* [PATCH] rsync: Patch CVE-2022-29154
@ 2022-08-05 12:00 Peter Müller
2022-08-05 16:05 ` Michael Tremer
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Peter Müller @ 2022-08-05 12:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: development
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 12337 bytes --]
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/08/02/1
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org>
---
lfs/rsync | 5 +-
src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch | 322 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 326 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
diff --git a/lfs/rsync b/lfs/rsync
index f40c28ce2..c27258929 100644
--- a/lfs/rsync
+++ b/lfs/rsync
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ DL_FROM = $(URL_IPFIRE)
DIR_APP = $(DIR_SRC)/$(THISAPP)
TARGET = $(DIR_INFO)/$(THISAPP)
PROG = rsync
-PAK_VER = 14
+PAK_VER = 15
DEPS =
@@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects))
# Replace shebang in rsync-ssl
cd $(DIR_APP) && sed -i -e "s@^#!.*@#!/bin/bash@" rsync-ssl
+ # Fix for CVE-2022-29154
+ cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
+
cd $(DIR_APP) && ./configure \
--prefix=/usr \
--without-included-popt \
diff --git a/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch b/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3b4499a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
+commit b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871
+Author: Wayne Davison <wayne(a)opencoder.net>
+Date: Sun Jul 31 16:55:34 2022 -0700
+
+ Some extra file-list safety checks.
+
+diff --git a/exclude.c b/exclude.c
+index 39073a0c..b670c8ba 100644
+--- a/exclude.c
++++ b/exclude.c
+@@ -27,16 +27,22 @@ extern int am_server;
+ extern int am_sender;
+ extern int eol_nulls;
+ extern int io_error;
++extern int xfer_dirs;
++extern int recurse;
+ extern int local_server;
+ extern int prune_empty_dirs;
+ extern int ignore_perishable;
++extern int old_style_args;
++extern int relative_paths;
+ extern int delete_mode;
+ extern int delete_excluded;
+ extern int cvs_exclude;
+ extern int sanitize_paths;
+ extern int protocol_version;
++extern int list_only;
+ extern int module_id;
+
++extern char *filesfrom_host;
+ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ extern unsigned int curr_dir_len;
+ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
+@@ -44,8 +50,10 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
+ filter_rule_list filter_list = { .debug_type = "" };
+ filter_rule_list cvs_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [global CVS]" };
+ filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [daemon]" };
++filter_rule_list implied_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [implied]" };
+
+ int saw_xattr_filter = 0;
++int trust_sender_filter = 0;
+
+ /* Need room enough for ":MODS " prefix plus some room to grow. */
+ #define MAX_RULE_PREFIX (16)
+@@ -292,6 +300,125 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *listp, const char *pat, unsigned int pat_
+ }
+ }
+
++/* Each arg the client sends to the remote sender turns into an implied include
++ * that the receiver uses to validate the file list from the sender. */
++void add_implied_include(const char *arg)
++{
++ filter_rule *rule;
++ int arg_len, saw_wild = 0, backslash_cnt = 0;
++ int slash_cnt = 1; /* We know we're adding a leading slash. */
++ const char *cp;
++ char *p;
++ if (old_style_args || list_only || filesfrom_host != NULL)
++ return;
++ if (relative_paths) {
++ cp = strstr(arg, "/./");
++ if (cp)
++ arg = cp+3;
++ } else {
++ if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL)
++ arg = cp + 1;
++ }
++ arg_len = strlen(arg);
++ if (arg_len) {
++ if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) {
++ /* We need to add room to escape backslashes if wildcard chars are present. */
++ cp = arg;
++ while ((cp = strchr(cp, '\\')) != NULL) {
++ arg_len++;
++ cp++;
++ }
++ saw_wild = 1;
++ }
++ arg_len++; /* Leave room for the prefixed slash */
++ rule = new0(filter_rule);
++ if (!implied_filter_list.head)
++ implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = rule;
++ else {
++ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
++ implied_filter_list.head = rule;
++ }
++ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
++ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 1);
++ *p++ = '/';
++ cp = arg;
++ while (*cp) {
++ switch (*cp) {
++ case '\\':
++ backslash_cnt++;
++ if (saw_wild)
++ *p++ = '\\';
++ *p++ = *cp++;
++ break;
++ case '/':
++ if (p[-1] == '/') /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
++ break;
++ if (relative_paths) {
++ filter_rule const *ent;
++ int found = 0;
++ *p = '\0';
++ for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
++ if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, rule->pattern) == 0)
