Greg
>>> Kroah-Hatrman's words - we do not "trust the userspace to do the right
>>> thing", this reduces local kernel attack surface.
>>>
>>> Further, there is no legitimate reason why an unprivileged user should
>>> load kernel modules during runtime, anyway.
>>>
>>> See also:
>>> - https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/4/15/890
>>> - https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2017/03/24/CVE-2017-2636.html
>>>
>>> Cc: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne.fitzenreiter(a)ipfire.org>
>>> Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>
>>> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org>
>>> ---
>>> config/etc/sysctl.conf | 4 ++++
>>> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/config/etc/sysctl.conf b/config/etc/sysctl.conf
>>> index d48c7734e..b5ede15ed 100644
>>> --- a/config/etc/sysctl.conf
>>> +++ b/config/etc/sysctl.conf
>>> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables = 0
>>> net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables = 0
>>> net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-arptables = 0
>>>
>>> +# Restrict loading TTY line disciplines to CAP_SYS_MODULE to prevent unprivileged attackers
>>> +# from loading vulnerable line disciplines with the TIOCSETD ioctl.
>>> +dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 0
>>> +
>>> # Try to keep kernel address exposures out of various /proc files (kallsyms, modules, etc).
>>> kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> 2.26.2
>>