Could you please check with Arne how severe this is for the sensors? > On 13 Apr 2022, at 10:18, Peter Müller wrote: > > Hello Michael, > > thanks for your e-mail. > > This is caused by the kernel lockdown patch, since /dev/ports apparently can be used to alter > the running kernel, hence it is no longer available if LSM runs in "integrity" mode. > > On my testing machine, sensors and sensors-detect continue to work, but any sensor that requires > /dev/ports access is no longer available. On my testing hardware, that does not make a difference, > but I presume it will on other hardware with more or different sensors. > > sensors-detect does not implement any option to probe non-/dev/ports-sensors only, so I guess > there is nothing we can do besides a "> /dev/null 2>&1". I will change the collectd initscript > to reflect that. > > Thanks, and best regards, > Peter Müller > > >> Hello, >> >> I don’t know exactly which patch is responsible for this, but /dev/port is no longer accessible by sensors-detect. >> >> This leads to ugly messages when the system is booting up for the first time. Please see the attached screenshot. >> >> At least the message needs to be silenced, but you should investigate whether sensors will still work and is able to access readings for its hardware sensors. >> >> >> >> -Michael >> >>> On 19 Mar 2022, at 21:08, Peter Müller wrote: >>> >>> This patchset improves hardening of our Linux kernel configurations for all >>> architectures. Most importantly, it features the activation of the "Linux >>> Security Module", also known as "kernel lockdown" (a phrase coined before the >>> pandemic), or LSM for short. >>> >>> Being set to "integrity" mode for a start, LSM prevents the kernel from being >>> modified by various mechanisms, of which we have some already covered. However, >>> it comes as a more holistic approach, which is why enabling it is desirable >>> for our userbase. >>> >>> Most of this patchset is based on recommendations by the "kconfig-hardened-check" >>> tool (https://github.com/a13xp0p0v/kconfig-hardened-check/), with some inspiration >>> taken directly from KSPP and grsecurity. >>> >>> Being unable to cross-compile IPFire for non-x86_64-architectures on my own, >>> and my VM on the Mustang currently being offline, this patchset does not come >>> with aligned kernel rootfiles for other architectures than x86_64. I am sorry >>> for any inconvenience and extra workload caused by this. >>> >>> Also, for the sake of completeness, the effect of LSM on virtualisation has not >>> been tested due to time constraints, and a lack of oversight _which_ virtualisation >>> features we officially support and which we don't. In doubt, however, I believe >>> the security benefit gained from LSM outweighs a partial functional loss of >>> virtualisation - but that is a highly biased opinion. :-) >>> >>> Peter Müller (11): >>> Kernel: Set CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS to 32 bits >>> Kernel: Disable support for tracing block I/O actions >>> Kernel: Pin loading kernel files to one filesystem >>> Kernel: Enable undefined behaviour sanity checker >>> Kernel: Gate SETID transitions to limit CAP_SET(G|U)ID capabilities >>> Kernel: Enable LSM support and set security level to "integrity" >>> Kernel: Trigger BUG if data corruption is detected >>> Kernel: Do not automatically load TTY line disciplines, only if >>> necessary >>> Kernel: Enable SVA support for both Intel and AMD CPUs >>> Kernel: Disable function and stack tracers >>> Kernel: Update rootfile for x86_64 >>> >>> config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire | 47 ++++++++++-------- >>> config/kernel/kernel.config.armv6l-ipfire | 47 ++++++++++-------- >>> config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire | 47 ++++++++++-------- >>> config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire | 57 ++++++++++++---------- >>> config/rootfiles/common/x86_64/linux | 33 +++++++------ >>> 5 files changed, 131 insertions(+), 100 deletions(-) >>> >>> -- >>> 2.34.1 >> >>