++ found = 1;
++ }
++ if (!found) {
++ filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
++ R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
++ R_rule->pattern = strdup(rule->pattern);
++ R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
++ R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
++ implied_filter_list.head = R_rule;
++ }
++ }
++ slash_cnt++;
++ *p++ = *cp++;
++ break;
++ default:
++ *p++ = *cp++;
++ break;
++ }
++ }
++ *p = '\0';
++ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
++ arg = (const char *)rule->pattern;
++ }
++
++ if (recurse || xfer_dirs) {
++ /* Now create a rule with an added "/" & "**" or "*" at the end */
++ rule = new0(filter_rule);
++ if (recurse)
++ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD | FILTRULE_WILD2;
++ else
++ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD;
++ /* A +4 in the len leaves enough room for / * * \0 or / * \0 \0 */
++ if (!saw_wild && backslash_cnt) {
++ /* We are appending a wildcard, so now the backslashes need to be escaped. */
++ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + backslash_cnt + 3 + 1);
++ cp = arg;
++ while (*cp) {
++ if (*cp == '\\')
++ *p++ = '\\';
++ *p++ = *cp++;
++ }
++ } else {
++ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 3 + 1);
++ if (arg_len) {
++ memcpy(p, arg, arg_len);
++ p += arg_len;
++ }
++ }
++ if (p[-1] != '/')
++ *p++ = '/';
++ *p++ = '*';
++ if (recurse)
++ *p++ = '*';
++ *p = '\0';
++ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1;
++ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
++ implied_filter_list.head = rule;
++ }
++}
++
+ /* This frees any non-inherited items, leaving just inherited items on the list. */
+ static void pop_filter_list(filter_rule_list *listp)
+ {
+@@ -718,7 +845,7 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum logcode code, char const *name,
+ : name_flags & NAME_IS_DIR ? "directory"
+ : "file";
+ rprintf(code, "[%s] %sing %s %s because of pattern %s%s%s\n",
+- w, actions[*w!='s'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
++ w, actions[*w=='g'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
+ t, name, ent->pattern,
+ ent->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY ? "/" : "", type);
+ }
+@@ -890,6 +1017,7 @@ static filter_rule *parse_rule_tok(const char **rulestr_ptr,
+ }
+ switch (ch) {
+ case ':':
++ trust_sender_filter = 1;
+ rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE
+ | FILTRULE_FINISH_SETUP;
+ /* FALL THROUGH */
+diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c
+index 1ba306bc..0e6bf782 100644
+--- a/flist.c
++++ b/flist.c
+@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int need_unsorted_flist;
+ extern int sender_symlink_iconv;
+ extern int output_needs_newline;
+ extern int sender_keeps_checksum;
++extern int trust_sender_filter;
+ extern int unsort_ndx;
+ extern uid_t our_uid;
+ extern struct stats stats;
+@@ -83,8 +84,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+
+ extern struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes;
+
+-extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
+-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
++extern filter_rule_list filter_list, implied_filter_list, daemon_filter_list;
+
+ #ifdef ICONV_OPTION
+ extern int filesfrom_convert;
+@@ -986,6 +986,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
+ }
+
++ if (*thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') {
++ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
++ if (!trust_sender_filter /* a per-dir filter rule means we must trust the sender's filtering */
++ && filter_list.head && check_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) {
++ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting excluded file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++ }
++ if (implied_filter_list.head && check_filter(&implied_filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) <= 0) {
++ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting unrequested file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++ }
++ }
++
+ if (inc_recurse && S_ISDIR(mode)) {
+ if (one_file_system) {
+ /* Room to save the dir's device for -x */
+diff --git a/io.c b/io.c
+index cf94cee7..a6e3ed30 100644
+--- a/io.c
++++ b/io.c
+@@ -419,6 +419,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
+ while (s != eob) {
+ if (*s++ == '\0') {
+ ff_xb.len = s - sob - 1;
++ add_implied_include(sob);
+ if (iconvbufs(ic_send, &ff_xb, &iobuf.out, flags) < 0)
+ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); /* impossible? */
+ write_buf(iobuf.out_fd, s-1, 1); /* Send the '\0'. */
+@@ -450,9 +451,12 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
+ char *f = ff_xb.buf + ff_xb.pos;
+ char *t = ff_xb.buf;
+ char *eob = f + len;
++ char *cur = t;
+ /* Eliminate any multi-'\0' runs. */
+ while (f != eob) {
