Re: Handling of TrustCor Systems' root CAs

[Michael Tremer <michael.tremer@ipfire.org>]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1968 bytes --]

Hello Peter,

> On 10 Nov 2022, at 10:39, Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> wrote:
> 
> Hello development folks,
> 
> well, I always hate it when the concerns expressed in blog posts of mine come true.
> Alas, in case of the last one on DANE (https://blog.ipfire.org/post/global-pki-considered-harmful-a-plaidoyer-for-using-dane),
> we now seem to have another textbook incident of a trusted, but rogue CA operator
> likely providing TLS surveillance capabilities to government entities:
> https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/11/08/trustcor-internet-addresses-government-connections/
> 
> Mozilla stated that it is currently investigating into TrustCor Systems' nature, and
> would remove its root certificates from its trust store if questions sent to TrustCore
> are not answered in a satisfying manner by November 22.
> 
> We are probably not going to have a Core Update released before this date. Also, as
> much as I would like to remove TrustCor Systems' certificates from the trust store
> we ship, this would be a slippery slope: First, we would have _another_ thing we have
> to maintain our own, and second, there are plenty of other dubious root CAs out there -
> where do we draw the line?
> 
> (To be honest, I am a bit surprised to see such TLS surveillance activity being
> carried out through dedicated root CAs - to the best of my understanding, procuring
> a trusted intermediate CA would have been a more stealthy approach.)
> 
> I guess this leaves us with watching Mozilla's trust store closely, and adapt their
> changes before releasing the next Core Update.

Yes, I would say so.

You mentioned the obvious reason before. Another one would be that it is not a good idea if some browser can open a TLS connection to some website, but IPFire cannot. That is unintuitive and difficult to debug behaviour.

Best,
-Michael

> Any opinions?
> 
> Thanks, and best regards,
> Peter Müller