[git.ipfire.org] IPFire 2.x development tree branch, next, updated. 4ac5f13f1e5358ceddc83343c52738ea73c40f9a

[Michael Tremer <git@ipfire.org>]

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- Log -----------------------------------------------------------------
commit 4ac5f13f1e5358ceddc83343c52738ea73c40f9a
Author: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>
Date:   Tue Sep 3 18:00:17 2024 +0000

    openssl: Update to 3.3.2
    
    Possible denial of service in X.509 name checks (CVE-2024-6119)
    ===============================================================
    
    Severity: Moderate
    
    Issue summary: Applications performing certificate name checks (e.g., TLS
    clients checking server certificates) may attempt to read an invalid memory
    address resulting in abnormal termination of the application process.
    
    Impact summary: Abnormal termination of an application can a cause a denial of
    service.
    
    Applications performing certificate name checks (e.g., TLS clients checking
    server certificates) may attempt to read an invalid memory address when
    comparing the expected name with an `otherName` subject alternative name of an
    X.509 certificate. This may result in an exception that terminates the
    application program.
    
    Note that basic certificate chain validation (signatures, dates, ...) is not
    affected, the denial of service can occur only when the application also
    specifies an expected DNS name, Email address or IP address.
    
    TLS servers rarely solicit client certificates, and even when they do, they
    generally don't perform a name check against a "reference identifier" (expected
    identity), but rather extract the presented identity after checking the
    certificate chain.  So TLS servers are generally not affected and the severity
    of the issue is Moderate.
    
    The FIPS modules in 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue.
    OpenSSL 1.1.1 and 1.0.2 are also not affected by this issue.
    
    OpenSSL 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are vulnerable to this issue.
    
    Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org>

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary of changes:
 lfs/openssl | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

Difference in files:
diff --git a/lfs/openssl b/lfs/openssl
index d6333f7a4..22a670118 100644
--- a/lfs/openssl
+++ b/lfs/openssl
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 
 include Config
 
-VER        = 3.3.1
+VER        = 3.3.2
 
 THISAPP    = openssl-$(VER)
 DL_FILE    = $(THISAPP).tar.gz
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE)
 
 $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE)
 
-$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = b09bbe94f49c33015fbcee5f578a20c0da33c289791bf33292170d5d3de44ea2e22144ee11067947aef2733e979c0fded875a4ec92d81468285837053447e68e
+$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = cc53d45418673bc2a406d6697b8bd17ff6c726463c4ccc87bb2fa5a6592d0d178dc8cfeb2fbb980ea354a5dc2c86f31c48453427c6937896c7221273e623c9b5
 
 install : $(TARGET)
 


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