+ if (!(*t++ = *f++)) {
++ add_implied_include(cur);
++ cur = t;
+ while (f != eob && *f == '\0')
+ f++;
+ }
+diff --git a/main.c b/main.c
+index 58920a2d..5a7fbdd7 100644
+--- a/main.c
++++ b/main.c
+@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ extern int backup_dir_len;
+ extern int basis_dir_cnt;
+ extern int default_af_hint;
+ extern int stdout_format_has_i;
++extern int trust_sender_filter;
+ extern struct stats stats;
+ extern char *stdout_format;
+ extern char *logfile_format;
+@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
+ extern char backup_dir_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ extern char *basis_dir[MAX_BASIS_DIRS+1];
+ extern struct file_list *first_flist;
+-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
++extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list, implied_filter_list;
+
+ uid_t our_uid;
+ gid_t our_gid;
+@@ -635,6 +636,7 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *machine, char *user, char **remote_argv, in
+ #ifdef ICONV_CONST
+ setup_iconv();
+ #endif
++ trust_sender_filter = 1;
+ } else if (local_server) {
+ /* If the user didn't request --[no-]whole-file, force
+ * it on, but only if we're not batch processing. */
+@@ -1500,6 +1502,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
+ char *dummy_host;
+ int dummy_port = rsync_port;
+ int i;
++ if (filesfrom_fd < 0)
++ add_implied_include(remote_argv[0]);
+ /* For remote source, any extra source args must have either
+ * the same hostname or an empty hostname. */
+ for (i = 1; i < remote_argc; i++) {
+@@ -1523,6 +1527,7 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
+ if (!rsync_port && !*arg) /* Turn an empty arg into a dot dir. */
+ arg = ".";
+ remote_argv[i] = arg;
++ add_implied_include(arg);
+ }
+ }
+
+diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
+index b3a69da0..93cf8efd 100644
+--- a/receiver.c
++++ b/receiver.c
+@@ -593,10 +593,13 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
+ if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
+ rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname);
+
+- if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')
+- && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
+- rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
+- exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++ if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')) {
++ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(file->mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
++ if (check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, filt_flags) < 0) {
++ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting file transfer request for daemon excluded file: %s\n",
++ fname);
++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++ }
+ }
+
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
--
2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] rsync: Patch CVE-2022-29154
2022-08-05 12:00 [PATCH] rsync: Patch CVE-2022-29154 Peter Müller
@ 2022-08-05 16:05 ` Michael Tremer
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Michael Tremer @ 2022-08-05 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: development
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 13204 bytes --]
Reviewed-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>
Thank you.
> On 5 Aug 2022, at 13:00, Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> wrote:
>
> https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2022/08/02/1
>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org>
> ---
> lfs/rsync | 5 +-
> src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch | 322 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 326 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
>
> diff --git a/lfs/rsync b/lfs/rsync
> index f40c28ce2..c27258929 100644
> --- a/lfs/rsync
> +++ b/lfs/rsync
> @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ DL_FROM = $(URL_IPFIRE)
> DIR_APP = $(DIR_SRC)/$(THISAPP)
> TARGET = $(DIR_INFO)/$(THISAPP)
> PROG = rsync
> -PAK_VER = 14
> +PAK_VER = 15
>
> DEPS =
>
> @@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects))
> # Replace shebang in rsync-ssl
> cd $(DIR_APP) && sed -i -e "s@^#!.*@#!/bin/bash@" rsync-ssl
>
> + # Fix for CVE-2022-29154
> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
> +
> cd $(DIR_APP) && ./configure \
> --prefix=/usr \
> --without-included-popt \
> diff --git a/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch b/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..d3b4499a4
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/src/patches/rsync-CVE-2022-29154.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,322 @@
> +commit b7231c7d02cfb65d291af74ff66e7d8c507ee871
> +Author: Wayne Davison <wayne(a)opencoder.net>
> +Date: Sun Jul 31 16:55:34 2022 -0700
> +
> + Some extra file-list safety checks.
