From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Peter =?utf-8?q?M=C3=BCller?= To: development@lists.ipfire.org Subject: [PATCH] vpnmain.cgi: Mark MODP-1536 as broken, phase out MODP-2048 Date: Sat, 06 Aug 2022 07:17:47 +0000 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============0579897145120413643==" List-Id: --===============0579897145120413643== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy-ccs15.pdf (released in 2015) recommends "to use primes of 2048 bits or larger", to which BSI's techical guideline BSI-TR-02102 (https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads= /DE/BSI/Publikationen/TechnischeRichtlinien/TR02102/BSI-TR-02102.pdf?__blob= =3DpublicationFile&v=3D5) concurs. The latter also recommends not to use DH groups comprising of less than 2000 bits after 2022, and shift to 3000 bit DH groups earlier as a precaution. According to RFC 3526, section 8, MODP-1536 provides an estimated security between 90 and 120 bits, a value that can be reasonably considered broken today, as it has been so for other types of cryptographic algorithms already, and per section 2.4 in the aforementioned paper, breaking 1024-bit DH is considered feasible for the NSA in 2015, which does not inspire confidence for MODP-1536 in 2022. Therefore, this patch suggests to mark MODP-1536 as broken, since it de facto is, and tag MODP-2048 as weak. The latter is also removed from the default selection, so newly created VPN connections won't use it anymore, to follow BSI's recommendations of using DH groups >=3D 3000 bits in 2022 and later. Signed-off-by: Peter M=C3=BCller --- html/cgi-bin/vpnmain.cgi | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/html/cgi-bin/vpnmain.cgi b/html/cgi-bin/vpnmain.cgi index 3652627e9..9828b2f9e 100644 --- a/html/cgi-bin/vpnmain.cgi +++ b/html/cgi-bin/vpnmain.cgi @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ ############################################################################= ### # = # # IPFire.org - A linux based firewall = # -# Copyright (C) 2007-2020 IPFire Team = # +# Copyright (C) 2007-2022 IPFire Team = # # = # # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify = # # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by = # @@ -2360,11 +2360,11 @@ END #use default advanced value $cgiparams{'IKE_ENCRYPTION'} =3D 'chacha20poly1305|aes256gcm128|aes256gcm96= |aes256gcm64|aes256|aes192gcm128|aes192gcm96|aes192gcm64|aes192|aes128gcm128|= aes128gcm96|aes128gcm64|aes128'; #[18]; $cgiparams{'IKE_INTEGRITY'} =3D 'sha2_512|sha2_256'; #[19]; - $cgiparams{'IKE_GROUPTYPE'} =3D 'curve448|curve25519|4096|3072|= 2048'; #[20]; + $cgiparams{'IKE_GROUPTYPE'} =3D 'curve448|curve25519|4096|3072'= ; #[20]; $cgiparams{'IKE_LIFETIME'} =3D '3'; #[16]; $cgiparams{'ESP_ENCRYPTION'} =3D 'chacha20poly1305|aes256gcm128|aes256gcm96= |aes256gcm64|aes256|aes192gcm128|aes192gcm96|aes192gcm64|aes192|aes128gcm128|= aes128gcm96|aes128gcm64|aes128'; #[21]; $cgiparams{'ESP_INTEGRITY'} =3D 'sha2_512|sha2_256'; #[22]; - $cgiparams{'ESP_GROUPTYPE'} =3D 'curve448|curve25519|4096|3072|= 2048'; #[23]; + $cgiparams{'ESP_GROUPTYPE'} =3D 'curve448|curve25519|4096|3072'= ; #[23]; $cgiparams{'ESP_KEYLIFE'} =3D '1'; #[17]; $cgiparams{'COMPRESSION'} =3D 'off'; #[13]; $cgiparams{'ONLY_PROPOSED'} =3D 'on'; #[24]; @@ -3146,8 +3146,8 @@ if(($cgiparams{'ACTION'} eq $Lang::tr{'advanced'}) || + @@ -3169,8 +3169,8 @@ if(($cgiparams{'ACTION'} eq $Lang::tr{'advanced'}) || + --=20 2.35.3 --===============0579897145120413643==--