From: Michael Tremer <git@ipfire.org>
To: ipfire-scm@lists.ipfire.org
Subject: [git.ipfire.org] IPFire 2.x development tree branch, next, updated. 928b3cbf66a249236ffa672f66edaf402a54289f
Date: Wed, 21 Nov 2018 11:23:22 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181121112322.BAA661081BB0@git01.ipfire.org> (raw)
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The branch, next has been updated
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via 5ca47910a7b5b7fd19422ed6311a391d68c56e95 (commit)
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- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 928b3cbf66a249236ffa672f66edaf402a54289f
Author: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>
Date: Wed Nov 21 11:21:42 2018 +0000
openssl: Update to 1.1.0j
*) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
algorithm to recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
(CVE-2018-0734)
[Paul Dale]
*) Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation
The OpenSSL ECDSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
algorithm to recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
(CVE-2018-0735)
[Paul Dale]
*) Add coordinate blinding for EC_POINT and implement projective
coordinate blinding for generic prime curves as a countermeasure to
chosen point SCA attacks.
[Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri, Billy Bob Brumley]
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>
commit 5ca47910a7b5b7fd19422ed6311a391d68c56e95
Author: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>
Date: Tue Nov 20 16:28:52 2018 +0000
openssl-compat: Update to 1.0.2q
*) Microarchitecture timing vulnerability in ECC scalar multiplication
OpenSSL ECC scalar multiplication, used in e.g. ECDSA and ECDH, has been
shown to be vulnerable to a microarchitecture timing side channel attack.
An attacker with sufficient access to mount local timing attacks during
ECDSA signature generation could recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th October 2018 by Alejandro
Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Cesar Pereida Garcia and
Nicola Tuveri.
(CVE-2018-5407)
[Billy Brumley]
*) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
algorithm to recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
(CVE-2018-0734)
[Paul Dale]
*) Resolve a compatibility issue in EC_GROUP handling with the FIPS Object
Module, accidentally introduced while backporting security fixes from the
development branch and hindering the use of ECC in FIPS mode.
[Nicola Tuveri]
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
config/rootfiles/common/openssl | 4 ++++
lfs/openssl | 4 ++--
lfs/openssl-compat | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Difference in files:
diff --git a/config/rootfiles/common/openssl b/config/rootfiles/common/openssl
index 8b26c4b42..f7d6f2fb5 100644
--- a/config/rootfiles/common/openssl
+++ b/config/rootfiles/common/openssl
@@ -1654,7 +1654,10 @@ usr/lib/libssl.so.1.1
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OCSP_resp_get0_certs.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OCSP_resp_get0_id.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OCSP_resp_get0_produced_at.html
+#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OCSP_resp_get0_respdata.html
+#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OCSP_resp_get0_signature.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OCSP_resp_get0_signer.html
+#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OCSP_resp_get0_tbs_sigalg.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OCSP_response_create.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OCSP_response_get1_basic.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OCSP_response_status.html
@@ -1676,6 +1679,7 @@ usr/lib/libssl.so.1.1
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OPENSSL_LH_stats.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OPENSSL_LH_stats_bio.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.html
+#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OPENSSL_atexit.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OPENSSL_buf2hexstr.html
#usr/share/doc/openssl/html/man3/OPENSSL_cleanse.html
diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl
index 94a08b97d..d7a616ff2 100644
--- a/lfs/openssl
+++ b/lfs/openssl
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
include Config
-VER = 1.1.0i
+VER = 1.1.0j
THISAPP = openssl-$(VER)
DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.gz
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE)
$(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE)
-$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 9495126aafd2659d357ea66a969c3fe1
+$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = b4ca5b78ae6ae79da80790b30dbedbdc
install : $(TARGET)
diff --git a/lfs/openssl-compat b/lfs/openssl-compat
index 1dcb829e5..062f85fdb 100644
--- a/lfs/openssl-compat
+++ b/lfs/openssl-compat
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
include Config
-VER = 1.0.2p
+VER = 1.0.2q
THISAPP = openssl-$(VER)
DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.gz
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE)
$(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE)
-$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = ac5eb30bf5798aa14b1ae6d0e7da58df
+$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 7563e1ce046cb21948eeb6ba1a0eb71c
install : $(TARGET)
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IPFire 2.x development tree
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