From: Michael Tremer <git@ipfire.org>
To: ipfire-scm@lists.ipfire.org
Subject: [git.ipfire.org] IPFire 2.x development tree branch, next, updated. b7b65e736e42be7e7988c4c3efe67ca0f2a05057
Date: Mon, 05 Oct 2020 15:08:33 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4C4kWQ0HKZz2xbb@people01.haj.ipfire.org> (raw)
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- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit b7b65e736e42be7e7988c4c3efe67ca0f2a05057
Author: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org>
Date: Mon Oct 5 14:12:18 2020 +0000
sysctl.conf: prevent unintentional writes into attacker-controlled files and FIFOs
Similar to hard- and symlink protection introduced a while ago, this
patch enables protections against unintentional writes into
attacker-controlled regular files or FIFOs, where a program expected to
create new ones. This makes exploiting TOCTOU flaws harder.
See also: https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of changes:
config/etc/sysctl.conf | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
Difference in files:
diff --git a/config/etc/sysctl.conf b/config/etc/sysctl.conf
index d48c7734e..be7c07c85 100644
--- a/config/etc/sysctl.conf
+++ b/config/etc/sysctl.conf
@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ kernel.dmesg_restrict = 1
fs.protected_symlinks = 1
fs.protected_hardlinks = 1
+# Don't allow writes to files and FIFOs that we don't own in world writable sticky
+# directories, unless they are owned by the owner of the directory.
+fs.protected_fifos = 2
+fs.protected_regular = 2
+
# Minimal preemption granularity for CPU-bound tasks:
# (default: 1 msec# (1 + ilog(ncpus)), units: nanoseconds)
kernel.sched_min_granularity_ns = 10000000
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IPFire 2.x development tree
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