* Re: [PATCH] dnsmasq: 2.76test10 with latest patches (001-004)
2016-02-26 17:29 Matthias Fischer
@ 2016-02-28 20:19 ` Michael Tremer
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Michael Tremer @ 2016-02-28 20:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: development
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 322553 bytes --]
Hi,
I merged this patch and the one after.
Please give this version a good test as it is a pre-release version.
You can maintain a branch where you integrate all new changes, but I
think it is not required to send every single one to the mailing list.
It creates a bit of noise and I think that unfortunately nobody is
testing every single one any ways. Which is sad.
Can we have maybe one aggregated patch after every release of a Core
Update? So we always have the latest version of dnsmasq in the updates?
Best,
-Michael
On Fri, 2016-02-26 at 18:29 +0100, Matthias Fischer wrote:
> This is 'dnsmasq 2.76test10', based on current 'next', containing
> latest patches.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer <matthias.fischer(a)ipfire.org>
> ---
> lfs/dnsmasq | 39 +-
> ...TL_parameter_to_--host-record_and_--cname.patch | 265 +++
> ...01-include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch | 41 -
> .../dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch | 117 ++
> ...subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch | 271 ---
> src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch | 17 +
> ...h_zones_locally_when_localise_queries_set.patch | 34 -
> .../dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch | 136 ++
> .../004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-option.patch | 38 -
> ...ution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch | 50 -
> ...page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch | 35 -
> ...gned_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch | 30 -
> ...6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch | 25 -
> ...pect_the_--no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch | 47 -
> ..._5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch | 26 -
> ...11-Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch | 32 -
> ...12-Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-priv.patch | 48 -
> ...y_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch | 43 -
> ...14-Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch | 39 -
> .../015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-dir.patch | 38 -
> ...ajor_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch | 2209 ----------
> ----------
> ...hing_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch | 612 ------
> ...caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch | 269 ---
> ...lise_RR-filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch | 755 -------
> .../dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch | 134 --
> ...1-Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch | 133 --
> ..._code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch | 409 ----
> ...023-Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch | 98 -
> ...ning_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.patch | 145 --
> ...EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch | 643 ------
> ...aks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch | 262 ---
> ...obscure_off-by-one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch | 27 -
> .../028-Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch | 39 -
> .../dnsmasq/029-NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch | 39 -
> 34 files changed, 542 insertions(+), 6603 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_
> --host-record_and_--cname.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
> create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-
> ttl_option.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
> enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
> create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
> dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
> ries_set.patch
> create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-
> mtu_option.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/004-
> fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-option.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
> suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
> clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
> handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
> DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
> --no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
> Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
> Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/012-
> Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-priv.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
> Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
> Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/015-
> Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-dir.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
> Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
> Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
> Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
> filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/020-
> DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
> Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
> existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
> Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
> Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
> atch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
> Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
> More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/027-
> Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
> Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
> delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/029-
> NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch
>
> diff --git a/lfs/dnsmasq b/lfs/dnsmasq
> index 8058663..29d7895 100644
> --- a/lfs/dnsmasq
> +++ b/lfs/dnsmasq
> @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
> ####################################################################
> ###########
> #
> #
> # IPFire.org - A linux based
> firewall #
> -# Copyright (C) 2015 Michael Tremer & Christian
> Schmidt #
> +# Copyright (C) 2016 Michael Tremer & Christian
> Schmidt #
> #
> #
> # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
> modify #
> # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
> by #
> @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
>
> include Config
>
> -VER = 2.75
> +VER = 2.76test10
>
> THISAPP = dnsmasq-$(VER)
> DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.xz
> @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE)
>
> $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE)
>
> -$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 887236f1ddde6eb57cdb9d01916c9f72
> +$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 4b51474ed6081b18c61407077f254cf7
>
> install : $(TARGET)
>
> @@ -73,35 +73,10 @@ $(subst %,%_MD5,$(objects)) :
> $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects))
> @$(PREBUILD)
> @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar axf
> $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE)
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
> enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
> dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
> ries_set.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
> option.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
> suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
> clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
> handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
> DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
> --no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
> Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
> Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-
> priv.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
> Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
> Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
> dir.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
> Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
> Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
> Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
> filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
> Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
> existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
> Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
> Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
> atch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
> Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
> More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-
> one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
> Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
> - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch
> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-
> record_and_--cname.patch
> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
> + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
> cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
> $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq-Add-support-to-read-ISC-DHCP-lease-
> file.patch
>
> cd $(DIR_APP) && sed -i src/config.h \
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-
> record_and_--cname.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-record_and_--cname.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..86fbc9c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-
> record_and_--cname.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
> +From df3d54f776a3c9b60735b45c0b7fd88b66a2d5c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> +From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> +Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 21:03:38 +0000
> +Subject: [PATCH] Add TTL parameter to --host-record and --cname.
> +
> +---
> + man/dnsmasq.8 | 12 ++++++++++--
> + src/cache.c | 7 +++++++
> + src/dnsmasq.h | 2 ++
> + src/option.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> + src/rfc1035.c | 6 +++++-
> + 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +index b782eaf..7bc1394 100644
> +--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
> ++++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ zone files: the port, weight and priority
> numbers are in a different
> + order. More than one SRV record for a given service/domain is
> allowed,
> + all that match are returned.
> + .TP
> +-.B --host-record=<name>[,<name>....],[<IPv4-address>],[<IPv6-
> address>]
> ++.B --host-record=<name>[,<name>....],[<IPv4-address>],[<IPv6-
> address>][,<TTL>]
> + Add A, AAAA and PTR records to the DNS. This adds one or more names
> to
> + the DNS with associated IPv4 (A) and IPv6 (AAAA) records. A name
> may
> + appear in more than one
> +@@ -546,6 +546,10 @@ is in effect. Short and long names may appear
> in the same
> + .B host-record,
> + eg.
> + .B --host-record=laptop,laptop.thekelleys.org,192.168.0.1,1234::100
> ++
> ++If the time-to-live is given, it overrides the default, which is
> zero
> ++or the value of --local-ttl. The value is a positive integer and
> gives
> ++the time-to-live in seconds.
> + .TP
> + .B \-Y, --txt-record=<name>[[,<text>],<text>]
> + Return a TXT DNS record. The value of TXT record is a set of
> strings,
> +@@ -559,7 +563,7 @@ Return a PTR DNS record.
> + .B --naptr-
> record=<name>,<order>,<preference>,<flags>,<service>,<regexp>[,<repla
> cement>]
> + Return an NAPTR DNS record, as specified in RFC3403.
> + .TP
> +-.B --cname=<cname>,<target>
> ++.B --cname=<cname>,<target>[,<TTL>]
> + Return a CNAME record which indicates that <cname> is really
> + <target>. There are significant limitations on the target; it must
> be a
> + DNS name which is known to dnsmasq from /etc/hosts (or additional
> +@@ -568,6 +572,10 @@ hosts files), from DHCP, from --interface-name
> or from another
> + If the target does not satisfy this
> + criteria, the whole cname is ignored. The cname must be unique, but
> it
> + is permissable to have more than one cname pointing to the same
> target.
> ++
> ++If the time-to-live is given, it overrides the default, which is
> zero
> ++or the value of -local-ttl. The value is a positive integer and
> gives
> ++the time-to-live in seconds.
> + .TP
> + .B --dns-rr=<name>,<RR-number>,[<hex data>]
> + Return an arbitrary DNS Resource Record. The number is the type of
> the
> +diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
> +index a9eaa65..4ecd535 100644
> +--- a/src/cache.c
> ++++ b/src/cache.c
> +@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ static void add_hosts_cname(struct crec *target)
> + (crec = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec))))
> + {
> + crec->flags = F_FORWARD | F_IMMORTAL | F_NAMEP | F_CONFIG |
> F_CNAME;
> ++ crec->ttd = a->ttl;
> + crec->name.namep = a->alias;
> + crec->addr.cname.target.cache = target;
> + crec->addr.cname.uid = target->uid;
> +@@ -981,6 +982,7 @@ int read_hostsfile(char *filename, unsigned int
> index, int cache_size, struct cr
> + strcat(cache->name.sname, ".");
> + strcat(cache->name.sname, domain_suffix);
> + cache->flags = flags;
> ++ cache->ttd = daemon->local_ttl;
> + add_hosts_entry(cache, &addr, addrlen, index,
> rhash, hashsz);
> + name_count++;
> + }
> +@@ -988,6 +990,7 @@ int read_hostsfile(char *filename, unsigned int
> index, int cache_size, struct cr
> + {
> + strcpy(cache->name.sname, canon);
> + cache->flags = flags;
> ++ cache->ttd = daemon->local_ttl;
> + add_hosts_entry(cache, &addr, addrlen, index,
> rhash, hashsz);
> + name_count++;
> + }
> +@@ -1057,6 +1060,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
> + ((cache = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec)))))
> + {
> + cache->flags = F_FORWARD | F_NAMEP | F_CNAME | F_IMMORTAL
> | F_CONFIG;
> ++ cache->ttd = a->ttl;
> + cache->name.namep = a->alias;
> + cache->addr.cname.target.int_name = intr;
> + cache->addr.cname.uid = SRC_INTERFACE;
> +@@ -1071,6 +1075,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
> + (cache->addr.ds.keydata = blockdata_alloc(ds->digest, ds-
> >digestlen)))
> + {
> + cache->flags = F_FORWARD | F_IMMORTAL | F_DS | F_CONFIG |
> F_NAMEP;
> ++ cache->ttd = daemon->local_ttl;
> + cache->name.namep = ds->name;
> + cache->addr.ds.keylen = ds->digestlen;
> + cache->addr.ds.algo = ds->algo;
> +@@ -1095,6 +1100,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
> + (cache = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec))))
> + {
> + cache->name.namep = nl->name;
> ++ cache->ttd = hr->ttl;
> + cache->flags = F_HOSTS | F_IMMORTAL | F_FORWARD |
> F_REVERSE | F_IPV4 | F_NAMEP | F_CONFIG;
> + add_hosts_entry(cache, (struct all_addr *)&hr->addr,
> INADDRSZ, SRC_CONFIG, (struct crec **)daemon->packet, revhashsz);
> + }
> +@@ -1103,6 +1109,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
> + (cache = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec))))
> + {
> + cache->name.namep = nl->name;
> ++ cache->ttd = hr->ttl;
> + cache->flags = F_HOSTS | F_IMMORTAL | F_FORWARD |
> F_REVERSE | F_IPV6 | F_NAMEP | F_CONFIG;
> + add_hosts_entry(cache, (struct all_addr *)&hr->addr6,
> IN6ADDRSZ, SRC_CONFIG, (struct crec **)daemon->packet, revhashsz);
> + }
> +diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +index 6d1c5ae..6344df5 100644
> +--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> ++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +@@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ struct ptr_record {
> + };
> +
> + struct cname {
> ++ int ttl;
> + char *alias, *target;
> + struct cname *next;
> + };
> +@@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ struct auth_zone {
> +
> +
> + struct host_record {
> ++ int ttl;
> + struct name_list {
> + char *name;
> + struct name_list *next;
> +diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
> +index c98bdc9..7c5e6bc 100644
> +--- a/src/option.c
> ++++ b/src/option.c
> +@@ -448,20 +448,20 @@ static struct {
> + { LOPT_GEN_NAMES, ARG_DUP, "[=tag:<tag>]", gettext_noop("Generate
> hostnames based on MAC address for nameless clients."), NULL},
> + { LOPT_PROXY, ARG_DUP, "[=<ipaddr>]...", gettext_noop("Use these
> DHCP relays as full proxies."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_RELAY, ARG_DUP, "<local-addr>,<server>[,<interface>]",
> gettext_noop("Relay DHCP requests to a remote server"), NULL},
> +- { LOPT_CNAME, ARG_DUP, "<alias>,<target>", gettext_noop("Specify
> alias name for LOCAL DNS name."), NULL },
> ++ { LOPT_CNAME, ARG_DUP, "<alias>,<target>[,<ttl>]",
> gettext_noop("Specify alias name for LOCAL DNS name."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_PXE_PROMT, ARG_DUP, "<prompt>,[<timeout>]",
> gettext_noop("Prompt to send to PXE clients."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_PXE_SERV, ARG_DUP, "<service>", gettext_noop("Boot service
> for PXE menu."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_TEST, 0, NULL, gettext_noop("Check configuration
> syntax."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_ADD_MAC, ARG_DUP, "[=base64|text]", gettext_noop("Add
> requestor's MAC address to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_ADD_SBNET, ARG_ONE, "<v4 pref>[,<v6 pref>]",
> gettext_noop("Add specified IP subnet to forwarded DNS queries."),
> NULL },
> +- { LOPT_CPE_ID, ARG_ONE, "<text>", gettext_noop("Add client
> identification to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
> ++ { LOPT_CPE_ID, ARG_ONE, "<text>", gettext_noop("Add client
> identification to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_DNSSEC, OPT_DNSSEC_PROXY, NULL, gettext_noop("Proxy DNSSEC
> validation results from upstream nameservers."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_INCR_ADDR, OPT_CONSEC_ADDR, NULL, gettext_noop("Attempt to
> allocate sequential IP addresses to DHCP clients."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_CONNTRACK, OPT_CONNTRACK, NULL, gettext_noop("Copy
> connection-track mark from queries to upstream connections."), NULL
> },
> + { LOPT_FQDN, OPT_FQDN_UPDATE, NULL, gettext_noop("Allow DHCP
> clients to do their own DDNS updates."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_RA, OPT_RA, NULL, gettext_noop("Send router-advertisements
> for interfaces doing DHCPv6"), NULL },
> + { LOPT_DUID, ARG_ONE, "<enterprise>,<duid>",
> gettext_noop("Specify DUID_EN-type DHCPv6 server DUID"), NULL },
> +- { LOPT_HOST_REC, ARG_DUP, "<name>,<address>",
> gettext_noop("Specify host (A/AAAA and PTR) records"), NULL },
> ++ { LOPT_HOST_REC, ARG_DUP, "<name>,<address>[,<ttl>]",
> gettext_noop("Specify host (A/AAAA and PTR) records"), NULL },
> + { LOPT_RR, ARG_DUP, "<name>,<RR-number>,[<data>]",
> gettext_noop("Specify arbitrary DNS resource record"), NULL },
> + { LOPT_CLVERBIND, OPT_CLEVERBIND, NULL, gettext_noop("Bind to
> interfaces in use - check for new interfaces"), NULL },
> + { LOPT_AUTHSERV, ARG_ONE, "<NS>,<interface>",
> gettext_noop("Export local names to global DNS"), NULL },
> +@@ -3692,12 +3692,15 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> + case LOPT_CNAME: /* --cname */
> + {
> + struct cname *new;
> +- char *alias;
> +- char *target;
> ++ char *alias, *target, *ttls;
> ++ int ttl = -1;
> +
> + if (!(comma = split(arg)))
> + ret_err(gen_err);
> +
> ++ if ((ttls = split(comma)) && !atoi_check(ttls, &ttl))
> ++ ret_err(_("bad TTL"));
> ++
> + alias = canonicalise_opt(arg);
> + target = canonicalise_opt(comma);
> +
> +@@ -3713,6 +3716,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char
> *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> + daemon->cnames = new;
> + new->alias = alias;
> + new->target = target;
> ++ new->ttl = ttl;
> + }
> +
> + break;
> +@@ -3913,14 +3917,22 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> + {
> + struct host_record *new = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct
> host_record));
> + memset(new, 0, sizeof(struct host_record));
> +-
> ++ new->ttl = -1;
> ++
> + if (!arg || !(comma = split(arg)))
> + ret_err(_("Bad host-record"));
> +
> + while (arg)
> + {
> + struct all_addr addr;
> +- if (inet_pton(AF_INET, arg, &addr))
> ++ char *dig;
> ++
> ++ for (dig = arg; *dig != 0; dig++)
> ++ if (*dig < '0' || *dig > '9')
> ++ break;
> ++ if (*dig == 0)
> ++ new->ttl = atoi(arg);
> ++ else if (inet_pton(AF_INET, arg, &addr))
> + new->addr = addr.addr.addr4;
> + #ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> + else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, arg, &addr))
> +@@ -4601,7 +4613,25 @@ void read_opts(int argc, char **argv, char
> *compile_opts)
> + }
> + }
> + }
> +-
> ++
> ++ if (daemon->host_records)
> ++ {
> ++ struct host_record *hr;
> ++
> ++ for (hr = daemon->host_records; hr; hr = hr->next)
> ++ if (hr->ttl == -1)
> ++ hr->ttl = daemon->local_ttl;
> ++ }
> ++
> ++ if (daemon->cnames)
> ++ {
> ++ struct cname *cn;
> ++
> ++ for (cn = daemon->cnames; cn; cn = cn->next)
> ++ if (cn->ttl == -1)
> ++ cn->ttl = daemon->local_ttl;
> ++ }
> ++
> + if (daemon->if_addrs)
> + {
> + struct iname *tmp;
> +diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> +index 9c0ddb5..3535a71 100644
> +--- a/src/rfc1035.c
> ++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> +@@ -1169,9 +1169,13 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec
> *crecp, time_t now)
> + /* Return 0 ttl for DHCP entries, which might change
> + before the lease expires. */
> +
> +- if (crecp->flags & (F_IMMORTAL | F_DHCP))
> ++ if (crecp->flags & F_DHCP)
> + return daemon->local_ttl;
> +
> ++ /* Immortal entries other than DHCP are local, and hold TTL in
> TTD field. */
> ++ if (crecp->flags & F_IMMORTAL)
> ++ return crecp->ttd;
> ++
> + /* Return the Max TTL value if it is lower then the actual TTL */
> + if (daemon->max_ttl == 0 || ((unsigned)(crecp->ttd - now) <
> daemon->max_ttl))
> + return crecp->ttd - now;
> +--
> +1.7.10.4
> +
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 8a2557a..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
> include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
> -From d2aa7dfbb6d1088dcbea9fecc61b9293b320eb95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2015 21:52:12 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Include 0.0.0.0/8 in DNS rebind checks.
> -
> ----
> - CHANGELOG | 7 +++++++
> - src/rfc1035.c | 3 ++-
> - 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> -index 901da47..3f4026d 100644
> ---- a/CHANGELOG
> -+++ b/CHANGELOG
> -@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
> -+version 2.76
> -+ Include 0.0.0.0/8 in DNS rebind checks. This range
> -+ translates to hosts on the local network, or, at
> -+ least, 0.0.0.0 accesses the local host, so could
> -+ be targets for DNS rebinding. See RFC 5735 section 3
> -+ for details. Thanks to Stephen Röttger for the bug
> report.
> -+
> - version 2.75
> - Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a
> - dhcp-script is configured. Thanks to Adrian Davey for
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index 56647b0..29e9e65 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -728,7 +728,8 @@ int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int
> ban_localhost)
> - in_addr_t ip_addr = ntohl(addr.s_addr);
> -
> - return
> -- (((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000) && ban_localhost) /*
> 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback) */ ||
> -+ (((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000) && ban_localhost) /*
> 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback) */ ||
> -+ ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x00000000) /* RFC 5735 section 3.
> "here" network */ ||
> - ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xC0A80000) /* 192.168.0.0/16
> (private) */ ||
> - ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x0A000000) /*
> 10.0.0.0/8 (private) */ ||
> - ((ip_addr & 0xFFF00000) == 0xAC100000) /*
> 172.16.0.0/12 (private) */ ||
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..45e3b9b
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
> +From 832e47beab95c2918b5264f0504f2fe6fe523e4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> +From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> +Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 21:24:45 +0000
> +Subject: [PATCH] Add --dhcp-ttl option.
> +
> +---
> + man/dnsmasq.8 | 5 ++++-
> + src/dnsmasq.h | 2 +-
> + src/option.c | 13 +++++++++++--
> + src/rfc1035.c | 2 +-
> + 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +index 7bc1394..2bcce20 100644
> +--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
> ++++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ in the same way as for DHCP-derived names. Note
> that this does not
> + apply to domain names in cnames, PTR records, TXT records etc.
> + .TP
> + .B \-T, --local-ttl=<time>
> +-When replying with information from /etc/hosts or the DHCP leases
> ++When replying with information from /etc/hosts or configuration or
> the DHCP leases
> + file dnsmasq by default sets the time-to-live field to zero,
> meaning
> + that the requester should not itself cache the information. This is
> + the correct thing to do in almost all situations. This option
> allows a
> +@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ time-to-live (in seconds) to be given for these
> replies. This will
> + reduce the load on the server at the expense of clients using stale
> + data under some circumstances.
> + .TP
> ++.B --dhcp-ttl=<time>
> ++As for --local-ttl, but affects only replies with information from
> DHCP leases. If both are given, --dhcp-ttl applies for DHCP
> information, and --local-ttl for others. Setting this to zero
> eliminates the effect of --local-ttl for DHCP.
> ++.TP
> + .B --neg-ttl=<time>
> + Negative replies from upstream servers normally contain time-to-
> live
> + information in SOA records which dnsmasq uses for caching. If the
> +diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +index 6344df5..9f73c3b 100644
> +--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> ++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
> + int max_logs; /* queue limit */
> + int cachesize, ftabsize;
> + int port, query_port, min_port, max_port;
> +- unsigned long local_ttl, neg_ttl, max_ttl, min_cache_ttl,
> max_cache_ttl, auth_ttl;
> ++ unsigned long local_ttl, neg_ttl, max_ttl, min_cache_ttl,
> max_cache_ttl, auth_ttl, dhcp_ttl, use_dhcp_ttl;
> + char *dns_client_id;
> + struct hostsfile *addn_hosts;
> + struct dhcp_context *dhcp, *dhcp6;
> +diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
> +index 7c5e6bc..3f6d162 100644
> +--- a/src/option.c
> ++++ b/src/option.c
> +@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ struct myoption {
> + #define LOPT_MAXPORT 345
> + #define LOPT_CPE_ID 346
> + #define LOPT_SCRIPT_ARP 347
> ++#define LOPT_DHCPTTL 348
> +
> + #ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG
> + static const struct option opts[] =
> +@@ -319,6 +320,7 @@ static const struct myoption opts[] =
> + { "quiet-ra", 0, 0, LOPT_QUIET_RA },
> + { "dns-loop-detect", 0, 0, LOPT_LOOP_DETECT },
> + { "script-arp", 0, 0, LOPT_SCRIPT_ARP },
> ++ { "dhcp-ttl", 1, 0 , LOPT_DHCPTTL },
> + { NULL, 0, 0, 0 }
> + };
> +
> +@@ -485,9 +487,10 @@ static struct {
> + { LOPT_QUIET_DHCP, OPT_QUIET_DHCP, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log
> routine DHCP."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_QUIET_DHCP6, OPT_QUIET_DHCP6, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not
> log routine DHCPv6."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_QUIET_RA, OPT_QUIET_RA, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log
> RA."), NULL },
> +- { LOPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, OPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, NULL,
> gettext_noop("Accept queries only from directly-connected networks"),
> NULL },
> +- { LOPT_LOOP_DETECT, OPT_LOOP_DETECT, NULL, gettext_noop("Detect
> and remove DNS forwarding loops"), NULL },
> ++ { LOPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, OPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, NULL,
> gettext_noop("Accept queries only from directly-connected
> networks."), NULL },
> ++ { LOPT_LOOP_DETECT, OPT_LOOP_DETECT, NULL, gettext_noop("Detect
> and remove DNS forwarding loops."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_IGNORE_ADDR, ARG_DUP, "<ipaddr>", gettext_noop("Ignore DNS
> responses containing ipaddr."), NULL },
> ++ { LOPT_DHCPTTL, ARG_ONE, "<ttl>", gettext_noop("Set TTL in DNS
> responses with DHCP-derived addresses."), NULL },
> + { 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL }
> + };
> +
> +@@ -2580,6 +2583,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char
> *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> + case LOPT_MINCTTL: /* --min-cache-ttl */
> + case LOPT_MAXCTTL: /* --max-cache-ttl */
> + case LOPT_AUTHTTL: /* --auth-ttl */
> ++ case LOPT_DHCPTTL: /* --dhcp-ttl */
> + {
> + int ttl;
> + if (!atoi_check(arg, &ttl))
> +@@ -2598,6 +2602,11 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> + daemon->max_cache_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
> + else if (option == LOPT_AUTHTTL)
> + daemon->auth_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
> ++ else if (option == LOPT_DHCPTTL)
> ++ {
> ++ daemon->dhcp_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
> ++ daemon->use_dhcp_ttl = 1;
> ++ }
> + else
> + daemon->local_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
> + break;
> +diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> +index 3535a71..8f1e3b4 100644
> +--- a/src/rfc1035.c
> ++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> +@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec
> *crecp, time_t now)
> + before the lease expires. */
> +
> + if (crecp->flags & F_DHCP)
> +- return daemon->local_ttl;
> ++ return daemon->use_dhcp_ttl ? daemon->dhcp_ttl : daemon-
> >local_ttl;
> +
> + /* Immortal entries other than DHCP are local, and hold TTL in
> TTD field. */
> + if (crecp->flags & F_IMMORTAL)
> +--
> +1.7.10.4
> +
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
> enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
> enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 2d3d6e4..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
> enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
> -From a7369bef8abd241c3d85633fa9c870943f091e76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Ed Bardsley <ebardsley(a)google.com>
> -Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2015 21:17:18 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Enhance --add-subnet to allow arbitary subnet
> addresses.
> -
> ----
> - CHANGELOG | 4 ++++
> - man/dnsmasq.8 | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
> - src/dnsmasq.h | 13 ++++++++++---
> - src/option.c | 59
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> - src/rfc1035.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
> - 5 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> -index 3f4026d..bbc2834 100644
> ---- a/CHANGELOG
> -+++ b/CHANGELOG
> -@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ version 2.76
> - least, 0.0.0.0 accesses the local host, so could
> - be targets for DNS rebinding. See RFC 5735 section 3
> - for details. Thanks to Stephen Röttger for the bug
> report.
> -+
> -+ Enhance --add-subnet to allow arbitrary subnet
> addresses.
> -+ Thanks to Ed Barsley for the patch.
> -+
> -
> - version 2.75
> - Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a
> -diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
> -index c8913b5..a23c898 100644
> ---- a/man/dnsmasq.8
> -+++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
> -@@ -604,17 +604,27 @@ experimental. Also note that exposing MAC
> addresses in this way may
> - have security and privacy implications. The warning about caching
> - given for --add-subnet applies to --add-mac too.
> - .TP
> --.B --add-subnet[[=<IPv4 prefix length>],<IPv6 prefix length>]
> --Add the subnet address of the requestor to the DNS queries which
> are
> --forwarded upstream. The amount of the address forwarded depends on
> the
> --prefix length parameter: 32 (128 for IPv6) forwards the whole
> address,
> --zero forwards none of it but still marks the request so that no
> --upstream nameserver will add client address information either. The
> --default is zero for both IPv4 and IPv6. Note that upstream
> nameservers
> --may be configured to return different results based on this
> --information, but the dnsmasq cache does not take account. If a
> dnsmasq
> --instance is configured such that different results may be
> encountered,
> --caching should be disabled.
> -+.B --add-subnet[[=[<IPv4 address>/]<IPv4 prefix length>][,[<IPv6
> address>/]<IPv6 prefix length>]]
> -+Add a subnet address to the DNS queries which are forwarded
> -+upstream. If an address is specified in the flag, it will be used,
> -+otherwise, the address of the requestor will be used. The amount of
> -+the address forwarded depends on the prefix length parameter: 32
> (128
> -+for IPv6) forwards the whole address, zero forwards none of it but
> -+still marks the request so that no upstream nameserver will add
> client
> -+address information either. The default is zero for both IPv4 and
> -+IPv6. Note that upstream nameservers may be configured to return
> -+different results based on this information, but the dnsmasq cache
> -+does not take account. If a dnsmasq instance is configured such
> that
> -+different results may be encountered, caching should be disabled.
> -+
> -+For example,
> -+.B --add-subnet=24,96
> -+will add the /24 and /96 subnets of the requestor for IPv4 and IPv6
> requestors, respectively.
> -+.B --add-subnet=1.2.3.4/24
> -+will add 1.2.3.0/24 for IPv4 requestors and ::/0 for IPv6
> requestors.
> -+.B --add-subnet=1.2.3.4/24,1.2.3.4/24
> -+will add 1.2.3.0/24 for both IPv4 and IPv6 requestors.
> -+
> - .TP
> - .B \-c, --cache-size=<cachesize>
> - Set the size of dnsmasq's cache. The default is 150 names. Setting
> the cache size to zero disables caching.
