Hello Peter, > On 10 Nov 2022, at 10:39, Peter Müller wrote: > > Hello development folks, > > well, I always hate it when the concerns expressed in blog posts of mine come true. > Alas, in case of the last one on DANE (https://blog.ipfire.org/post/global-pki-considered-harmful-a-plaidoyer-for-using-dane), > we now seem to have another textbook incident of a trusted, but rogue CA operator > likely providing TLS surveillance capabilities to government entities: > https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/11/08/trustcor-internet-addresses-government-connections/ > > Mozilla stated that it is currently investigating into TrustCor Systems' nature, and > would remove its root certificates from its trust store if questions sent to TrustCore > are not answered in a satisfying manner by November 22. > > We are probably not going to have a Core Update released before this date. Also, as > much as I would like to remove TrustCor Systems' certificates from the trust store > we ship, this would be a slippery slope: First, we would have _another_ thing we have > to maintain our own, and second, there are plenty of other dubious root CAs out there - > where do we draw the line? > > (To be honest, I am a bit surprised to see such TLS surveillance activity being > carried out through dedicated root CAs - to the best of my understanding, procuring > a trusted intermediate CA would have been a more stealthy approach.) > > I guess this leaves us with watching Mozilla's trust store closely, and adapt their > changes before releasing the next Core Update. Yes, I would say so. You mentioned the obvious reason before. Another one would be that it is not a good idea if some browser can open a TLS connection to some website, but IPFire cannot. That is unintuitive and difficult to debug behaviour. Best, -Michael > Any opinions? > > Thanks, and best regards, > Peter Müller