From: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>
To: development@lists.ipfire.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] sysctl.conf: prevent autoloading of TTY line disciplines
Date: Tue, 06 Apr 2021 11:15:22 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9AEBFF01-D158-4365-8764-99707003D25C@ipfire.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <92f0b0b7-530f-214f-d14f-9d8c9cbb60d7@ipfire.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2567 bytes --]
Okay, merged.
> On 2 Apr 2021, at 20:30, Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> wrote:
>
> Hello Michael,
>
> it seems as the kernel folks backported this into 4.14.x by now:
>
>> [root(a)maverick ~]# uname -a
>> Linux maverick 4.14.212-ipfire #1 SMP Wed Dec 16 12:01:25 GMT 2020 x86_64 Intel(R) Celeron(R) CPU N3150 @ 1.60GHz GenuineIntel GNU/Linux
>> [root(a)maverick ~]# sysctl dev.tty.ldisc_autoload
>> dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 1
>
> Therefore, I would like to see this patch being merged - that is, if it is still applicable. :-)
>
> Thanks, and best regards,
> Peter Müller
>
>
>> Hello Michael,
>>
>> grmpf, overlooked some patched distribution kernel again. :-/
>>
>> Sorry for the noise - I will keep the patch queued and wait for kernel 5.9 ...
>>
>> Thanks, and best regards,
>> Peter Müller
>>
>>
>>> This does not exist before kernel 5.1.
>>>
>>> -Michael
>>>
>>>> On 5 Oct 2020, at 20:45, Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Malicious/vulnerable TTY line disciplines have been subject of some
>>>> kernel exploits such as CVE-2017-2636, and since - to put it in Greg
>>>> Kroah-Hatrman's words - we do not "trust the userspace to do the right
>>>> thing", this reduces local kernel attack surface.
>>>>
>>>> Further, there is no legitimate reason why an unprivileged user should
>>>> load kernel modules during runtime, anyway.
>>>>
>>>> See also:
>>>> - https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/4/15/890
>>>> - https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2017/03/24/CVE-2017-2636.html
>>>>
>>>> Cc: Arne Fitzenreiter <arne.fitzenreiter(a)ipfire.org>
>>>> Cc: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org>
>>>> ---
>>>> config/etc/sysctl.conf | 4 ++++
>>>> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/config/etc/sysctl.conf b/config/etc/sysctl.conf
>>>> index d48c7734e..b5ede15ed 100644
>>>> --- a/config/etc/sysctl.conf
>>>> +++ b/config/etc/sysctl.conf
>>>> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables = 0
>>>> net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables = 0
>>>> net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-arptables = 0
>>>>
>>>> +# Restrict loading TTY line disciplines to CAP_SYS_MODULE to prevent unprivileged attackers
>>>> +# from loading vulnerable line disciplines with the TIOCSETD ioctl.
>>>> +dev.tty.ldisc_autoload = 0
>>>> +
>>>> # Try to keep kernel address exposures out of various /proc files (kallsyms, modules, etc).
>>>> kernel.kptr_restrict = 2
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> 2.26.2
>>>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-04-06 10:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-05 16:07 Question regarding legitimate loading of kernel modules during runtime Peter Müller
2020-10-05 19:45 ` [PATCH] sysctl.conf: prevent autoloading of TTY line disciplines Peter Müller
2020-10-06 12:26 ` Michael Tremer
2020-10-06 13:03 ` Peter Müller
2021-04-02 19:30 ` Peter Müller
2021-04-06 10:15 ` Michael Tremer [this message]
2020-10-07 8:22 ` Question regarding legitimate loading of kernel modules during runtime Michael Tremer
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