> -diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -index cf1a782..f42acdb 100644
> ---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> -+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -@@ -541,6 +541,13 @@ struct iname {
> - struct iname *next;
> - };
> -
> -+/* subnet parameters from command line */
> -+struct mysubnet {
> -+ union mysockaddr addr;
> -+ int addr_used;
> -+ int mask;
> -+};
> -+
> - /* resolv-file parms from command-line */
> - struct resolvc {
> - struct resolvc *next;
> -@@ -935,9 +942,9 @@ extern struct daemon {
> - struct auth_zone *auth_zones;
> - struct interface_name *int_names;
> - char *mxtarget;
> -- int addr4_netmask;
> -- int addr6_netmask;
> -- char *lease_file;
> -+ struct mysubnet *add_subnet4;
> -+ struct mysubnet *add_subnet6;
> -+ char *lease_file;
> - char *username, *groupname, *scriptuser;
> - char *luascript;
> - char *authserver, *hostmaster;
> -diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
> -index ecc2619..746cd11 100644
> ---- a/src/option.c
> -+++ b/src/option.c
> -@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static struct {
> - { LOPT_PXE_SERV, ARG_DUP, "<service>", gettext_noop("Boot service
> for PXE menu."), NULL },
> - { LOPT_TEST, 0, NULL, gettext_noop("Check configuration
> syntax."), NULL },
> - { LOPT_ADD_MAC, OPT_ADD_MAC, NULL, gettext_noop("Add requestor's
> MAC address to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
> -- { LOPT_ADD_SBNET, ARG_ONE, "<v4 pref>[,<v6 pref>]",
> gettext_noop("Add requestor's IP subnet to forwarded DNS queries."),
> NULL },
> -+ { LOPT_ADD_SBNET, ARG_ONE, "<v4 pref>[,<v6 pref>]",
> gettext_noop("Add specified IP subnet to forwarded DNS queries."),
> NULL },
> - { LOPT_DNSSEC, OPT_DNSSEC_PROXY, NULL, gettext_noop("Proxy DNSSEC
> validation results from upstream nameservers."), NULL },
> - { LOPT_INCR_ADDR, OPT_CONSEC_ADDR, NULL, gettext_noop("Attempt to
> allocate sequential IP addresses to DHCP clients."), NULL },
> - { LOPT_CONNTRACK, OPT_CONNTRACK, NULL, gettext_noop("Copy
> connection-track mark from queries to upstream connections."), NULL
> },
> -@@ -722,6 +722,20 @@ static void do_usage(void)
> -
> - #define ret_err(x) do { strcpy(errstr, (x)); return 0; } while (0)
> -
> -+static char *parse_mysockaddr(char *arg, union mysockaddr *addr)
> -+{
> -+ if (inet_pton(AF_INET, arg, &addr->in.sin_addr) > 0)
> -+ addr->sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
> -+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -+ else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, arg, &addr->in6.sin6_addr) > 0)
> -+ addr->sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
> -+#endif
> -+ else
> -+ return _("bad address");
> -+
> -+ return NULL;
> -+}
> -+
> - char *parse_server(char *arg, union mysockaddr *addr, union
> mysockaddr *source_addr, char *interface, int *flags)
> - {
> - int source_port = 0, serv_port = NAMESERVER_PORT;
> -@@ -1585,7 +1599,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char
> *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> - li = match_suffix->next;
> - free(match_suffix->suffix);
> - free(match_suffix);
> -- }
> -+ }
> - break;
> - }
> -
> -@@ -1593,10 +1607,45 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> - set_option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET);
> - if (arg)
> - {
> -+ char *err, *end;
> - comma = split(arg);
> -- if (!atoi_check(arg, &daemon->addr4_netmask) ||
> -- (comma && !atoi_check(comma, &daemon-
> >addr6_netmask)))
> -- ret_err(gen_err);
> -+
> -+ struct mysubnet* new = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct
> mysubnet));
> -+ if ((end = split_chr(arg, '/')))
> -+ {
> -+ /* has subnet+len */
> -+ err = parse_mysockaddr(arg, &new->addr);
> -+ if (err)
> -+ ret_err(err);
> -+ if (!atoi_check(end, &new->mask))
> -+ ret_err(gen_err);
> -+ new->addr_used = 1;
> -+ }
> -+ else if (!atoi_check(arg, &new->mask))
> -+ ret_err(gen_err);
> -+
> -+ daemon->add_subnet4 = new;
> -+
> -+ new = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct mysubnet));
> -+ if (comma)
> -+ {
> -+ if ((end = split_chr(comma, '/')))
> -+ {
> -+ /* has subnet+len */
> -+ err = parse_mysockaddr(comma, &new->addr);
> -+ if (err)
> -+ ret_err(err);
> -+ if (!atoi_check(end, &new->mask))
> -+ ret_err(gen_err);
> -+ new->addr_used = 1;
> -+ }
> -+ else
> -+ {
> -+ if (!atoi_check(comma, &new->mask))
> -+ ret_err(gen_err);
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+ daemon->add_subnet6 = new;
> - }
> - break;
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index 29e9e65..6a51b30 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -629,26 +629,47 @@ struct subnet_opt {
> - #endif
> - };
> -
> -+static void *get_addrp(union mysockaddr *addr, const short family)
> -+{
> -+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -+ if (family == AF_INET6)
> -+ return &addr->in6.sin6_addr;
> -+#endif
> -+
> -+ return &addr->in.sin_addr;
> -+}
> -+
> - static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct subnet_opt *opt, union
> mysockaddr *source)
> - {
> - /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subne
> t-02 */
> -
> - int len;
> - void *addrp;
> -+ int sa_family = source->sa.sa_family;
> -
> - #ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> - if (source->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
> - {
> -- opt->family = htons(2);
> -- opt->source_netmask = daemon->addr6_netmask;
> -- addrp = &source->in6.sin6_addr;
> -+ opt->source_netmask = daemon->add_subnet6->mask;
> -+ if (daemon->add_subnet6->addr_used)
> -+ {
> -+ sa_family = daemon->add_subnet6->addr.sa.sa_family;
> -+ addrp = get_addrp(&daemon->add_subnet6->addr, sa_family);
> -+ }
> -+ else
> -+ addrp = &source->in6.sin6_addr;
> - }
> - else
> - #endif
> - {
> -- opt->family = htons(1);
> -- opt->source_netmask = daemon->addr4_netmask;
> -- addrp = &source->in.sin_addr;
> -+ opt->source_netmask = daemon->add_subnet4->mask;
> -+ if (daemon->add_subnet4->addr_used)
> -+ {
> -+ sa_family = daemon->add_subnet4->addr.sa.sa_family;
> -+ addrp = get_addrp(&daemon->add_subnet4->addr, sa_family);
> -+ }
> -+ else
> -+ addrp = &source->in.sin_addr;
> - }
> -
> - opt->scope_netmask = 0;
> -@@ -656,6 +677,11 @@ static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct subnet_opt
> *opt, union mysockaddr *source)
> -
> - if (opt->source_netmask != 0)
> - {
> -+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -+ opt->family = htons(sa_family == AF_INET6 ? 2 : 1);
> -+#else
> -+ opt->family = htons(1);
> -+#endif
> - len = ((opt->source_netmask - 1) >> 3) + 1;
> - memcpy(opt->addr, addrp, len);
> - if (opt->source_netmask & 7)
> -@@ -2335,4 +2361,3 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -
> - return len;
> - }
> --
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..f04f943
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
> +X-Git-Url: http://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=blobdiff
> _plain;f=CHANGELOG;h=6d9ba490488f80ef565f459cef3c110bdf31212c;hp=1435
> 4f2506a7fbf8360cd32c96e1d7ce1bfeb3f9;hb=e06e6e34bffd781b7cefa49b25fb8
> ae863654ca2;hpb=832e47beab95c2918b5264f0504f2fe6fe523e4c
> +
> +diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> +index 14354f2..6d9ba49 100644
> +--- a/CHANGELOG
> ++++ b/CHANGELOG
> +@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ version 2.76
> + (ie xx::0 to xx::ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff)
> + Thanks to Laurent Bendel for spotting this problem.
> +
> ++ Add support for a TTL parameter in --host-record and
> ++ --cname.
> ++
> ++ Add --dhcp-ttl option.
> +
> + version 2.75
> + Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
> dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
> ries_set.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
> dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
> ries_set.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index cfbcdfb..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
> dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
> ries_set.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
> -From 3a3965ac21b1b759eab8799b6edb09195b671306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 17:45:06 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Don't answer non-auth queries for auth zones
> locally when
> - --localise-queries set.
> -
> ----
> - src/forward.c | 4 ++--
> - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
> -index 2731b90..b76a974 100644
> ---- a/src/forward.c
> -+++ b/src/forward.c
> -@@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> -
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> - /* find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer
> them directly */
> -- if (!auth_dns)
> -+ if (!auth_dns && !option_bool(OPT_LOCALISE))
> - for (zone = daemon->auth_zones; zone; zone = zone->next)
> - if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
> - {
> -@@ -1904,7 +1904,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> -
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> - /* find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and
> answer them directly */
> -- if (!auth_dns)
> -+ if (!auth_dns && !option_bool(OPT_LOCALISE))
> - for (zone = daemon->auth_zones; zone; zone = zone-
> >next)
> - if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
> - {
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..c06705a
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
> +From bec366b4041df72b559e713f1c924177676e6eb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> +From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> +Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 22:03:26 +0000
> +Subject: [PATCH] Add --tftp-mtu option.
> +
> +---
> + CHANGELOG | 4 ++++
> + man/dnsmasq.8 | 4 ++++
> + src/dnsmasq.h | 2 +-
> + src/option.c | 10 +++++++++-
> + src/tftp.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
> + 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> +index 6d9ba49..9218b8c 100644
> +--- a/CHANGELOG
> ++++ b/CHANGELOG
> +@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ version 2.76
> +
> + Add --dhcp-ttl option.
> +
> ++ Add --tftp-mtu option. Thanks to Patrick McLean for
> the
> ++ initial patch.
> ++
> ++
> + version 2.75
> + Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a
> + dhcp-script is configured. Thanks to Adrian Davey for
> +diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +index 2bcce20..3cf48cd 100644
> +--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
> ++++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
> +@@ -1810,6 +1810,10 @@ require about (2*n) + 10 descriptors. If
> + .B --tftp-port-range
> + is given, that can affect the number of concurrent connections.
> + .TP
> ++.B --tftp-mtu=<mtu size>
> ++Use size as the ceiling of the MTU supported by the intervening
> network when
> ++negotiating TFTP blocksize, overriding the MTU setting of the local
> interface if it is larger.
> ++.TP
> + .B --tftp-no-blocksize
> + Stop the TFTP server from negotiating the "blocksize" option with a
> + client. Some buggy clients request this option but then behave
> badly
> +diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +index 9f73c3b..280ad9d 100644
> +--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> ++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> +@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
> + struct dhcp_netid_list *dhcp_ignore, *dhcp_ignore_names,
> *dhcp_gen_names;
> + struct dhcp_netid_list *force_broadcast, *bootp_dynamic;
> + struct hostsfile *dhcp_hosts_file, *dhcp_opts_file,
> *dynamic_dirs;
> +- int dhcp_max, tftp_max;
> ++ int dhcp_max, tftp_max, tftp_mtu;
> + int dhcp_server_port, dhcp_client_port;
> + int start_tftp_port, end_tftp_port;
> + unsigned int min_leasetime;
> +diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
> +index 3f6d162..765965f 100644
> +--- a/src/option.c
> ++++ b/src/option.c
> +@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ struct myoption {
> + #define LOPT_CPE_ID 346
> + #define LOPT_SCRIPT_ARP 347
> + #define LOPT_DHCPTTL 348
> +-
> ++#define LOPT_TFTP_MTU 349
> ++
> + #ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG
> + static const struct option opts[] =
> + #else
> +@@ -244,6 +245,7 @@ static const struct myoption opts[] =
> + { "tftp-unique-root", 0, 0, LOPT_APREF },
> + { "tftp-root", 1, 0, LOPT_PREFIX },
> + { "tftp-max", 1, 0, LOPT_TFTP_MAX },
> ++ { "tftp-mtu", 1, 0, LOPT_TFTP_MTU },
> + { "tftp-lowercase", 0, 0, LOPT_TFTP_LC },
> + { "ptr-record", 1, 0, LOPT_PTR },
> + { "naptr-record", 1, 0, LOPT_NAPTR },
> +@@ -432,6 +434,7 @@ static struct {
> + { LOPT_SECURE, OPT_TFTP_SECURE, NULL, gettext_noop("Allow access
> only to files owned by the user running dnsmasq."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_TFTP_NO_FAIL, OPT_TFTP_NO_FAIL, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not
> terminate the service if TFTP directories are inaccessible."), NULL
> },
> + { LOPT_TFTP_MAX, ARG_ONE, "<integer>", gettext_noop("Maximum
> number of conncurrent TFTP transfers (defaults to %s)."), "#" },
> ++ { LOPT_TFTP_MTU, ARG_ONE, "<integer>", gettext_noop("Maximum MTU
> to use for TFTP transfers."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_NOBLOCK, OPT_TFTP_NOBLOCK, NULL, gettext_noop("Disable the
> TFTP blocksize extension."), NULL },
> + { LOPT_TFTP_LC, OPT_TFTP_LC, NULL, gettext_noop("Convert TFTP
> filenames to lowercase"), NULL },
> + { LOPT_TFTPPORTS, ARG_ONE, "<start>,<end>",
> gettext_noop("Ephemeral port range for use by TFTP transfers."), NULL
> },
> +@@ -2625,6 +2628,11 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> + ret_err(gen_err);
> + break;
> +
> ++ case LOPT_TFTP_MTU: /* --tftp-mtu */
> ++ if (!atoi_check(arg, &daemon->tftp_mtu))
> ++ ret_err(gen_err);
> ++ break;
> ++
> + case LOPT_PREFIX: /* --tftp-prefix */
> + comma = split(arg);
> + if (comma)
> +diff --git a/src/tftp.c b/src/tftp.c
> +index 00ed2fc..dc4aa85 100644
> +--- a/src/tftp.c
> ++++ b/src/tftp.c
> +@@ -103,8 +103,10 @@ void tftp_request(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> + if (listen->iface)
> + {
> + addr = listen->iface->addr;
> +- mtu = listen->iface->mtu;
> + name = listen->iface->name;
> ++ mtu = listen->iface->mtu;
> ++ if (daemon->tftp_mtu != 0 && daemon->tftp_mtu < mtu)
> ++ mtu = daemon->tftp_mtu;
> + }
> + else
> + {
> +@@ -234,9 +236,17 @@ void tftp_request(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> +
> + strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, name, IF_NAMESIZE);
> + if (ioctl(listen->tftpfd, SIOCGIFMTU, &ifr) != -1)
> +- mtu = ifr.ifr_mtu;
> ++ {
> ++ mtu = ifr.ifr_mtu;
> ++ if (daemon->tftp_mtu != 0 && daemon->tftp_mtu < mtu)
> ++ mtu = daemon->tftp_mtu;
> ++ }
> + }
> +
> ++ /* Failed to get interface mtu - can use configured value. */
> ++ if (mtu == 0)
> ++ mtu = daemon->tftp_mtu;
> ++
> + if (name)
> + {
> + /* check for per-interface prefix */
> +--
> +1.7.10.4
> +
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
> option.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
> option.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 492ada9..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
> option.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
> -From 5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 23:08:39 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Fix behaviour of empty dhcp-option=option6:dns-
> server, which
> - should inhibit sending option.
> -
> ----
> - src/rfc3315.c | 9 +++++----
> - 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
> -index 2665d0d..3f1f9ee 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc3315.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc3315.c
> -@@ -1320,15 +1320,16 @@ static struct dhcp_netid *add_options(struct
> state *state, int do_refresh)
> -
> - if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_REFRESH_TIME)
> - done_refresh = 1;
> -+
> -+ if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
> -+ done_dns = 1;
> -
> -- if (opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6)
> -+ /* Empty DNS_SERVER option will not set DHOPT_ADDR6 */
> -+ if ((opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6) || opt_cfg->opt ==
> OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
> - {
> - int len, j;
> - struct in6_addr *a;
> -
> -- if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
> -- done_dns = 1;
> --
> - for (a = (struct in6_addr *)opt_cfg->val, len = opt_cfg-
> >len, j = 0;
> - j < opt_cfg->len; j += IN6ADDRSZ, a++)
> - if ((IN6_IS_ADDR_ULA_ZERO(a) &&
> IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(state->ula_addr)) ||
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
> suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
> suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index c7cee60..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
> suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
> -From 9cdcfe9f19ffd45bac4e5b459879bf7c50a287ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2015 22:38:08 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Suggest solution to ENOMEM error with IPv6
> multicast.
> -
> ----
> - src/network.c | 13 ++++++++++---
> - 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/network.c b/src/network.c
> -index a1d90c8..819302f 100644
> ---- a/src/network.c
> -+++ b/src/network.c
> -@@ -1076,23 +1076,30 @@ void join_multicast(int dienow)
> -
> - if ((daemon->doing_dhcp6 || daemon->relay6) &&
> - setsockopt(daemon->dhcp6fd, IPPROTO_IPV6,
> IPV6_JOIN_GROUP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) == -1)
> -- err = 1;
> -+ err = errno;
> -
> - inet_pton(AF_INET6, ALL_SERVERS,
> &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
> -
> - if (daemon->doing_dhcp6 &&
> - setsockopt(daemon->dhcp6fd, IPPROTO_IPV6,
> IPV6_JOIN_GROUP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) == -1)
> -- err = 1;
> -+ err = errno;
> -
> - inet_pton(AF_INET6, ALL_ROUTERS,
> &mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
> -
> - if (daemon->doing_ra &&
> - setsockopt(daemon->icmp6fd, IPPROTO_IPV6,
> IPV6_JOIN_GROUP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) == -1)
> -- err = 1;
> -+ err = errno;
> -
> - if (err)
> - {
> - char *s = _("interface %s failed to join DHCPv6
> multicast group: %s");
> -+ errno = err;
> -+
> -+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
> -+ if (errno == ENOMEM)
> -+ my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("try increasing
> /proc/sys/net/core/optmem_max"));
> -+#endif
> -+
> - if (dienow)
> - die(s, iface->name, EC_BADNET);
> - else
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
> clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
> clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 19c76e6..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
> clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
> -From 20fd11e11a9d09edcea94de135396ae1541fbbab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2015 22:48:13 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Clarify man page on RDNSS set in router
> advertisement.
> -
> ----
> - man/dnsmasq.8 | 6 +++---
> - 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
> -index a23c898..d51b10f 100644
> ---- a/man/dnsmasq.8
> -+++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
> -@@ -1687,15 +1687,15 @@ creation are handled by a different
> protocol. When DHCP is in use,
> - only a subset of this is needed, and dnsmasq can handle it, using
> - existing DHCP configuration to provide most data. When RA is
> enabled,
> - dnsmasq will advertise a prefix for each dhcp-range, with default
> --router and recursive DNS server as the relevant link-local address
> on
> --the machine running dnsmasq. By default, he "managed address" bits
> are set, and
> -+router as the relevant link-local address on
> -+the machine running dnsmasq. By default, the "managed address" bits
> are set, and
> - the "use SLAAC" bit is reset. This can be changed for individual
> - subnets with the mode keywords described in
> - .B --dhcp-range.
> - RFC6106 DNS parameters are included in the advertisements. By
> default,
> - the relevant link-local address of the machine running dnsmasq is
> sent
> - as recursive DNS server. If provided, the DHCPv6 options dns-server
> and
> --domain-search are used for RDNSS and DNSSL.
> -+domain-search are used for the DNS server (RDNSS) and the domain
> serach list (DNSSL).
> - .TP
> - .B --ra-param=<interface>,[high|low],[[<ra-interval>],<router
> lifetime>]
> - Set non-default values for router advertisements sent via an
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
> handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
> handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 832a22e..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
> handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
> -From 6de81f1250fd323c9155de065d5a9dc200a6f20b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2015 22:51:13 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Handle signed dangling CNAME replies to DS queries.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 7 ++-----
> - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 4deda24..67ce486 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1232,11 +1232,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> -
> - /* If we return STAT_NO_SIG, name contains the name of the DS
> query */
> - if (val == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -- {
> -- *keyname = 0;
> -- return val;
> -- }
> --
> -+ return val;
> -+
> - /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as
> the DS, we'll
> - loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS
> answer comes
> - from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
> DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
> DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index fdccd0e..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
> DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
> -From 102208df695e886a3086754d32bf7f8c541fbe46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 21:50:00 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] DHCPv6 option 56 does not hold an address list.
> (RFC 5908).
> -
> ----
> - src/dhcp-common.c | 2 +-
> - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dhcp-common.c b/src/dhcp-common.c
> -index bc48f41..8fc171a 100644
> ---- a/src/dhcp-common.c
> -+++ b/src/dhcp-common.c
> -@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ static const struct opttab_t opttab6[] = {
> - { "sntp-server", 31, OT_ADDR_LIST },
> - { "information-refresh-time", 32, OT_TIME },
> - { "FQDN", 39, OT_INTERNAL | OT_RFC1035_NAME },
> -- { "ntp-server", 56, OT_ADDR_LIST },
> -+ { "ntp-server", 56, 0 },
> - { "bootfile-url", 59, OT_NAME },
> - { "bootfile-param", 60, OT_CSTRING },
> - { NULL, 0, 0 }
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
> --no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-
> Respect_the_--no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 2014fdb..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
> --no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
> -From 77607cbea0ad0f876dfb79c8b2c121ee400d57d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 23:08:43 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Respect the --no-resolv flag in inotify code.
> -
> ----
> - CHANGELOG | 7 ++++++-
> - debian/changelog | 6 ++++++
> - src/inotify.c | 3 +++
> - 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> -index bbc2834..d6e309f 100644
> ---- a/CHANGELOG
> -+++ b/CHANGELOG
> -@@ -7,8 +7,13 @@ version 2.76
> -
> - Enhance --add-subnet to allow arbitrary subnet
> addresses.
> - Thanks to Ed Barsley for the patch.
> -+
> -+ Respect the --no-resolv flag in inotify code. Fixes bug
> -+ which caused dnsmasq to fail to start if a resolv-file
> -+ was a dangling symbolic link, even of --no-resolv set.
> -+ Thanks to Alexander Kurtz for spotting the problem.
> -+
> -
> --
> - version 2.75
> - Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a
> - dhcp-script is configured. Thanks to Adrian Davey for
> -diff --git a/src/inotify.c b/src/inotify.c
> -index 52d412f..ef05c58 100644
> ---- a/src/inotify.c
> -+++ b/src/inotify.c
> -@@ -90,6 +90,9 @@ void inotify_dnsmasq_init()
> -
> - if (daemon->inotifyfd == -1)
> - die(_("failed to create inotify: %s"), NULL, EC_MISC);
> -+
> -+ if (option_bool(OPT_NO_RESOLV))
> -+ return;
> -
> - for (res = daemon->resolv_files; res; res = res->next)
> - {
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
> Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
> Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 281697f..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
> Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
> -From 27b78d990b7cd901866ad6f1a17b9d633a95fdce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2015 21:40:45 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Rationalise
> 5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca
> -
> ----
> - src/rfc3315.c | 3 +--
> - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
> -index 3f1f9ee..3ed8623 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc3315.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc3315.c
> -@@ -1324,8 +1324,7 @@ static struct dhcp_netid *add_options(struct
> state *state, int do_refresh)
> - if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
> - done_dns = 1;
> -
> -- /* Empty DNS_SERVER option will not set DHOPT_ADDR6 */
> -- if ((opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6) || opt_cfg->opt ==
> OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
> -+ if (opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6)
> - {
> - int len, j;
> - struct in6_addr *a;
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
> Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
> Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 631495f..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
> Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
> -From 98079ea89851da1df4966dfdfa1852a98da02912 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 20:30:32 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Catch errors from sendmsg in DHCP code. Logs,
> eg, iptables
> - DROPS of dest 255.255.255.255
> -
> ----
> - src/dhcp.c | 7 ++++++-
> - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dhcp.c b/src/dhcp.c
> -index e6fceb1..1c85e42 100644
> ---- a/src/dhcp.c
> -+++ b/src/dhcp.c
> -@@ -452,8 +452,13 @@ void dhcp_packet(time_t now, int pxe_fd)
> - #endif
> -
> - while(retry_send(sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0)));
> -+
> -+ /* This can fail when, eg, iptables DROPS destination
> 255.255.255.255 */
> -+ if (errno != 0)
> -+ my_syslog(MS_DHCP | LOG_WARNING, _("Error sending DHCP packet
> to %s: %s"),
> -+ inet_ntoa(dest.sin_addr), strerror(errno));
> - }
> --
> -+
> - /* check against secondary interface addresses */
> - static int check_listen_addrs(struct in_addr local, int if_index,
> char *label,
> - struct in_addr netmask, struct
> in_addr broadcast, void *vparam)
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-Update_list_of_subnet_for_
> --bogus-priv.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-
> Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-priv.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 3ba98fc..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-
> priv.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
> -From 90477fb79420a34124b66ebd808c578817a30e4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 21:21:32 +0100
> -Subject: [PATCH] Update list of subnet for --bogus-priv
> -
> -RFC6303 specifies & recommends following zones not be forwarded
> -to globally facing servers.
> -+------------------------------+-----------------------+
> -| Zone | Description |
> -+------------------------------+-----------------------+
> -| 0.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 "THIS" NETWORK |
> -| 127.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 Loopback NETWORK |
> -| 254.169.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 LINK LOCAL |
> -| 2.0.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 TEST-NET-1 |
> -| 100.51.198.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 TEST-NET-2 |
> -| 113.0.203.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 TEST-NET-3 |
> -| 255.255.255.255.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 BROADCAST |
> -+------------------------------+-----------------------+
> -
> -Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <kevin(a)darbyshire-bryant.me.u
> k>
> ----
> - src/rfc1035.c | 8 ++++++--
> - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index 6a51b30..4eb1772 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -756,10 +756,14 @@ int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int
> ban_localhost)
> - return
> - (((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000) && ban_localhost) /*
> 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback) */ ||
> - ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x00000000) /* RFC 5735 section 3.
> "here" network */ ||
> -- ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xC0A80000) /* 192.168.0.0/16
> (private) */ ||
> - ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x0A000000) /*
> 10.0.0.0/8 (private) */ ||
> - ((ip_addr & 0xFFF00000) == 0xAC100000) /*
> 172.16.0.0/12 (private) */ ||
> -- ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xA9FE0000) /* 169.254.0.0/16
> (zeroconf) */ ;
> -+ ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xC0A80000) /* 192.168.0.0/16
> (private) */ ||
> -+ ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xA9FE0000) /* 169.254.0.0/16
> (zeroconf) */ ||
> -+ ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xC0000200) /*
> 192.0.2.0/24 (test-net) */ ||
> -+ ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xC6336400) /*
> 198.51.100.0/24(test-net) */ ||
> -+ ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xCB007100) /* 203.0.113.0/24
> (test-net) */ ||
> -+ ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFFFF) == 0xFFFFFFFF) /* 255.255.255.255/32
> (broadcast)*/ ;
> - }
> -
> - static unsigned char *do_doctor(unsigned char *p, int count, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, int *doctored)
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
> Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
> Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 736cf38..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
> Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
> -From 41a8d9e99be9f2cc8b02051dd322cb45e0faac87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: =?utf8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edwin+ml-cerowrt(a)etorok.ne
> t>
> -Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2015 17:45:48 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Fix crash when empty address from DNS overlays A
> record from
> - hosts.
> -
> ----
> - CHANGELOG | 5 +++++
> - src/cache.c | 2 +-
> - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
> -index d6e309f..93c73d0 100644
> ---- a/CHANGELOG
> -+++ b/CHANGELOG
> -@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ version 2.76
> - was a dangling symbolic link, even of --no-resolv set.
> - Thanks to Alexander Kurtz for spotting the problem.
> -
> -+ Fix crash when an A or AAAA record is defined locally,
> -+ in a hosts file, and an upstream server sends a reply
> -+ that the same name is empty. Thanks to Edwin Török
> for
> -+ the patch.
> -+
> -
> - version 2.75
> - Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a
> -diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
> -index 178d654..1b76b67 100644
> ---- a/src/cache.c
> -+++ b/src/cache.c
> -@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ struct crec *cache_insert(char *name, struct
> all_addr *addr,
> - existing record is for an A or AAAA and
> - the record we're trying to insert is the same,
> - just drop the insert, but don't error the whole process.
> */
> -- if ((flags & (F_IPV4 | F_IPV6)) && (flags & F_FORWARD))
> -+ if ((flags & (F_IPV4 | F_IPV6)) && (flags & F_FORWARD) &&
> addr)
> - {
> - if ((flags & F_IPV4) && (new->flags & F_IPV4) &&
> - new->addr.addr.addr.addr4.s_addr == addr-
> >addr.addr4.s_addr)
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
> Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
> Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 8b17431..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
> Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
> -From 67ab3285b5d9a1b1e20e034cf272867fdab8a0f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 23:20:47 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Handle unknown DS hash algos correctly.
> -
> -When we can validate a DS RRset, but don't speak the hash algo it
> -contains, treat that the same as an NSEC/3 proving that the DS
> -doesn't exist. 4025 5.2
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> - 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 67ce486..b4dc14e 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1005,6 +1005,19 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> - return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -
> -+ /* 4035 5.2
> -+ If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed
> in an
> -+ authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported
> -+ authentication path leading from the parent to the child. The
> -+ resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an
> -+ authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists, */
> -+ for (recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1,
> name, now, F_DS))
> -+ if (hash_find(ds_digest_name(recp1->addr.ds.digest)))
> -+ break;
> -+
> -+ if (!recp1)
> -+ return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -+
> - /* NOTE, we need to find ONE DNSKEY which matches the DS */
> - for (valid = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0 && !valid; j
> --)
> - {
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
> dir.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
> dir.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index a9102c1..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
> dir.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
> -From 0007ee90646a5a78a96ee729932e89d31c69513a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2015 21:47:41 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Fix crash at start up with conf-dir=/path,*
> -
> -Thanks to Brian Carpenter and American Fuzzy Lop for finding the
> bug.