> +
> +diff --git a/exclude.c b/exclude.c
> +index 39073a0c..b670c8ba 100644
> +--- a/exclude.c
> ++++ b/exclude.c
> +@@ -27,16 +27,22 @@ extern int am_server;
> + extern int am_sender;
> + extern int eol_nulls;
> + extern int io_error;
> ++extern int xfer_dirs;
> ++extern int recurse;
> + extern int local_server;
> + extern int prune_empty_dirs;
> + extern int ignore_perishable;
> ++extern int old_style_args;
> ++extern int relative_paths;
> + extern int delete_mode;
> + extern int delete_excluded;
> + extern int cvs_exclude;
> + extern int sanitize_paths;
> + extern int protocol_version;
> ++extern int list_only;
> + extern int module_id;
> +
> ++extern char *filesfrom_host;
> + extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
> + extern unsigned int curr_dir_len;
> + extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
> +@@ -44,8 +50,10 @@ extern unsigned int module_dirlen;
> + filter_rule_list filter_list = { .debug_type = "" };
> + filter_rule_list cvs_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [global CVS]" };
> + filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [daemon]" };
> ++filter_rule_list implied_filter_list = { .debug_type = " [implied]" };
> +
> + int saw_xattr_filter = 0;
> ++int trust_sender_filter = 0;
> +
> + /* Need room enough for ":MODS " prefix plus some room to grow. */
> + #define MAX_RULE_PREFIX (16)
> +@@ -292,6 +300,125 @@ static void add_rule(filter_rule_list *listp, const char *pat, unsigned int pat_
> + }
> + }
> +
> ++/* Each arg the client sends to the remote sender turns into an implied include
> ++ * that the receiver uses to validate the file list from the sender. */
> ++void add_implied_include(const char *arg)
> ++{
> ++ filter_rule *rule;
> ++ int arg_len, saw_wild = 0, backslash_cnt = 0;
> ++ int slash_cnt = 1; /* We know we're adding a leading slash. */
> ++ const char *cp;
> ++ char *p;
> ++ if (old_style_args || list_only || filesfrom_host != NULL)
> ++ return;
> ++ if (relative_paths) {
> ++ cp = strstr(arg, "/./");
> ++ if (cp)
> ++ arg = cp+3;
> ++ } else {
> ++ if ((cp = strrchr(arg, '/')) != NULL)
> ++ arg = cp + 1;
> ++ }
> ++ arg_len = strlen(arg);
> ++ if (arg_len) {
> ++ if (strpbrk(arg, "*[?")) {
> ++ /* We need to add room to escape backslashes if wildcard chars are present. */
> ++ cp = arg;
> ++ while ((cp = strchr(cp, '\\')) != NULL) {
> ++ arg_len++;
> ++ cp++;
> ++ }
> ++ saw_wild = 1;
> ++ }
> ++ arg_len++; /* Leave room for the prefixed slash */
> ++ rule = new0(filter_rule);
> ++ if (!implied_filter_list.head)
> ++ implied_filter_list.head = implied_filter_list.tail = rule;
> ++ else {
> ++ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
> ++ implied_filter_list.head = rule;
> ++ }
> ++ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
> ++ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 1);
> ++ *p++ = '/';
> ++ cp = arg;
> ++ while (*cp) {
> ++ switch (*cp) {
> ++ case '\\':
> ++ backslash_cnt++;
> ++ if (saw_wild)
> ++ *p++ = '\\';
> ++ *p++ = *cp++;
> ++ break;
> ++ case '/':
> ++ if (p[-1] == '/') /* This is safe because of the initial slash. */
> ++ break;
> ++ if (relative_paths) {
> ++ filter_rule const *ent;
> ++ int found = 0;
> ++ *p = '\0';
> ++ for (ent = implied_filter_list.head; ent; ent = ent->next) {
> ++ if (ent != rule && strcmp(ent->pattern, rule->pattern) == 0)
> ++ found = 1;
> ++ }
> ++ if (!found) {
> ++ filter_rule *R_rule = new0(filter_rule);
> ++ R_rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE + (saw_wild ? FILTRULE_WILD : 0);
> ++ R_rule->pattern = strdup(rule->pattern);
> ++ R_rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
> ++ R_rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
> ++ implied_filter_list.head = R_rule;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++ slash_cnt++;
> ++ *p++ = *cp++;
> ++ break;
> ++ default:
> ++ *p++ = *cp++;
> ++ break;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++ *p = '\0';