> ----
> - src/option.c | 14 ++++++++++----
> - 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
> -index 746cd11..71beb98 100644
> ---- a/src/option.c
> -+++ b/src/option.c
> -@@ -1515,10 +1515,16 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
> char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
> - li = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct list));
> - if (*arg == '*')
> - {
> -- li->next = match_suffix;
> -- match_suffix = li;
> -- /* Have to copy: buffer is overwritten */
> -- li->suffix = opt_string_alloc(arg+1);
> -+ /* "*" with no suffix is a no-op */
> -+ if (arg[1] == 0)
> -+ free(li);
> -+ else
> -+ {
> -+ li->next = match_suffix;
> -+ match_suffix = li;
> -+ /* Have to copy: buffer is overwritten */
> -+ li->suffix = opt_string_alloc(arg+1);
> -+ }
> - }
> - else
> - {
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
> Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
> Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 7f25066..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
> Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,2209 +0,0 @@
> -From 9a31b68b59adcac01016d4026d906b69c4216c01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 10:20:39 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Major rationalisation of DNSSEC validation.
> -
> -Much gnarly special-case code removed and replaced with correct
> -general implementaion. Checking of zone-status moved to DNSSEC code,
> -where it should be, vastly simplifying query-forwarding code.
> ----
> - src/dnsmasq.h | 19 +-
> - src/dnssec.c | 926 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
> -------------
> - src/forward.c | 741 ++++++++++-----------------------------------
> - 3 files changed, 653 insertions(+), 1033 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -index f42acdb..023a1cf 100644
> ---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> -+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -@@ -586,12 +586,8 @@ struct hostsfile {
> - #define STAT_NEED_KEY 5
> - #define STAT_TRUNCATED 6
> - #define STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD 7
> --#define STAT_NO_SIG 8
> --#define STAT_NO_DS 9
> --#define STAT_NO_NS 10
> --#define STAT_NEED_DS_NEG 11
> --#define STAT_CHASE_CNAME 12
> --#define STAT_INSECURE_DS 13
> -+#define STAT_OK 8
> -+#define STAT_ABANDONED 9
> -
> - #define FREC_NOREBIND 1
> - #define FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED 2
> -@@ -601,8 +597,7 @@ struct hostsfile {
> - #define FREC_AD_QUESTION 32
> - #define FREC_DO_QUESTION 64
> - #define FREC_ADDED_PHEADER 128
> --#define FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN 256
> --#define FREC_TEST_PKTSZ 512
> -+#define FREC_TEST_PKTSZ 256
> -
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> - #define HASH_SIZE 20 /* SHA-1 digest size */
> -@@ -626,9 +621,7 @@ struct frec {
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> - int class, work_counter;
> - struct blockdata *stash; /* Saved reply, whilst we validate */
> -- struct blockdata *orig_domain; /* domain of original query,
> whilst
> -- we're seeing is if in unsigned
> domain */
> -- size_t stash_len, name_start, name_len;
> -+ size_t stash_len;
> - struct frec *dependent; /* Query awaiting internally-generated
> DNSKEY or DS query */
> - struct frec *blocking_query; /* Query which is blocking us. */
> - #endif
> -@@ -1162,8 +1155,8 @@ int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char
> *name, char **cut);
> - size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, char *end,
> char *name, int class, int type, union mysockaddr *addr, int
> edns_pktsz);
> - int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t n, char *name, char *keyname, int class);
> - int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class);
> --int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int *class, int *neganswer,
> int *nons);
> --int dnssec_chase_cname(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname);
> -+int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int *class,
> -+ int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int
> *nons);
> - int dnskey_keytag(int alg, int flags, unsigned char *rdata, int
> rdlen);
> - size_t filter_rrsigs(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
> - unsigned char* hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, char *name);
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index b4dc14e..de7b335 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -65,8 +65,10 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
> - case 8: return "sha256";
> - case 10: return "sha512";
> - case 12: return "gosthash94";
> -+#ifndef NO_NETTLE_ECC
> - case 13: return "sha256";
> - case 14: return "sha384";
> -+#endif
> - default: return NULL;
> - }
> - }
> -@@ -592,30 +594,30 @@ static int get_rdata(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, unsigned char *end,
> - }
> - }
> -
> --static int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *sz, int
> new)
> -+static int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int
> new)
> - {
> - unsigned char **p;
> -- int new_sz = *sz;
> --
> -- if (new_sz > new)
> -+ int old = *szp;
> -+
> -+ if (old >= new+1)
> - return 1;
> -
> - if (new >= 100)
> - return 0;
> -
> -- new_sz += 5;
> -+ new += 5;
> -
> -- if (!(p = whine_malloc((new_sz) * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
> -+ if (!(p = whine_malloc(new * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
> - return 0;
> -
> -- if (*wkspc)
> -+ if (old != 0 && *wkspc)
> - {
> -- memcpy(p, *wkspc, *sz * sizeof(unsigned char **));
> -+ memcpy(p, *wkspc, old * sizeof(unsigned char **));
> - free(*wkspc);
> - }
> -
> - *wkspc = p;
> -- *sz = new_sz;
> -+ *szp = new;
> -
> - return 1;
> - }
> -@@ -706,47 +708,28 @@ static void sort_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, u16 *rr_desc, int
> - } while (swap);
> - }
> -
> --/* Validate a single RRset (class, type, name) in the supplied DNS
> reply
> -- Return code:
> -- STAT_SECURE if it validates.
> -- STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD if it validates and is the result of
> wildcard expansion.
> -- (In this case *wildcard_out points to the "body" of the wildcard
> within name.)
> -- STAT_NO_SIG no RRsigs found.
> -- STAT_INSECURE RRset empty.
> -- STAT_BOGUS signature is wrong, bad packet.
> -- STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
> returned in keyname)
> --
> -- if key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
> given in the params of those names,
> -- otherwise find the key in the cache.
> -+static unsigned char **rrset = NULL, **sigs = NULL;
> -
> -- name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
> trashed.
> --*/
> --static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, int class, int type,
> -- char *name, char *keyname, char
> **wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen, int algo_in, int
> keytag_in)
> -+/* Get pointers to RRset menbers and signature(s) for same.
> -+ Check signatures, and return keyname associated in keyname. */
> -+static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> int class, int type,
> -+ char *name, char *keyname, int *sigcnt,
> int *rrcnt)
> - {
> -- static unsigned char **rrset = NULL, **sigs = NULL;
> -- static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0;
> --
> -+ static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0;
> - unsigned char *p;
> -- int rrsetidx, sigidx, res, rdlen, j, name_labels;
> -- struct crec *crecp = NULL;
> -- int type_covered, algo, labels, orig_ttl, sig_expiration,
> sig_inception, key_tag;
> -- u16 *rr_desc = get_desc(type);
> --
> -- if (wildcard_out)
> -- *wildcard_out = NULL;
> --
> -+ int rrsetidx, sigidx, j, rdlen, res;
> -+ int name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
> -+ int gotkey = 0;
> -+
> - if (!(p = skip_questions(header, plen)))
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
> -
> -- /* look for RRSIGs for this RRset and get pointers to each RR in
> the set. */
> -+ /* look for RRSIGs for this RRset and get pointers to each RR in
> the set. */
> - for (rrsetidx = 0, sigidx = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount) +
> ntohs(header->nscount);
> - j != 0; j--)
> - {
> - unsigned char *pstart, *pdata;
> -- int stype, sclass;
> -+ int stype, sclass, algo, type_covered, labels,
> sig_expiration, sig_inception;
> -
> - pstart = p;
> -
> -@@ -762,14 +745,14 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -
> - if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - if (res == 1 && sclass == class)
> - {
> - if (stype == type)
> - {
> - if (!expand_workspace(&rrset, &rrset_sz, rrsetidx))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - rrset[rrsetidx++] = pstart;
> - }
> -@@ -777,14 +760,54 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - if (stype == T_RRSIG)
> - {
> - if (rdlen < 18)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+ return 0; /* bad packet */
> -
> - GETSHORT(type_covered, p);
> -+ algo = *p++;
> -+ labels = *p++;
> -+ p += 4; /* orig_ttl */
> -+ GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
> -+ GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
> -+ p += 2; /* key_tag */
> -
> -- if (type_covered == type)
> -+ if (gotkey)
> -+ {
> -+ /* If there's more than one SIG, ensure they all
> have same keyname */
> -+ if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 0, 0)
> != 1)
> -+ return 0;
> -+ }
> -+ else
> -+ {
> -+ gotkey = 1;
> -+
> -+ if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1,
> 0))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ /* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name
> field MUST equal
> -+ the name of the zone containing the RRset. We
> can't tell that
> -+ for certain, but we can check that the RRset
> name is equal to
> -+ or encloses the signers name, which should be
> enough to stop
> -+ an attacker using signatures made with the key
> of an unrelated
> -+ zone he controls. Note that the root key is
> always allowed. */
> -+ if (*keyname != 0)
> -+ {
> -+ char *name_start;
> -+ for (name_start = name;
> !hostname_isequal(name_start, keyname); )
> -+ if ((name_start = strchr(name_start, '.')))
> -+ name_start++; /* chop a label off and try
> again */
> -+ else
> -+ return 0;
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ /* Don't count signatures for algos we don't support
> */
> -+ if (check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration)
> &&
> -+ labels <= name_labels &&
> -+ type_covered == type &&
> -+ algo_digest_name(algo))
> - {
> - if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - sigs[sigidx++] = pdata;
> - }
> -@@ -794,17 +817,45 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - }
> -
> - if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> - }
> -
> -- /* RRset empty */
> -- if (rrsetidx == 0)
> -- return STAT_INSECURE;
> -+ *sigcnt = sigidx;
> -+ *rrcnt = rrsetidx;
> -+
> -+ return 1;
> -+}
> -+
> -+/* Validate a single RRset (class, type, name) in the supplied DNS
> reply
> -+ Return code:
> -+ STAT_SECURE if it validates.
> -+ STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD if it validates and is the result of
> wildcard expansion.
> -+ (In this case *wildcard_out points to the "body" of the wildcard
> within name.)
> -+ STAT_BOGUS signature is wrong, bad packet.
> -+ STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
> returned in keyname)
> -+ STAT_NEED_DS need DS to complete validation (name is returned
> in keyname)
> -+
> -+ if key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
> given in the params of those names,
> -+ otherwise find the key in the cache.
> -
> -- /* no RRSIGs */
> -- if (sigidx == 0)
> -- return STAT_NO_SIG;
> -+ name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
> trashed.
> -+
> -+ Call explore_rrset first to find and count RRs and sigs.
> -+*/
> -+static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, int class, int type, int sigidx, int rrsetidx,
> -+ char *name, char *keyname, char
> **wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen, int algo_in, int
> keytag_in)
> -+{
> -+ unsigned char *p;
> -+ int rdlen, j, name_labels;
> -+ struct crec *crecp = NULL;
> -+ int algo, labels, orig_ttl, key_tag;
> -+ u16 *rr_desc = get_desc(type);
> -+
> -+ if (wildcard_out)
> -+ *wildcard_out = NULL;
> -
> -+ name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
> -+
> - /* Sort RRset records into canonical order.
> - Note that at this point keyname and daemon->workspacename
> buffs are
> - unused, and used as workspace by the sort. */
> -@@ -828,44 +879,16 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - algo = *p++;
> - labels = *p++;
> - GETLONG(orig_ttl, p);
> -- GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
> -- GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
> -+ p += 8; /* sig_expiration, sig_inception already checked */
> - GETSHORT(key_tag, p);
> -
> - if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> -
> -- /* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name field MUST
> equal
> -- the name of the zone containing the RRset. We can't tell
> that
> -- for certain, but we can check that the RRset name is
> equal to
> -- or encloses the signers name, which should be enough to
> stop
> -- an attacker using signatures made with the key of an
> unrelated
> -- zone he controls. Note that the root key is always
> allowed. */
> -- if (*keyname != 0)
> -- {
> -- int failed = 0;
> --
> -- for (name_start = name; !hostname_isequal(name_start,
> keyname); )
> -- if ((name_start = strchr(name_start, '.')))
> -- name_start++; /* chop a label off and try again */
> -- else
> -- {
> -- failed = 1;
> -- break;
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Bad sig, try another */
> -- if (failed)
> -- continue;
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Other 5.3.1 checks */
> -- if (!check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration) ||
> -- labels > name_labels ||
> -- !(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
> -+ if (!(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
> - !hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
> - continue;
> --
> -+
> - /* OK, we have the signature record, see if the relevant
> DNSKEY is in the cache. */
> - if (!key && !(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)))
> - return STAT_NEED_KEY;
> -@@ -971,10 +994,11 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - /* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY
> query.
> - Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
> - return codes:
> -- STAT_SECURE At least one valid DNSKEY found and in
> cache.
> -- STAT_BOGUS No DNSKEYs found, which can be validated
> with DS,
> -- or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not valid,
> bad packet.
> -- STAT_NEED_DS DS records to validate a key not found, name
> in keyname
> -+ STAT_OK Done, key(s) in cache.
> -+ STAT_BOGUS No DNSKEYs found, which can be
> validated with DS,
> -+ or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not
> valid, bad packet.
> -+ STAT_NEED_DS DS records to validate a key not found,
> name in keyname
> -+ STAT_NEED_DNSKEY DNSKEY records to validate a key not
> found, name in keyname
> - */
> - int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
> - {
> -@@ -1001,23 +1025,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - return STAT_NEED_DS;
> - }
> -
> -- /* If we've cached that DS provably doesn't exist, result must be
> INSECURE */
> -- if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -- return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --
> -- /* 4035 5.2
> -- If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed
> in an
> -- authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported
> -- authentication path leading from the parent to the child. The
> -- resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an
> -- authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists, */
> -- for (recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1,
> name, now, F_DS))
> -- if (hash_find(ds_digest_name(recp1->addr.ds.digest)))
> -- break;
> --
> -- if (!recp1)
> -- return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> --
> - /* NOTE, we need to find ONE DNSKEY which matches the DS */
> - for (valid = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0 && !valid; j
> --)
> - {
> -@@ -1070,7 +1077,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - void *ctx;
> - unsigned char *digest, *ds_digest;
> - const struct nettle_hash *hash;
> --
> -+ int sigcnt, rrcnt;
> -+
> - if (recp1->addr.ds.algo == algo &&
> - recp1->addr.ds.keytag == keytag &&
> - recp1->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> -@@ -1088,10 +1096,14 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -
> - from_wire(name);
> -
> -- if (recp1->addr.ds.keylen == (int)hash->digest_size
> &&
> -+ if (!(recp1->flags & F_NEG) &&
> -+ recp1->addr.ds.keylen == (int)hash->digest_size
> &&
> - (ds_digest = blockdata_retrieve(recp1-
> >addr.key.keydata, recp1->addr.ds.keylen, NULL)) &&
> - memcmp(ds_digest, digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen)
> == 0 &&
> -- validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class,
> T_DNSKEY, name, keyname, NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo, keytag) ==
> STAT_SECURE)
> -+ explore_rrset(header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY,
> name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt) &&
> -+ sigcnt != 0 && rrcnt != 0 &&
> -+ validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class,
> T_DNSKEY, sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname,
> -+ NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo,
> keytag) == STAT_SECURE)
> - {
> - valid = 1;
> - break;
> -@@ -1112,7 +1124,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - {
> - /* Ensure we have type, class TTL and length */
> - if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
> -- return STAT_INSECURE; /* bad packet */
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -
> - GETSHORT(qtype, p);
> - GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> -@@ -1198,7 +1210,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -
> - /* commit cache insert. */
> - cache_end_insert();
> -- return STAT_SECURE;
> -+ return STAT_OK;
> - }
> -
> - log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DNSKEY");
> -@@ -1207,12 +1219,14 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -
> - /* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DS query
> - Put all DSs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
> -+ Also handles replies which prove that there's no DS at this
> location,
> -+ either because the zone is unsigned or this isn't a zone cut.
> These are
> -+ cached too.
> - return codes:
> -- STAT_SECURE At least one valid DS found and in cache.
> -- STAT_NO_DS It's proved there's no DS here.
> -- STAT_NO_NS It's proved there's no DS _or_ NS here.
> -+ STAT_OK At least one valid DS found and in cache.
> - STAT_BOGUS no DS in reply or not signed, fails validation,
> bad packet.
> - STAT_NEED_KEY DNSKEY records to validate a DS not found, name
> in keyname
> -+ STAT_NEED_DS DS record needed.
> - */
> -
> - int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
> -@@ -1230,7 +1244,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - if (qtype != T_DS || qclass != class)
> - val = STAT_BOGUS;
> - else
> -- val = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
> NULL, &neganswer, &nons);
> -+ val = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
> NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons);
> - /* Note dnssec_validate_reply() will have cached positive answers
> */
> -
> - if (val == STAT_INSECURE)
> -@@ -1242,22 +1256,21 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> -
> - if (!(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
> - val = STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- /* If we return STAT_NO_SIG, name contains the name of the DS
> query */
> -- if (val == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -- return val;
> -
> - /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as
> the DS, we'll
> - loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS
> answer comes
> - from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
> -- if (val == STAT_BOGUS || (val == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
> hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
> -+ if (val == STAT_BOGUS || (val == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
> hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
> - {
> - log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS");
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> - }
> -+
> -+ if (val != STAT_SECURE)
> -+ return val;
> -
> - /* By here, the answer is proved secure, and a positive answer
> has been cached. */
> -- if (val == STAT_SECURE && neganswer)
> -+ if (neganswer)
> - {
> - int rdlen, flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK;
> - unsigned long ttl, minttl = ULONG_MAX;
> -@@ -1317,15 +1330,14 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> -
> - cache_end_insert();
> -
> -- log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, nons ? "no
> delegation" : "no DS");
> -+ log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "no DS");
> - }
> --
> -- return nons ? STAT_NO_NS : STAT_NO_DS;
> - }
> -
> -- return val;
> -+ return STAT_OK;
> - }
> -
> -+
> - /* 4034 6.1 */
> - static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const char *b)
> - {
> -@@ -1452,7 +1464,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> - int mask = 0x80 >> (type & 0x07);
> -
> - if (nons)
> -- *nons = 0;
> -+ *nons = 1;
> -
> - /* Find NSEC record that proves name doesn't exist */
> - for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> -@@ -1480,9 +1492,22 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> - /* rdlen is now length of type map, and p points to it */
> -
> - /* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that
> information. */
> -- if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] & (0x80 >>
> T_NS)) == 0)
> -- *nons = 1;
> -+ if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] & (0x80 >>
> T_NS)) != 0)
> -+ *nons = 0;
> -
> -+ if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
> -+ {
> -+ /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's
> a CNAME is should
> -+ have been returned. */
> -+ if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+
> -+ /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we
> have the
> -+ DS from the wrong side of the delegation. */
> -+ if (type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) != 0)
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ }
> -+
> - while (rdlen >= 2)
> - {
> - if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -@@ -1586,7 +1611,7 @@ static int base32_decode(char *in, unsigned
> char *out)
> - static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, int digest_len, unsigned char *digest, int type,
> - char *workspace1, char *workspace2,
> unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count, int *nons)
> - {
> -- int i, hash_len, salt_len, base32_len, rdlen;
> -+ int i, hash_len, salt_len, base32_len, rdlen, flags;
> - unsigned char *p, *psave;
> -
> - for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> -@@ -1599,7 +1624,9 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
> - p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
> - GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> - psave = p;
> -- p += 4; /* algo, flags, iterations */
> -+ p++; /* algo */
> -+ flags = *p++; /* flags */
> -+ p += 2; /* iterations */
> - salt_len = *p++; /* salt_len */
> - p += salt_len; /* salt */
> - hash_len = *p++; /* p now points to next hashed name */
> -@@ -1626,16 +1653,29 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
> - return 0;
> -
> - /* If we can prove that there's no NS record,
> return that information. */
> -- if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] &
> (0x80 >> T_NS)) == 0)
> -- *nons = 1;
> -+ if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] &
> (0x80 >> T_NS)) != 0)
> -+ *nons = 0;
> -
> -+ if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
> -+ {
> -+ /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if
> there's a CNAME is should
> -+ have been returned. */
> -+ if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then
> we have the
> -+ DS from the wrong side of the delegation. */
> -+ if (type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) !=
> 0)
> -+ return 0;
> -+ }
> -+
> - while (rdlen >= 2)
> - {
> - if (p[0] == type >> 8)
> - {
> - /* Does the NSEC3 say our type exists? */
> - if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask)
> != 0)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - break; /* finshed checking */
> - }
> -@@ -1643,7 +1683,7 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
> - rdlen -= p[1];
> - p += p[1];
> - }
> --
> -+
> - return 1;
> - }
> - else if (rc < 0)
> -@@ -1651,16 +1691,27 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
> - /* Normal case, hash falls between NSEC3 name-hash
> and next domain name-hash,
> - wrap around case, name-hash falls between NSEC3
> name-hash and end */
> - if (memcmp(p, digest, digest_len) >= 0 ||
> memcmp(workspace2, p, digest_len) >= 0)
> -- return 1;
> -+ {
> -+ if ((flags & 0x01) && nons) /* opt out */
> -+ *nons = 0;
> -+
> -+ return 1;
> -+ }
> - }
> - else
> - {
> - /* wrap around case, name falls between start and
> next domain name */
> - if (memcmp(workspace2, p, digest_len) >= 0 &&
> memcmp(p, digest, digest_len) >= 0)
> -- return 1;
> -+ {
> -+ if ((flags & 0x01) && nons) /* opt out */
> -+ *nons = 0;
> -+
> -+ return 1;
> -+ }
> - }
> - }
> - }
> -+
> - return 0;
> - }
> -
> -@@ -1673,7 +1724,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - char *closest_encloser, *next_closest, *wildcard;
> -
> - if (nons)
> -- *nons = 0;
> -+ *nons = 1;
> -
> - /* Look though the NSEC3 records to find the first one with
> - an algorithm we support (currently only algo == 1).
> -@@ -1813,16 +1864,81 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -
> - return STAT_SECURE;
> - }
> --
> --/* Validate all the RRsets in the answer and authority sections of
> the reply (4035:3.2.3) */
> --/* Returns are the same as validate_rrset, plus the class if the
> missing key is in *class */
> -+
> -+/* Check signing status of name.
> -+ returns:
> -+ STAT_SECURE zone is signed.
> -+ STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
> -+ STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname.
> -+
> -+ name returned unaltered.
> -+*/
> -+static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t
> now)
> -+{
> -+ int name_start = strlen(name);
> -+ struct crec *crecp;
> -+ char *p;
> -+
> -+ while (1)
> -+ {
> -+ strcpy(keyname, &name[name_start]);
> -+
> -+ if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
> -+ return STAT_NEED_DS;
> -+ else
> -+ do
> -+ {
> -+ if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
> -+ {
> -+ /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
> existance of NS record.
> -+ F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
> there's no DS record here,
> -+ but that's because there's no NS record either,
> ie this isn't the start
> -+ of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below
> a node is unsigned when
> -+ we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no
> DS record.
> -+ */
> -+ if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -+ {
> -+ if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -+ return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */
> -+ }
> -+ else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest) ||
> !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -+ return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
> insecure */
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+ while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DS)));
> -+
> -+ if (name_start == 0)
> -+ break;
> -+
> -+ for (p = &name[name_start-2]; (*p != '.') && (p != name); p
> --);
> -+
> -+ if (p != name)
> -+ p++;
> -+
> -+ name_start = p - name;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ return STAT_SECURE;
> -+}
> -+
> -+/* Validate all the RRsets in the answer and authority sections of
> the reply (4035:3.2.3)
> -+ Return code:
> -+ STAT_SECURE if it validates.
> -+ STAT_INSECURE at least one RRset not validated, because in
> unsigned zone.
> -+ STAT_BOGUS signature is wrong, bad packet, no validation
> where there should be.
> -+ STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
> returned in keyname, class in *class)
> -+ STAT_NEED_DS need DS to complete validation (name is returned
> in keyname)
> -+*/
> - int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname,
> -- int *class, int *neganswer, int *nons)
> -+ int *class, int check_unsigned, int
> *neganswer, int *nons)
> - {
> -- unsigned char *ans_start, *qname, *p1, *p2, **nsecs;
> -- int type1, class1, rdlen1, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype;
> -- int i, j, rc, nsec_count, cname_count = CNAME_CHAIN;
> -- int nsec_type = 0, have_answer = 0;
> -+ static unsigned char **targets = NULL;
> -+ static int target_sz = 0;
> -+
> -+ unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2, **nsecs;
> -+ int type1, class1, rdlen1, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype,
> targetidx;
> -+ int i, j, rc, nsec_count;
> -+ int nsec_type;
> -
> - if (neganswer)
> - *neganswer = 0;
> -@@ -1833,70 +1949,51 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - if (RCODE(header) != NXDOMAIN && RCODE(header) != NOERROR)
> - return STAT_INSECURE;
> -
> -- qname = p1 = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -+ p1 = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -
> -+ /* Find all the targets we're looking for answers to.
> -+ The zeroth array element is for the query, subsequent ones
> -+ for CNAME targets, unless the query is for a CNAME. */
> -+
> -+ if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, 0))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+
> -+ targets[0] = p1;
> -+ targetidx = 1;
> -+
> - if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 4))
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -+
> - GETSHORT(qtype, p1);
> - GETSHORT(qclass, p1);
> - ans_start = p1;
> --
> -- if (qtype == T_ANY)
> -- have_answer = 1;
> -
> -- /* Can't validate an RRISG query */
> -+ /* Can't validate an RRSIG query */
> - if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
> - return STAT_INSECURE;
> --
> -- cname_loop:
> -- for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--)
> -- {
> -- /* leave pointer to missing name in qname */
> --
> -- if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 0, 10)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --
> -- GETSHORT(type2, p1);
> -- GETSHORT(class2, p1);
> -- p1 += 4; /* TTL */
> -- GETSHORT(rdlen2, p1);
> --
> -- if (rc == 1 && qclass == class2)
> -- {
> -- /* Do we have an answer for the question? */
> -- if (type2 == qtype)
> -- {
> -- have_answer = 1;
> -- break;
> -- }
> -- else if (type2 == T_CNAME)
> -- {
> -- qname = p1;
> --
> -- /* looped CNAMES */
> -- if (!cname_count-- || !extract_name(header, plen,
> &p1, name, 1, 0))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- p1 = ans_start;
> -- goto cname_loop;
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -- if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen2))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -- }
> --
> -- if (neganswer && !have_answer)
> -- *neganswer = 1;
> -
> -- /* No data, therefore no sigs */
> -- if (ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) == 0)
> -- {
> -- *keyname = 0;
> -- return STAT_NO_SIG;
> -- }
> --
> -+ if (qtype != T_CNAME)
> -+ for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--)
> -+ {
> -+ if (!(p1 = skip_name(p1, header, plen, 10)))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+
> -+ GETSHORT(type2, p1);
> -+ p1 += 6; /* class, TTL */
> -+ GETSHORT(rdlen2, p1);
> -+
> -+ if (type2 == T_CNAME)
> -+ {
> -+ if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, targetidx))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+
> -+ targets[targetidx++] = p1; /* pointer to target name */
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen2))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ }
> -+
> - for (p1 = ans_start, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) +
> ntohs(header->nscount); i++)
> - {
> - if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 10))
> -@@ -1931,7 +2028,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - /* Not done, validate now */
> - if (j == i)
> - {
> -- int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, type_covered;
> -+ int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, type_covered, sigcnt,
> rrcnt;
> - unsigned char *psave;
> - struct all_addr a;
> - struct blockdata *key;
> -@@ -1939,143 +2036,186 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now,
> struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - char *wildname;
> - int have_wildcard = 0;
> -
> -- rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class1, type1,
> name, keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
> --
> -- if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> -- {
> -- have_wildcard = 1;
> --
> -- /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with a
> different
> -- answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove this
> -- hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
> -- the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check that
> here. */
> -- if (!nsec_type && !(nsec_type =
> find_nsec_records(header, plen, &nsecs, &nsec_count, class1)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad packet */
> --
> -- if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -- rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen,
> nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type1,
> NULL);
> -- else
> -- rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen,
> nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename,
> -- keyname, name,
> type1, wildname, NULL);
> --
> -- if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -- return rc;
> -- }
> -- else if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -- {
> -- if (class)
> -- *class = class1; /* Class for DS or DNSKEY */
> -+ if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name,
> keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -
> -- if (rc == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -+ /* No signatures for RRset. We can be configured to
> assume this is OK and return a INSECURE result. */
> -+ if (sigcnt == 0)
> -+ {
> -+ if (check_unsigned)
> - {
> -- /* If we dropped off the end of a CNAME
> chain, return
> -- STAT_NO_SIG and the last name is keyname.
> This is used for proving non-existence
> -- if DS records in CNAME chains. */
> -- if (cname_count == CNAME_CHAIN || i <
> ntohs(header->ancount))
> -- /* No CNAME chain, or no sig in answer
> section, return empty name. */
> -- *keyname = 0;
> -- else if (!extract_name(header, plen, &qname,
> keyname, 1, 0))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ rc = zone_status(name, class1, keyname, now);
> -+ if (rc == STAT_SECURE)
> -+ rc = STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ if (class)
> -+ *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> - }
> --
> -+ else
> -+ rc = STAT_INSECURE;
> -+
> - return rc;
> - }
> -
> -- /* Cache RRsigs in answer section, and if we just
> validated a DS RRset, cache it */
> -- cache_start_insert();
> -+ /* explore_rrset() gives us key name from sigs in
> keyname.
> -+ Can't overwrite name here. */
> -+ strcpy(daemon->workspacename, keyname);
> -+ rc = zone_status(daemon->workspacename, class1,
> keyname, now);
> -+ if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+ {
> -+ /* Zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset
> */
> -+ if (class)
> -+ *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -+ return rc;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class1, type1,
> sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
> -
> -- for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header-
> >ancount); j++)
> -+ if (rc == STAT_BOGUS || rc == STAT_NEED_KEY || rc ==
> STAT_NEED_DS)
> - {
> -- if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name,
> 0, 10)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+ if (class)
> -+ *class = class1; /* Class for DS or DNSKEY */
> -+ return rc;
> -+ }
> -+ else
> -+ {
> -+ /* rc is now STAT_SECURE or STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD
> */
> -+
> -+ /* Note if we've validated either the answer to
> the question
> -+ or the target of a CNAME. Any not noted will
> need NSEC or
> -+ to be in unsigned space. */
> -+
> -+ for (j = 0; j <targetidx; j++)
> -+ if ((p2 = targets[j]))
> -+ {
> -+ if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2,
> name, 0, 10)))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+
> -+ if (class1 == qclass && rc == 1 && (type1
> == T_CNAME || type1 == qtype || qtype == T_ANY ))
> -+ targets[j] = NULL;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> -+ {
> -+ have_wildcard = 1;
> -
> -- GETSHORT(type2, p2);
> -- GETSHORT(class2, p2);
> -- GETLONG(ttl, p2);
> -- GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
> --
> -- if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --
> -- if (class2 == class1 && rc == 1)
> -- {
> -- psave = p2;
> -+ /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with
> a different
> -+ answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
> this
> -+ hasn't happened, the answer must prove
> that
> -+ the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check
> that here. */
> -+ if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header,
> plen, &nsecs, &nsec_count, class1)))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad
> packet */
> -+
> -+ /* Note that we may not yet have validated
> the NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets. Since the check
> -+ below returns either SECURE or BOGUS,
> that's not a problem. If the RRsets later fail
> -+ we'll return BOGUS then. */
> -
> -- if (type1 == T_DS && type2 == T_DS)
> -- {
> -- if (rdlen2 < 4)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --
> -- GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
> -- algo = *p2++;
> -- digest = *p2++;
> --
> -- /* Cache needs to known class for DNSSEC
> stuff */
> -- a.addr.dnssec.class = class2;
> --
> -- if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p2,
> rdlen2 - 4)))
> -- {
> -- if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name, &a,
> now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
> -- blockdata_free(key);
> -- else
> -- {
> -- a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> -- log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -- crecp->addr.ds.digest = digest;
> -- crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
> -- crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
> -- crecp->addr.ds.keytag = keytag;
> -- crecp->addr.ds.keylen = rdlen2 -
> 4;
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> -- else if (type2 == T_RRSIG)
> -- {
> -- if (rdlen2 < 18)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+ if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -+ rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen,
> nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type1,
> NULL);
> -+ else
> -+ rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header,
> plen, nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename,
> -+ keyname,
> name, type1, wildname, NULL);
> -+
> -+ if (rc == STAT_BOGUS)
> -+ return rc;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ /* Cache RRsigs in answer section, and if we just
> validated a DS RRset, cache it */
> -+ /* Also note if the RRset is the answer to the
> question, or the target of a CNAME */
> -+ cache_start_insert();
> -+
> -+ for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header-
> >ancount); j++)
> -+ {
> -+ if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2,
> name, 0, 10)))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+
> -+ GETSHORT(type2, p2);
> -+ GETSHORT(class2, p2);
> -+ GETLONG(ttl, p2);
> -+ GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
> -+
> -+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+
> -+ if (class2 == class1 && rc == 1)
> -+ {
> -+ psave = p2;
> -
> -- GETSHORT(type_covered, p2);
> --
> -- if (type_covered == type1 &&
> -- (type_covered == T_A || type_covered
> == T_AAAA ||
> -- type_covered == T_CNAME ||
> type_covered == T_DS ||
> -- type_covered == T_DNSKEY ||
> type_covered == T_PTR))
> -+ if (type1 == T_DS && type2 == T_DS)
> - {
> -- a.addr.dnssec.type = type_covered;
> -- a.addr.dnssec.class = class1;
> -+ if (rdlen2 < 4)
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -
> -- algo = *p2++;
> -- p2 += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl,
> expiration, inception */
> - GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
> -+ algo = *p2++;
> -+ digest = *p2++;
> -+
> -+ /* Cache needs to known class for
> DNSSEC stuff */
> -+ a.addr.dnssec.class = class2;
> -
> -- /* We don't cache sigs for wildcard
> answers, because to reproduce the
> -- answer from the cache will require
> one or more NSEC/NSEC3 records
> -- which we don't cache. The lack of
> the RRSIG ensures that a query for
> -- this RRset asking for a secure
> answer will always be forwarded. */
> -- if (!have_wildcard && (key =
> blockdata_alloc((char*)psave, rdlen2)))
> -+ if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p2,
> rdlen2 - 4)))
> - {
> -- if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name,
> &a, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> -+ if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name,
> &a, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
> - blockdata_free(key);
> - else
> - {
> -- crecp->addr.sig.keydata =
> key;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.keylen =
> rdlen2;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.keytag =
> keytag;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.type_covered
> = type_covered;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.algo = algo;
> -+ a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> -+ log_query(F_NOEXTRA |
> F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -+ crecp->addr.ds.digest =
> digest;
> -+ crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
> -+ crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
> -+ crecp->addr.ds.keytag =
> keytag;
> -+ crecp->addr.ds.keylen =
> rdlen2 - 4;
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+ else if (type2 == T_RRSIG)
> -+ {
> -+ if (rdlen2 < 18)
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+
> -+ GETSHORT(type_covered, p2);
> -+
> -+ if (type_covered == type1 &&
> -+ (type_covered == T_A ||
> type_covered == T_AAAA ||
> -+ type_covered == T_CNAME ||
> type_covered == T_DS ||
> -+ type_covered == T_DNSKEY ||
> type_covered == T_PTR))
> -+ {
> -+ a.addr.dnssec.type =
> type_covered;
> -+ a.addr.dnssec.class = class1;
> -+
> -+ algo = *p2++;
> -+ p2 += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl,
> expiration, inception */
> -+ GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
> -+
> -+ /* We don't cache sigs for
> wildcard answers, because to reproduce the
> -+ answer from the cache will
> require one or more NSEC/NSEC3 records
> -+ which we don't cache. The lack
> of the RRSIG ensures that a query for
> -+ this RRset asking for a secure
> answer will always be forwarded. */
> -+ if (!have_wildcard && (key =
> blockdata_alloc((char*)psave, rdlen2)))
> -+ {
> -+ if (!(crecp =
> cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> -+ blockdata_free(key);
> -+ else
> -+ {
> -+ crecp->addr.sig.keydata =
> key;
> -+ crecp->addr.sig.keylen =
> rdlen2;
> -+ crecp->addr.sig.keytag =
> keytag;
> -+ crecp-
> >addr.sig.type_covered = type_covered;
> -+ crecp->addr.sig.algo =
> algo;
> -+ }
> - }
> - }
> - }
> -+
> -+ p2 = psave;
> - }
> -
> -- p2 = psave;
> -+ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> - }
> -
> -- if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+ cache_end_insert();
> - }
> --
> -- cache_end_insert();
> - }
> - }
> -
> -@@ -2083,143 +2223,49 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now,
> struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> - }
> -
> -- /* OK, all the RRsets validate, now see if we have a NODATA or
> NXDOMAIN reply */
> -- if (have_answer)
> -- return STAT_SECURE;
> --
> -- /* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, prove that (name, class1, type1)
> can't exist */
> -- /* First marshall the NSEC records, if we've not done it
> previously */
> -- if (!nsec_type && !(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen,
> &nsecs, &nsec_count, qclass)))
> -- {
> -- /* No NSEC records. If we dropped off the end of a CNAME
> chain, return
> -- STAT_NO_SIG and the last name is keyname. This is used for
> proving non-existence
> -- if DS records in CNAME chains. */
> -- if (cname_count == CNAME_CHAIN) /* No CNAME chain, return
> empty name. */
> -- *keyname = 0;
> -- else if (!extract_name(header, plen, &qname, keyname, 1, 0))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -- return STAT_NO_SIG; /* No NSECs, this is probably a dangling
> CNAME pointing into
> -- an unsigned zone. Return STAT_NO_SIG
> to cause this to be proved. */
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Get name of missing answer */
> -- if (!extract_name(header, plen, &qname, name, 1, 0))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -- return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
> -- else
> -- return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, NULL, nons);
> --}
> --
> --/* Chase the CNAME chain in the packet until the first record which
> _doesn't validate.
> -- Needed for proving answer in unsigned space.
> -- Return STAT_NEED_*
> -- STAT_BOGUS - error
> -- STAT_INSECURE - name of first non-secure record in name
> --*/
> --int dnssec_chase_cname(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname)
> --{
> -- unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -- int type, class, qclass, rdlen, j, rc;
> -- int cname_count = CNAME_CHAIN;
> -- char *wildname;
> --
> -- /* Get question */
> -- if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- p +=2; /* type */
> -- GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> --
> -- while (1)
> -- {
> -- for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--)
> -- {
> -- if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --
> -- GETSHORT(type, p);
> -- GETSHORT(class, p);
> -- p += 4; /* TTL */
> -- GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> --
> -- /* Not target, loop */
> -- if (rc == 2 || qclass != class)
> -- {
> -- if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -- continue;
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Got to end of CNAME chain. */
> -- if (type != T_CNAME)
> -- return STAT_INSECURE;
> --
> -- /* validate CNAME chain, return if insecure or need more
> data */
> -- rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class, type, name,
> keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
> --
> -- if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> -- {
> -- int nsec_type, nsec_count, i;
> -- unsigned char **nsecs;
> --
> -- /* An attacker can replay a wildcard answer with a
> different
> -- answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove this
> -- hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
> -- the genuine record doesn't exist. Check that here.
> */
> -- if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen,
> &nsecs, &nsec_count, class)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad packet */
> --
> -- /* Note that we're called here because something
> didn't validate in validate_reply,
> -- so we can't assume that any NSEC records have been
> validated. We do them by steam here */
> --
> -- for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> -- {
> -- unsigned char *p1 = nsecs[i];
> --
> -- if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon-
> >workspacename, 1, 0))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class,
> nsec_type, daemon->workspacename, keyname, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
> -+ /* OK, all the RRsets validate, now see if we have a missing
> answer or CNAME target. */
> -+ for (j = 0; j <targetidx; j++)
> -+ if ((p2 = targets[j]))
> -+ {
> -+ if (neganswer)
> -+ *neganswer = 1;
> -
> -- /* NSECs can't be wildcards. */
> -- if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> -- rc = STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 1, 10))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+
> -+ /* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, unanswered question is (name,
> qclass, qtype) */
> -
> -- if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+ /* For anything other than a DS record, this situation is
> OK if either
> -+ the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's a NSEC
> records. */
> -+ if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen, &nsecs,
> &nsec_count, qclass)))
> -+ {
> -+ /* Empty DS without NSECS */
> -+ if (qtype == T_DS)
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ else
> -+ {
> -+ rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
> -+ if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+ {
> -+ if (class)
> -+ *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> - return rc;
> -- }
> --
> -- if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -- rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type, NULL);
> -- else
> -- rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename,
> -- keyname, name, type,
> wildname, NULL);
> --
> -- if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -- return rc;
> -- }
> --
> -- if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -- {
> -- if (rc == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -- rc = STAT_INSECURE;
> -- return rc;
> -- }
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -
> -- /* Loop down CNAME chain/ */
> -- if (!cname_count-- ||
> -- !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 0) ||
> -- !(p = skip_questions(header, plen)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- break;
> -- }
> -+ if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -+ rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
> -+ else
> -+ rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, NULL, nons);
> -
> -- /* End of CNAME chain */
> -- return STAT_INSECURE;
> -- }
> -+ if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+ return rc;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ return STAT_SECURE;
> - }
> -
> -
> -diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
> -index b76a974..dd22a62 100644
> ---- a/src/forward.c
> -+++ b/src/forward.c
> -@@ -23,15 +23,6 @@ static struct frec
> *lookup_frec_by_sender(unsigned short id,
> - static unsigned short get_id(void);
> - static void free_frec(struct frec *f);
> -
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int status, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t n,
> -- int class, char *name, char *keyname,
> struct server *server, int *keycount);
> --static int do_check_sign(struct frec *forward, int status, time_t
> now, char *name, char *keyname);
> --static int send_check_sign(struct frec *forward, time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> -- char *name, char *keyname);
> --#endif
> --
> --
> - /* Send a UDP packet with its source address set as "source"
> - unless nowild is true, when we just send it with the kernel
> default */
> - int send_from(int fd, int nowild, char *packet, size_t len,
> -@@ -825,236 +816,142 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
> now)
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> - if (server && option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(forward-
> >flags & FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED))
> - {
> -- int status;
> -+ int status = 0;
> -
> - /* We've had a reply already, which we're validating.
> Ignore this duplicate */
> - if (forward->blocking_query)
> - return;
> --
> -- if (header->hb3 & HB3_TC)
> -- {
> -- /* Truncated answer can't be validated.
> -+
> -+ /* Truncated answer can't be validated.
> - If this is an answer to a DNSSEC-generated query,
> we still
> - need to get the client to retry over TCP, so
> return
> - an answer with the TC bit set, even if the actual
> answer fits.
> - */
> -- status = STAT_TRUNCATED;
> -- }
> -- else if (forward->flags & FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY)
> -- status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, daemon-
> >namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> -- else if (forward->flags & FREC_DS_QUERY)
> -- {
> -- status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, daemon-
> >namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> -- /* Provably no DS, everything below is insecure, even
> if signatures are offered */
> -- if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
> -- /* We only cache sigs when we've validated a reply.
> -- Avoid caching a reply with sigs if there's a
> vaildated break in the
> -- DS chain, so we don't return replies from cache
> missing sigs. */
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- else if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -- {
> -- if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> -- {
> -- status = send_check_sign(forward, now,
> header, n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> -- if (status == STAT_INSECURE)
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- }
> -- else
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- }
> -- else if (status == STAT_NO_NS)
> -- status = STAT_BOGUS;
> -- }
> -- else if (forward->flags & FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN)
> -- {
> -- status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, daemon-
> >namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> -- if (status != STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -- status = do_check_sign(forward, status, now,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> -- }
> -- else
> -+ if (header->hb3 & HB3_TC)
> -+ status = STAT_TRUNCATED;
> -+
> -+ while (1)
> - {
> -- status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class, NULL, NULL);
> -- if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -+ /* As soon as anything returns BOGUS, we stop and
> unwind, to do otherwise
> -+ would invite infinite loops, since the answers to
> DNSKEY and DS queries
> -+ will not be cached, so they'll be repeated. */
> -+ if (status != STAT_BOGUS && status != STAT_TRUNCATED
> && status != STAT_ABANDONED)
> - {
> -- if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> -- status = send_check_sign(forward, now, header,
> n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> -+ if (forward->flags & FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY)
> -+ status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> -+ else if (forward->flags & FREC_DS_QUERY)
> -+ status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> - else
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE;
> -+ status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class,
> -+ option_bool(OPT_
> DNSSEC_NO_SIGN), NULL, NULL);
> - }
> -- }
> -- /* Can't validate, as we're missing key data. Put this
> -- answer aside, whilst we get that. */
> -- if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status == STAT_NEED_DS_NEG
> || status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -- {
> -- struct frec *new, *orig;
> --
> -- /* Free any saved query */
> -- if (forward->stash)
> -- blockdata_free(forward->stash);
> --
> -- /* Now save reply pending receipt of key data */
> -- if (!(forward->stash = blockdata_alloc((char
> *)header, n)))
> -- return;
> -- forward->stash_len = n;
> -
> -- anotherkey:
> -- /* Find the original query that started it all.... */
> -- for (orig = forward; orig->dependent; orig = orig-
> >dependent);
> --
> -- if (--orig->work_counter == 0 || !(new =
> get_new_frec(now, NULL, 1)))
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE;
> -- else
> -+ /* Can't validate, as we're missing key data. Put
> this
> -+ answer aside, whilst we get that. */
> -+ if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status ==
> STAT_NEED_KEY)
> - {
> -- int fd;
> -- struct frec *next = new->next;
> -- *new = *forward; /* copy everything, then
> overwrite */
> -- new->next = next;
> -- new->blocking_query = NULL;
> -- new->sentto = server;
> -- new->rfd4 = NULL;
> -- new->orig_domain = NULL;
> --#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -- new->rfd6 = NULL;
> --#endif
> -- new->flags &= ~(FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY
> | FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN);
> -+ struct frec *new, *orig;
> -
> -- new->dependent = forward; /* to find query
> awaiting new one. */
> -- forward->blocking_query = new; /* for garbage
> cleaning */
> -- /* validate routines leave name of required
> record in daemon->keyname */
> -- if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -- {
> -- new->flags |= FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY;
> -- nn = dnssec_generate_query(header, ((char *)
> header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
> -- daemon->keyname,
> forward->class, T_DNSKEY, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
> -- }
> -- else
> -- {
> -- if (status == STAT_NEED_DS_NEG)
> -- new->flags |= FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN;
> -- else
> -- new->flags |= FREC_DS_QUERY;
> -- nn = dnssec_generate_query(header,((char *)
> header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
> -- daemon->keyname,
> forward->class, T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
> -- }
> -- if ((hash = hash_questions(header, nn, daemon-
> >namebuff)))
> -- memcpy(new->hash, hash, HASH_SIZE);
> -- new->new_id = get_id();
> -- header->id = htons(new->new_id);
> -- /* Save query for retransmission */
> -- if (!(new->stash = blockdata_alloc((char
> *)header, nn)))
> -+ /* Free any saved query */
> -+ if (forward->stash)
> -+ blockdata_free(forward->stash);
> -+
> -+ /* Now save reply pending receipt of key data */
> -+ if (!(forward->stash = blockdata_alloc((char
> *)header, n)))
> - return;
> --
> -- new->stash_len = nn;
> -+ forward->stash_len = n;
> -
> -- /* Don't resend this. */
> -- daemon->srv_save = NULL;
> -+ /* Find the original query that started it
> all.... */
> -+ for (orig = forward; orig->dependent; orig =
> orig->dependent);
> -
> -- if (server->sfd)
> -- fd = server->sfd->fd;
> -+ if (--orig->work_counter == 0 || !(new =
> get_new_frec(now, NULL, 1)))
> -+ status = STAT_ABANDONED;
> - else
> - {
> -- fd = -1;
> -+ int fd;
> -+ struct frec *next = new->next;
> -+ *new = *forward; /* copy everything, then
> overwrite */
> -+ new->next = next;
> -+ new->blocking_query = NULL;
> -+ new->sentto = server;
> -+ new->rfd4 = NULL;
> - #ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -- if (server->addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
> -+ new->rfd6 = NULL;
> -+#endif
> -+ new->flags &= ~(FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY |
> FREC_DS_QUERY);
> -+
> -+ new->dependent = forward; /* to find query
> awaiting new one. */
> -+ forward->blocking_query = new; /* for garbage
> cleaning */
> -+ /* validate routines leave name of required
> record in daemon->keyname */
> -+ if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -+ {
> -+ new->flags |= FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY;
> -+ nn = dnssec_generate_query(header, ((char
> *) header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
> -+ daemon-
> >keyname, forward->class, T_DNSKEY, &server->addr, server-
> >edns_pktsz);
> -+ }
> -+ else
> - {
> -- if (new->rfd6 || (new->rfd6 =
> allocate_rfd(AF_INET6)))
> -- fd = new->rfd6->fd;
> -+ new->flags |= FREC_DS_QUERY;
> -+ nn = dnssec_generate_query(header,((char
> *) header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
> -+ daemon-
> >keyname, forward->class, T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
> - }
> -+ if ((hash = hash_questions(header, nn,
> daemon->namebuff)))
> -+ memcpy(new->hash, hash, HASH_SIZE);
> -+ new->new_id = get_id();
> -+ header->id = htons(new->new_id);
> -+ /* Save query for retransmission */
> -+ new->stash = blockdata_alloc((char *)header,
> nn);
> -+ new->stash_len = nn;
> -+
> -+ /* Don't resend this. */
> -+ daemon->srv_save = NULL;
> -+
> -+ if (server->sfd)
> -+ fd = server->sfd->fd;
> - else
> -+ {
> -+ fd = -1;
> -+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
> -+ if (server->addr.sa.sa_family ==
> AF_INET6)
> -+ {
> -+ if (new->rfd6 || (new->rfd6 =
> allocate_rfd(AF_INET6)))
> -+ fd = new->rfd6->fd;
> -+ }
> -+ else
> - #endif
> -+ {
> -+ if (new->rfd4 || (new->rfd4 =
> allocate_rfd(AF_INET)))
> -+ fd = new->rfd4->fd;
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ if (fd != -1)
> - {
> -- if (new->rfd4 || (new->rfd4 =
> allocate_rfd(AF_INET)))
> -- fd = new->rfd4->fd;
> -+ while (retry_send(sendto(fd, (char
> *)header, nn, 0,
> -+ &server-
> >addr.sa,
> -+ sa_len(&server-
> >addr))));
> -+ server->queries++;
> - }
> -- }
> --
> -- if (fd != -1)
> -- {
> -- while (retry_send(sendto(fd, (char *)header,
> nn, 0,
> -- &server->addr.sa,
> -- sa_len(&server-
> >addr))));
> -- server->queries++;
> -- }
> --
> -+ }
> - return;
> - }
> -- }
> -
> -- /* Ok, we reached far enough up the chain-of-trust that
> we can validate something.
> -- Now wind back down, pulling back answers which
> wouldn't previously validate
> -- and validate them with the new data. Note that if an
> answer needs multiple
> -- keys to validate, we may find another key is needed,
> in which case we set off
> -- down another branch of the tree. Once we get to the
> original answer
> -- (FREC_DNSSEC_QUERY not set) and it validates, return
> it to the original requestor. */
> -- while (forward->dependent)
> -- {
> -+ /* Validated original answer, all done. */
> -+ if (!forward->dependent)
> -+ break;
> -+
> -+ /* validated subsdiary query, (and cached result)
> -+ pop that and return to the previous query we were
> working on. */
> - struct frec *prev = forward->dependent;
> - free_frec(forward);
> - forward = prev;
> - forward->blocking_query = NULL; /* already gone */
> - blockdata_retrieve(forward->stash, forward-
> >stash_len, (void *)header);
> - n = forward->stash_len;
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_SECURE)
> -- {
> -- if (forward->flags & FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY)
> -- status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> -- else if (forward->flags & FREC_DS_QUERY)
> -- {
> -- status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> -- /* Provably no DS, everything below is
> insecure, even if signatures are offered */
> -- if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
> -- /* We only cache sigs when we've validated
> a reply.
> -- Avoid caching a reply with sigs if
> there's a vaildated break in the
> -- DS chain, so we don't return replies
> from cache missing sigs. */
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- else if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -- {
> -- if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> -- {
> -- status = send_check_sign(forward,
> now, header, n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> -- if (status == STAT_INSECURE)
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- }
> -- else
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- }
> -- else if (status == STAT_NO_NS)
> -- status = STAT_BOGUS;
> -- }
> -- else if (forward->flags & FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN)
> -- {
> -- status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
> daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
> -- if (status != STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -- status = do_check_sign(forward, status,
> now, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> -- }
> -- else
> -- {
> -- status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header,
> n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class, NULL, NULL);
> -- if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -- {
> -- if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> -- status = send_check_sign(forward, now,
> header, n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
> -- else
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE;
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status ==
> STAT_NEED_DS_NEG || status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -- goto anotherkey;
> -- }
> - }
> -+
> -
> - no_cache_dnssec = 0;
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_INSECURE_DS)
> -- {
> -- /* We only cache sigs when we've validated a reply.
> -- Avoid caching a reply with sigs if there's a
> vaildated break in the
> -- DS chain, so we don't return replies from cache
> missing sigs. */
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE;
> -- no_cache_dnssec = 1;
> -- }
> -
> - if (status == STAT_TRUNCATED)
> - header->hb3 |= HB3_TC;
> -@@ -1062,7 +959,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
> now)
> - {
> - char *result, *domain = "result";
> -
> -- if (forward->work_counter == 0)
> -+ if (status == STAT_ABANDONED)
> - {
> - result = "ABANDONED";
> - status = STAT_BOGUS;
> -@@ -1072,7 +969,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
> now)
> -
> - if (status == STAT_BOGUS && extract_request(header,
> n, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
> - domain = daemon->namebuff;
> --
> -+
> - log_query(F_KEYTAG | F_SECSTAT, domain, NULL,
> result);
> - }
> -
> -@@ -1415,315 +1312,49 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> - }
> -
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> --
> --/* UDP: we've got an unsigned answer, return STAT_INSECURE if we
> can prove there's no DS
> -- and therefore the answer shouldn't be signed, or STAT_BOGUS if
> it should be, or
> -- STAT_NEED_DS_NEG and keyname if we need to do the query. */
> --static int send_check_sign(struct frec *forward, time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> -- char *name, char *keyname)
> --{
> -- int status = dnssec_chase_cname(now, header, plen, name,
> keyname);
> --
> -- if (status != STAT_INSECURE)
> -- return status;
> --
> -- /* Store the domain we're trying to check. */
> -- forward->name_start = strlen(name);
> -- forward->name_len = forward->name_start + 1;
> -- if (!(forward->orig_domain = blockdata_alloc(name, forward-
> >name_len)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- return do_check_sign(forward, 0, now, name, keyname);
> --}
> --
> --/* We either have a a reply (header non-NULL, or we need to start
> by looking in the cache */
> --static int do_check_sign(struct frec *forward, int status, time_t
> now, char *name, char *keyname)
> --{
> -- /* get domain we're checking back from blockdata store, it's
> stored on the original query. */
> -- while (forward->dependent && !forward->orig_domain)
> -- forward = forward->dependent;
> --
> -- blockdata_retrieve(forward->orig_domain, forward->name_len,
> name);
> --
> -- while (1)
> -- {
> -- char *p;
> --
> -- if (status == 0)
> -- {
> -- struct crec *crecp;
> --
> -- /* Haven't received answer, see if in cache */
> -- if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, &name[forward-
> >name_start], now, F_DS)))
> -- {
> -- /* put name of DS record we're missing into keyname
> */
> -- strcpy(keyname, &name[forward->name_start]);
> -- /* and wait for reply to arrive */
> -- return STAT_NEED_DS_NEG;
> -- }
> --
> -- /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
> existance of NS record */
> -- if (!(crecp->flags & F_NEG))
> -- status = STAT_SECURE;
> -- else if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -- status = STAT_NO_DS;
> -- else
> -- status = STAT_NO_NS;
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Have entered non-signed part of DNS tree. */
> -- if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
> -- return forward->dependent ? STAT_INSECURE_DS :
> STAT_INSECURE;
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_BOGUS)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_NO_SIG && *keyname != 0)
> -- {
> -- /* There is a validated CNAME chain that doesn't end in a
> DS record. Start
> -- the search again in that domain. */
> -- blockdata_free(forward->orig_domain);
> -- forward->name_start = strlen(keyname);
> -- forward->name_len = forward->name_start + 1;
> -- if (!(forward->orig_domain = blockdata_alloc(keyname,
> forward->name_len)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- strcpy(name, keyname);
> -- status = 0; /* force to cache when we iterate. */
> -- continue;
> -- }
> --
> -- /* There's a proven DS record, or we're within a zone, where
> there doesn't need
> -- to be a DS record. Add a name and try again.
> -- If we've already tried the whole name, then fail */
> --
> -- if (forward->name_start == 0)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- for (p = &name[forward->name_start-2]; (*p != '.') && (p !=
> name); p--);
> --
> -- if (p != name)
> -- p++;
> --
> -- forward->name_start = p - name;
> -- status = 0; /* force to cache when we iterate. */
> -- }
> --}
> --
> --/* Move down from the root, until we find a signed non-existance of
> a DS, in which case
> -- an unsigned answer is OK, or we find a signed DS, in which case
> there should be
> -- a signature, and the answer is BOGUS */
> --static int tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, char *name,
> -- char *keyname, struct
> server *server, int *keycount)
> --{
> -- size_t m;
> -- unsigned char *packet, *payload;
> -- u16 *length;
> -- int status, name_len;
> -- struct blockdata *block;
> --
> -- char *name_start;
> --
> -- /* Get first insecure entry in CNAME chain */
> -- status = tcp_key_recurse(now, STAT_CHASE_CNAME, header, plen,
> class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> -- if (status == STAT_BOGUS)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- if (!(packet = whine_malloc(65536 + MAXDNAME + RRFIXEDSZ +
> sizeof(u16))))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- payload = &packet[2];
> -- header = (struct dns_header *)payload;
> -- length = (u16 *)packet;
> --
> -- /* Stash the name away, since the buffer will be trashed when we
> recurse */
> -- name_len = strlen(name) + 1;
> -- name_start = name + name_len - 1;
> --
> -- if (!(block = blockdata_alloc(name, name_len)))
> -- {
> -- free(packet);
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -- }
> --
> -- while (1)
> -- {
> -- unsigned char c1, c2;
> -- struct crec *crecp;
> --
> -- if (--(*keycount) == 0)
> -- {
> -- free(packet);
> -- blockdata_free(block);
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -- }
> --
> -- while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name_start, now,
> F_DS)))
> -- {
> -- if ((crecp->flags & F_NEG) && (crecp->flags &
> F_DNSSECOK))
> -- {
> -- /* Found a secure denial of DS - delegation is indeed
> insecure */
> -- free(packet);
> -- blockdata_free(block);
> -- return STAT_INSECURE;
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Here, either there's a secure DS, or no NS and no DS,
> and therefore no delegation.