> ++ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt;
> ++ arg = (const char *)rule->pattern;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ if (recurse || xfer_dirs) {
> ++ /* Now create a rule with an added "/" & "**" or "*" at the end */
> ++ rule = new0(filter_rule);
> ++ if (recurse)
> ++ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD | FILTRULE_WILD2;
> ++ else
> ++ rule->rflags = FILTRULE_INCLUDE | FILTRULE_WILD;
> ++ /* A +4 in the len leaves enough room for / * * \0 or / * \0 \0 */
> ++ if (!saw_wild && backslash_cnt) {
> ++ /* We are appending a wildcard, so now the backslashes need to be escaped. */
> ++ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + backslash_cnt + 3 + 1);
> ++ cp = arg;
> ++ while (*cp) {
> ++ if (*cp == '\\')
> ++ *p++ = '\\';
> ++ *p++ = *cp++;
> ++ }
> ++ } else {
> ++ p = rule->pattern = new_array(char, arg_len + 3 + 1);
> ++ if (arg_len) {
> ++ memcpy(p, arg, arg_len);
> ++ p += arg_len;
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++ if (p[-1] != '/')
> ++ *p++ = '/';
> ++ *p++ = '*';
> ++ if (recurse)
> ++ *p++ = '*';
> ++ *p = '\0';
> ++ rule->u.slash_cnt = slash_cnt + 1;
> ++ rule->next = implied_filter_list.head;
> ++ implied_filter_list.head = rule;
> ++ }
> ++}
> ++
> + /* This frees any non-inherited items, leaving just inherited items on the list. */
> + static void pop_filter_list(filter_rule_list *listp)
> + {
> +@@ -718,7 +845,7 @@ static void report_filter_result(enum logcode code, char const *name,
> + : name_flags & NAME_IS_DIR ? "directory"
> + : "file";
> + rprintf(code, "[%s] %sing %s %s because of pattern %s%s%s\n",
> +- w, actions[*w!='s'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
> ++ w, actions[*w=='g'][!(ent->rflags & FILTRULE_INCLUDE)],
> + t, name, ent->pattern,
> + ent->rflags & FILTRULE_DIRECTORY ? "/" : "", type);
> + }
> +@@ -890,6 +1017,7 @@ static filter_rule *parse_rule_tok(const char **rulestr_ptr,
> + }
> + switch (ch) {
> + case ':':
> ++ trust_sender_filter = 1;
> + rule->rflags |= FILTRULE_PERDIR_MERGE
> + | FILTRULE_FINISH_SETUP;
> + /* FALL THROUGH */
> +diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c
> +index 1ba306bc..0e6bf782 100644
> +--- a/flist.c
> ++++ b/flist.c
> +@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern int need_unsorted_flist;
> + extern int sender_symlink_iconv;
> + extern int output_needs_newline;
> + extern int sender_keeps_checksum;
> ++extern int trust_sender_filter;
> + extern int unsort_ndx;
> + extern uid_t our_uid;
> + extern struct stats stats;
> +@@ -83,8 +84,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
> +
> + extern struct chmod_mode_struct *chmod_modes;
> +
> +-extern filter_rule_list filter_list;
> +-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
> ++extern filter_rule_list filter_list, implied_filter_list, daemon_filter_list;
> +
> + #ifdef ICONV_OPTION
> + extern int filesfrom_convert;
> +@@ -986,6 +986,19 @@ static struct file_struct *recv_file_entry(int f, struct file_list *flist, int x
> + exit_cleanup(RERR_UNSUPPORTED);
> + }
> +
> ++ if (*thisname != '.' || thisname[1] != '\0') {
> ++ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
> ++ if (!trust_sender_filter /* a per-dir filter rule means we must trust the sender's filtering */
> ++ && filter_list.head && check_filter(&filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) < 0) {
> ++ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting excluded file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
> ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
> ++ }
> ++ if (implied_filter_list.head && check_filter(&implied_filter_list, FINFO, thisname, filt_flags) <= 0) {
> ++ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting unrequested file-list name: %s\n", thisname);
> ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
> ++ }
> ++ }
> ++
> + if (inc_recurse && S_ISDIR(mode)) {