> -- Add another label and continue. */
> --
> -- if (name_start == name)
> -- {
> -- free(packet);
> -- blockdata_free(block);
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* run out of labels */
> -- }
> --
> -- name_start -= 2;
> -- while (*name_start != '.' && name_start != name)
> -- name_start--;
> -- if (name_start != name)
> -- name_start++;
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Can't find it in the cache, have to send a query */
> --
> -- m = dnssec_generate_query(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
> name_start, class, T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
> --
> -- *length = htons(m);
> --
> -- if (read_write(server->tcpfd, packet, m + sizeof(u16), 0) &&
> -- read_write(server->tcpfd, &c1, 1, 1) &&
> -- read_write(server->tcpfd, &c2, 1, 1) &&
> -- read_write(server->tcpfd, payload, (c1 << 8) | c2, 1))
> -- {
> -- m = (c1 << 8) | c2;
> --
> -- /* Note this trashes all three name workspaces */
> -- status = tcp_key_recurse(now, STAT_NEED_DS_NEG, header,
> m, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
> -- {
> -- /* Found a secure denial of DS - delegation is indeed
> insecure */
> -- free(packet);
> -- blockdata_free(block);
> -- return STAT_INSECURE;
> -- }
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_NO_SIG && *keyname != 0)
> -- {
> -- /* There is a validated CNAME chain that doesn't end
> in a DS record. Start
> -- the search again in that domain. */
> -- blockdata_free(block);
> -- name_len = strlen(keyname) + 1;
> -- name_start = name + name_len - 1;
> --
> -- if (!(block = blockdata_alloc(keyname, name_len)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -- strcpy(name, keyname);
> -- continue;
> -- }
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_BOGUS)
> -- {
> -- free(packet);
> -- blockdata_free(block);
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Here, either there's a secure DS, or no NS and no DS,
> and therefore no delegation.
> -- Add another label and continue. */
> --
> -- /* Get name we're checking back. */
> -- blockdata_retrieve(block, name_len, name);
> --
> -- if (name_start == name)
> -- {
> -- free(packet);
> -- blockdata_free(block);
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* run out of labels */
> -- }
> --
> -- name_start -= 2;
> -- while (*name_start != '.' && name_start != name)
> -- name_start--;
> -- if (name_start != name)
> -- name_start++;
> -- }
> -- else
> -- {
> -- /* IO failure */
> -- free(packet);
> -- blockdata_free(block);
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* run out of labels */
> -- }
> -- }
> --}
> --
> - static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int status, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t n,
> - int class, char *name, char *keyname,
> struct server *server, int *keycount)
> - {
> - /* Recurse up the key heirarchy */
> - int new_status;
> -+ unsigned char *packet = NULL;
> -+ size_t m;
> -+ unsigned char *payload = NULL;
> -+ struct dns_header *new_header = NULL;
> -+ u16 *length = NULL;
> -+ unsigned char c1, c2;
> -
> -- /* limit the amount of work we do, to avoid cycling forever on
> loops in the DNS */
> -- if (--(*keycount) == 0)
> -- return STAT_INSECURE;
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -- new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, class);
> -- else if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status == STAT_NEED_DS_NEG)
> -+ while (1)
> - {
> -- new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, class);
> -- if (status == STAT_NEED_DS)
> -+ /* limit the amount of work we do, to avoid cycling forever
> on loops in the DNS */
> -+ if (--(*keycount) == 0)
> -+ new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
> -+ else if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -+ new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, class);
> -+ else if (status == STAT_NEED_DS)
> -+ new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, class);
> -+ else
> -+ new_status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, &class, option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN), NULL, NULL);
> -+
> -+ if (new_status != STAT_NEED_DS && new_status !=
> STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -+ break;
> -+
> -+ /* Can't validate because we need a key/DS whose name now in
> keyname.
> -+ Make query for same, and recurse to validate */
> -+ if (!packet)
> - {
> -- if (new_status == STAT_NO_DS)
> -- new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -- {
> -- if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> -- {
> -- new_status = tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now,
> header, n, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> -- if (new_status == STAT_INSECURE)
> -- new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- }
> -- else
> -- new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- }
> -- else if (new_status == STAT_NO_NS)
> -- new_status = STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ packet = whine_malloc(65536 + MAXDNAME + RRFIXEDSZ +
> sizeof(u16));
> -+ payload = &packet[2];
> -+ new_header = (struct dns_header *)payload;
> -+ length = (u16 *)packet;
> - }
> -- }
> -- else if (status == STAT_CHASE_CNAME)
> -- new_status = dnssec_chase_cname(now, header, n, name, keyname);
> -- else
> -- {
> -- new_status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n, name,
> keyname, &class, NULL, NULL);
> -
> -- if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -+ if (!packet)
> - {
> -- if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> -- new_status = tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now, header,
> n, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> -- else
> -- new_status = STAT_INSECURE;
> -+ new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
> -+ break;
> - }
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Can't validate because we need a key/DS whose name now in
> keyname.
> -- Make query for same, and recurse to validate */
> -- if (new_status == STAT_NEED_DS || new_status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -- {
> -- size_t m;
> -- unsigned char *packet = whine_malloc(65536 + MAXDNAME +
> RRFIXEDSZ + sizeof(u16));
> -- unsigned char *payload = &packet[2];
> -- struct dns_header *new_header = (struct dns_header *)payload;
> -- u16 *length = (u16 *)packet;
> -- unsigned char c1, c2;
> --
> -- if (!packet)
> -- return STAT_INSECURE;
> --
> -- another_tcp_key:
> -+
> - m = dnssec_generate_query(new_header, ((char *) new_header) +
> 65536, keyname, class,
> - new_status == STAT_NEED_KEY ?
> T_DNSKEY : T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
> -
> -@@ -1733,65 +1364,22 @@ static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int
> status, struct dns_header *header, si
> - !read_write(server->tcpfd, &c1, 1, 1) ||
> - !read_write(server->tcpfd, &c2, 1, 1) ||
> - !read_write(server->tcpfd, payload, (c1 << 8) | c2, 1))
> -- new_status = STAT_INSECURE;
> -- else
> - {
> -- m = (c1 << 8) | c2;
> --
> -- new_status = tcp_key_recurse(now, new_status, new_header,
> m, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> --
> -- if (new_status == STAT_SECURE)
> -- {
> -- /* Reached a validated record, now try again at this
> level.
> -- Note that we may get ANOTHER NEED_* if an answer
> needs more than one key.
> -- If so, go round again. */
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -- new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n,
> name, keyname, class);
> -- else if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status ==
> STAT_NEED_DS_NEG)
> -- {
> -- new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
> name, keyname, class);
> -- if (status == STAT_NEED_DS)
> -- {
> -- if (new_status == STAT_NO_DS)
> -- new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- else if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -- {
> -- if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> -- {
> -- new_status =
> tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now, header, n, class, name, keyname,
> server, keycount);
> -- if (new_status == STAT_INSECURE)
> -- new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- }
> -- else
> -- new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
> -- }
> -- else if (new_status == STAT_NO_NS)
> -- new_status = STAT_BOGUS;
> -- }
> -- }
> -- else if (status == STAT_CHASE_CNAME)
> -- new_status = dnssec_chase_cname(now, header, n,
> name, keyname);
> -- else
> -- {
> -- new_status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header,
> n, name, keyname, &class, NULL, NULL);
> --
> -- if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
> -- {
> -- if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
> -- new_status =
> tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now, header, n, class, name, keyname,
> server, keycount);
> -- else
> -- new_status = STAT_INSECURE;
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -- if (new_status == STAT_NEED_DS || new_status ==
> STAT_NEED_KEY)
> -- goto another_tcp_key;
> -- }
> -+ new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
> -+ break;
> - }
> -+
> -+ m = (c1 << 8) | c2;
> -
> -- free(packet);
> -+ new_status = tcp_key_recurse(now, new_status, new_header, m,
> class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
> -+
> -+ if (new_status != STAT_OK)
> -+ break;
> - }
> -+
> -+ if (packet)
> -+ free(packet);
> -+
> - return new_status;
> - }
> - #endif
> -@@ -2075,19 +1663,10 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> - if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) &&
> !checking_disabled)
> - {
> - int keycount = DNSSEC_WORK; /* Limit to
> number of DNSSEC questions, to catch loops and avoid filling cache.
> */
> -- int status = tcp_key_recurse(now,
> STAT_TRUNCATED, header, m, 0, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname,
> last_server, &keycount);
> -+ int status = tcp_key_recurse(now,
> STAT_OK, header, m, 0, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname,
> last_server, &keycount);
> - char *result, *domain = "result";
> --
> -- if (status == STAT_INSECURE_DS)
> -- {
> -- /* We only cache sigs when we've
> validated a reply.
> -- Avoid caching a reply with sigs if
> there's a vaildated break in the
> -- DS chain, so we don't return
> replies from cache missing sigs. */
> -- status = STAT_INSECURE;
> -- no_cache_dnssec = 1;
> -- }
> -
> -- if (keycount == 0)
> -+ if (status == STAT_ABANDONED)
> - {
> - result = "ABANDONED";
> - status = STAT_BOGUS;
> -@@ -2179,7 +1758,6 @@ static struct frec *allocate_frec(time_t now)
> - f->dependent = NULL;
> - f->blocking_query = NULL;
> - f->stash = NULL;
> -- f->orig_domain = NULL;
> - #endif
> - daemon->frec_list = f;
> - }
> -@@ -2248,12 +1826,6 @@ static void free_frec(struct frec *f)
> - f->stash = NULL;
> - }
> -
> -- if (f->orig_domain)
> -- {
> -- blockdata_free(f->orig_domain);
> -- f->orig_domain = NULL;
> -- }
> --
> - /* Anything we're waiting on is pointless now, too */
> - if (f->blocking_query)
> - free_frec(f->blocking_query);
> -@@ -2281,14 +1853,23 @@ struct frec *get_new_frec(time_t now, int
> *wait, int force)
> - target = f;
> - else
> - {
> -- if (difftime(now, f->time) >= 4*TIMEOUT)
> -- {
> -- free_frec(f);
> -- target = f;
> -- }
> --
> -- if (!oldest || difftime(f->time, oldest->time) <= 0)
> -- oldest = f;
> -+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -+ /* Don't free DNSSEC sub-queries here, as we may end up
> with
> -+ dangling references to them. They'll go when their
> "real" query
> -+ is freed. */
> -+ if (!f->dependent)
> -+#endif
> -+ {
> -+ if (difftime(now, f->time) >= 4*TIMEOUT)
> -+ {
> -+ free_frec(f);
> -+ target = f;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+
> -+ if (!oldest || difftime(f->time, oldest->time) <=
> 0)
> -+ oldest = f;
> -+ }
> - }
> -
> - if (target)
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
> Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
> Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 5ffaf97..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
> Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,612 +0,0 @@
> -From 93be5b1e023b0c661e1ec2cd6d811a8ec9055c49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 12:04:40 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Abandon caching RRSIGs and returning them from
> cache.
> -
> -The list of exceptions to being able to locally answer
> -cached data for validated records when DNSSEC data is requested
> -was getting too long, so don't ever do that. This means
> -that the cache no longer has to hold RRSIGS and allows
> -us to lose lots of code. Note that cached validated
> -answers are still returned as long as do=0
> ----
> - src/cache.c | 38 ++---------
> - src/dnsmasq.h | 10 +--
> - src/dnssec.c | 94 ++++-----------------------
> - src/rfc1035.c | 197 ++++++--------------------------------------
> -------------
> - 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 297 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
> -index 1b76b67..51ba7cc 100644
> ---- a/src/cache.c
> -+++ b/src/cache.c
> -@@ -189,12 +189,7 @@ static void cache_hash(struct crec *crecp)
> - static void cache_blockdata_free(struct crec *crecp)
> - {
> - if (crecp->flags & F_DNSKEY)
> -- {
> -- if (crecp->flags & F_DS)
> -- blockdata_free(crecp->addr.sig.keydata);
> -- else
> -- blockdata_free(crecp->addr.key.keydata);
> -- }
> -+ blockdata_free(crecp->addr.key.keydata);
> - else if ((crecp->flags & F_DS) && !(crecp->flags & F_NEG))
> - blockdata_free(crecp->addr.ds.keydata);
> - }
> -@@ -369,13 +364,8 @@ static struct crec *cache_scan_free(char *name,
> struct all_addr *addr, time_t no
> - }
> -
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -- /* Deletion has to be class-sensitive for DS, DNSKEY,
> RRSIG, also
> -- type-covered sensitive for RRSIG */
> -- if ((flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) &&
> -- (flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) == (crecp->flags &
> (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) &&
> -- crecp->uid == addr->addr.dnssec.class &&
> -- (!((flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY)) == (F_DS |
> F_DNSKEY)) ||
> -- crecp->addr.sig.type_covered == addr-
> >addr.dnssec.type))
> -+ /* Deletion has to be class-sensitive for DS and
> DNSKEY */
> -+ if ((flags & crecp->flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) &&
> crecp->uid == addr->addr.dnssec.class)
> - {
> - if (crecp->flags & F_CONFIG)
> - return crecp;
> -@@ -532,13 +522,9 @@ struct crec *cache_insert(char *name, struct
> all_addr *addr,
> - struct all_addr free_addr = new->addr.addr;;
> -
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -- /* For DNSSEC records, addr holds class and
> type_covered for RRSIG */
> -+ /* For DNSSEC records, addr holds class. */
> - if (new->flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY))
> -- {
> -- free_addr.addr.dnssec.class = new->uid;
> -- if ((new->flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY)) == (F_DS |
> F_DNSKEY))
> -- free_addr.addr.dnssec.type = new-
> >addr.sig.type_covered;
> -- }
> -+ free_addr.addr.dnssec.class = new->uid;
> - #endif
> -
> - free_avail = 1; /* Must be free space now. */
> -@@ -653,9 +639,6 @@ struct crec *cache_find_by_name(struct crec
> *crecp, char *name, time_t now, unsi
> - if (!is_expired(now, crecp) &&
> !is_outdated_cname_pointer(crecp))
> - {
> - if ((crecp->flags & F_FORWARD) &&
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -- (((crecp->flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) == (prot &
> (F_DNSKEY | F_DS))) || (prot & F_NSIGMATCH)) &&
> --#endif
> - (crecp->flags & prot) &&
> - hostname_isequal(cache_get_name(crecp), name))
> - {
> -@@ -713,9 +696,6 @@ struct crec *cache_find_by_name(struct crec
> *crecp, char *name, time_t now, unsi
> -
> - if (ans &&
> - (ans->flags & F_FORWARD) &&
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -- (((ans->flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) == (prot & (F_DNSKEY |
> F_DS))) || (prot & F_NSIGMATCH)) &&
> --#endif
> - (ans->flags & prot) &&
> - hostname_isequal(cache_get_name(ans), name))
> - return ans;
> -@@ -1472,11 +1452,7 @@ void dump_cache(time_t now)
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> - else if (cache->flags & F_DS)
> - {
> -- if (cache->flags & F_DNSKEY)
> -- /* RRSIG */
> -- sprintf(a, "%5u %3u %s", cache->addr.sig.keytag,
> -- cache->addr.sig.algo, querystr("", cache-
> >addr.sig.type_covered));
> -- else if (!(cache->flags & F_NEG))
> -+ if (!(cache->flags & F_NEG))
> - sprintf(a, "%5u %3u %3u", cache->addr.ds.keytag,
> - cache->addr.ds.algo, cache-
> >addr.ds.digest);
> - }
> -@@ -1502,8 +1478,6 @@ void dump_cache(time_t now)
> - else if (cache->flags & F_CNAME)
> - t = "C";
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -- else if ((cache->flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY)) == (F_DS |
> F_DNSKEY))
> -- t = "G"; /* DNSKEY and DS set -> RRISG */
> - else if (cache->flags & F_DS)
> - t = "S";
> - else if (cache->flags & F_DNSKEY)
> -diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -index 023a1cf..4344cae 100644
> ---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> -+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -@@ -398,14 +398,9 @@ struct crec {
> - unsigned char algo;
> - unsigned char digest;
> - } ds;
> -- struct {
> -- struct blockdata *keydata;
> -- unsigned short keylen, type_covered, keytag;
> -- char algo;
> -- } sig;
> - } addr;
> - time_t ttd; /* time to die */
> -- /* used as class if DNSKEY/DS/RRSIG, index to source for F_HOSTS
> */
> -+ /* used as class if DNSKEY/DS, index to source for F_HOSTS */
> - unsigned int uid;
> - unsigned short flags;
> - union {
> -@@ -445,8 +440,7 @@ struct crec {
> - #define F_SECSTAT (1u<<24)
> - #define F_NO_RR (1u<<25)
> - #define F_IPSET (1u<<26)
> --#define F_NSIGMATCH (1u<<27)
> --#define F_NOEXTRA (1u<<28)
> -+#define F_NOEXTRA (1u<<27)
> -
> - /* Values of uid in crecs with F_CONFIG bit set. */
> - #define SRC_INTERFACE 0
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index de7b335..1ae03a6 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - {
> - unsigned char *psave, *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> - struct crec *crecp, *recp1;
> -- int rc, j, qtype, qclass, ttl, rdlen, flags, algo, valid, keytag,
> type_covered;
> -+ int rc, j, qtype, qclass, ttl, rdlen, flags, algo, valid, keytag;
> - struct blockdata *key;
> - struct all_addr a;
> -
> -@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -
> - if (valid)
> - {
> -- /* DNSKEY RRset determined to be OK, now cache it and the
> RRsigs that sign it. */
> -+ /* DNSKEY RRset determined to be OK, now cache it. */
> - cache_start_insert();
> -
> - p = skip_questions(header, plen);
> -@@ -1155,7 +1155,10 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
> - {
> - if (!(recp1 = cache_insert(name, &a, now,
> ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DNSSECOK)))
> -- blockdata_free(key);
> -+ {
> -+ blockdata_free(key);
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ }
> - else
> - {
> - a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> -@@ -1169,38 +1172,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - }
> - }
> - }
> -- else if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
> -- {
> -- /* RRSIG, cache if covers DNSKEY RRset */
> -- if (rdlen < 18)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --
> -- GETSHORT(type_covered, p);
> --
> -- if (type_covered == T_DNSKEY)
> -- {
> -- a.addr.dnssec.class = class;
> -- a.addr.dnssec.type = type_covered;
> --
> -- algo = *p++;
> -- p += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl, expiration,
> inception */
> -- GETSHORT(keytag, p);
> -- if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)psave,
> rdlen)))
> -- {
> -- if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name, &a, now,
> ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> -- blockdata_free(key);
> -- else
> -- {
> -- crecp->addr.sig.keydata = key;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.keylen = rdlen;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.keytag = keytag;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.type_covered =
> type_covered;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.algo = algo;
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -+
> - p = psave;
> - }
> -
> -@@ -1326,7 +1298,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - cache_start_insert();
> -
> - a.addr.dnssec.class = class;
> -- cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl, flags);
> -+ if (!cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl, flags))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -
> - cache_end_insert();
> -
> -@@ -2028,14 +2001,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - /* Not done, validate now */
> - if (j == i)
> - {
> -- int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, type_covered, sigcnt,
> rrcnt;
> -+ int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, sigcnt, rrcnt;
> - unsigned char *psave;
> - struct all_addr a;
> - struct blockdata *key;
> - struct crec *crecp;
> - char *wildname;
> -- int have_wildcard = 0;
> --
> -+
> - if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name,
> keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt))
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> -
> -@@ -2096,8 +2068,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -
> - if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> - {
> -- have_wildcard = 1;
> --
> - /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with
> a different
> - answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
> this
> - hasn't happened, the answer must prove
> that
> -@@ -2119,7 +2089,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - return rc;
> - }
> -
> -- /* Cache RRsigs in answer section, and if we just
> validated a DS RRset, cache it */
> -+ /* If we just validated a DS RRset, cache it */
> - /* Also note if the RRset is the answer to the
> question, or the target of a CNAME */
> - cache_start_insert();
> -
> -@@ -2168,45 +2138,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - }
> - }
> - }
> -- else if (type2 == T_RRSIG)
> -- {
> -- if (rdlen2 < 18)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --
> -- GETSHORT(type_covered, p2);
> --
> -- if (type_covered == type1 &&
> -- (type_covered == T_A ||
> type_covered == T_AAAA ||
> -- type_covered == T_CNAME ||
> type_covered == T_DS ||
> -- type_covered == T_DNSKEY ||
> type_covered == T_PTR))
> -- {
> -- a.addr.dnssec.type =
> type_covered;
> -- a.addr.dnssec.class = class1;
> --
> -- algo = *p2++;
> -- p2 += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl,
> expiration, inception */
> -- GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
> --
> -- /* We don't cache sigs for
> wildcard answers, because to reproduce the
> -- answer from the cache will
> require one or more NSEC/NSEC3 records
> -- which we don't cache. The lack
> of the RRSIG ensures that a query for
> -- this RRset asking for a secure
> answer will always be forwarded. */
> -- if (!have_wildcard && (key =
> blockdata_alloc((char*)psave, rdlen2)))
> -- {
> -- if (!(crecp =
> cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> -- blockdata_free(key);
> -- else
> -- {
> -- crecp->addr.sig.keydata =
> key;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.keylen =
> rdlen2;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.keytag =
> keytag;
> -- crecp-
> >addr.sig.type_covered = type_covered;
> -- crecp->addr.sig.algo =
> algo;
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -+
> - p2 = psave;
> - }
> -
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index 4eb1772..def8fa0 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -1275,11 +1275,9 @@ int check_for_local_domain(char *name, time_t
> now)
> - struct naptr *naptr;
> -
> - /* Note: the call to cache_find_by_name is intended to find any
> record which matches
> -- ie A, AAAA, CNAME, DS. Because RRSIG records are marked by
> setting both F_DS and F_DNSKEY,
> -- cache_find_by name ordinarily only returns records with an
> exact match on those bits (ie
> -- for the call below, only DS records). The F_NSIGMATCH bit
> changes this behaviour */
> -+ ie A, AAAA, CNAME. */
> -
> -- if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_IPV4 | F_IPV6
> | F_CNAME | F_DS | F_NO_RR | F_NSIGMATCH)) &&
> -+ if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_IPV4 | F_IPV6
> | F_CNAME |F_NO_RR)) &&
> - (crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)))
> - return 1;
> -
> -@@ -1566,9 +1564,11 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> -
> - if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
> -- *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */
> -+ {
> -+ *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */
> -+ *ad_reqd = 1;
> -+ }
> -
> -- *ad_reqd = 1;
> - dryrun = 1;
> - }
> -
> -@@ -1636,98 +1636,6 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - }
> - }
> -
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -- if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && (qtype == T_DNSKEY ||
> qtype == T_DS))
> -- {
> -- int gotone = 0;
> -- struct blockdata *keydata;
> --
> -- /* Do we have RRSIG? Can't do DS or DNSKEY otherwise. */
> -- if (sec_reqd)
> -- {
> -- crecp = NULL;
> -- while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name, now,
> F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> -- if (crecp->uid == qclass && crecp-
> >addr.sig.type_covered == qtype)
> -- break;
> -- }
> --
> -- if (!sec_reqd || crecp)
> -- {
> -- if (qtype == T_DS)
> -- {
> -- crecp = NULL;
> -- while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name,
> now, F_DS)))
> -- if (crecp->uid == qclass)
> -- {
> -- gotone = 1;
> -- if (!dryrun)
> -- {
> -- if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -- {
> -- if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
> -- nxdomain = 1;
> -- log_query(F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL,
> "no DS");
> -- }
> -- else if ((keydata =
> blockdata_retrieve(crecp->addr.ds.keydata, crecp->addr.ds.keylen,
> NULL)))
> -- {
>
> -- struct all_addr a;
> -- a.addr.keytag = crecp-
> >addr.ds.keytag;
> -- log_query(F_KEYTAG | (crecp->flags
> & F_CONFIG), name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -- if (add_resource_record(header,
> limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp,
> -- crec_ttl(cr
> ecp, now), &nameoffset,
> -- T_DS,
> qclass, "sbbt",
> -- crecp-
> >addr.ds.keytag, crecp->addr.ds.algo,
> -- crecp-
> >addr.ds.digest, crecp->addr.ds.keylen, keydata))
> -- anscount++;
> --
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> -- else /* DNSKEY */
> -- {
> -- crecp = NULL;
> -- while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name,
> now, F_DNSKEY)))
> -- if (crecp->uid == qclass)
> -- {
> -- gotone = 1;
> -- if (!dryrun && (keydata =
> blockdata_retrieve(crecp->addr.key.keydata, crecp->addr.key.keylen,
> NULL)))
> -- {
>
> -- struct all_addr a;
> -- a.addr.keytag = crecp-
> >addr.key.keytag;
> -- log_query(F_KEYTAG | (crecp->flags &
> F_CONFIG), name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u");
> -- if (add_resource_record(header, limit,
> &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp,
> -- crec_ttl(crecp,
> now), &nameoffset,
> -- T_DNSKEY,
> qclass, "sbbt",
> -- crecp-
> >addr.key.flags, 3, crecp->addr.key.algo, crecp->addr.key.keylen,
> keydata))
> -- anscount++;
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Now do RRSIGs */
> -- if (gotone)
> -- {
> -- ans = 1;
> -- auth = 0;
> -- if (!dryrun && sec_reqd)
> -- {
> -- crecp = NULL;
> -- while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name,
> now, F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
> -- if (crecp->uid == qclass && crecp-
> >addr.sig.type_covered == qtype &&
> -- (keydata = blockdata_retrieve(crecp-
> >addr.sig.keydata, crecp->addr.sig.keylen, NULL)))
> -- {
> -- add_resource_record(header, limit, &trunc,
> nameoffset, &ansp,
> -- crec_ttl(crecp, now),
> &nameoffset,
> -- T_RRSIG, qclass, "t",
> crecp->addr.sig.keylen, keydata);
> -- anscount++;
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> --#endif
> --
> - if (qclass == C_IN)
> - {
> - struct txt_record *t;
> -@@ -1736,6 +1644,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - if ((t->class == qtype || qtype == T_ANY) &&
> hostname_isequal(name, t->name))
> - {
> - ans = 1;
> -+ sec_data = 0;
> - if (!dryrun)
> - {
> - log_query(F_CONFIG | F_RRNAME, name, NULL,
> "<RR>");
> -@@ -1792,6 +1701,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -
> - if (intr)
> - {
> -+ sec_data = 0;
> - ans = 1;
> - if (!dryrun)
> - {
> -@@ -1805,6 +1715,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - else if (ptr)
> - {
> - ans = 1;
> -+ sec_data = 0;
> - if (!dryrun)
> - {
> - log_query(F_CONFIG | F_RRNAME, name, NULL,
> "<PTR>");
> -@@ -1819,38 +1730,8 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - }
> - else if ((crecp = cache_find_by_addr(NULL, &addr,
> now, is_arpa)))
> - {
> -- if (!(crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) && sec_reqd)
> -- {
> -- if (!option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) ||
> ((crecp->flags & F_NEG) && (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
> -- crecp = NULL;
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -- else if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -- {
> -- int gotsig = 0;
> -- struct crec *rr_crec = NULL;
> --
> -- while ((rr_crec =
> cache_find_by_name(rr_crec, name, now, F_DS | F_DNSKEY)))
> -- {
> -- if (rr_crec->addr.sig.type_covered ==
> T_PTR && rr_crec->uid == C_IN)
> -- {
> -- char *sigdata =
> blockdata_retrieve(rr_crec->addr.sig.keydata, rr_crec-
> >addr.sig.keylen, NULL);
> -- gotsig = 1;
> --
> -- if (!dryrun &&
> -- add_resource_record(header,
> limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp,
> -- rr_crec-
> >ttd - now, &nameoffset,
> -- T_RRSIG,
> C_IN, "t", crecp->addr.sig.keylen, sigdata))
> -- anscount++;
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -- if (!gotsig)
> -- crecp = NULL;
> -- }
> --#endif
> -- }
> --
> -- if (crecp)
> -+ /* Don't use cache when DNSSEC data required. */
> -+ if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> - {
> - do
> - {
> -@@ -1860,19 +1741,19 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -
> - if (!(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> - sec_data = 0;
> --
> -+
> -+ ans = 1;
> -+
> - if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> - {
> -- ans = 1;
> - auth = 0;
> - if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
> - nxdomain = 1;
> - if (!dryrun)
> - log_query(crecp->flags &
> ~F_FORWARD, name, &addr, NULL);
> - }
> -- else if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS |
> F_DHCP)) || !sec_reqd || option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
> -+ else
> - {
> -- ans = 1;
> - if (!(crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS |
> F_DHCP)))
> - auth = 0;
> - if (!dryrun)
> -@@ -1892,6 +1773,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - else if (is_rev_synth(is_arpa, &addr, name))
> - {
> - ans = 1;
> -+ sec_data = 0;
> - if (!dryrun)
> - {
> - log_query(F_CONFIG | F_REVERSE | is_arpa,
> name, &addr, NULL);
> -@@ -1908,6 +1790,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - {
> - /* if not in cache, enabled and private IPV4
> address, return NXDOMAIN */
> - ans = 1;
> -+ sec_data = 0;
> - nxdomain = 1;
> - if (!dryrun)
> - log_query(F_CONFIG | F_REVERSE | F_IPV4 | F_NEG
> | F_NXDOMAIN,
> -@@ -1955,6 +1838,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - if (i == 4)
> - {
> - ans = 1;
> -+ sec_data = 0;
> - if (!dryrun)
> - {
> - addr.addr.addr4.s_addr = htonl(a);
> -@@ -1993,6 +1877,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - continue;
> - #endif
> - ans = 1;
> -+ sec_data = 0;
> - if (!dryrun)
> - {
> - gotit = 1;
> -@@ -2032,48 +1917,8 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - crecp = save;
> - }
> -
> -- /* If the client asked for DNSSEC and we can't
> provide RRSIGs, either
> -- because we've not doing DNSSEC or the cached
> answer is signed by negative,
> -- don't answer from the cache, forward instead.
> */
> -- if (!(crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) && sec_reqd)
> -- {
> -- if (!option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) ||
> ((crecp->flags & F_NEG) && (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
> -- crecp = NULL;
> --#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -- else if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -- {
> -- /* We're returning validated data, need
> to return the RRSIG too. */
> -- struct crec *rr_crec = NULL;
> -- int sigtype = type;
> -- /* The signature may have expired even
> though the data is still in cache,
> -- forward instead of answering from
> cache if so. */
> -- int gotsig = 0;
> --
> -- if (crecp->flags & F_CNAME)
> -- sigtype = T_CNAME;
> --
> -- while ((rr_crec =
> cache_find_by_name(rr_crec, name, now, F_DS | F_DNSKEY)))
> -- {
> -- if (rr_crec->addr.sig.type_covered ==
> sigtype && rr_crec->uid == C_IN)
> -- {
> -- char *sigdata =
> blockdata_retrieve(rr_crec->addr.sig.keydata, rr_crec-
> >addr.sig.keylen, NULL);
> -- gotsig = 1;
> --
> -- if (!dryrun &&
> -- add_resource_record(header,
> limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp,
> -- rr_crec-
> >ttd - now, &nameoffset,
> -- T_RRSIG,
> C_IN, "t", rr_crec->addr.sig.keylen, sigdata))
> -- anscount++;
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -- if (!gotsig)
> -- crecp = NULL;
> -- }
> --#endif
> -- }
> --
> -- if (crecp)
> -+ /* If the client asked for DNSSEC don't use
> cached data. */
> -+ if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> - do
> - {
> - /* don't answer wildcard queries with data
> not from /etc/hosts
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
> Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
> Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index ff055f7..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
> Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,269 +0,0 @@
> -From d64c81fff7faf4392b688223ef3a617c5c07e7dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 16:11:06 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Move code which caches DS records to a more logical
> place.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> -------------
> - 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 1ae03a6..359231f 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1204,7 +1204,10 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
> - {
> - unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -- int qtype, qclass, val, i, neganswer, nons;
> -+ int qtype, qclass, rc, i, neganswer, nons;
> -+ int aclass, atype, rdlen;
> -+ unsigned long ttl;
> -+ struct all_addr a;
> -
> - if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
> - !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
> -@@ -1214,40 +1217,100 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> -
> - if (qtype != T_DS || qclass != class)
> -- val = STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ rc = STAT_BOGUS;
> - else
> -- val = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
> NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons);
> -+ rc = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
> NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons);
> - /* Note dnssec_validate_reply() will have cached positive answers
> */
> -
> -- if (val == STAT_INSECURE)
> -- val = STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> -+ if (rc == STAT_INSECURE)
> -+ rc = STAT_BOGUS;
> -+
> - p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> - extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4);
> - p += 4; /* qtype, qclass */
> -
> -- if (!(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
> -- val = STAT_BOGUS;
> --
> - /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as
> the DS, we'll
> - loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS
> answer comes
> - from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
> -- if (val == STAT_BOGUS || (val == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
> hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
> -+ if (rc == STAT_BOGUS || (rc == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
> hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
> - {
> - log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS");
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> - }
> -
> -- if (val != STAT_SECURE)
> -- return val;
> --
> -- /* By here, the answer is proved secure, and a positive answer
> has been cached. */
> -- if (neganswer)
> -+ if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+ return rc;
> -+
> -+ if (!neganswer)
> - {
> -- int rdlen, flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK;
> -- unsigned long ttl, minttl = ULONG_MAX;
> -- struct all_addr a;
> -+ cache_start_insert();
> -+
> -+ for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++)
> -+ {
> -+ if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+
> -+ GETSHORT(atype, p);
> -+ GETSHORT(aclass, p);
> -+ GETLONG(ttl, p);
> -+ GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -+
> -+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+
> -+ if (aclass == class && atype == T_DS && rc == 1)
> -+ {
> -+ int algo, digest, keytag;
> -+ unsigned char *psave = p;
> -+ struct blockdata *key;
> -+ struct crec *crecp;
> -
> -+ if (rdlen < 4)
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+
> -+ GETSHORT(keytag, p);
> -+ algo = *p++;
> -+ digest = *p++;
> -+
> -+ /* Cache needs to known class for DNSSEC stuff */
> -+ a.addr.dnssec.class = class;
> -+
> -+ if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
> -+ {
> -+ if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl,
> F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
> -+ {
> -+ blockdata_free(key);
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ }
> -+ else
> -+ {
> -+ a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> -+ log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM,
> name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -+ crecp->addr.ds.digest = digest;
> -+ crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
> -+ crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
> -+ crecp->addr.ds.keytag = keytag;
> -+ crecp->addr.ds.keylen = rdlen - 4;
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ p = psave;
> -+
> -+ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ cache_end_insert();
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+ else
> -+ {
> -+ int flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK;
> -+ unsigned long minttl = ULONG_MAX;
> -+
> -+ if (!(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header,
> plen)))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+
> - if (RCODE(header) == NXDOMAIN)
> - flags |= F_NXDOMAIN;
> -
> -@@ -1261,20 +1324,20 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 0)))
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> -
> -- GETSHORT(qtype, p);
> -- GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> -+ GETSHORT(atype, p);
> -+ GETSHORT(aclass, p);
> - GETLONG(ttl, p);
> - GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> --
> -+
> - if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> - return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --
> -- if (qclass != class || qtype != T_SOA)
> -+
> -+ if (aclass != class || atype != T_SOA)
> - {
> - p += rdlen;
> - continue;
> - }
> --
> -+
> - if (ttl < minttl)
> - minttl = ttl;
> -
> -@@ -1306,7 +1369,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "no DS");
> - }
> - }
> --
> -+
> - return STAT_OK;
> - }
> -
> -@@ -2001,11 +2064,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - /* Not done, validate now */
> - if (j == i)
> - {
> -- int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, sigcnt, rrcnt;
> -- unsigned char *psave;
> -- struct all_addr a;
> -- struct blockdata *key;
> -- struct crec *crecp;
> -+ int sigcnt, rrcnt;
> - char *wildname;
> -
> - if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name,
> keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt))
> -@@ -2032,6 +2091,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - Can't overwrite name here. */
> - strcpy(daemon->workspacename, keyname);
> - rc = zone_status(daemon->workspacename, class1,
> keyname, now);
> -+
> - if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> - {
> - /* Zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset
> */
> -@@ -2088,65 +2148,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - if (rc == STAT_BOGUS)
> - return rc;
> - }
> --
> -- /* If we just validated a DS RRset, cache it */
> -- /* Also note if the RRset is the answer to the
> question, or the target of a CNAME */
> -- cache_start_insert();
> --
> -- for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header-
> >ancount); j++)
> -- {
> -- if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2,
> name, 0, 10)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --
> -- GETSHORT(type2, p2);
> -- GETSHORT(class2, p2);
> -- GETLONG(ttl, p2);
> -- GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
> --
> -- if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --
> -- if (class2 == class1 && rc == 1)
> -- {
> -- psave = p2;
> --
> -- if (type1 == T_DS && type2 == T_DS)
> -- {
> -- if (rdlen2 < 4)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> --
> -- GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
> -- algo = *p2++;
> -- digest = *p2++;
> --
> -- /* Cache needs to known class for
> DNSSEC stuff */
> -- a.addr.dnssec.class = class2;
> --
> -- if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p2,
> rdlen2 - 4)))
> -- {
> -- if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name,
> &a, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
> -- blockdata_free(key);
> -- else
> -- {
> -- a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> -- log_query(F_NOEXTRA |
> F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -- crecp->addr.ds.digest =
> digest;
> -- crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
> -- crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
> -- crecp->addr.ds.keytag =
> keytag;
> -- crecp->addr.ds.keylen =
> rdlen2 - 4;
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -- p2 = psave;
> -- }
> --
> -- if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -- }
> --
> -- cache_end_insert();
> - }
> - }
> - }
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
> filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-
> Generalise_RR-filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 0a4942a..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
> filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,755 +0,0 @@
> -From c2bcd1e183bcc5fdd63811c045355fc57e36ecfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 17:25:21 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Generalise RR-filtering code, for use with EDNS0.
> -
> ----
> - Makefile | 3 +-
> - bld/Android.mk | 2 +-
> - src/dnsmasq.h | 5 +
> - src/dnssec.c | 307 +------------------------------------------
> -------
> - src/forward.c | 2 +-
> - src/rrfilter.c | 339
> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> - 6 files changed, 349 insertions(+), 309 deletions(-)
> - create mode 100644 src/rrfilter.c
> -
> -diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
> -index 4c87ea9..b664160 100644
> ---- a/Makefile
> -+++ b/Makefile
> -@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ objs = cache.o rfc1035.o util.o option.o forward.o
> network.o \
> - dnsmasq.o dhcp.o lease.o rfc2131.o netlink.o dbus.o bpf.o \
> - helper.o tftp.o log.o conntrack.o dhcp6.o rfc3315.o \
> - dhcp-common.o outpacket.o radv.o slaac.o auth.o ipset.o \
> -- domain.o dnssec.o blockdata.o tables.o loop.o inotify.o
> poll.o
> -+ domain.o dnssec.o blockdata.o tables.o loop.o inotify.o \
> -+ poll.o rrfilter.o
> -
> - hdrs = dnsmasq.h config.h dhcp-protocol.h dhcp6-protocol.h \
> - dns-protocol.h radv-protocol.h ip6addr.h
> -diff --git a/bld/Android.mk b/bld/Android.mk
> -index 5364ee7..67b9c4b 100644
> ---- a/bld/Android.mk
> -+++ b/bld/Android.mk
> -@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ LOCAL_SRC_FILES := bpf.c cache.c dbus.c dhcp.c
> dnsmasq.c \
> - dhcp6.c rfc3315.c dhcp-common.c outpacket.c \
> - radv.c slaac.c auth.c ipset.c domain.c \
> - dnssec.c dnssec-openssl.c blockdata.c tables.c
> \
> -- loop.c inotify.c poll.c
> -+ loop.c inotify.c poll.c rrfilter.c
> -
> - LOCAL_MODULE := dnsmasq
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -index 4344cae..39a930c 100644
> ---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> -+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -@@ -1513,3 +1513,8 @@ int poll_check(int fd, short event);
> - void poll_listen(int fd, short event);
> - int do_poll(int timeout);
> -
> -+/* rrfilter.c */
> -+size_t rrfilter(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int mode);
> -+u16 *rrfilter_desc(int type);
> -+int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int new);
> -+
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 359231f..fa3eb81 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -507,50 +507,6 @@ static int check_date_range(unsigned long
> date_start, unsigned long date_end)
> - && serial_compare_32(curtime, date_end) == SERIAL_LT;
> - }
> -
> --static u16 *get_desc(int type)
> --{
> -- /* List of RRtypes which include domains in the data.
> -- 0 -> domain
> -- integer -> no of plain bytes
> -- -1 -> end
> --
> -- zero is not a valid RRtype, so the final entry is returned for
> -- anything which needs no mangling.
> -- */
> --
> -- static u16 rr_desc[] =
> -- {
> -- T_NS, 0, -1,
> -- T_MD, 0, -1,
> -- T_MF, 0, -1,
> -- T_CNAME, 0, -1,
> -- T_SOA, 0, 0, -1,
> -- T_MB, 0, -1,
> -- T_MG, 0, -1,
> -- T_MR, 0, -1,
> -- T_PTR, 0, -1,
> -- T_MINFO, 0, 0, -1,
> -- T_MX, 2, 0, -1,
> -- T_RP, 0, 0, -1,
> -- T_AFSDB, 2, 0, -1,
> -- T_RT, 2, 0, -1,
> -- T_SIG, 18, 0, -1,
> -- T_PX, 2, 0, 0, -1,
> -- T_NXT, 0, -1,
> -- T_KX, 2, 0, -1,
> -- T_SRV, 6, 0, -1,
> -- T_DNAME, 0, -1,
> -- 0, -1 /* wildcard/catchall */
> -- };
> --
> -- u16 *p = rr_desc;
> --
> -- while (*p != type && *p != 0)
> -- while (*p++ != (u16)-1);
> --
> -- return p+1;
> --}
> --
> - /* Return bytes of canonicalised rdata, when the return value is
> zero, the remaining
> - data, pointed to by *p, should be used raw. */
> - static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> unsigned char *end, char *buff, int bufflen,
> -@@ -594,34 +550,6 @@ static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, unsigned char *end,
> - }
> - }
> -
> --static int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int
> new)
> --{
> -- unsigned char **p;
> -- int old = *szp;
> --
> -- if (old >= new+1)
> -- return 1;
> --
> -- if (new >= 100)
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- new += 5;
> --
> -- if (!(p = whine_malloc(new * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- if (old != 0 && *wkspc)
> -- {
> -- memcpy(p, *wkspc, old * sizeof(unsigned char **));
> -- free(*wkspc);
> -- }
> --
> -- *wkspc = p;
> -- *szp = new;
> --
> -- return 1;
> --}
> --
> - /* Bubble sort the RRset into the canonical order.
> - Note that the byte-streams from two RRs may get unsynced:
> consider
> - RRs which have two domain-names at the start and then other
> data.
> -@@ -849,7 +777,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - int rdlen, j, name_labels;
> - struct crec *crecp = NULL;
> - int algo, labels, orig_ttl, key_tag;
> -- u16 *rr_desc = get_desc(type);
> -+ u16 *rr_desc = rrfilter_desc(type);
> -
> - if (wildcard_out)
> - *wildcard_out = NULL;
> -@@ -2266,239 +2194,6 @@ size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct
> dns_header *header, char *end, char *name, i
> - return ret;
> - }
> -
> --/* Go through a domain name, find "pointers" and fix them up based
> on how many bytes
> -- we've chopped out of the packet, or check they don't point into
> an elided part. */
> --static int check_name(unsigned char **namep, struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
> --{
> -- unsigned char *ansp = *namep;
> --
> -- while(1)
> -- {
> -- unsigned int label_type;
> --
> -- if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 1))
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- label_type = (*ansp) & 0xc0;
> --
> -- if (label_type == 0xc0)
> -- {
> -- /* pointer for compression. */
> -- unsigned int offset;
> -- int i;
> -- unsigned char *p;
> --
> -- if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- offset = ((*ansp++) & 0x3f) << 8;
> -- offset |= *ansp++;
> --
> -- p = offset + (unsigned char *)header;
> --
> -- for (i = 0; i < rr_count; i++)
> -- if (p < rrs[i])
> -- break;
> -- else
> -- if (i & 1)
> -- offset -= rrs[i] - rrs[i-1];
> --
> -- /* does the pointer end up in an elided RR? */
> -- if (i & 1)
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- /* No, scale the pointer */
> -- if (fixup)
> -- {
> -- ansp -= 2;
> -- *ansp++ = (offset >> 8) | 0xc0;
> -- *ansp++ = offset & 0xff;
> -- }
> -- break;
> -- }
> -- else if (label_type == 0x80)
> -- return 0; /* reserved */
> -- else if (label_type == 0x40)
> -- {
> -- /* Extended label type */
> -- unsigned int count;
> --
> -- if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- if (((*ansp++) & 0x3f) != 1)
> -- return 0; /* we only understand bitstrings */
> --
> -- count = *(ansp++); /* Bits in bitstring */
> --
> -- if (count == 0) /* count == 0 means 256 bits */
> -- ansp += 32;
> -- else
> -- ansp += ((count-1)>>3)+1;
> -- }
> -- else
> -- { /* label type == 0 Bottom six bits is length */
> -- unsigned int len = (*ansp++) & 0x3f;
> --
> -- if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, ansp, plen, len))
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- if (len == 0)
> -- break; /* zero length label marks the end. */
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -- *namep = ansp;
> --
> -- return 1;
> --}
> --
> --/* Go through RRs and check or fixup the domain names contained
> within */
> --static int check_rrs(unsigned char *p, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
> --{
> -- int i, type, class, rdlen;
> -- unsigned char *pp;
> --
> -- for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
> ntohs(header->arcount); i++)
> -- {
> -- pp = p;
> --
> -- if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- GETSHORT(type, p);
> -- GETSHORT(class, p);
> -- p += 4; /* TTL */
> -- GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> --
> -- if (type != T_NSEC && type != T_NSEC3 && type != T_RRSIG)
> -- {
> -- /* fixup name of RR */
> -- if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup, rrs, rr_count))
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- if (class == C_IN)
> -- {
> -- u16 *d;
> --
> -- for (pp = p, d = get_desc(type); *d != (u16)-1; d++)
> -- {
> -- if (*d != 0)
> -- pp += *d;
> -- else if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup,
> rrs, rr_count))
> -- return 0;
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> --
> -- if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -- return 0;
> -- }
> --
> -- return 1;
> --}
> --
> --
> --size_t filter_rrsigs(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen)
> --{
> -- static unsigned char **rrs;
> -- static int rr_sz = 0;
> --
> -- unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -- int i, rdlen, qtype, qclass, rr_found, chop_an, chop_ns, chop_ar;
> --
> -- if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
> -- !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
> -- return plen;
> --
> -- GETSHORT(qtype, p);
> -- GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> --
> -- /* First pass, find pointers to start and end of all the records
> we wish to elide:
> -- records added for DNSSEC, unless explicity queried for */
> -- for (rr_found = 0, chop_ns = 0, chop_an = 0, chop_ar = 0, i = 0;
> -- i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
> ntohs(header->arcount);
> -- i++)
> -- {
> -- unsigned char *pstart = p;
> -- int type, class;
> --
> -- if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> -- return plen;
> --
> -- GETSHORT(type, p);
> -- GETSHORT(class, p);
> -- p += 4; /* TTL */
> -- GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> --
> -- if ((type == T_NSEC || type == T_NSEC3 || type == T_RRSIG)
> &&
> -- (type != qtype || class != qclass))
> -- {
> -- if (!expand_workspace(&rrs, &rr_sz, rr_found + 1))
> -- return plen;
> --
> -- rrs[rr_found++] = pstart;
> --
> -- if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -- return plen;
> --
> -- rrs[rr_found++] = p;
> --
> -- if (i < ntohs(header->ancount))
> -- chop_an++;
> -- else if (i < (ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header-
> >ancount)))
> -- chop_ns++;
> -- else
> -- chop_ar++;
> -- }
> -- else if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -- return plen;
> -- }
> --
> -- /* Nothing to do. */
> -- if (rr_found == 0)
> -- return plen;
> --
> -- /* Second pass, look for pointers in names in the records we're
> keeping and make sure they don't
> -- point to records we're going to elide. This is theoretically
> possible, but unlikely. If
> -- it happens, we give up and leave the answer unchanged. */
> -- p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> --
> -- /* question first */
> -- if (!check_name(&p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
> -- return plen;
> -- p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
> --
> -- /* Now answers and NS */
> -- if (!check_rrs(p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
> -- return plen;
> --
> -- /* Third pass, elide records */
> -- for (p = rrs[0], i = 1; i < rr_found; i += 2)
> -- {
> -- unsigned char *start = rrs[i];
> -- unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
> ((unsigned char *)(header+1)) + plen;
> --
> -- memmove(p, start, end-start);
> -- p += end-start;
> -- }
> --
> -- plen = p - (unsigned char *)header;
> -- header->ancount = htons(ntohs(header->ancount) - chop_an);
> -- header->nscount = htons(ntohs(header->nscount) - chop_ns);
> -- header->arcount = htons(ntohs(header->arcount) - chop_ar);
> --
> -- /* Fourth pass, fix up pointers in the remaining records */
> -- p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> --
> -- check_name(&p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
> -- p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
> --
> -- check_rrs(p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
> --
> -- return plen;
> --}
> --
> - unsigned char* hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, char *name)
> - {
> - int q;
> -diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
> -index dd22a62..3e801c8 100644
> ---- a/src/forward.c
> -+++ b/src/forward.c
> -@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header
> *header, time_t now, struct server
> -
> - /* If the requestor didn't set the DO bit, don't return DNSSEC
> info. */
> - if (!do_bit)
> -- n = filter_rrsigs(header, n);
> -+ n = rrfilter(header, n, 1);
> - #endif
> -
> - /* do this after extract_addresses. Ensure NODATA reply and
> remove
> -diff --git a/src/rrfilter.c b/src/rrfilter.c
> -new file mode 100644
> -index 0000000..ae12261
> ---- /dev/null
> -+++ b/src/rrfilter.c
> -@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
> -+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2015 Simon Kelley
> -+
> -+ This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
> modify
> -+ it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
> published by
> -+ the Free Software Foundation; version 2 dated June, 1991, or
> -+ (at your option) version 3 dated 29 June, 2007.
> -+
> -+ This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> -+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> -+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
> -+ GNU General Public License for more details.
> -+
> -+ You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
> License
> -+ along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licens
> es/>.
> -+*/
> -+
> -+/* Code to safely remove RRs from an DNS answer */
> -+
> -+#include "dnsmasq.h"
> -+
> -+/* Go through a domain name, find "pointers" and fix them up based
> on how many bytes
> -+ we've chopped out of the packet, or check they don't point into
> an elided part. */
> -+static int check_name(unsigned char **namep, struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
> -+{
> -+ unsigned char *ansp = *namep;
> -+
> -+ while(1)
> -+ {
> -+ unsigned int label_type;
> -+
> -+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 1))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ label_type = (*ansp) & 0xc0;
> -+
> -+ if (label_type == 0xc0)
> -+ {
> -+ /* pointer for compression. */
> -+ unsigned int offset;
> -+ int i;
> -+ unsigned char *p;
> -+
> -+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ offset = ((*ansp++) & 0x3f) << 8;
> -+ offset |= *ansp++;
> -+
> -+ p = offset + (unsigned char *)header;
> -+
> -+ for (i = 0; i < rr_count; i++)
> -+ if (p < rrs[i])
> -+ break;
> -+ else
> -+ if (i & 1)
> -+ offset -= rrs[i] - rrs[i-1];
> -+
> -+ /* does the pointer end up in an elided RR? */
> -+ if (i & 1)
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ /* No, scale the pointer */
> -+ if (fixup)
> -+ {
> -+ ansp -= 2;
> -+ *ansp++ = (offset >> 8) | 0xc0;
> -+ *ansp++ = offset & 0xff;
> -+ }
> -+ break;
> -+ }
> -+ else if (label_type == 0x80)
> -+ return 0; /* reserved */
> -+ else if (label_type == 0x40)
> -+ {
> -+ /* Extended label type */
> -+ unsigned int count;
> -+
> -+ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ if (((*ansp++) & 0x3f) != 1)
> -+ return 0; /* we only understand bitstrings */
> -+
> -+ count = *(ansp++); /* Bits in bitstring */
> -+
> -+ if (count == 0) /* count == 0 means 256 bits */
> -+ ansp += 32;
> -+ else
> -+ ansp += ((count-1)>>3)+1;
> -+ }
> -+ else
> -+ { /* label type == 0 Bottom six bits is length */
> -+ unsigned int len = (*ansp++) & 0x3f;
> -+
> -+ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, ansp, plen, len))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ if (len == 0)
> -+ break; /* zero length label marks the end. */
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ *namep = ansp;
> -+
> -+ return 1;
> -+}
> -+
> -+/* Go through RRs and check or fixup the domain names contained
> within */
> -+static int check_rrs(unsigned char *p, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
> -+{
> -+ int i, j, type, class, rdlen;
> -+ unsigned char *pp;
> -+
> -+ for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
> ntohs(header->arcount); i++)
> -+ {
> -+ pp = p;
> -+
> -+ if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ GETSHORT(type, p);
> -+ GETSHORT(class, p);
> -+ p += 4; /* TTL */
> -+ GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -+
> -+ /* If this RR is to be elided, don't fix up its contents */
> -+ for (j = 0; j < rr_count; j += 2)
> -+ if (rrs[j] == pp)
> -+ break;
> -+
> -+ if (j >= rr_count)
> -+ {
> -+ /* fixup name of RR */
> -+ if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup, rrs, rr_count))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ if (class == C_IN)
> -+ {
> -+ u16 *d;
> -+
> -+ for (pp = p, d = rrfilter_desc(type); *d != (u16)-1;
> d++)
> -+ {
> -+ if (*d != 0)
> -+ pp += *d;
> -+ else if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup,
> rrs, rr_count))
> -+ return 0;
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+ return 0;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ return 1;
> -+}
> -+
> -+
> -+/* mode is 0 to remove EDNS0, 1 to filter DNSSEC RRs */
> -+size_t rrfilter(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int mode)
> -+{
> -+ static unsigned char **rrs;
> -+ static int rr_sz = 0;
> -+
> -+ unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -+ int i, rdlen, qtype, qclass, rr_found, chop_an, chop_ns, chop_ar;
> -+
> -+ if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
> -+ !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
> -+ return plen;
> -+
> -+ GETSHORT(qtype, p);
> -+ GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> -+
> -+ /* First pass, find pointers to start and end of all the records
> we wish to elide:
> -+ records added for DNSSEC, unless explicity queried for */
> -+ for (rr_found = 0, chop_ns = 0, chop_an = 0, chop_ar = 0, i = 0;
> -+ i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
> ntohs(header->arcount);
> -+ i++)
> -+ {
> -+ unsigned char *pstart = p;
> -+ int type, class;
> -+
> -+ if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> -+ return plen;
> -+
> -+ GETSHORT(type, p);
> -+ GETSHORT(class, p);
> -+ p += 4; /* TTL */
> -+ GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -+
> -+ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+ return plen;
> -+
> -+ /* Don't remove the answer. */
> -+ if (i < ntohs(header->ancount) && type == qtype && class ==
> qclass)
> -+ continue;
> -+
> -+ if (mode == 0) /* EDNS */
> -+ {
> -+ /* EDNS mode, remove T_OPT from additional section only
> */
> -+ if (i < (ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header->ancount))
> || type != T_OPT)
> -+ continue;
> -+ }
> -+ else if (type != T_NSEC && type != T_NSEC3 && type !=
> T_RRSIG)
> -+ /* DNSSEC mode, remove SIGs and NSECs from all three
> sections. */
> -+ continue;
> -+
> -+
> -+ if (!expand_workspace(&rrs, &rr_sz, rr_found + 1))
> -+ return plen;
> -+
> -+ rrs[rr_found++] = pstart;
> -+ rrs[rr_found++] = p;
> -+
> -+ if (i < ntohs(header->ancount))
> -+ chop_an++;
> -+ else if (i < (ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header-
> >ancount)))
> -+ chop_ns++;
> -+ else
> -+ chop_ar++;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ /* Nothing to do. */
> -+ if (rr_found == 0)
> -+ return plen;
> -+
> -+ /* Second pass, look for pointers in names in the records we're
> keeping and make sure they don't
> -+ point to records we're going to elide. This is theoretically
> possible, but unlikely. If
> -+ it happens, we give up and leave the answer unchanged. */
> -+ p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -+
> -+ /* question first */
> -+ if (!check_name(&p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
> -+ return plen;
> -+ p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
> -+
> -+ /* Now answers and NS */
> -+ if (!check_rrs(p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
> -+ return plen;
> -+
> -+ /* Third pass, elide records */
> -+ for (p = rrs[0], i = 1; i < rr_found; i += 2)
> -+ {
> -+ unsigned char *start = rrs[i];
> -+ unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
> ((unsigned char *)(header+1)) + plen;
> -+
> -+ memmove(p, start, end-start);
> -+ p += end-start;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ plen = p - (unsigned char *)header;
> -+ header->ancount = htons(ntohs(header->ancount) - chop_an);
> -+ header->nscount = htons(ntohs(header->nscount) - chop_ns);
> -+ header->arcount = htons(ntohs(header->arcount) - chop_ar);
> -+
> -+ /* Fourth pass, fix up pointers in the remaining records */
> -+ p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
> -+
> -+ check_name(&p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
> -+ p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
> -+
> -+ check_rrs(p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
> -+
> -+ return plen;
> -+}
> -+
> -+/* This is used in the DNSSEC code too, hence it's exported */
> -+u16 *rrfilter_desc(int type)
> -+{
> -+ /* List of RRtypes which include domains in the data.
> -+ 0 -> domain
> -+ integer -> no of plain bytes
> -+ -1 -> end
> -+
> -+ zero is not a valid RRtype, so the final entry is returned for
> -+ anything which needs no mangling.
> -+ */
> -+
> -+ static u16 rr_desc[] =
> -+ {
> -+ T_NS, 0, -1,
> -+ T_MD, 0, -1,
> -+ T_MF, 0, -1,
> -+ T_CNAME, 0, -1,
> -+ T_SOA, 0, 0, -1,
> -+ T_MB, 0, -1,
> -+ T_MG, 0, -1,
> -+ T_MR, 0, -1,
> -+ T_PTR, 0, -1,
> -+ T_MINFO, 0, 0, -1,
> -+ T_MX, 2, 0, -1,
> -+ T_RP, 0, 0, -1,
> -+ T_AFSDB, 2, 0, -1,
> -+ T_RT, 2, 0, -1,
> -+ T_SIG, 18, 0, -1,
> -+ T_PX, 2, 0, 0, -1,
> -+ T_NXT, 0, -1,
> -+ T_KX, 2, 0, -1,
> -+ T_SRV, 6, 0, -1,
> -+ T_DNAME, 0, -1,
> -+ 0, -1 /* wildcard/catchall */
> -+ };
> -+
> -+ u16 *p = rr_desc;
> -+
> -+ while (*p != type && *p != 0)
> -+ while (*p++ != (u16)-1);
> -+
> -+ return p+1;
> -+}
> -+
> -+int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int new)
> -+{
> -+ unsigned char **p;
> -+ int old = *szp;
> -+
> -+ if (old >= new+1)
> -+ return 1;
> -+
> -+ if (new >= 100)
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ new += 5;
> -+
> -+ if (!(p = whine_malloc(new * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ if (old != 0 && *wkspc)
> -+ {
> -+ memcpy(p, *wkspc, old * sizeof(unsigned char **));
> -+ free(*wkspc);
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ *wkspc = p;
> -+ *szp = new;
> -+
> -+ return 1;
> -+}
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index ffb412b..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
> -From 2dbba34b2c1289a108f876c78b84889f2a93115d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2015 13:41:58 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] DNSSEC validation tweak.
> -
> -A zone which has at least one key with an algorithm we don't
> -support should be considered as insecure.
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> -----------
> - 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index fa3eb81..dc563e0 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -763,10 +763,10 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> - STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
> returned in keyname)
> - STAT_NEED_DS need DS to complete validation (name is returned
> in keyname)
> -
> -- if key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
> given in the params of those names,
> -+ If key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
> given in the params of those names,
> - otherwise find the key in the cache.
> -
> -- name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
> trashed.
> -+ Name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
> trashed.
> -
> - Call explore_rrset first to find and count RRs and sigs.
> - */
> -@@ -919,6 +919,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> - }
> -
> -+
> - /* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY
> query.
> - Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
> - return codes:
> -@@ -1831,15 +1832,15 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -
> - /* Check signing status of name.
> - returns:
> -- STAT_SECURE zone is signed.
> -- STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
> -- STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname.
> --
> -+ STAT_SECURE zone is signed.
> -+ STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
> -+ STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname.
> -+ STAT_NEED_DNSKEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in
> keyname.
> - name returned unaltered.
> - */
> - static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t
> now)
> - {
> -- int name_start = strlen(name);
> -+ int secure_ds, name_start = strlen(name);
> - struct crec *crecp;
> - char *p;
> -
> -@@ -1850,27 +1851,52 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int
> class, char *keyname, time_t now)
> - if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
> - return STAT_NEED_DS;
> - else
> -- do
> -- {
> -- if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
> -- {
> -- /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
> existance of NS record.
> -- F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
> there's no DS record here,
> -- but that's because there's no NS record either,
> ie this isn't the start
> -- of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below
> a node is unsigned when
> -- we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no
> DS record.
> -- */
> -- if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -- {
> -- if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -- return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */
> -- }
> -- else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest) ||
> !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -- return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
> insecure */
> -- }
> -- }
> -- while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DS)));
> --
> -+ {
> -+ secure_ds = 0;
> -+
> -+ do
> -+ {
> -+ if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
> -+ {
> -+ /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
> existance of NS record.
> -+ F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
> there's no DS record here,
> -+ but that's because there's no NS record
> either, ie this isn't the start
> -+ of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree
> below a node is unsigned when
> -+ we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's
> no DS record.
> -+ */
> -+ if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -+ {
> -+ if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -+ return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here
> */
> -+ }
> -+ else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest)
> || !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -+ return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
> insecure */
> -+ else
> -+ secure_ds = 1;
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+ while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DS)));
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ if (secure_ds)
> -+ {
> -+ /* We've found only DS records that attest to the DNSKEY
> RRset in the zone, so we believe
> -+ that RRset is good. Furthermore the DNSKEY whose hash
> is proved by the DS record is
> -+ one we can use. However the DNSKEY RRset may contain
> more than one key and
> -+ one of the other keys may use an algorithm we don't
> support. If that's
> -+ the case the zone is insecure for us. */
> -+
> -+ if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)))
> -+ return STAT_NEED_KEY;
> -+
> -+ do
> -+ {
> -+ if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.key.algo))
> -+ return STAT_INSECURE;
> -+ }
> -+ while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)));
> -+ }
> -+
> - if (name_start == 0)
> - break;
> -
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
> Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
> Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index c3c74cc..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
> Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
> -From dd4ad9ac7ea6d51dcc34a1f2cd2da14efbb87714 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:44:58 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Tweaks to EDNS0 handling in DNS replies.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 20 +++++++++-----------
> - src/rfc1035.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
> -----------
> - 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index dc563e0..012b2a6 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -2129,18 +2129,16 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - /* Empty DS without NSECS */
> - if (qtype == T_DS)
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> -- else
> -+
> -+ rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
> -+ if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> - {
> -- rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
> -- if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -- {
> -- if (class)
> -- *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -- return rc;
> -- }
> --
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
> -- }
> -+ if (class)
> -+ *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -+ return rc;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
> - }
> -
> - if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index def8fa0..188d05f 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -1539,7 +1539,13 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - int nxdomain = 0, auth = 1, trunc = 0, sec_data = 1;
> - struct mx_srv_record *rec;
> - size_t len;
> --
> -+
> -+ if (ntohs(header->ancount) != 0 ||
> -+ ntohs(header->nscount) != 0 ||
> -+ ntohs(header->qdcount) == 0 ||
> -+ OPCODE(header) != QUERY )
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> - /* Don't return AD set if checking disabled. */
> - if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
> - sec_data = 0;
> -@@ -1548,33 +1554,32 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - *ad_reqd = header->hb4 & HB4_AD;
> - *do_bit = 0;
> -
> -- /* If there is an RFC2671 pseudoheader then it will be
> overwritten by
> -+ /* If there is an additional data section then it will be
> overwritten by
> - partial replies, so we have to do a dry run to see if we can
> answer
> -- the query. We check to see if the do bit is set, if so we
> always
> -- forward rather than answering from the cache, which doesn't
> include
> -- security information, unless we're in DNSSEC validation mode.
> */
> -+ the query. */
> -
> -- if (find_pseudoheader(header, qlen, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
> -- {
> -- unsigned short flags;
> --
> -- have_pseudoheader = 1;
> -+ if (ntohs(header->arcount) != 0)
> -+ {
> -+ dryrun = 1;
> -
> -- pheader += 4; /* udp size, ext_rcode */
> -- GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> --
> -- if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
> -- {
> -- *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */
> -- *ad_reqd = 1;
> -+ /* If there's an additional section, there might be an
> EDNS(0) pseudoheader */
> -+ if (find_pseudoheader(header, qlen, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
> -+ {
> -+ unsigned short flags;
> -+
> -+ have_pseudoheader = 1;
> -+
> -+ pheader += 4; /* udp size, ext_rcode */
> -+ GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> -+
> -+ if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
> -+ {
> -+ *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */
> -+ *ad_reqd = 1;
> -+ }
> - }
> --
> -- dryrun = 1;
> - }
> -
> -- if (ntohs(header->qdcount) == 0 || OPCODE(header) != QUERY )
> -- return 0;
> --
> - for (rec = daemon->mxnames; rec; rec = rec->next)
> - rec->offset = 0;
> -
> -@@ -1730,8 +1735,12 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - }
> - else if ((crecp = cache_find_by_addr(NULL, &addr,
> now, is_arpa)))
> - {
> -- /* Don't use cache when DNSSEC data required. */
> -- if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> -+ /* Don't use cache when DNSSEC data required,
> unless we know that
> -+ the zone is unsigned, which implies that we're
> doing
> -+ validation. */
> -+ if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) ||
> -+ !sec_reqd ||
> -+ (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(crecp-
> >flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
> - {
> - do
> - {
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
> existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
> existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 60503e9..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
> existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,409 +0,0 @@
> -From b40f26c0199235073abc37e1e1d6ed93bed372f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 11:57:26 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Tidy up DNSSEC non-existence code. Check zone
> status is NSEC
> - proof bad.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 207 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
> -------------
> - 1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 012b2a6..ddae497 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1367,59 +1367,6 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const
> char *b)
> - }
> - }
> -
> --/* Find all the NSEC or NSEC3 records in a reply.
> -- return an array of pointers to them. */
> --static int find_nsec_records(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, unsigned char ***nsecsetp, int *nsecsetl, int class_reqd)
> --{
> -- static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL;
> -- static int nsecset_sz = 0;
> --
> -- int type_found = 0;
> -- unsigned char *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
> -- int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found;
> --
> -- /* Move to NS section */
> -- if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header,
> plen)))
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- for (nsecs_found = 0, i = ntohs(header->nscount); i != 0; i--)
> -- {
> -- unsigned char *pstart = p;
> --
> -- if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- GETSHORT(type, p);
> -- GETSHORT(class, p);
> -- p += 4; /* TTL */
> -- GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> --
> -- if (class == class_reqd && (type == T_NSEC || type ==
> T_NSEC3))
> -- {
> -- /* No mixed NSECing 'round here, thankyouverymuch */
> -- if (type_found == T_NSEC && type == T_NSEC3)
> -- return 0;
> -- if (type_found == T_NSEC3 && type == T_NSEC)
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- type_found = type;
> --
> -- if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz,
> nsecs_found))
> -- return 0;
> --
> -- nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
> -- }
> --
> -- if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -- return 0;
> -- }
> --
> -- *nsecsetp = nsecset;
> -- *nsecsetl = nsecs_found;
> --
> -- return type_found;
> --}
> --
> - static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count,
> - char *workspace1, char
> *workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)
> - {
> -@@ -1436,12 +1383,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> - {
> - p = nsecs[i];
> - if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> - p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
> - GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> - psave = p;
> - if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 10))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - rc = hostname_cmp(workspace1, name);
> -
> -@@ -1449,7 +1396,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> - {
> - /* 4035 para 5.4. Last sentence */
> - if (type == T_NSEC || type == T_RRSIG)
> -- return STAT_SECURE;
> -+ return 1;
> -
> - /* NSEC with the same name as the RR we're testing, check
> - that the type in question doesn't appear in the type
> map */
> -@@ -1465,24 +1412,24 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> - /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's
> a CNAME is should
> - have been returned. */
> - if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we
> have the
> - DS from the wrong side of the delegation. */
> - if (type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) != 0)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> - }
> -
> - while (rdlen >= 2)
> - {
> - if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - if (p[0] == type >> 8)
> - {
> - /* Does the NSEC say our type exists? */
> - if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask) != 0)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - break; /* finshed checking */
> - }
> -@@ -1491,24 +1438,24 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
> - p += p[1];
> - }
> -
> -- return STAT_SECURE;
> -+ return 1;
> - }
> - else if (rc == -1)
> - {
> - /* Normal case, name falls between NSEC name and next
> domain name,
> - wrap around case, name falls between NSEC name (rc ==
> -1) and end */
> - if (hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >= 0 ||
> hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0)
> -- return STAT_SECURE;
> -+ return 1;
> - }
> - else
> - {
> - /* wrap around case, name falls between start and next
> domain name */
> - if (hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0 &&
> hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >=0 )
> -- return STAT_SECURE;
> -+ return 1;
> - }
> - }
> -
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> - }
> -
> - /* return digest length, or zero on error */
> -@@ -1701,7 +1648,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> - {
> - if (!(p = skip_name(nsecs[i], header, plen, 15)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+ return 0; /* bad packet */
> -
> - p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
> - algo = *p++;
> -@@ -1712,14 +1659,14 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -
> - /* No usable NSEC3s */
> - if (i == nsec_count)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - p++; /* flags */
> - GETSHORT (iterations, p);
> - salt_len = *p++;
> - salt = p;
> - if (!CHECK_LEN(header, salt, plen, salt_len))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+ return 0; /* bad packet */
> -
> - /* Now prune so we only have NSEC3 records with same iterations,
> salt and algo */
> - for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> -@@ -1730,7 +1677,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - nsecs[i] = NULL; /* Speculative, will be restored if OK. */
> -
> - if (!(p = skip_name(nsec3p, header, plen, 15)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+ return 0; /* bad packet */
> -
> - p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
> -
> -@@ -1747,7 +1694,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - continue;
> -
> - if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, salt_len))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> -+ return 0; /* bad packet */
> -
> - if (memcmp(p, salt, salt_len) != 0)
> - continue;
> -@@ -1758,13 +1705,13 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> -
> - /* Algo is checked as 1 above */
> - if (!(hash = hash_find("sha1")))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - if ((digest_len = hash_name(name, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len,
> iterations)) == 0)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - if (check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type,
> workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, nons))
> -- return STAT_SECURE;
> -+ return 1;
> -
> - /* Can't find an NSEC3 which covers the name directly, we need
> the "closest encloser NSEC3"
> - or an answer inferred from a wildcard record. */
> -@@ -1780,14 +1727,14 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - break;
> -
> - if ((digest_len = hash_name(closest_encloser, &digest, hash,
> salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> - if ((p = nsecs[i]))
> - {
> - if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0)
> ||
> - !(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned
> char *)workspace2)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - if (digest_len == base32_len &&
> - memcmp(digest, workspace2, digest_len) == 0)
> -@@ -1802,32 +1749,81 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - while ((closest_encloser = strchr(closest_encloser, '.')));
> -
> - if (!closest_encloser)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - /* Look for NSEC3 that proves the non-existence of the next-
> closest encloser */
> - if ((digest_len = hash_name(next_closest, &digest, hash, salt,
> salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type,
> workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - /* Finally, check that there's no seat of wildcard synthesis */
> - if (!wildname)
> - {
> - if (!(wildcard = strchr(next_closest, '.')) || wildcard ==
> next_closest)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - wildcard--;
> - *wildcard = '*';
> -
> - if ((digest_len = hash_name(wildcard, &digest, hash, salt,
> salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> -
> - if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest,
> type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS;
> -+ return 0;
> - }
> -
> -- return STAT_SECURE;
> -+ return 1;
> -+}
> -+
> -+static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass, char
> *wildname, int *nons)
> -+{
> -+ static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL;
> -+ static int nsecset_sz = 0;
> -+
> -+ int type_found = 0;
> -+ unsigned char *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
> -+ int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found;
> -+
> -+ /* Move to NS section */
> -+ if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header,
> plen)))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ for (nsecs_found = 0, i = ntohs(header->nscount); i != 0; i--)
> -+ {
> -+ unsigned char *pstart = p;
> -+
> -+ if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ GETSHORT(type, p);
> -+ GETSHORT(class, p);
> -+ p += 4; /* TTL */
> -+ GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
> -+
> -+ if (class == qclass && (type == T_NSEC || type == T_NSEC3))
> -+ {
> -+ /* No mixed NSECing 'round here, thankyouverymuch */
> -+ if (type_found != 0 && type_found != type)
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ type_found = type;
> -+
> -+ if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz,
> nsecs_found))
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+ return 0;
> -+ }
> -+
> -+ if (type_found == T_NSEC)
> -+ return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset,
> nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
> -+ else
> -+ return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset,
> nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname,
> nons);
> - }
> -
> - /* Check signing status of name.
> -@@ -1925,10 +1921,9 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - static unsigned char **targets = NULL;
> - static int target_sz = 0;
> -
> -- unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2, **nsecs;
> -+ unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2;
> - int type1, class1, rdlen1, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype,
> targetidx;
> -- int i, j, rc, nsec_count;
> -- int nsec_type;
> -+ int i, j, rc;
> -
> - if (neganswer)
> - *neganswer = 0;
> -@@ -2080,28 +2075,15 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - targets[j] = NULL;
> - }
> -
> -- if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
> -- {
> -- /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with
> a different
> -- answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
> this
> -- hasn't happened, the answer must prove
> that
> -- the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check
> that here. */
> -- if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header,
> plen, &nsecs, &nsec_count, class1)))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad
> packet */
> --
> -- /* Note that we may not yet have validated
> the NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets. Since the check
> -- below returns either SECURE or BOGUS,
> that's not a problem. If the RRsets later fail
> -- we'll return BOGUS then. */
> --
> -- if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -- rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen,
> nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type1,
> NULL);
> -- else
> -- rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header,
> plen, nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename,
> -- keyname,
> name, type1, wildname, NULL);
> --
> -- if (rc == STAT_BOGUS)
> -- return rc;
> -- }
> -+ /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with a
> different
> -+ answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
> this
> -+ hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
> -+ the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check that
> here.
> -+ Note that we may not yet have validated the
> NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets.
> -+ That's not a problem since if the RRsets
> later fail
> -+ we'll return BOGUS then. */
> -+ if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD &&
> !prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, type1, class1,
> wildname, NULL))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS;
> - }
> - }
> - }
> -@@ -2124,14 +2106,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -
> - /* For anything other than a DS record, this situation is
> OK if either
> - the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's a NSEC
> records. */
> -- if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen, &nsecs,
> &nsec_count, qclass)))
> -+ if (!prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name,
> qtype, qclass, NULL, nons))
> - {
> - /* Empty DS without NSECS */
> - if (qtype == T_DS)
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> -
> -- rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
> -- if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -+ if ((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)) !=
> STAT_SECURE)
> - {
> - if (class)
> - *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -@@ -2140,14 +2121,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> -
> - return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
> - }
> --
> -- if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
> -- rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
> -- else
> -- rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
> nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, NULL, nons);
> --
> -- if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
> -- return rc;
> - }
> -
> - return STAT_SECURE;
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
> Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index eda6fbd..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
> Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
> -From 3b799c826db05fc2da1c6d15cbe372e394209d27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 16:58:04 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Fix brace botch in dnssec_validate_ds()
> -MIME-Version: 1.0
> -Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8
> -Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
> -
> -Thanks to Michał Kępień for spotting this.
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
> - 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index ddae497..1f8c954 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -923,11 +923,11 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - /* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY
> query.
> - Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
> - return codes:
> -- STAT_OK Done, key(s) in cache.
> -- STAT_BOGUS No DNSKEYs found, which can be
> validated with DS,
> -- or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not
> valid, bad packet.
> -- STAT_NEED_DS DS records to validate a key not found,
> name in keyname
> -- STAT_NEED_DNSKEY DNSKEY records to validate a key not
> found, name in keyname
> -+ STAT_OK Done, key(s) in cache.
> -+ STAT_BOGUS No DNSKEYs found, which can be validated
> with DS,
> -+ or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not valid,
> bad packet.
> -+ STAT_NEED_DS DS records to validate a key not found,
> name in keyname
> -+ STAT_NEED_KEY DNSKEY records to validate a key not found,
> name in keyname
> - */
> - int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
> - {
> -@@ -1224,13 +1224,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - }
> -
> - p = psave;
> --
> -- if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -- return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> - }
> --
> -- cache_end_insert();
> -+ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
> -+ return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
> - }
> -+
> -+ cache_end_insert();
> -+
> - }
> - else
> - {
> -@@ -1828,10 +1828,10 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
> -
> - /* Check signing status of name.
> - returns:
> -- STAT_SECURE zone is signed.
> -- STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
> -- STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname.
> -- STAT_NEED_DNSKEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in
> keyname.
> -+ STAT_SECURE zone is signed.
> -+ STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
> -+ STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname.
> -+ STAT_NEED_KEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in keyname.
> - name returned unaltered.
> - */
> - static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t
> now)
> -@@ -2028,7 +2028,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - if (rc == STAT_SECURE)
> - rc = STAT_BOGUS;
> - if (class)
> -- *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -+ *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_KEY */
> - }
> - else
> - rc = STAT_INSECURE;
> -@@ -2045,7 +2045,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - {
> - /* Zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset
> */
> - if (class)
> -- *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -+ *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_KEY */
> - return rc;
> - }
> -
> -@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - if ((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)) !=
> STAT_SECURE)
> - {
> - if (class)
> -- *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
> NEED_DNSKEY */
> -+ *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or NEED_KEY
> */
> - return rc;
> - }
> -
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
> Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
> atch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
> Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
> atch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index abcae5c..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
> Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
> atch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
> -From 14a4ae883d51130d33da7133287e8867c64bab65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 17:23:03 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Do a better job of determining which DNSSEC sig
> algos are
> - supported.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
> -------
> - 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 1f8c954..82394ee 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -65,10 +65,9 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
> - case 8: return "sha256";
> - case 10: return "sha512";
> - case 12: return "gosthash94";
> --#ifndef NO_NETTLE_ECC
> - case 13: return "sha256";
> - case 14: return "sha384";
> --#endif
> -+
> - default: return NULL;
> - }
> - }
> -@@ -129,13 +128,15 @@ static int hash_init(const struct nettle_hash
> *hash, void **ctxp, unsigned char
> - }
> -
> - static int dnsmasq_rsa_verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned
> int key_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> -- unsigned char *digest, int algo)
> -+ unsigned char *digest, size_t
> digest_len, int algo)
> - {
> - unsigned char *p;
> - size_t exp_len;
> -
> - static struct rsa_public_key *key = NULL;
> - static mpz_t sig_mpz;
> -+
> -+ (void)digest_len;
> -
> - if (key == NULL)
> - {
> -@@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ static int dnsmasq_rsa_verify(struct blockdata
> *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
> - }
> -
> - static int dnsmasq_dsa_verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned
> int key_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> -- unsigned char *digest, int algo)
> -+ unsigned char *digest, size_t
> digest_len, int algo)
> - {
> - unsigned char *p;
> - unsigned int t;
> -@@ -189,6 +190,8 @@ static int dnsmasq_dsa_verify(struct blockdata
> *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
> - static struct dsa_public_key *key = NULL;
> - static struct dsa_signature *sig_struct;
> -
> -+ (void)digest_len;
> -+
> - if (key == NULL)
> - {
> - if (!(sig_struct = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct
> dsa_signature))) ||
> -@@ -292,26 +295,45 @@ static int dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify(struct
> blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len
> - }
> - #endif
> -
> --static int verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
> unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> -- unsigned char *digest, size_t digest_len, int
> algo)
> -+static int (*verify_func(int algo))(struct blockdata *key_data,
> unsigned int key_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> -+ unsigned char *digest, size_t
> digest_len, int algo)
> - {
> -- (void)digest_len;
> --
> -+
> -+ /* Enure at runtime that we have support for this digest */
> -+ if (!hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo)))
> -+ return NULL;
> -+
> -+ /* This switch defines which sig algorithms we support, can't
> introspect Nettle for that. */
> - switch (algo)
> - {
> - case 1: case 5: case 7: case 8: case 10:
> -- return dnsmasq_rsa_verify(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len,
> digest, algo);
> -+ return dnsmasq_rsa_verify;
> -
> - case 3: case 6:
> -- return dnsmasq_dsa_verify(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len,
> digest, algo);
> -+ return dnsmasq_dsa_verify;
> -
> - #ifndef NO_NETTLE_ECC
> - case 13: case 14:
> -- return dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len,
> digest, digest_len, algo);
> -+ return dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify;
> - #endif
> - }
> -
> -- return 0;
> -+ return NULL;
> -+}
> -+
> -+static int verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
> unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> -+ unsigned char *digest, size_t digest_len, int
> algo)
> -+{
> -+
> -+ int (*func)(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
> unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
> -+ unsigned char *digest, size_t digest_len, int algo);
> -+
> -+ func = verify_func(algo);
> -+
> -+ if (!func)
> -+ return 0;
> -+
> -+ return (*func)(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len, digest,
> digest_len, algo);
> - }
> -
> - /* Convert from presentation format to wire format, in place.
> -@@ -732,7 +754,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> - if (check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration)
> &&
> - labels <= name_labels &&
> - type_covered == type &&
> -- algo_digest_name(algo))
> -+ verify_func(algo))
> - {
> - if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx))
> - return 0;
> -@@ -1865,7 +1887,7 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class,
> char *keyname, time_t now)
> - if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> - return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here
> */
> - }
> -- else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest)
> || !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -+ else if (!hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp-
> >addr.ds.digest)) || !verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> - return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
> insecure */
> - else
> - secure_ds = 1;
> -@@ -1887,7 +1909,7 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class,
> char *keyname, time_t now)
> -
> - do
> - {
> -- if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.key.algo))
> -+ if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> !verify_func(crecp->addr.key.algo))
> - return STAT_INSECURE;
> - }
> - while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)));
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
> Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
> Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index c016e73..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
> Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,643 +0,0 @@
> -From fa14bec83b2db010fd076910fddab56957b9375d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 17:12:16 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Major tidy up of EDNS0 handling and computation/use
> of udp
> - packet size.
> -
> ----
> - src/auth.c | 8 ++-
> - src/dnsmasq.h | 7 ++-
> - src/dnssec.c | 1 -
> - src/forward.c | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> -----------
> - src/netlink.c | 3 +-
> - src/rfc1035.c | 81 +++++++------------------
> - src/rrfilter.c | 2 +-
> - 7 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/auth.c b/src/auth.c
> -index 2b0b7d6..85bd5e7 100644
> ---- a/src/auth.c
> -+++ b/src/auth.c
> -@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char *name,
> char **cut)
> - }
> -
> -
> --size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t
> qlen, time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, int local_query)
> -+size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t
> qlen, time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr,
> -+ int local_query, int do_bit, int
> have_pseudoheader)
> - {
> - char *name = daemon->namebuff;
> - unsigned char *p, *ansp;
> -@@ -820,6 +821,11 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header,
> char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
> - header->ancount = htons(anscount);
> - header->nscount = htons(authcount);
> - header->arcount = htons(0);
> -+
> -+ /* Advertise our packet size limit in our reply */
> -+ if (have_pseudoheader)
> -+ return add_pseudoheader(header, ansp - (unsigned char
> *)header, (unsigned char *)limit, daemon->edns_pktsz, 0, NULL, 0,
> do_bit);
> -+
> - return ansp - (unsigned char *)header;
> - }
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -index 39a930c..abb34c5 100644
> ---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
> -+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
> -@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t qlen, char *namebuff,
> - int no_cache, int secure, int *doctored);
> - size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit,
> size_t qlen,
> - struct in_addr local_addr, struct in_addr
> local_netmask,
> -- time_t now, int *ad_reqd, int *do_bit);
> -+ time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int
> have_pseudoheader);
> - int check_for_bogus_wildcard(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> qlen, char *name,
> - struct bogus_addr *addr, time_t now);
> - int check_for_ignored_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> qlen, struct bogus_addr *baddr);
> -@@ -1123,6 +1123,8 @@ int check_for_local_domain(char *name, time_t
> now);
> - unsigned int questions_crc(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> char *buff);
> - size_t resize_packet(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> - unsigned char *pheader, size_t hlen);
> -+size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> unsigned char *limit,
> -+ unsigned short udp_sz, int optno, unsigned
> char *opt, size_t optlen, int set_do);
> - size_t add_mac(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *limit,
> union mysockaddr *l3);
> - size_t add_source_addr(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> *limit, union mysockaddr *source);
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -@@ -1141,7 +1143,8 @@ int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int
> ban_localhost);
> - /* auth.c */
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> - size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t
> qlen,
> -- time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, int
> local_query);
> -+ time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, int
> local_query,
> -+ int do_bit, int have_pseudoheader);
> - int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char *name, char **cut);
> - #endif
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 82394ee..299ca64 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
> - case 12: return "gosthash94";
> - case 13: return "sha256";
> - case 14: return "sha384";
> --
> - default: return NULL;
> - }
> - }
> -diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
> -index 3e801c8..041353c 100644
> ---- a/src/forward.c
> -+++ b/src/forward.c
> -@@ -244,7 +244,6 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
> mysockaddr *udpaddr,
> - void *hash = &crc;
> - #endif
> - unsigned int gotname = extract_request(header, plen, daemon-
> >namebuff, NULL);
> -- unsigned char *pheader;
> -
> - (void)do_bit;
> -
> -@@ -264,7 +263,8 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
> mysockaddr *udpaddr,
> - there's no point retrying the query, retry the key query
> instead...... */
> - if (forward->blocking_query)
> - {
> -- int fd;
> -+ int fd, is_sign;
> -+ unsigned char *pheader;
> -
> - forward->flags &= ~FREC_TEST_PKTSZ;
> -
> -@@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
> mysockaddr *udpaddr,
> - blockdata_retrieve(forward->stash, forward->stash_len,
> (void *)header);
> - plen = forward->stash_len;
> -
> -- if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, &pheader,
> NULL))
> -- PUTSHORT((forward->flags & FREC_TEST_PKTSZ) ?
> SAFE_PKTSZ : forward->sentto->edns_pktsz, pheader);
> -+ if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, &pheader,
> &is_sign) && !is_sign)
> -+ PUTSHORT(SAFE_PKTSZ, pheader);
> -
> - if (forward->sentto->addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
> - log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_DNSSEC | F_IPV4, "retry",
> (struct all_addr *)&forward->sentto->addr.in.sin_addr, "dnssec");
> -@@ -394,32 +394,40 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
> mysockaddr *udpaddr,
> - forward->log_id = daemon->log_id;
> -
> - if (option_bool(OPT_ADD_MAC))
> -- plen = add_mac(header, plen, ((char *) header) + daemon-
> >packet_buff_sz, &forward->source);
> --
> -+ {
> -+ size_t new = add_mac(header, plen, ((char *) header) +
> daemon->packet_buff_sz, &forward->source);
> -+ if (new != plen)
> -+ {
> -+ plen = new;
> -+ forward->flags |= FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
> -+ }
> -+ }
> -+
> - if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET))
> - {
> - size_t new = add_source_addr(header, plen, ((char *)
> header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz, &forward->source);
> - if (new != plen)
> - {
> - plen = new;
> -- forward->flags |= FREC_HAS_SUBNET;
> -+ forward->flags |= FREC_HAS_SUBNET |
> FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
> - }
> - }
> -
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> - if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
> - {
> -- size_t new_plen = add_do_bit(header, plen, ((char *)
> header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz);
> -+ size_t new = add_do_bit(header, plen, ((char *) header) +
> daemon->packet_buff_sz);
> -
> -+ if (new != plen)
> -+ forward->flags |= FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
> -+
> -+ plen = new;
> -+
> - /* For debugging, set Checking Disabled, otherwise, have
> the upstream check too,
> - this allows it to select auth servers when one is
> returning bad data. */
> - if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG))
> - header->hb4 |= HB4_CD;
> -
> -- if (new_plen != plen)
> -- forward->flags |= FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
> --
> -- plen = new_plen;
> - }
> - #endif
> -
> -@@ -469,10 +477,23 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
> mysockaddr *udpaddr,
> - }
> - #endif
> - }
> --
> -- if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, &pheader,
> NULL))
> -- PUTSHORT((forward->flags & FREC_TEST_PKTSZ) ?
> SAFE_PKTSZ : start->edns_pktsz, pheader);
> -
> -+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -+ if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !do_bit)
> -+ {
> -+ /* Difficult one here. If our client didn't send
> EDNS0, we will have set the UDP
> -+ packet size to 512. But that won't provide
> space for the RRSIGS in many cases.
> -+ The RRSIGS will be stripped out before the
> answer goes back, so the packet should
> -+ shrink again. So, if we added a do-bit, bump
> the udp packet size to the value
> -+ known to be OK for this server. Maybe check
> returned size after stripping and set
> -+ the truncated bit? */
> -+ unsigned char *pheader;
> -+ int is_sign;
> -+ if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL,
> &pheader, &is_sign))
> -+ PUTSHORT(start->edns_pktsz, pheader);
> -+ }
> -+#endif
> -+
> - if (retry_send(sendto(fd, (char *)header, plen, 0,
> - &start->addr.sa,
> - sa_len(&start->addr))))
> -@@ -563,30 +584,34 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header
> *header, time_t now, struct server
> - }
> - #endif
> -
> -- /* If upstream is advertising a larger UDP packet size
> -- than we allow, trim it so that we don't get overlarge
> -- requests for the client. We can't do this for signed packets.
> */
> --
> - if ((pheader = find_pseudoheader(header, n, &plen, &sizep,
> &is_sign)))
> - {
> -- unsigned short udpsz;
> -- unsigned char *psave = sizep;
> --
> -- GETSHORT(udpsz, sizep);
> --
> -- if (!is_sign && udpsz > daemon->edns_pktsz)
> -- PUTSHORT(daemon->edns_pktsz, psave);
> --
> - if (check_subnet && !check_source(header, plen, pheader,
> query_source))
> - {
> - my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("discarding DNS reply: subnet
> option mismatch"));
> - return 0;
> - }
> -
> -- if (added_pheader)
> -+ if (!is_sign)
> - {
> -- pheader = 0;
> -- header->arcount = htons(0);
> -+ if (added_pheader)
> -+ {
> -+ /* client didn't send EDNS0, we added one, strip it
> off before returning answer. */
> -+ n = rrfilter(header, n, 0);
> -+ pheader = NULL;
> -+ }
> -+ else
> -+ {
> -+ /* If upstream is advertising a larger UDP packet
> size
> -+ than we allow, trim it so that we don't get
> overlarge
> -+ requests for the client. We can't do this for
> signed packets. */
> -+ unsigned short udpsz;
> -+ unsigned char *psave = sizep;
> -+
> -+ GETSHORT(udpsz, sizep);
> -+ if (udpsz > daemon->edns_pktsz)
> -+ PUTSHORT(daemon->edns_pktsz, psave);
> -+ }
> - }
> - }
> -
> -@@ -655,14 +680,16 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header
> *header, time_t now, struct server
> - }
> -
> - if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
> -- header->hb4 &= ~HB4_AD;
> --
> -- if (!(header->hb4 & HB4_CD) && ad_reqd && cache_secure)
> -- header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
> --
> -- /* If the requestor didn't set the DO bit, don't return DNSSEC
> info. */
> -- if (!do_bit)
> -- n = rrfilter(header, n, 1);
> -+ {
> -+ header->hb4 &= ~HB4_AD;
> -+
> -+ if (!(header->hb4 & HB4_CD) && ad_reqd && cache_secure)
> -+ header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
> -+
> -+ /* If the requestor didn't set the DO bit, don't return
> DNSSEC info. */
> -+ if (!do_bit)
> -+ n = rrfilter(header, n, 1);
> -+ }
> - #endif
> -
> - /* do this after extract_addresses. Ensure NODATA reply and
> remove
> -@@ -761,8 +788,14 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
> now)
> - if ((nn = resize_packet(header, (size_t)n, pheader,
> plen)))
> - {
> - header->hb3 &= ~(HB3_QR | HB3_AA | HB3_TC);
> -- header->hb4 &= ~(HB4_RA | HB4_RCODE);
> -- forward_query(-1, NULL, NULL, 0, header, nn, now,
> forward, 0, 0);
> -+ header->hb4 &= ~(HB4_RA | HB4_RCODE | HB4_CD |
> HB4_AD);
> -+ if (forward->flags |= FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED)
> -+ header->hb4 |= HB4_CD;
> -+ if (forward->flags |= FREC_AD_QUESTION)
> -+ header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
> -+ if (forward->flags & FREC_DO_QUESTION)
> -+ add_do_bit(header, nn, (char *)pheader + plen);
> -+ forward_query(-1, NULL, NULL, 0, header, nn, now,
> forward, forward->flags & FREC_AD_QUESTION, forward->flags &
> FREC_DO_QUESTION);
> - return;
> - }
> - }
> -@@ -1007,12 +1040,13 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> - {
> - struct dns_header *header = (struct dns_header *)daemon->packet;
> - union mysockaddr source_addr;
> -- unsigned short type;
> -+ unsigned char *pheader;
> -+ unsigned short type, udp_size = PACKETSZ; /* default if no EDNS0
> */
> - struct all_addr dst_addr;
> - struct in_addr netmask, dst_addr_4;
> - size_t m;
> - ssize_t n;
> -- int if_index = 0, auth_dns = 0;
> -+ int if_index = 0, auth_dns = 0, do_bit = 0, have_pseudoheader =
> 0;
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> - int local_auth = 0;
> - #endif
> -@@ -1279,10 +1313,30 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> - #endif
> - }
> -
> -+ if (find_pseudoheader(header, (size_t)n, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
> -+ {
> -+ unsigned short flags;
> -+
> -+ have_pseudoheader = 1;
> -+ GETSHORT(udp_size, pheader);
> -+ pheader += 2; /* ext_rcode */
> -+ GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> -+
> -+ if (flags & 0x8000)
> -+ do_bit = 1;/* do bit */
> -+
> -+ /* If the client provides an EDNS0 UDP size, use that to
> limit our reply.
> -+ (bounded by the maximum configured). If no EDNS0, then it
> -+ defaults to 512 */
> -+ if (udp_size > daemon->edns_pktsz)
> -+ udp_size = daemon->edns_pktsz;
> -+ }
> -+
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> - if (auth_dns)
> - {
> -- m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + daemon-
> >packet_buff_sz, (size_t)n, now, &source_addr, local_auth);
> -+ m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + udp_size,
> (size_t)n, now, &source_addr,
> -+ local_auth, do_bit, have_pseudoheader);
> - if (m >= 1)
> - {
> - send_from(listen->fd, option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) ||
> option_bool(OPT_CLEVERBIND),
> -@@ -1293,9 +1347,13 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
> time_t now)
> - else
> - #endif
> - {
> -- int ad_reqd, do_bit;
> -- m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + daemon-
> >packet_buff_sz, (size_t)n,
> -- dst_addr_4, netmask, now, &ad_reqd,
> &do_bit);
> -+ int ad_reqd = do_bit;
> -+ /* RFC 6840 5.7 */
> -+ if (header->hb4 & HB4_AD)
> -+ ad_reqd = 1;
> -+
> -+ m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + udp_size,
> (size_t)n,
> -+ dst_addr_4, netmask, now, ad_reqd, do_bit,
> have_pseudoheader);
> -
> - if (m >= 1)
> - {
> -@@ -1397,7 +1455,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> - int local_auth = 0;
> - #endif
> -- int checking_disabled, ad_question, do_bit, added_pheader = 0;
> -+ int checking_disabled, do_bit, added_pheader = 0,
> have_pseudoheader = 0;
> - int check_subnet, no_cache_dnssec = 0, cache_secure = 0,
> bogusanswer = 0;
> - size_t m;
> - unsigned short qtype;
> -@@ -1414,6 +1472,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> - union mysockaddr peer_addr;
> - socklen_t peer_len = sizeof(union mysockaddr);
> - int query_count = 0;
> -+ unsigned char *pheader;
> -
> - if (getpeername(confd, (struct sockaddr *)&peer_addr, &peer_len)
> == -1)
> - return packet;
> -@@ -1508,15 +1567,35 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> - else
> - dst_addr_4.s_addr = 0;
> -
> -+ do_bit = 0;
> -+
> -+ if (find_pseudoheader(header, (size_t)size, NULL, &pheader,
> NULL))
> -+ {
> -+ unsigned short flags;
> -+
> -+ have_pseudoheader = 1;
> -+ pheader += 4; /* udp_size, ext_rcode */
> -+ GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> -+
> -+ if (flags & 0x8000)
> -+ do_bit = 1;/* do bit */
> -+ }
> -+
> - #ifdef HAVE_AUTH
> - if (auth_dns)
> -- m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
> (size_t)size, now, &peer_addr, local_auth);
> -+ m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
> (size_t)size, now, &peer_addr,
> -+ local_auth, do_bit, have_pseudoheader);
> - else
> - #endif
> - {
> -- /* m > 0 if answered from cache */
> -- m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
> (size_t)size,
> -- dst_addr_4, netmask, now,
> &ad_question, &do_bit);
> -+ int ad_reqd = do_bit;
> -+ /* RFC 6840 5.7 */
> -+ if (header->hb4 & HB4_AD)
> -+ ad_reqd = 1;
> -+
> -+ /* m > 0 if answered from cache */
> -+ m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
> (size_t)size,
> -+ dst_addr_4, netmask, now, ad_reqd,
> do_bit, have_pseudoheader);
> -
> - /* Do this by steam now we're not in the select() loop */
> - check_log_writer(1);
> -@@ -1615,6 +1694,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> - }
> -
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> -+ added_pheader = 0;
>
> - if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
> - {
> - size_t new_size = add_do_bit(header,
> size, ((char *) header) + 65536);
> -@@ -1719,7 +1799,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
> now,
> -
> - m = process_reply(header, now, last_server,
> (unsigned int)m,
> - option_bool(OPT_NO_REBIND)
> && !norebind, no_cache_dnssec, cache_secure, bogusanswer,
> -- ad_question, do_bit,
> added_pheader, check_subnet, &peer_addr);
> -+ ad_reqd, do_bit,
> added_pheader, check_subnet, &peer_addr);
> -
> - break;
> - }
> -diff --git a/src/netlink.c b/src/netlink.c
> -index 753784d..3376d68 100644
> ---- a/src/netlink.c
> -+++ b/src/netlink.c
> -@@ -288,7 +288,8 @@ int iface_enumerate(int family, void *parm, int
> (*callback)())
> - rta = RTA_NEXT(rta, len1);
> - }
> -
> -- if (inaddr && mac && callback_ok)
> -+ if (!(neigh->ndm_state & (NUD_NOARP | NUD_INCOMPLETE |
> NUD_FAILED)) &&
> -+ inaddr && mac && callback_ok)
> - if (!((*callback)(neigh->ndm_family, inaddr, mac,
> maclen, parm)))
> - callback_ok = 0;
> - }
> -diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
> -index 188d05f..18858a8 100644
> ---- a/src/rfc1035.c
> -+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
> -@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ struct macparm {
> - union mysockaddr *l3;
> - };
> -
> --static size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t
> plen, unsigned char *limit,
> -- int optno, unsigned char *opt,
> size_t optlen, int set_do)
> -+size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
> unsigned char *limit,
> -+ unsigned short udp_sz, int optno, unsigned
> char *opt, size_t optlen, int set_do)
> - {
> - unsigned char *lenp, *datap, *p;
> - int rdlen, is_sign;
> -@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ static size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, unsigned
> - return plen;
> - *p++ = 0; /* empty name */
> - PUTSHORT(T_OPT, p);
> -- PUTSHORT(SAFE_PKTSZ, p); /* max packet length, this will be
> overwritten */
> -+ PUTSHORT(udp_sz, p); /* max packet length, 512 if not given
> in EDNS0 header */
> - PUTSHORT(0, p); /* extended RCODE and version */
> - PUTSHORT(set_do ? 0x8000 : 0, p); /* DO flag */
> - lenp = p;
> -@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static int filter_mac(int family, char *addrp,
> char *mac, size_t maclen, void *p
> - if (!match)
> - return 1; /* continue */
> -
> -- parm->plen = add_pseudoheader(parm->header, parm->plen, parm-
> >limit, EDNS0_OPTION_MAC, (unsigned char *)mac, maclen, 0);
> -+ parm->plen = add_pseudoheader(parm->header, parm->plen, parm-
> >limit, PACKETSZ, EDNS0_OPTION_MAC, (unsigned char *)mac, maclen, 0);
> -
> - return 0; /* done */
> - }
> -@@ -603,12 +603,6 @@ size_t add_mac(struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, char *limit, union mysock
> - {
> - struct macparm parm;
> -
> --/* Must have an existing pseudoheader as the only ar-record,
> -- or have no ar-records. Must also not be signed */
> --
> -- if (ntohs(header->arcount) > 1)
> -- return plen;
> --
> - parm.header = header;
> - parm.limit = (unsigned char *)limit;
> - parm.plen = plen;
> -@@ -699,13 +693,13 @@ size_t add_source_addr(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, char *limit, unio
> - struct subnet_opt opt;
> -
> - len = calc_subnet_opt(&opt, source);
> -- return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit,
> EDNS0_OPTION_CLIENT_SUBNET, (unsigned char *)&opt, len, 0);
> -+ return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit,
> PACKETSZ, EDNS0_OPTION_CLIENT_SUBNET, (unsigned char *)&opt, len, 0);
> - }
> -
> - #ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
> - size_t add_do_bit(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> *limit)
> - {
> -- return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit, 0,
> NULL, 0, 1);
> -+ return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit,
> PACKETSZ, 0, NULL, 0, 1);
> - }
> - #endif
> -
> -@@ -1525,16 +1519,16 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec
> *crecp, time_t now)
> - /* return zero if we can't answer from cache, or packet size if we
> can */
> - size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit,
> size_t qlen,
> - struct in_addr local_addr, struct in_addr
> local_netmask,
> -- time_t now, int *ad_reqd, int *do_bit)
> -+ time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int
> have_pseudoheader)
> - {
> - char *name = daemon->namebuff;
> -- unsigned char *p, *ansp, *pheader;
> -+ unsigned char *p, *ansp;
> - unsigned int qtype, qclass;
> - struct all_addr addr;
> - int nameoffset;
> - unsigned short flag;
> - int q, ans, anscount = 0, addncount = 0;
> -- int dryrun = 0, sec_reqd = 0, have_pseudoheader = 0;
> -+ int dryrun = 0;
> - struct crec *crecp;
> - int nxdomain = 0, auth = 1, trunc = 0, sec_data = 1;
> - struct mx_srv_record *rec;
> -@@ -1550,35 +1544,11 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
> - sec_data = 0;
> -
> -- /* RFC 6840 5.7 */
> -- *ad_reqd = header->hb4 & HB4_AD;
> -- *do_bit = 0;
> --
> - /* If there is an additional data section then it will be
> overwritten by
> - partial replies, so we have to do a dry run to see if we can
> answer
> - the query. */
> --
> - if (ntohs(header->arcount) != 0)
> -- {
> -- dryrun = 1;
> --
> -- /* If there's an additional section, there might be an
> EDNS(0) pseudoheader */
> -- if (find_pseudoheader(header, qlen, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
> -- {
> -- unsigned short flags;
> --
> -- have_pseudoheader = 1;
> --
> -- pheader += 4; /* udp size, ext_rcode */
> -- GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
> --
> -- if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
> -- {
> -- *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */
> -- *ad_reqd = 1;
> -- }
> -- }
> -- }
> -+ dryrun = 1;
> -
> - for (rec = daemon->mxnames; rec; rec = rec->next)
> - rec->offset = 0;
> -@@ -1603,11 +1573,6 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - GETSHORT(qtype, p);
> - GETSHORT(qclass, p);
> -
> -- /* Don't filter RRSIGS from answers to ANY queries, even if
> do-bit
> -- not set. */
> -- if (qtype == T_ANY)
> -- *do_bit = 1;
> --
> - ans = 0; /* have we answered this question */
> -
> - if (qtype == T_TXT || qtype == T_ANY)
> -@@ -1739,7 +1704,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - the zone is unsigned, which implies that we're
> doing
> - validation. */
> - if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) ||
> -- !sec_reqd ||
> -+ !do_bit ||
> - (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(crecp-
> >flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
> - {
> - do
> -@@ -1927,7 +1892,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> - }
> -
> - /* If the client asked for DNSSEC don't use
> cached data. */
> -- if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> -+ if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
> F_CONFIG)) || !do_bit || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
> - do
> - {
> - /* don't answer wildcard queries with data
> not from /etc/hosts
> -@@ -1961,17 +1926,12 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -
> - if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> - {
> -- /* We don't cache NSEC records, so if a
> DNSSEC-validated negative answer
> -- is cached and the client wants
> DNSSEC, forward rather than answering from the cache */
> -- if (!sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags &
> F_DNSSECOK))
> -- {
> -- ans = 1;
> -- auth = 0;
> -- if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
> -- nxdomain = 1;
> -- if (!dryrun)
> -- log_query(crecp->flags, name,
> NULL, NULL);
> -- }
> -+ ans = 1;
> -+ auth = 0;
> -+ if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
> -+ nxdomain = 1;
> -+ if (!dryrun)
> -+ log_query(crecp->flags, name, NULL,
> NULL);
> - }
> - else
> - {
> -@@ -2209,10 +2169,11 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
> *header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
> -
> - len = ansp - (unsigned char *)header;
> -
> -+ /* Advertise our packet size limit in our reply */
> - if (have_pseudoheader)
> -- len = add_pseudoheader(header, len, (unsigned char *)limit, 0,
> NULL, 0, sec_reqd);
> -+ len = add_pseudoheader(header, len, (unsigned char *)limit,
> daemon->edns_pktsz, 0, NULL, 0, do_bit);
> -
> -- if (*ad_reqd && sec_data)
> -+ if (ad_reqd && sec_data)
> - header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
> - else
> - header->hb4 &= ~HB4_AD;
> -diff --git a/src/rrfilter.c b/src/rrfilter.c
> -index ae12261..b26b39f 100644
> ---- a/src/rrfilter.c
> -+++ b/src/rrfilter.c
> -@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ size_t rrfilter(struct dns_header *header,
> size_t plen, int mode)
> - for (p = rrs[0], i = 1; i < rr_found; i += 2)
> - {
> - unsigned char *start = rrs[i];
> -- unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
> ((unsigned char *)(header+1)) + plen;
> -+ unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
> ((unsigned char *)header) + plen;
> -
> - memmove(p, start, end-start);
> - p += end-start;
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
> More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
> b/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
> More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 910921b..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
> More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
> -From d67ecac59d58f249707d26e38d49c29b552af4d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 20:44:23 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] More tweaks in handling unknown DNSSEC algorithms.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> -------------
> - 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 299ca64..e09f304 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -70,7 +70,17 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
> - default: return NULL;
> - }
> - }
> --
> -+
> -+/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/dnssec-nsec3-parameters/dnssec-n
> sec3-parameters.xhtml */
> -+static char *nsec3_digest_name(int digest)
> -+{
> -+ switch (digest)
> -+ {
> -+ case 1: return "sha1";
> -+ default: return NULL;
> -+ }
> -+}
> -+
> - /* Find pointer to correct hash function in nettle library */
> - static const struct nettle_hash *hash_find(char *name)
> - {
> -@@ -667,7 +677,6 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> - static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0;
> - unsigned char *p;
> - int rrsetidx, sigidx, j, rdlen, res;
> -- int name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
> - int gotkey = 0;
> -
> - if (!(p = skip_questions(header, plen)))
> -@@ -678,7 +687,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> - j != 0; j--)
> - {
> - unsigned char *pstart, *pdata;
> -- int stype, sclass, algo, type_covered, labels,
> sig_expiration, sig_inception;
> -+ int stype, sclass, type_covered;
> -
> - pstart = p;
> -
> -@@ -712,12 +721,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> - return 0; /* bad packet */
> -
> - GETSHORT(type_covered, p);
> -- algo = *p++;
> -- labels = *p++;
> -- p += 4; /* orig_ttl */
> -- GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
> -- GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
> -- p += 2; /* key_tag */
> -+ p += 16; /* algo, labels, orig_ttl, sig_expiration,
> sig_inception, key_tag */
> -
> - if (gotkey)
> - {
> -@@ -749,11 +753,8 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
> *header, size_t plen, int class, int
> - }
> - }
> -
> -- /* Don't count signatures for algos we don't support
> */
> -- if (check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration)
> &&
> -- labels <= name_labels &&
> -- type_covered == type &&
> -- verify_func(algo))
> -+
> -+ if (type_covered == type)
> - {
> - if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx))
> - return 0;
> -@@ -795,7 +796,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - char *name, char *keyname, char
> **wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen, int algo_in, int
> keytag_in)
> - {
> - unsigned char *p;
> -- int rdlen, j, name_labels;
> -+ int rdlen, j, name_labels, sig_expiration, sig_inception;
> - struct crec *crecp = NULL;
> - int algo, labels, orig_ttl, key_tag;
> - u16 *rr_desc = rrfilter_desc(type);
> -@@ -828,13 +829,16 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
> - algo = *p++;
> - labels = *p++;
> - GETLONG(orig_ttl, p);
> -- p += 8; /* sig_expiration, sig_inception already checked */
> -+ GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
> -+ GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
> - GETSHORT(key_tag, p);
> -
> - if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
> - return STAT_BOGUS;
> -
> -- if (!(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
> -+ if (!check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration) ||
> -+ labels > name_labels ||
> -+ !(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
> - !hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
> - continue;
> -
> -@@ -1112,7 +1116,10 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
> - else
> - {
> - a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> -- log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u");
> -+ if (verify_func(algo))
> -+ log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u");
> -+ else
> -+ log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u (not supported)");
> -
> - recp1->addr.key.keylen = rdlen - 4;
> - recp1->addr.key.keydata = key;
> -@@ -1235,7 +1242,11 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
> - else
> - {
> - a.addr.keytag = keytag;
> -- log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM,
> name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -+ if (hash_find(ds_digest_name(digest)) &&
> verify_func(algo))
> -+ log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
> -+ else
> -+ log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
> F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u (not supported)");
> -+
> - crecp->addr.ds.digest = digest;
> - crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
> - crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
> -@@ -1660,7 +1671,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - *nons = 1;
> -
> - /* Look though the NSEC3 records to find the first one with
> -- an algorithm we support (currently only algo == 1).
> -+ an algorithm we support.
> -
> - Take the algo, iterations, and salt of that record
> - as the ones we're going to use, and prune any
> -@@ -1674,7 +1685,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
> - algo = *p++;
> -
> -- if (algo == 1)
> -+ if ((hash = hash_find(nsec3_digest_name(algo))))
> - break; /* known algo */
> - }
> -
> -@@ -1724,10 +1735,6 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - nsecs[i] = nsec3p;
> - }
> -
> -- /* Algo is checked as 1 above */
> -- if (!(hash = hash_find("sha1")))
> -- return 0;
> --
> - if ((digest_len = hash_name(name, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len,
> iterations)) == 0)
> - return 0;
> -
> -@@ -1843,8 +1850,10 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
> -
> - if (type_found == T_NSEC)
> - return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset,
> nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
> -- else
> -+ else if (type_found == T_NSEC3)
> - return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset,
> nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname,
> nons);
> -+ else
> -+ return 0;
> - }
> -
> - /* Check signing status of name.
> -@@ -1857,7 +1866,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
> - */
> - static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t
> now)
> - {
> -- int secure_ds, name_start = strlen(name);
> -+ int name_start = strlen(name);
> - struct crec *crecp;
> - char *p;
> -
> -@@ -1867,51 +1876,40 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int
> class, char *keyname, time_t now)
> -
> - if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
> - return STAT_NEED_DS;
> -+
> -+ /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-existance
> of NS record.
> -+ F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved there's no
> DS record here,
> -+ but that's because there's no NS record either, ie this
> isn't the start
> -+ of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below a node
> is unsigned when
> -+ we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no DS
> record. */
> -+ if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -+ {
> -+ if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -+ return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */
> -+ }
> - else
> - {
> -- secure_ds = 0;
> --
> -+ int gotone = 0;
> -+
> -+ /* If all the DS records have digest and/or sig algos we
> don't support,
> -+ then the zone is insecure. Note that if an algo
> -+ appears in the DS, then RRSIGs for that algo MUST
> -+ exist for each RRset: 4035 para 2.2 So if we find
> -+ a DS here with digest and sig we can do, we're
> entitled
> -+ to assume we can validate the zone and if we can't
> later,
> -+ because an RRSIG is missing we return BOGUS.
> -+ */
> - do
> - {
> -- if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
> -- {
> -- /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
> existance of NS record.
> -- F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
> there's no DS record here,
> -- but that's because there's no NS record
> either, ie this isn't the start
> -- of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree
> below a node is unsigned when
> -- we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's
> no DS record.
> -- */
> -- if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
> -- {
> -- if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
> -- return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here
> */
> -- }
> -- else if (!hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp-
> >addr.ds.digest)) || !verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -- return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
> insecure */
> -- else
> -- secure_ds = 1;
> -- }
> -+ if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> -+ hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest))
> &&
> -+ verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -+ gotone = 1;
> - }
> - while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DS)));
> -- }
> --
> -- if (secure_ds)
> -- {
> -- /* We've found only DS records that attest to the DNSKEY
> RRset in the zone, so we believe
> -- that RRset is good. Furthermore the DNSKEY whose hash
> is proved by the DS record is
> -- one we can use. However the DNSKEY RRset may contain
> more than one key and
> -- one of the other keys may use an algorithm we don't
> support. If that's
> -- the case the zone is insecure for us. */
> --
> -- if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)))
> -- return STAT_NEED_KEY;
> -
> -- do
> -- {
> -- if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> !verify_func(crecp->addr.key.algo))
> -- return STAT_INSECURE;
> -- }
> -- while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DNSKEY)));
> -+ if (!gotone)
> -+ return STAT_INSECURE;
> - }
> -
> - if (name_start == 0)
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-
> one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-
> Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 031339e..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-
> one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
> -From 3e86d316c4bb406ed813aa5256615c8a95cac6d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 20:50:05 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Nasty, rare and obscure off-by-one in DNSSEC
> hostname_cmp().
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 4 ++--
> - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index e09f304..29848e1 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1394,8 +1394,8 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const
> char *b)
> - if (sb == b)
> - return 1;
> -
> -- ea = sa--;
> -- eb = sb--;
> -+ ea = --sa;
> -+ eb = --sb;
> - }
> - }
> -
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
> Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
> Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index f3758fc..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
> -From a86fdf437ecc29398f9715ceb5240442a17ac014 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 21:19:20 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] Minor tweak to previous commit.
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 6 ++----
> - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 29848e1..9fa64b6 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1889,8 +1889,6 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class,
> char *keyname, time_t now)
> - }
> - else
> - {
> -- int gotone = 0;
> --
> - /* If all the DS records have digest and/or sig algos we
> don't support,
> - then the zone is insecure. Note that if an algo
> - appears in the DS, then RRSIGs for that algo MUST
> -@@ -1904,11 +1902,11 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int
> class, char *keyname, time_t now)
> - if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
> - hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest))
> &&
> - verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
> -- gotone = 1;
> -+ break;
> - }
> - while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
> F_DS)));
> -
> -- if (!gotone)
> -+ if (!crecp)
> - return STAT_INSECURE;
> - }
> -
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
> diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-
> NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-
> NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch
> deleted file mode 100644
> index 33219d2..0000000
> --- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
> -From ce5732e84fc46d7f99c152f736cfb4ef5ec98a01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
> 2001
> -From: Simon Kelley <simon(a)thekelleys.org.uk>
> -Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 21:39:19 +0000
> -Subject: [PATCH] NSEC3 check: RFC5155 para 8.2
> -
> ----
> - src/dnssec.c | 8 ++++++--
> - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> -
> -diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
> -index 9fa64b6..486e422 100644
> ---- a/src/dnssec.c
> -+++ b/src/dnssec.c
> -@@ -1704,7 +1704,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
> - {
> - unsigned char *nsec3p = nsecs[i];
> -- int this_iter;
> -+ int this_iter, flags;
> -
> - nsecs[i] = NULL; /* Speculative, will be restored if OK. */
> -
> -@@ -1716,8 +1716,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
> dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
> - if (*p++ != algo)
> - continue;
> -
> -- p++; /* flags */
> -+ flags = *p++; /* flags */
> -
> -+ /* 5155 8.2 */
> -+ if (flags != 0 && flags != 1)
> -+ continue;
> -+
> - GETSHORT(this_iter, p);
> - if (this_iter != iterations)
> - continue;
> ---
> -1.7.10.4
> -
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