> + if (one_file_system) {
> + /* Room to save the dir's device for -x */
> +diff --git a/io.c b/io.c
> +index cf94cee7..a6e3ed30 100644
> +--- a/io.c
> ++++ b/io.c
> +@@ -419,6 +419,7 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
> + while (s != eob) {
> + if (*s++ == '\0') {
> + ff_xb.len = s - sob - 1;
> ++ add_implied_include(sob);
> + if (iconvbufs(ic_send, &ff_xb, &iobuf.out, flags) < 0)
> + exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL); /* impossible? */
> + write_buf(iobuf.out_fd, s-1, 1); /* Send the '\0'. */
> +@@ -450,9 +451,12 @@ static void forward_filesfrom_data(void)
> + char *f = ff_xb.buf + ff_xb.pos;
> + char *t = ff_xb.buf;
> + char *eob = f + len;
> ++ char *cur = t;
> + /* Eliminate any multi-'\0' runs. */
> + while (f != eob) {
> + if (!(*t++ = *f++)) {
> ++ add_implied_include(cur);
> ++ cur = t;
> + while (f != eob && *f == '\0')
> + f++;
> + }
> +diff --git a/main.c b/main.c
> +index 58920a2d..5a7fbdd7 100644
> +--- a/main.c
> ++++ b/main.c
> +@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ extern int backup_dir_len;
> + extern int basis_dir_cnt;
> + extern int default_af_hint;
> + extern int stdout_format_has_i;
> ++extern int trust_sender_filter;
> + extern struct stats stats;
> + extern char *stdout_format;
> + extern char *logfile_format;
> +@@ -104,7 +105,7 @@ extern char curr_dir[MAXPATHLEN];
> + extern char backup_dir_buf[MAXPATHLEN];
> + extern char *basis_dir[MAX_BASIS_DIRS+1];
> + extern struct file_list *first_flist;
> +-extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
> ++extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list, implied_filter_list;
> +
> + uid_t our_uid;
> + gid_t our_gid;
> +@@ -635,6 +636,7 @@ static pid_t do_cmd(char *cmd, char *machine, char *user, char **remote_argv, in
> + #ifdef ICONV_CONST
> + setup_iconv();
> + #endif
> ++ trust_sender_filter = 1;
> + } else if (local_server) {
> + /* If the user didn't request --[no-]whole-file, force
> + * it on, but only if we're not batch processing. */
> +@@ -1500,6 +1502,8 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
> + char *dummy_host;
> + int dummy_port = rsync_port;
> + int i;
> ++ if (filesfrom_fd < 0)
> ++ add_implied_include(remote_argv[0]);
> + /* For remote source, any extra source args must have either
> + * the same hostname or an empty hostname. */
> + for (i = 1; i < remote_argc; i++) {
> +@@ -1523,6 +1527,7 @@ static int start_client(int argc, char *argv[])
> + if (!rsync_port && !*arg) /* Turn an empty arg into a dot dir. */
> + arg = ".";
> + remote_argv[i] = arg;
> ++ add_implied_include(arg);
> + }
> + }
> +
> +diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
> +index b3a69da0..93cf8efd 100644
> +--- a/receiver.c
> ++++ b/receiver.c
> +@@ -593,10 +593,13 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
> + if (DEBUG_GTE(RECV, 1))
> + rprintf(FINFO, "recv_files(%s)\n", fname);
> +
> +- if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')
> +- && check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, 0) < 0) {
> +- rprintf(FERROR, "attempt to hack rsync failed.\n");
> +- exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
> ++ if (daemon_filter_list.head && (*fname != '.' || fname[1] != '\0')) {
> ++ int filt_flags = S_ISDIR(file->mode) ? NAME_IS_DIR : NAME_IS_FILE;
> ++ if (check_filter(&daemon_filter_list, FLOG, fname, filt_flags) < 0) {
> ++ rprintf(FERROR, "ERROR: rejecting file transfer request for daemon excluded file: %s\n",
> ++ fname);
> ++ exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
> ++ }
> + }
> +
> + #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
> --
> 2.35.3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2022-08-05 16:05 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2022-08-05 12:00 [PATCH] rsync: Patch CVE-2022-29154 Peter Müller
2022-08-05 16:05 ` Michael Tremer
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox