Development December 2016

development@lists.ipfire.org

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31 discussions

[PATCH 0/6] Update ffmepg and the packages that use it
by Marcel Lorenz 14 Mar '17

14 Mar '17

The next series of patches updates ffmpeg an all packges they wont build after update ffmpeg. ffmpeg and ffmpeg-libs: update 3.1.4 motion: update to 4.0.1 xvid: update to 1.3.4 minidlna: update to 1.1.5 apcupsd: update to 3.14.14 mpd: update to 0.19.19 -- 2.9.3

3 17

[PATCH] openssh: Update to 7.3p1.
by Stefan Schantl 27 Feb '17

27 Feb '17

This is a major update to the latest stable version of OpenSSH. * Drop not longer required patches. * Drop SElinux support. Fixes #11218. Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl(a)ipfire.org> --- openssh/openssh.nm | 8 +- openssh/patches/openssh-6.7p1-audit.patch | 2332 -------------------- .../patches/openssh-6.7p1-seccomp-aarch64.patch | 66 - 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2403 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 openssh/patches/openssh-6.7p1-audit.patch delete mode 100644 openssh/patches/openssh-6.7p1-seccomp-aarch64.patch diff --git a/openssh/openssh.nm b/openssh/openssh.nm index 8489438..2e8de76 100644 --- a/openssh/openssh.nm +++ b/openssh/openssh.nm @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ ############################################################################### name = openssh -version = 6.8p1 -release = 2 +version = 7.3p1 +release = 1 groups = Application/Internet url = http://www.openssh.com/portable.html @@ -28,10 +28,9 @@ build automake groff libedit-devel - libselinux-devel ncurses-devel openldap-devel - openssl-devel >= 1.0.0d-2 + openssl-devel >= 1.0.2 pam-devel util-linux zlib-devel @@ -51,7 +50,6 @@ build --with-ipaddr-display \ --with-pam \ --with-libedit \ - --with-selinux \ --with-audit=linux prepare_cmds diff --git a/openssh/patches/openssh-6.7p1-audit.patch b/openssh/patches/openssh-6.7p1-audit.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 213ca67..0000000 --- a/openssh/patches/openssh-6.7p1-audit.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2332 +0,0 @@ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in ---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.065883826 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in 2015-03-20 13:41:15.100883769 +0100 -@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ - sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o \ - kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \ - kexdhc.o kexgexc.o kexecdhc.o kexc25519c.o \ -- kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o -+ kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o kexc25519s.o auditstub.o - - SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ - sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/audit-bsm.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/audit-bsm.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/audit-bsm.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.092883782 +0100 -@@ -375,10 +375,23 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host, - #endif - } - --void -+int - audit_run_command(const char *command) - { - /* not implemented */ -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+void -+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_count_session_open(void) -+{ -+ /* not necessary */ - } - - void -@@ -393,6 +406,12 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) - /* not implemented */ - } - -+int -+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ - void - audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - { -@@ -454,4 +473,40 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event); - } - } -+ -+void -+audit_unsupported_body(int what) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) -+{ -+ /* not implemented */ -+} - #endif /* BSM */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/audit-linux.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/audit-linux.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/audit-linux.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 -@@ -35,13 +35,25 @@ - - #include "log.h" - #include "audit.h" -+#include "key.h" -+#include "hostfile.h" -+#include "auth.h" -+#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ -+#include "servconf.h" - #include "canohost.h" -+#include "packet.h" -+#include "cipher.h" - -+#define AUDIT_LOG_SIZE 256 -+ -+extern ServerOptions options; -+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; -+extern u_int utmp_len; - const char* audit_username(void); - --int --linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, -- const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success) -+static void -+linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, -+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) - { - int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; - -@@ -49,11 +61,11 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, - if (audit_fd < 0) { - if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || - errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) -- return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ -+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ - else -- return 0; /* Must prevent login */ -+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ - } -- rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN, -+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event, - NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)", - username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); - saved_errno = errno; -@@ -65,35 +77,154 @@ linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, - if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) - rc = 0; - errno = saved_errno; -- return (rc >= 0); -+ if (rc < 0) { -+fatal_report: -+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); -+ } - } - -+static void -+linux_audit_user_auth(int uid, const char *username, -+ const char *hostname, const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event) -+{ -+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; -+ static const char *event_name[] = { -+ "maxtries exceeded", -+ "root denied", -+ "success", -+ "none", -+ "password", -+ "challenge-response", -+ "pubkey", -+ "hostbased", -+ "gssapi", -+ "invalid user", -+ "nologin", -+ "connection closed", -+ "connection abandoned", -+ "unknown" -+ }; -+ -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || -+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ -+ else -+ goto fatal_report; /* Must prevent login */ -+ } -+ -+ if ((event < 0) || (event > SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN)) -+ event = SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; -+ -+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, -+ NULL, event_name[event], username ? username : "(unknown)", -+ username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success); -+ saved_errno = errno; -+ close(audit_fd); -+ /* -+ * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non -+ * root user. -+ */ -+ if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0)) -+ rc = 0; -+ errno = saved_errno; -+ if (rc < 0) { -+fatal_report: -+ fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); -+ } -+} -+ -+int -+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) -+{ -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno; -+ -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || -+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */ -+ else -+ return 0; /* Must prevent login */ -+ } -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth rport=%d", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", get_remote_port()); -+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, -+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); -+ if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) -+ goto out; -+ /* is the fingerprint_prefix() still needed? -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s%s rport=%d", -+ type, bits, sshkey_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, get_remote_port()); -+ */ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "key algo=%s size=%d fp=%s rport=%d", -+ type, bits, fp, get_remote_port()); -+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL, -+ buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, rv); -+out: -+ saved_errno = errno; -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+ errno = saved_errno; -+ /* do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ -+ return (rc >= 0) || ((rc == -EPERM) && (getuid() != 0)); -+} -+ -+static int user_login_count = 0; -+ - /* Below is the sshd audit API code */ - - void - audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port) - { --} - /* not implemented */ -+} - --void -+int - audit_run_command(const char *command) - { -- /* not implemented */ -+ if (!user_login_count++) -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+void -+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); -+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_count_session_open(void) -+{ -+ user_login_count++; - } - - void - audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li) - { -- if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -- NULL, li->line, 1) == 0) -- fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno)); -+ if (!user_login_count++) -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START); - } - - void - audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) - { -- /* not implemented */ -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END); -+ if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count) -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, -+ NULL, li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); - } - - void -@@ -101,21 +232,43 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - { - switch(event) { - case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS: -- case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: -+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 1, event); -+ break; -+ - case SSH_NOLOGIN: -- case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: - case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: -+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); - break; - -+ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: - case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: -+ linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, event); -+ break; -+ -+ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: -+ if (user_login_count) { -+ while (user_login_count--) -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END); -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), -+ NULL, "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT); -+ } -+ break; -+ -+ case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON: - case SSH_INVALID_USER: -- linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -- get_remote_ipaddr(), "sshd", 0); -+ linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(), NULL, -+ get_remote_ipaddr(), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN); - break; - - default: -@@ -123,4 +276,135 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - } - } - -+void -+audit_unsupported_body(int what) -+{ -+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" }; -+ char *s; -+ int audit_fd; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=unsupported-%s direction=? cipher=? ksize=? rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", -+ name[what], get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), -+ get_local_port()); -+ free(s); -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) -+ /* no problem, the next instruction will be fatal() */ -+ return; -+ audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, -+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 0); -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+#endif -+} -+ -+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" }; -+ -+void -+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, -+ uid_t uid) -+{ -+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ int audit_fd, audit_ok; -+ const Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc); -+ char *s; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=start direction=%s cipher=%s ksize=%d mac=%s pfs=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", -+ direction[ctos], enc, cipher ? 8 * cipher->key_len : 0, mac, pfs, -+ (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, -+ get_remote_port(), (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), get_local_port()); -+ free(s); -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT || -+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ return; /* No audit support in kernel */ -+ else -+ fatal("cannot open audit"); /* Must prevent login */ -+ } -+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION, -+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ -+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) -+ fatal("cannot write into audit"); /* Must prevent login */ -+#endif -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ int audit_fd, audit_ok; -+ char *s; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ", -+ direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid, -+ get_remote_port(), -+ (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())), -+ get_local_port()); -+ free(s); -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && -+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ error("cannot open audit"); -+ return; -+ } -+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, -+ buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1); -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ -+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) -+ error("cannot write into audit"); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ int audit_fd, audit_ok; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=server fp=%s direction=? spid=%jd suid=%jd ", -+ fp, (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid); -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && -+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ error("cannot open audit"); -+ return; -+ } -+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, -+ buf, NULL, -+ listening_for_clients() ? get_remote_ipaddr() : NULL, -+ NULL, 1); -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ -+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) -+ error("cannot write into audit"); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *fp) -+{ -+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE]; -+ int audit_fd, audit_ok; -+ -+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=create kind=server fp=%s direction=? ", fp); -+ audit_fd = audit_open(); -+ if (audit_fd < 0) { -+ if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT && -+ errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) -+ error("cannot open audit"); -+ return; -+ } -+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, -+ buf, NULL, 0, NULL, 1); -+ audit_close(audit_fd); -+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */ -+ if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0))) -+ error("cannot write into audit"); -+} - #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/audit.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/audit.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/audit.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/audit.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ - - #include <stdarg.h> - #include <string.h> -+#include <unistd.h> - - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - -@@ -36,6 +37,11 @@ - #include "key.h" - #include "hostfile.h" - #include "auth.h" -+#include "ssh-gss.h" -+#include "monitor_wrap.h" -+#include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "misc.h" -+#include "servconf.h" - - /* - * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when -@@ -43,6 +49,7 @@ - * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called. Test for NULL before using. - */ - extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; -+extern ServerOptions options; - - /* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */ - ssh_audit_event_t -@@ -71,13 +78,10 @@ audit_classify_auth(const char *method) - const char * - audit_username(void) - { -- static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)"; -- static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)"; -+ static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown)"; - -- if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL) -+ if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) - return (unknownuser); -- if (!the_authctxt->valid) -- return (invaliduser); - return (the_authctxt->user); - } - -@@ -111,6 +115,40 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev) - return(event_lookup[i].name); - } - -+void -+audit_key(int host_user, int *rv, const Key *key) -+{ -+ char *fp; -+ const char *crypto_name; -+ -+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) -+ crypto_name = "ssh-rsa1"; -+ else -+ crypto_name = key_ssh_name(key); -+ if (audit_keyusage(host_user, crypto_name, key_size(key), fp, *rv) == 0) -+ *rv = 0; -+ free(fp); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_unsupported(int what) -+{ -+ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(what)); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) -+{ -+ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid())); -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free(int ctos) -+{ -+ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid())); -+} -+ - # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - /* - * Null implementations of audit functions. -@@ -140,6 +178,17 @@ audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - } - - /* -+ * Called when a child process has called, or will soon call, -+ * audit_session_open. -+ */ -+void -+audit_count_session_open(void) -+{ -+ debug("audit count session open euid %d user %s", geteuid(), -+ audit_username()); -+} -+ -+/* - * Called when a user session is started. Argument is the tty allocated to - * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated. - * -@@ -174,13 +223,91 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li) - /* - * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command. Note that - * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows -- * multiple sessions within a single connection. -+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. Returns a "handle" for -+ * audit_end_command. - */ --void -+int - audit_run_command(const char *command) - { - debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), - audit_username(), command); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called when the non-interactive command finishes. Note that -+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows -+ * multiple sessions within a single connection. "handle" should come from -+ * the corresponding audit_run_command. -+ */ -+void -+audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ -+ debug("audit end nopty exec euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(), -+ audit_username(), command); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called when user is successfully autherized by the RSA1/RSA/DSA key. -+ * -+ * Type is the key type, len is the key length(byte) and fp is the fingerprint of the key. -+ */ -+int -+audit_keyusage(int host_user, const char *type, unsigned bits, char *fp, int rv) -+{ -+ debug("audit %s key usage euid %d user %s key type %s key length %d fingerprint %s%s, result %d", -+ host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased", geteuid(), audit_username(), type, bits, -+ sshkey_fingerprint_prefix(), fp, rv); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called when the protocol negotiation fails. -+ */ -+void -+audit_unsupported_body(int what) -+{ -+ debug("audit unsupported protocol euid %d type %d", geteuid(), what); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on succesfull protocol negotiation. -+ */ -+void -+audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, char *pfs, pid_t pid, -+ uid_t uid) -+{ -+ debug("audit protocol negotiation euid %d direction %d cipher %s mac %s compresion %s pfs %s from pid %ld uid %u", -+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, pfs, (long)pid, -+ (unsigned)uid); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard -+ */ -+void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u", -+ (unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on destroy private part of the server key -+ */ -+void -+audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ debug("audit destroy sensitive data euid %d fingerprint %s from pid %ld uid %u", -+ geteuid(), fp, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid); -+} -+ -+/* -+ * This will be called on generation of the ephemeral server key -+ */ -+void -+audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *) -+{ -+ debug("audit create ephemeral server key euid %d fingerprint %s", geteuid(), fp); - } - # endif /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ - #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/audit.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/audit.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/audit.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/audit.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 -@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ - # define _SSH_AUDIT_H - - #include "loginrec.h" -+#include "key.h" - - enum ssh_audit_event_type { - SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES, -@@ -47,11 +48,25 @@ enum ssh_audit_event_type { - }; - typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t; - -+int listening_for_clients(void); -+ - void audit_connection_from(const char *, int); - void audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); -+void audit_count_session_open(void); - void audit_session_open(struct logininfo *); - void audit_session_close(struct logininfo *); --void audit_run_command(const char *); -+int audit_run_command(const char *); -+void audit_end_command(int, const char *); - ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *); -+int audit_keyusage(int, const char *, unsigned, char *, int); -+void audit_key(int, int *, const Key *); -+void audit_unsupported(int); -+void audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *, char *); -+void audit_unsupported_body(int); -+void audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); -+void audit_session_key_free(int ctos); -+void audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t); -+void audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); -+void audit_generate_ephemeral_server_key(const char *); - - #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auditstub.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/auditstub.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/auditstub.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 -@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ -+/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */ -+ -+/* -+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. -+ * Use is subject to license terms. -+ * -+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without -+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions -+ * are met: -+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. -+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright -+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the -+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. -+ * -+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR -+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES -+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. -+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, -+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT -+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, -+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY -+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT -+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF -+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. -+ * -+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima(a)redhat.com> -+ */ -+ -+#include <sys/types.h> -+ -+void -+audit_unsupported(int n) -+{ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs) -+{ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free(int ctos) -+{ -+} -+ -+void -+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+} -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth-rsa.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/auth-rsa.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/auth-rsa.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.094883779 +0100 -@@ -95,7 +95,10 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) - { - u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16]; - struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; -- int len; -+ int len, rv; -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ char *fp; -+#endif - - /* don't allow short keys */ - if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { -@@ -119,12 +122,18 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) - ssh_digest_free(md); - - /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ -- if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { -- /* Wrong answer. */ -- return (0); -+ rv = timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) == 0; -+ -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ if (audit_keyusage(1, "ssh-rsa1", RSA_size(key->rsa) * 8, fp, rv) == 0) { -+ debug("unsuccessful audit"); -+ rv = 0; - } -- /* Correct answer. */ -- return (1); -+ free(fp); -+#endif -+ -+ return rv; - } - - /* -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/auth.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/auth.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.094883779 +0100 -@@ -644,9 +644,6 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user) - record_failed_login(user, - get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); - #endif --#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -- audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); --#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ - return (NULL); - } - if (!allowed_user(pw)) -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/auth.h.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.002883927 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/auth.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.094883779 +0100 -@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt - - char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); - char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); -+int user_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); - - FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); - FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); -@@ -213,6 +214,7 @@ int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struc - int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); - int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *, - const u_char *, size_t, u_int); -+int hostbased_key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); - - /* debug messages during authentication */ - void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.002883927 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 -@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) - /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ - authenticated = 0; - if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && -- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), -+ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), - buffer_len(&b))) == 1) - authenticated = 1; - -@@ -164,6 +164,18 @@ done: - return authenticated; - } - -+int -+hostbased_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) -+{ -+ int rv; -+ -+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_key(0, &rv, key); -+#endif -+ return rv; -+} -+ - /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ - int - hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.013883910 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.094883779 +0100 -@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) - /* test for correct signature */ - authenticated = 0; - if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) && -- PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), -+ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), - buffer_len(&b))) == 1) { - authenticated = 1; - /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */ -@@ -250,6 +250,18 @@ pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, con - free(extra); - } - -+int -+user_key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *sig, u_int slen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) -+{ -+ int rv; -+ -+ rv = key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, datalen); -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_key(1, &rv, key); -+#endif -+ return rv; -+} -+ - static int - match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) - { -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/auth2.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/auth2.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.044883860 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/auth2.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.093883780 +0100 -@@ -249,9 +249,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 - } else { - logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user); - authctxt->pw = fakepw(); --#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -- PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); --#endif - } - #ifdef USE_PAM - if (options.use_pam) -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/cipher.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/cipher.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/cipher.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.101883767 +0100 -@@ -57,26 +59,6 @@ extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(v - extern int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); - #endif - --struct sshcipher { -- char *name; -- int number; /* for ssh1 only */ -- u_int block_size; -- u_int key_len; -- u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ -- u_int auth_len; -- u_int discard_len; -- u_int flags; --#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) --#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) --#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) --#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) --#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -- const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); --#else -- void *ignored; --#endif --}; -- - static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { - #ifdef WITH_SSH1 - { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/cipher.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/cipher.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/cipher.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.094883779 +0100 -@@ -62,7 +62,26 @@ - #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 - #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 - --struct sshcipher; -+struct sshcipher { -+ char *name; -+ int number; /* for ssh1 only */ -+ u_int block_size; -+ u_int key_len; -+ u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ -+ u_int auth_len; -+ u_int discard_len; -+ u_int flags; -+#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) -+#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) -+#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) -+#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) -+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL -+ const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); -+#else -+ void *ignored; -+#endif -+}; -+ - struct sshcipher_ctx { - int plaintext; - int encrypt; -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/kex.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/kex.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/kex.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.046883856 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/kex.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.101883767 +0100 -@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ - #include "ssherr.h" - #include "sshbuf.h" - #include "digest.h" -+#include "audit.h" - - #ifdef GSSAPI - #include "ssh-gss.h" -@@ -484,8 +508,12 @@ choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *cli - { - char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - -- if (name == NULL) -+ if (name == NULL) { -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_unsupported(0); -+#endif - return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; -+ } - if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - enc->name = name; -@@ -503,8 +531,12 @@ choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshma - { - char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - -- if (name == NULL) -+ if (name == NULL) { -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_unsupported(1); -+#endif - return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; -+ } - if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) - return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - /* truncate the key */ -@@ -521,8 +553,12 @@ choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char * - { - char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); - -- if (name == NULL) -+ if (name == NULL) { -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_unsupported(2); -+#endif - return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; -+ } - if (strcmp(name, "zlib(a)openssh.com") == 0) { - comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; - } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { -@@ -672,6 +708,10 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) - dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); - dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); - dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); -+ debug("kex: %s need=%d dh_need=%d", kex->name, need, dh_need); -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_kex(mode, newkeys->enc.name, newkeys->mac.name, newkeys->comp.name, kex->name); -+#endif - } - /* XXX need runden? */ - kex->we_need = need; -@@ -847,3 +887,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i - sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr); - } - #endif -+ -+static void -+enc_destroy(struct sshenc *enc) -+{ -+ if (enc == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ if (enc->key) { -+ memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len); -+ free(enc->key); -+ } -+ -+ if (enc->iv) { -+ memset(enc->iv, 0, enc->block_size); -+ free(enc->iv); -+ } -+ -+ memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc)); -+} -+ -+void -+newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys) -+{ -+ if (newkeys == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc); -+ mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac); -+ memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); -+} -+ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/kex.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/kex.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/kex.h.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.046883856 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/kex.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.095883777 +0100 -@@ -199,6 +199,8 @@ int kexgss_client(struct ssh *); - int kexgss_server(struct ssh *); - #endif - -+void newkeys_destroy(struct newkeys *newkeys); -+ - int kex_dh_hash(const char *, const char *, - const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, - const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, u_char *, size_t *); -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/key.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/key.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/key.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/key.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.095883777 +0100 -@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ typedef struct sshkey Key; - #define key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid - #define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid - #define key_is_cert sshkey_is_cert -+#define key_is_private sshkey_is_private - #define key_type_plain sshkey_type_plain - #define key_cert_is_legacy sshkey_cert_is_legacy - #define key_curve_name_to_nid sshkey_curve_name_to_nid -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/mac.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/mac.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/mac.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/mac.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.102883766 +0100 -@@ -226,6 +246,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac) - mac->umac_ctx = NULL; - } - -+void -+mac_destroy(struct sshmac *mac) -+{ -+ if (mac == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ if (mac->key) { -+ memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len); -+ free(mac->key); -+ } -+ -+ memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac)); -+} -+ - /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ - #define MAC_SEP "," - int -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/mac.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/mac.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/mac.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/mac.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.095883777 +0100 -@@ -47,5 +47,6 @@ int mac_init(struct sshmac *); - int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int, - u_char *, size_t); - void mac_clear(struct sshmac *); -+void mac_destroy(struct sshmac *); - - #endif /* SSHMAC_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/monitor.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/monitor.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.072883814 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/monitor.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.107883758 +0100 -@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ - #include "ssh2.h" - #include "roaming.h" - #include "authfd.h" -+#include "audit.h" - #include "match.h" - #include "ssherr.h" - -@@ -117,6 +118,8 @@ extern Buffer auth_debug; - extern int auth_debug_init; - extern Buffer loginmsg; - -+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); -+ - /* State exported from the child */ - static struct sshbuf *child_state; - -@@ -167,6 +170,11 @@ int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffe - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); - int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *); -+int mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int, Buffer *); - #endif - - static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); -@@ -226,6 +234,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] - #endif - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, - #endif - #ifdef BSD_AUTH - {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, -@@ -264,6 +276,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20 - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, - #endif - {0, 0, NULL} - }; -@@ -296,6 +313,10 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] - #endif - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, - #endif - #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - {0, 0, NULL} -@@ -309,6 +330,11 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15 - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, - {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body}, -+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_server_key_free}, - #endif - #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - {0, 0, NULL} -@@ -1466,9 +1493,11 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) - Key *key; - u_char *signature, *data, *blob; - u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; -+ int type = 0; - int verified = 0; - int valid_data = 0; - -+ type = buffer_get_int(m); - blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); - signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); - data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); -@@ -1476,6 +1505,8 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) - if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || - !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) - fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); -+ if (type != key_blobtype) -+ fatal("%s: bad key type", __func__); - - key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); - if (key == NULL) -@@ -1496,7 +1527,17 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) - if (!valid_data) - fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); - -- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); -+ switch (key_blobtype) { -+ case MM_USERKEY: -+ verified = user_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); -+ break; -+ case MM_HOSTKEY: -+ verified = hostbased_key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); -+ break; -+ default: -+ verified = 0; -+ break; -+ } - debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", - __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); - -@@ -1554,6 +1595,12 @@ mm_session_close(Session *s) - debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); - session_pty_cleanup2(s); - } -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (s->command != NULL) { -+ debug3("%s: command %d", __func__, s->command_handle); -+ session_end_command2(s); -+ } -+#endif - session_unused(s->self); - } - -@@ -1836,6 +1883,8 @@ mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) - sshpam_cleanup(); - #endif - -+ destroy_sensitive_data(0); -+ - while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) - if (errno != EINTR) - exit(1); -@@ -1878,11 +1927,43 @@ mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buff - { - u_int len; - char *cmd; -+ Session *s; - - debug3("%s entering", __func__); - cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ - /* sanity check command, if so how? */ -- audit_run_command(cmd); -+ s = session_new(); -+ if (s == NULL) -+ fatal("%s: error allocating a session", __func__); -+ s->command = cmd; -+ s->command_handle = audit_run_command(cmd); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ buffer_put_int(m, s->self); -+ -+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, m); -+ -+ return (0); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_audit_end_command(int socket, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ int handle; -+ u_int len; -+ char *cmd; -+ Session *s; -+ -+ debug3("%s entering", __func__); -+ handle = buffer_get_int(m); -+ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ -+ s = session_by_id(handle); -+ if (s == NULL || s->ttyfd != -1 || s->command == NULL || -+ strcmp(s->command, cmd) != 0) -+ fatal("%s: invalid handle", __func__); -+ mm_session_close(s); - free(cmd); - return (0); - } -@@ -1936,6 +2017,7 @@ - void - mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) - { -+ Buffer m; - debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); - - if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) -@@ -1946,6 +2027,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor - mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, - child_state); - debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__); -+ -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (compat20) { -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); -+ mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); -+ buffer_free(&m); -+ } -+#endif -+ -+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ -+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) -+ ; -+ - } - - -@@ -2212,3 +2308,87 @@ mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Bu - - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+int -+mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int sock, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ int what; -+ -+ what = buffer_get_int(m); -+ -+ audit_unsupported_body(what); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ -+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, m); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ int ctos, len; -+ char *cipher, *mac, *compress, *pfs; -+ pid_t pid; -+ uid_t uid; -+ -+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m); -+ cipher = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ mac = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ compress = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ pfs = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ -+ audit_kex_body(ctos, cipher, mac, compress, pfs, pid, uid); -+ -+ free(cipher); -+ free(mac); -+ free(compress); -+ free(pfs); -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ -+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, m); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ int ctos; -+ pid_t pid; -+ uid_t uid; -+ -+ ctos = buffer_get_int(m); -+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ -+ audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid); -+ -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ -+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m); -+ return 0; -+} -+ -+int -+mm_answer_audit_server_key_free(int sock, Buffer *m) -+{ -+ int len; -+ char *fp; -+ pid_t pid; -+ uid_t uid; -+ -+ fp = buffer_get_string(m, &len); -+ pid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ uid = buffer_get_int64(m); -+ -+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); -+ -+ free(fp); -+ buffer_clear(m); -+ -+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, m); -+ return 0; -+} -+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/monitor.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/monitor.h.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.072883814 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/monitor.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.096883775 +0100 -@@ -69,7 +69,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype { - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109, - MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111, -- MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 114, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND = 115, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND = 116, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 118, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED = 119, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX = 120, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX = 121, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 122, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE = 123, -+ MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 124, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE = 125 - - }; - -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.047883855 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.108883756 +0100 -@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, cha - */ - - int --mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) -+mm_key_verify(enum mm_keytype type, Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) - { - Buffer m; - u_char *blob; -@@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i - return (0); - - buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_int(&m, type); - buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); - buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); - buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); -@@ -492,6 +493,18 @@ mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_i - return (verified); - } - -+int -+mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) -+{ -+ return mm_key_verify(MM_HOSTKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); -+} -+ -+int -+mm_user_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) -+{ -+ return mm_key_verify(MM_USERKEY, key, sig, siglen, data, datalen); -+} -+ - void - mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) - { -@@ -1005,10 +1018,11 @@ mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) - buffer_free(&m); - } - --void -+int - mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) - { - Buffer m; -+ int handle; - - debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); - -@@ -1016,6 +1030,26 @@ mm_audit_run_command(const char *command - buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); - - mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); -+ -+ handle = buffer_get_int(&m); -+ buffer_free(&m); -+ -+ return (handle); -+} -+ -+void -+mm_audit_end_command(int handle, const char *command) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_int(&m, handle); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, &m); - buffer_free(&m); - } - #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -@@ -1151,3 +1185,72 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc - - #endif /* GSSAPI */ - -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+void -+mm_audit_unsupported_body(int what) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_int(&m, what); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, -+ &m); -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+} -+ -+void -+mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher, char *mac, char *compress, char *fps, pid_t pid, -+ uid_t uid) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, cipher); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, (mac ? mac : "")); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, compress); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fps); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX, -+ &m); -+ -+ buffer_free(&m); -+} -+ -+void -+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_int(&m, ctos); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, -+ &m); -+ buffer_free(&m); -+} -+ -+void -+mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *fp, pid_t pid, uid_t uid) -+{ -+ Buffer m; -+ -+ buffer_init(&m); -+ buffer_put_cstring(&m, fp); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, pid); -+ buffer_put_int64(&m, uid); -+ -+ mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, &m); -+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SERVER_KEY_FREE, -+ &m); -+ buffer_free(&m); -+} -+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.048883853 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/monitor_wrap.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.096883775 +0100 -@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char - int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); - int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); - int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); --int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); -+int mm_hostbased_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); -+int mm_user_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); - int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); - int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *); - BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); -@@ -79,7 +80,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - #include "audit.h" - void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); --void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); -+int mm_audit_run_command(const char *); -+void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *); -+void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int); -+void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t); -+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t); -+void mm_audit_destroy_sensitive_data(const char *, pid_t, uid_t); - #endif - - struct Session; -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/packet.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/packet.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/packet.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:14.990883947 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/packet.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.097883774 +0100 -@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ - #include "key.h" /* typedefs XXX */ - - #include "xmalloc.h" -+#include "audit.h" - #include "crc32.h" - #include "deattack.h" - #include "compat.h" -@@ -448,6 +449,13 @@ ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh - return ssh->state->connection_out; - } - -+static int -+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state) -+{ -+ return state != NULL && -+ (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL); -+} -+ - /* - * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned - * string must not be freed. -@@ -478,13 +486,6 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) - if (!state->initialized) - return; - state->initialized = 0; -- if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { -- shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); -- close(state->connection_out); -- } else { -- close(state->connection_in); -- close(state->connection_out); -- } - sshbuf_free(state->input); - sshbuf_free(state->output); - sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); -@@ -516,14 +517,24 @@ ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) - inflateEnd(stream); - } - } -- if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0) -- error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -- if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0) -- error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ if (packet_state_has_keys(state)) { -+ if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0) -+ error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0) -+ error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); -+ audit_session_key_free(2); -+ } - if (ssh->remote_ipaddr) { - free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); - ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; - } -+ if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { -+ shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); -+ close(state->connection_out); -+ } else { -+ close(state->connection_in); -+ close(state->connection_out); -+ } - free(ssh->state); - ssh->state = NULL; - } -@@ -941,6 +952,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mod - } - if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { - debug("set_newkeys: rekeying"); -+ audit_session_key_free(mode); - if ((r = cipher_cleanup(cc)) != 0) - return r; - enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; -@@ -2263,6 +2275,75 @@ ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) - return (void *)ssh->state->output; - } - -+static void -+newkeys_destroy_and_free(struct newkeys *newkeys) -+{ -+ if (newkeys == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ free(newkeys->enc.name); -+ -+ if (newkeys->mac.enabled) { -+ mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); -+ free(newkeys->mac.name); -+ } -+ -+ free(newkeys->comp.name); -+ -+ newkeys_destroy(newkeys); -+ free(newkeys); -+} -+ -+static void -+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state) -+{ -+ if (state == NULL) -+ return; -+ -+ cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context); -+ cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context); -+ -+ buffer_free(state->input); -+ state->input = NULL; -+ buffer_free(state->output); -+ state->output = NULL; -+ buffer_free(state->outgoing_packet); -+ state->outgoing_packet = NULL; -+ buffer_free(state->incoming_packet); -+ state->incoming_packet = NULL; -+ if( state->compression_buffer ) { -+ buffer_free(state->compression_buffer); -+ state->compression_buffer = NULL; -+ } -+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]); -+ state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL; -+ newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); -+ state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; -+ mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac); -+// TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; -+// memset(state, 0, sizeof(state)); -+} -+ -+void -+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep) -+{ -+ if (audit_it) -+ audit_it = (active_state != NULL && packet_state_has_keys(active_state->state)) -+ || (backup_state != NULL && packet_state_has_keys(backup_state->state)); -+ if (active_state != NULL) -+ packet_destroy_state(active_state->state); -+ if (backup_state != NULL) -+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state->state); -+ if (audit_it) { -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (privsep) -+ audit_session_key_free(2); -+ else -+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); -+#endif -+ } -+} -+ - /* XXX TODO update roaming to new API (does not work anyway) */ - /* - * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when -@@ -2272,18 +2373,12 @@ void - ssh_packet_backup_state(struct ssh *ssh, - struct ssh *backup_state) - { -- struct ssh *tmp; -- - close(ssh->state->connection_in); - ssh->state->connection_in = -1; - close(ssh->state->connection_out); - ssh->state->connection_out = -1; -- if (backup_state) -- tmp = backup_state; -- else -- tmp = ssh_alloc_session_state(); - backup_state = ssh; -- ssh = tmp; -+ ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state(); - } - - /* XXX FIXME FIXME FIXME */ -@@ -2302,9 +2397,7 @@ ssh_packet_restore_state(struct ssh *ssh - backup_state = ssh; - ssh = tmp; - ssh->state->connection_in = backup_state->state->connection_in; -- backup_state->state->connection_in = -1; - ssh->state->connection_out = backup_state->state->connection_out; -- backup_state->state->connection_out = -1; - len = sshbuf_len(backup_state->state->input); - if (len > 0) { - if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->input, -@@ -2313,6 +2406,11 @@ ssh_packet_restore_state(struct ssh *ssh - sshbuf_reset(backup_state->state->input); - add_recv_bytes(len); - } -+ backup_state->state->connection_in = -1; -+ backup_state->state->connection_out = -1; -+ packet_destroy_state(backup_state->state); -+ free(backup_state); -+ backup_state = NULL; - } - - /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/packet.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/packet.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/packet.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/packet.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.097883774 +0100 -@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh); - const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp); - - /* OLD API */ --extern struct ssh *active_state; -+extern struct ssh *active_state, *backup_state; - #include "opacket.h" - - #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) -@@ -203,4 +203,5 @@ extern struct ssh *active_state; - # undef EC_POINT - #endif - -+void packet_destroy_all(int, int); - #endif /* PACKET_H */ -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/session.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/session.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/session.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.073883813 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/session.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.097883774 +0100 -@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ extern int log_stderr; - extern int debug_flag; - extern u_int utmp_len; - extern int startup_pipe; --extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); -+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(int); - extern Buffer loginmsg; - - /* original command from peer. */ -@@ -731,6 +731,14 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *comm - /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ - close(ttyfd); - -+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA -+ /* do_login in the child did not affect state in this process, -+ compensate. From an architectural standpoint, this is extremely -+ ugly. */ -+ if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) -+ audit_count_session_open(); -+#endif -+ - /* Enter interactive session. */ - s->ptymaster = ptymaster; - packet_set_interactive(1, -@@ -853,15 +861,19 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) - get_remote_port()); - - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1) -+ fatal("do_exec: command already set"); - if (command != NULL) -- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); -+ s->command = xstrdup(command); - else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { - char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; - - if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ - shell =_PATH_BSHELL; -- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); -+ s->command = xstrdup(shell); - } -+ if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1) -+ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(s->command)); - #endif - if (s->ttyfd != -1) - ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); -@@ -1704,7 +1716,10 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command - int r = 0; - - /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ -- destroy_sensitive_data(); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(1); -+ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the -+ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */ -+ packet_destroy_all(0, 1); - - /* Force a password change */ - if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { -@@ -1934,6 +1949,7 @@ session_unused(int id) - sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; - sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; - sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; -+ sessions[id].command_handle = -1; - sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; - sessions_first_unused = id; - } -@@ -2016,6 +2032,19 @@ session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int cha - } - - Session * -+session_by_id(int id) -+{ -+ if (id >= 0 && id < sessions_nalloc) { -+ Session *s = &sessions[id]; -+ if (s->used) -+ return s; -+ } -+ debug("session_by_id: unknown id %d", id); -+ session_dump(); -+ return NULL; -+} -+ -+Session * - session_by_tty(char *tty) - { - int i; -@@ -2532,6 +2561,32 @@ session_exit_message(Session *s, int sta - chan_write_failed(c); - } - -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+void -+session_end_command2(Session *s) -+{ -+ if (s->command != NULL) { -+ if (s->command_handle != -1) -+ audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command); -+ free(s->command); -+ s->command = NULL; -+ s->command_handle = -1; -+ } -+} -+ -+static void -+session_end_command(Session *s) -+{ -+ if (s->command != NULL) { -+ if (s->command_handle != -1) -+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(s->command_handle, s->command)); -+ free(s->command); -+ s->command = NULL; -+ s->command_handle = -1; -+ } -+} -+#endif -+ - void - session_close(Session *s) - { -@@ -2540,6 +2593,10 @@ session_close(Session *s) - debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); - if (s->ttyfd != -1) - session_pty_cleanup(s); -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ if (s->command) -+ session_end_command(s); -+#endif - free(s->term); - free(s->display); - free(s->x11_chanids); -@@ -2754,6 +2811,15 @@ do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) - server_loop2(authctxt); - } - -+static void -+do_cleanup_one_session(Session *s) -+{ -+ session_pty_cleanup2(s); -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ session_end_command2(s); -+#endif -+} -+ - void - do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) - { -@@ -2802,5 +2868,5 @@ do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) - * or if running in monitor. - */ - if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) -- session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); -+ session_destroy_all(do_cleanup_one_session); - } -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/session.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/session.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/session.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/session.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.097883774 +0100 -@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session { - char *name; - char *val; - } *env; -+ -+ /* exec */ -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ int command_handle; -+ char *command; -+#endif - }; - - void do_authenticated(Authctxt *); -@@ -73,8 +79,10 @@ void session_close_by_pid(pid_t, int); - void session_close_by_channel(int, void *); - void session_destroy_all(void (*)(Session *)); - void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *); -+void session_end_command2(Session *); - - Session *session_new(void); -+Session *session_by_id(int); - Session *session_by_tty(char *); - void session_close(Session *); - void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *); -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/sshd.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/sshd.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.083883796 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/sshd.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.110883753 +0100 -@@ -121,6 +124,7 @@ - #endif - #include "monitor_wrap.h" - #include "roaming.h" -+#include "audit.h" - #include "ssh-sandbox.h" - #include "version.h" - #include "ssherr.h" -@@ -260,7 +264,7 @@ Buffer loginmsg; - struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; - - /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ --void destroy_sensitive_data(void); -+void destroy_sensitive_data(int); - void demote_sensitive_data(void); - - #ifdef WITH_SSH1 -@@ -281,6 +285,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void) - num_listen_socks = -1; - } - -+/* -+ * Is this process listening for clients (i.e. not specific to any specific -+ * client connection?) -+ */ -+int listening_for_clients(void) -+{ -+ return num_listen_socks > 0; -+} -+ - static void - close_startup_pipes(void) - { -@@ -560,22 +573,45 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in - } - } - --/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ -+/* -+ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful, -+ * this can be called from cleanup_exit() - i.e. from just about anywhere. -+ */ - void --destroy_sensitive_data(void) -+destroy_sensitive_data(int privsep) - { - int i; -+ pid_t pid; -+ uid_t uid; - - if (sensitive_data.server_key) { - key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); - sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; - } -+ pid = getpid(); -+ uid = getuid(); - for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { - if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { -+ char *fp; -+ -+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) -+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ else -+ fp = NULL; - key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); - sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; -+ if (fp != NULL) { -+ if (privsep) -+ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, -+ pid, uid)); -+ else -+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, -+ pid, uid); -+ free(fp); -+ } - } -- if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { -+ if (sensitive_data.host_certificates -+ && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { - key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); - sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; - } -@@ -589,6 +625,8 @@ void - demote_sensitive_data(void) - { - Key *tmp; -+ pid_t pid; -+ uid_t uid; - int i; - - if (sensitive_data.server_key) { -@@ -597,13 +635,25 @@ demote_sensitive_data(void) - sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; - } - -+ pid = getpid(); -+ uid = getuid(); - for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { - if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { -+ char *fp; -+ -+ if (key_is_private(sensitive_data.host_keys[i])) -+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sensitive_data.host_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX); -+ else -+ fp = NULL; - tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); - key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); - sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; - if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) - sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; -+ if (fp != NULL) { -+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(fp, pid, uid); -+ free(fp); -+ } - } - /* Certs do not need demotion */ - } -@@ -675,7 +725,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - - if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) - box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); -- pid = fork(); -+ pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork(); - if (pid == -1) { - fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); - } else if (pid != 0) { -@@ -759,6 +811,12 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) - else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { - verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); - buffer_clear(&loginmsg); -+ if (*pmonitor->m_pkex != NULL ){ -+ newkeys_destroy((*pmonitor->m_pkex)->newkeys[MODE_OUT]); -+ newkeys_destroy((*pmonitor->m_pkex)->newkeys[MODE_IN]); -+ audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid()); -+ packet_destroy_all(0, 0); -+ } - monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); - - /* NEVERREACHED */ -@@ -1286,6 +1341,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so - if (received_sigterm) { - logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", - (int) received_sigterm); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(0); - close_listen_socks(); - if (options.pid_file != NULL) - unlink(options.pid_file); -@@ -2242,6 +2321,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - */ - if (use_privsep) { - mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); -+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1); - exit(0); - } - -@@ -2287,7 +2367,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - privsep_postauth(authctxt); - /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ - if (!compat20) -- destroy_sensitive_data(); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(0); - } - - packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, -@@ -2301,6 +2381,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av) - do_authenticated(authctxt); - - /* The connection has been terminated. */ -+ packet_destroy_all(1, 1); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(1); -+ - packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); - verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", - (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); -@@ -2461,6 +2544,10 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) - if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) - packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); - -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ audit_kex(2, cipher_name(cipher_type), "crc", "none", "none"); -+#endif -+ - debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); - - /* Get the encrypted integer. */ -@@ -2520,7 +2607,7 @@ do_ssh1_kex(void) - } - - /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ -- destroy_sensitive_data(); -+ destroy_sensitive_data(1); - - if (use_privsep) - mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); -@@ -2703,6 +2802,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) - void - cleanup_exit(int i) - { -+ static int in_cleanup = 0; -+ int is_privsep_child; -+ -+ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep -+ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse -+ indefinitely. */ -+ if (in_cleanup) -+ _exit(i); -+ in_cleanup = 1; -+ - if (the_authctxt) { - do_cleanup(the_authctxt); - if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && -@@ -2714,9 +2823,14 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) - pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); - } - } -+ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0; -+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL) -+ destroy_sensitive_data(is_privsep_child); -+ packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child); - #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ -- if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) -+ if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) && -+ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) - audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); - #endif - _exit(i); -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.c.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.111883751 +0100 -@@ -317,6 +319,33 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) - } - - int -+sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k) -+{ -+ switch (k->type) { -+ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: -+ case KEY_RSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_RSA1: -+ case KEY_RSA: -+ return k->rsa->d != NULL; -+ case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: -+ case KEY_DSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_DSA: -+ return k->dsa->priv_key != NULL; -+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: -+ case KEY_ECDSA: -+ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL; -+#endif -+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: -+ case KEY_ED25519: -+ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL); -+ default: -+ /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */ -+ return 0; -+ } -+} -+ -+int - sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) - { - if (k == NULL) -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.h ---- openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.h.audit 2015-03-17 06:49:20.000000000 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/sshkey.h 2015-03-20 13:41:15.098883772 +0100 -@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey - int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp); - int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); - int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); -+int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *); - int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); - int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); - int sshkey_type_plain(int); -diff -up openssh-6.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.audit openssh-6.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c ---- openssh-6.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.audit 2015-03-20 13:41:15.088883788 +0100 -+++ openssh-6.8p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c 2015-03-20 13:41:15.097883774 +0100 -@@ -110,6 +110,12 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_ - #ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */ - SC_ALLOW(time), - #endif -+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS -+ SC_ALLOW(getuid), -+#ifdef __NR_getuid32 /* not defined on x86_64 */ -+ SC_ALLOW(getuid32), -+#endif -+#endif - SC_ALLOW(read), - SC_ALLOW(write), - SC_ALLOW(close), diff --git a/openssh/patches/openssh-6.7p1-seccomp-aarch64.patch b/openssh/patches/openssh-6.7p1-seccomp-aarch64.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 4285bd9..0000000 --- a/openssh/patches/openssh-6.7p1-seccomp-aarch64.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,66 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac -index 4065d0e..d59ad44 100644 ---- a/configure.ac -+++ b/configure.ac -@@ -764,9 +764,12 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) - i*86-*) - seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386 - ;; -- arm*-*) -+ aarch64*-*) -+ seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 -+ ;; -+ arm*-*) - seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM -- ;; -+ ;; - esac - if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then - AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"]) -diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -index 095b04a..52f6810 100644 ---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c -@@ -90,8 +90,20 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { - /* Load the syscall number for checking. */ - BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, - offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), -- SC_DENY(open, EACCES), -- SC_DENY(stat, EACCES), -+ SC_DENY(openat, EACCES), -+#ifdef __NR_open -+ SC_DENY(open, EACCES), /* not on AArch64 */ -+#endif -+#ifdef __NR_fstat -+ SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES), /* x86_64, Aarch64 */ -+#endif -+#if defined(__NR_stat64) && defined(__NR_fstat64) -+ SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES), /* ix86, arm */ -+ SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES), -+#endif -+#ifdef __NR_newfstatat -+ SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES), /* Aarch64 */ -+#endif - SC_ALLOW(getpid), - SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday), - SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime), -@@ -111,12 +123,19 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { - SC_ALLOW(shutdown), - #endif - SC_ALLOW(brk), -+#ifdef __NR_poll /* not on AArch64 */ - SC_ALLOW(poll), -+#endif - #ifdef __NR__newselect - SC_ALLOW(_newselect), - #else -+#ifdef __NR_select /* not on AArch64 */ - SC_ALLOW(select), - #endif -+#ifdef __NR_pselect6 /* AArch64 */ -+ SC_ALLOW(pselect6), -+#endif -+#endif - SC_ALLOW(madvise), - #ifdef __NR_mmap2 /* EABI ARM only has mmap2() */ - SC_ALLOW(mmap2), -- 2.7.4

3 5

[PATCH] net-snmp: Update to 5.7.3
by Stefan Schantl 16 Jan '17

16 Jan '17

This is a minor update to the latest available version of net-snmp. * Drop SELinux support. Fixes #11216. Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl(a)ipfire.org> --- net-snmp/net-snmp.nm | 5 +- net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.5-apsl-copying.patch | 20 +-- net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.6-multilib.patch | 30 ++-- .../net-snmp-5.7.2-python-ipaddress-size.patch | 23 ---- net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.7.2-systemd.patch | 151 ++++++++++----------- 5 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.7.2-python-ipaddress-size.patch diff --git a/net-snmp/net-snmp.nm b/net-snmp/net-snmp.nm index 8b2a7fa..36254ef 100644 --- a/net-snmp/net-snmp.nm +++ b/net-snmp/net-snmp.nm @@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ ############################################################################### name = net-snmp -version = 5.7.2 -release = 2 +version = 5.7.3 +release = 1 groups = Networking/Daemons url = http://net-snmp.sourceforge.net @@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ build bzip2-devel chrpath elfutils-devel - libselinux-devel lm-sensors-devel >= 3 openssl-devel perl(ExtUtils::Embed) diff --git a/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.5-apsl-copying.patch b/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.5-apsl-copying.patch index 43b85b6..5ae7ca3 100644 --- a/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.5-apsl-copying.patch +++ b/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.5-apsl-copying.patch @@ -11,15 +11,15 @@ the code to 'any subsequent version of this License published by Apple'. According to http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Licensing, APSL ver. 2.0 is better for us. -diff -up net-snmp-5.5/COPYING.apsl net-snmp-5.5/COPYING ---- net-snmp-5.5/COPYING.apsl 2010-08-04 12:40:27.494479126 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.5/COPYING 2010-08-04 12:45:47.713684755 +0200 -@@ -292,3 +292,337 @@ ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN C - TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE - USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH - DAMAGE. +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/COPYING.skiFvk net-snmp-5.7.3/COPYING +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/COPYING.skiFvk 2015-02-17 13:33:15.963257594 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/COPYING 2015-02-17 13:33:37.931241818 +0100 +@@ -325,3 +325,337 @@ PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEV + LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING + NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS + SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + -+---- Part 10: APPLE PUBLIC SOURCE LICENSE (APSL 2.0) ---- ++---- Part 11: APPLE PUBLIC SOURCE LICENSE (APSL 2.0) ---- + +Version 2.0 - August 6, 2003 + @@ -333,8 +333,8 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.5/COPYING.apsl net-snmp-5.5/COPYING + +Where You are located in the province of Quebec, Canada, the following clause +applies: The parties hereby confirm that they have requested that this License -+and all related documents be drafted in English. Les parties ont exig� que le -+pr�sent contrat et tous les documents connexes soient r�dig�s en anglais. ++and all related documents be drafted in English. Les parties ont exige que le ++present contrat et tous les documents connexes soient rediges en anglais. + +EXHIBIT A. + diff --git a/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.6-multilib.patch b/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.6-multilib.patch index a50f5a8..9c12385 100644 --- a/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.6-multilib.patch +++ b/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.6-multilib.patch @@ -1,8 +1,6 @@ -Make the man pages multilib safe. - -diff -up net-snmp-5.6/man/netsnmp_config_api.3.def.multilib net-snmp-5.6/man/netsnmp_config_api.3.def ---- net-snmp-5.6/man/netsnmp_config_api.3.def.multilib 2010-09-08 17:41:37.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.6/man/netsnmp_config_api.3.def 2010-10-25 17:40:43.433726423 +0200 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/man/netsnmp_config_api.3.def.oSBcEB net-snmp-5.7.3/man/netsnmp_config_api.3.def +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/man/netsnmp_config_api.3.def.oSBcEB 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/man/netsnmp_config_api.3.def 2015-02-17 13:32:38.903284207 +0100 @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ for one particular machine. .PP The default list of directories to search is \fC SYSCONFDIR/snmp\fP, @@ -19,24 +17,24 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.6/man/netsnmp_config_api.3.def.multilib net-snmp-5.6/man/net -Default: SYSCONFDIR/snmp:DATADIR/snmp:LIBDIR/snmp:$HOME/.snmp +Default: SYSCONFDIR/snmp:DATADIR/snmp:/usr/lib(64)/snmp:$HOME/.snmp .SH "SEE ALSO" - .BR mib_api "(3), " snmp_api (3) + netsnmp_mib_api(3), snmp_api(3) .\" Local Variables: -diff -up net-snmp-5.6/man/snmp_config.5.def.multilib net-snmp-5.6/man/snmp_config.5.def ---- net-snmp-5.6/man/snmp_config.5.def.multilib 2010-09-17 11:51:52.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.6/man/snmp_config.5.def 2010-10-25 17:40:12.681976439 +0200 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/man/snmp_config.5.def.oSBcEB net-snmp-5.7.3/man/snmp_config.5.def +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/man/snmp_config.5.def.oSBcEB 2015-02-17 13:32:04.251309092 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/man/snmp_config.5.def 2015-02-17 13:33:09.217262438 +0100 @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ First off, there are numerous places tha found and read from. By default, the applications look for configuration files in the following 4 directories, in order: SYSCONFDIR/snmp, -DATADIR/snmp, LIBDIR/snmp, and $HOME/.snmp. In each of these +DATADIR/snmp, /usr/lib(64)/snmp, and $HOME/.snmp. In each of these - directories, it looks for files with the extension of both - .IR conf " and " local.conf - (reading the second ones last). In this manner, there are -diff -up net-snmp-5.6/man/snmpd.conf.5.def.multilib net-snmp-5.6/man/snmpd.conf.5.def ---- net-snmp-5.6/man/snmpd.conf.5.def.multilib 2010-09-17 11:51:52.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.6/man/snmpd.conf.5.def 2010-10-25 17:40:12.682976925 +0200 -@@ -1387,7 +1387,7 @@ filename), and call the initialisation r + directories, it looks for files snmp.conf, snmpd.conf and/or + snmptrapd.conf, as well as snmp.local.conf, snmpd.local.conf + and/or snmptrapd.local.conf. *.local.conf are always +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/man/snmpd.conf.5.def.oSBcEB net-snmp-5.7.3/man/snmpd.conf.5.def +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/man/snmpd.conf.5.def.oSBcEB 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/man/snmpd.conf.5.def 2015-02-17 13:32:04.251309092 +0100 +@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ filename), and call the initialisation r .RS .IP "Note:" If the specified PATH is not a fully qualified filename, it will diff --git a/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.7.2-python-ipaddress-size.patch b/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.7.2-python-ipaddress-size.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 51a489f..0000000 --- a/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.7.2-python-ipaddress-size.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -895357 - net-snmp-python adds zeros to end of IP address (IPADDR type), which is not valid - -Source: upstream commit 234158b8e84cc204cbac96e6e9be6959635404b8 - - --- a/python/netsnmp/client_intf.c -+++ a/python/netsnmp/client_intf.c -@@ -821,14 +821,14 @@ OCT: - - case TYPE_IPADDR: - vars->type = ASN_IPADDRESS; -- vars->val.integer = (long *)malloc(sizeof(long)); -+ vars->val.integer = (in_addr_t *)malloc(sizeof(in_addr_t)); - if (val) - *(vars->val.integer) = inet_addr(val); - else { - ret = FAILURE; - *(vars->val.integer) = 0; - } -- vars->val_len = sizeof(long); -+ vars->val_len = sizeof(in_addr_t); - break; - - case TYPE_OBJID: diff --git a/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.7.2-systemd.patch b/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.7.2-systemd.patch index b349097..4c89d60 100644 --- a/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.7.2-systemd.patch +++ b/net-snmp/patches/net-snmp-5.7.2-systemd.patch @@ -57,10 +57,9 @@ Date: Tue Aug 9 10:53:43 2011 +0200 - update WantedBy in socket units as recommended by http://0pointer.de/blog/projects/socket-activation.html - rephrase README.systemd - -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/agent/snmpd.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/agent/snmpd.c ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/agent/snmpd.c.systemd 2012-10-10 00:28:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/agent/snmpd.c 2012-11-12 10:18:46.084369548 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/agent/snmpd.c.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/agent/snmpd.c +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/agent/snmpd.c.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/agent/snmpd.c 2015-02-17 13:34:05.736221851 +0100 @@ -164,6 +164,10 @@ typedef long fd_mask; #endif @@ -72,7 +71,7 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/agent/snmpd.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/agent/snmpd.c netsnmp_feature_want(logging_file) netsnmp_feature_want(logging_stdio) netsnmp_feature_want(logging_syslog) -@@ -441,18 +445,26 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) +@@ -443,18 +447,26 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) int agent_mode = -1; char *pid_file = NULL; char option_compatability[] = "-Le"; @@ -101,7 +100,7 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/agent/snmpd.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/agent/snmpd.c } #endif /* #WIN32 */ -@@ -1100,6 +1112,19 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) +@@ -1107,6 +1119,19 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) netsnmp_addrcache_initialise(); /* @@ -121,9 +120,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/agent/snmpd.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/agent/snmpd.c * Forever monitor the dest_port for incoming PDUs. */ DEBUGMSGTL(("snmpd/main", "We're up. Starting to process data.\n")); -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/apps/snmptrapd.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/apps/snmptrapd.c ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/apps/snmptrapd.c.systemd 2012-10-10 00:28:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/apps/snmptrapd.c 2012-11-12 10:18:46.084369548 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/apps/snmptrapd.c.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/apps/snmptrapd.c +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/apps/snmptrapd.c.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/apps/snmptrapd.c 2015-02-17 13:34:05.736221851 +0100 @@ -125,6 +125,10 @@ SOFTWARE. #include <net-snmp/net-snmp-features.h> @@ -135,7 +134,7 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/apps/snmptrapd.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/apps/snmptrapd.c #ifndef BSD4_3 #define BSD4_2 #endif -@@ -655,15 +659,22 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) +@@ -657,15 +661,22 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) int agentx_subagent = 1; #endif netsnmp_trapd_handler *traph; @@ -160,7 +159,7 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/apps/snmptrapd.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/apps/snmptrapd.c } #endif /* #WIN32 */ -@@ -1311,6 +1322,19 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) +@@ -1318,6 +1329,19 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[]) #endif #endif @@ -180,9 +179,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/apps/snmptrapd.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/apps/snmptrapd.c #ifdef WIN32SERVICE trapd_status = SNMPTRAPD_RUNNING; #endif -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.d/config_modules_lib.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.d/config_modules_lib ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.d/config_modules_lib.systemd 2012-10-10 00:28:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.d/config_modules_lib 2012-11-12 10:18:46.085369546 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/configure.d/config_modules_lib.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/configure.d/config_modules_lib +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/configure.d/config_modules_lib.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/configure.d/config_modules_lib 2015-02-17 13:34:05.737221850 +0100 @@ -53,6 +53,14 @@ if test "x$PARTIALTARGETOS" = "xmingw32" other_ftobjs_list="$other_ftobjs_list winpipe.ft" fi @@ -198,9 +197,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.d/config_modules_lib.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/co AC_SUBST(other_src_list) AC_SUBST(other_objs_list) AC_SUBST(other_lobjs_list) -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.d/config_project_with_enable.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.d/config_project_with_enable ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.d/config_project_with_enable.systemd 2012-10-10 00:28:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.d/config_project_with_enable 2012-11-12 10:18:46.086369544 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/configure.d/config_project_with_enable.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/configure.d/config_project_with_enable +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/configure.d/config_project_with_enable.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/configure.d/config_project_with_enable 2015-02-17 13:34:05.737221850 +0100 @@ -690,6 +690,15 @@ if test "x$with_dummy_values" != "xyes"; data for]) fi @@ -217,10 +216,10 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.d/config_project_with_enable.systemd net-snmp- NETSNMP_ARG_ENABLE(set-support, [ --disable-set-support Do not allow SNMP set requests.]) if test "x$enable_set_support" = "xno"; then -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/configure ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.systemd 2012-10-10 00:35:37.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/configure 2012-11-12 10:18:46.099369517 +0100 -@@ -950,6 +950,8 @@ with_kmem_usage +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/configure.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/configure +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/configure.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:37.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/configure 2015-02-17 13:34:05.744221845 +0100 +@@ -951,6 +951,8 @@ with_kmem_usage enable_kmem_usage with_dummy_values enable_dummy_values @@ -229,7 +228,7 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/configure enable_set_support with_set_support with_sys_contact -@@ -1866,6 +1868,8 @@ Configuring the agent: +@@ -1867,6 +1869,8 @@ Configuring the agent: This is technically not compliant with the SNMP specifications, but was how the agent operated for versions < 4.0. @@ -238,7 +237,7 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/configure --with-sys-contact="who@where" Default system contact. (Default: LOGIN@DOMAINNAME) --with-sys-location="location" Default system location. -@@ -4397,6 +4401,24 @@ $as_echo "#define NETSNMP_NO_DUMMY_VALUE +@@ -4398,6 +4402,24 @@ $as_echo "#define NETSNMP_NO_DUMMY_VALUE fi @@ -263,7 +262,7 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/configure # Check whether --enable-set-support was given. if test "${enable_set_support+set}" = set; then : enableval=$enable_set_support; -@@ -18239,6 +18261,14 @@ if test "x$PARTIALTARGETOS" = "xmingw32" +@@ -18639,6 +18661,14 @@ if test "x$PARTIALTARGETOS" = "xmingw32" other_ftobjs_list="$other_ftobjs_list winpipe.ft" fi @@ -278,9 +277,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/configure.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/configure -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.service.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.service ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.service.systemd 2012-11-12 10:18:46.104369507 +0100 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.service 2012-11-12 10:18:46.104369507 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmpd.service.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmpd.service +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmpd.service.MPGqYh 2015-02-17 13:34:05.745221844 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmpd.service 2015-02-17 13:34:05.745221844 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +# +# SNMP agent service file for systemd @@ -300,9 +299,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.service.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.ser + +[Install] +WantedBy=multi-user.target -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.socket.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.socket ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.socket.systemd 2012-11-12 10:18:46.104369507 +0100 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.socket 2012-11-12 10:18:46.104369507 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmpd.socket.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmpd.socket +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmpd.socket.MPGqYh 2015-02-17 13:34:05.745221844 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmpd.socket 2015-02-17 13:34:05.745221844 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +[Unit] +Description=Socket listening for SNMP and AgentX messages @@ -321,9 +320,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.socket.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpd.sock + +[Install] +WantedBy=sockets.target -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptrapd.service.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptrapd.service ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptrapd.service.systemd 2012-11-12 10:18:46.105369505 +0100 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptrapd.service 2012-11-12 10:18:46.105369505 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmptrapd.service.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmptrapd.service +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmptrapd.service.MPGqYh 2015-02-17 13:34:05.745221844 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmptrapd.service 2015-02-17 13:34:05.745221844 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +# +# SNMP trap-processing service file for systemd @@ -341,9 +340,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptrapd.service.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmpt + +[Install] +WantedBy=multi-user.target -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptrapd.socket.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptrapd.socket ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptrapd.socket.systemd 2012-11-12 10:18:46.105369505 +0100 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptrapd.socket 2012-11-12 10:18:46.105369505 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmptrapd.socket.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmptrapd.socket +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmptrapd.socket.MPGqYh 2015-02-17 13:34:05.745221844 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/dist/snmptrapd.socket 2015-02-17 13:34:05.745221844 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +[Unit] +Description=Socket listening for SNMP trap messages @@ -359,9 +358,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptrapd.socket.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/dist/snmptr + +[Install] +WantedBy=sockets.target -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/include/net-snmp/library/sd-daemon.h.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/include/net-snmp/library/sd-daemon.h ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/include/net-snmp/library/sd-daemon.h.systemd 2012-11-12 10:18:46.106369503 +0100 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/include/net-snmp/library/sd-daemon.h 2012-11-12 10:18:46.106369503 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/include/net-snmp/library/sd-daemon.h.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/include/net-snmp/library/sd-daemon.h +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/include/net-snmp/library/sd-daemon.h.MPGqYh 2015-02-17 13:34:05.746221843 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/include/net-snmp/library/sd-daemon.h 2015-02-17 13:34:05.746221843 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,286 @@ +/*-*- Mode: C; c-basic-offset: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*-*/ + @@ -649,10 +648,10 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/include/net-snmp/library/sd-daemon.h.systemd net-snmp-5. +#endif + +#endif /* SNMPD_SD_DAEMON_H */ -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/include/net-snmp/net-snmp-config.h.in.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/include/net-snmp/net-snmp-config.h.in ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/include/net-snmp/net-snmp-config.h.in.systemd 2012-10-10 00:28:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/include/net-snmp/net-snmp-config.h.in 2012-11-12 10:18:46.107369501 +0100 -@@ -1389,6 +1389,9 @@ +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/include/net-snmp/net-snmp-config.h.in.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/include/net-snmp/net-snmp-config.h.in +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/include/net-snmp/net-snmp-config.h.in.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/include/net-snmp/net-snmp-config.h.in 2015-02-17 13:34:05.746221843 +0100 +@@ -1410,6 +1410,9 @@ /* If you don't have root access don't exit upon kmem errors */ #undef NETSNMP_NO_ROOT_ACCESS @@ -662,9 +661,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/include/net-snmp/net-snmp-config.h.in.systemd net-snmp-5 /* Define if you want to remove all SET/write access from the code */ #undef NETSNMP_NO_WRITE_SUPPORT -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/README.systemd.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/README.systemd ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/README.systemd.systemd 2012-11-12 10:18:46.108369499 +0100 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/README.systemd 2012-11-12 10:18:46.108369499 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/README.systemd.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/README.systemd +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/README.systemd.MPGqYh 2015-02-17 13:34:05.747221843 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/README.systemd 2015-02-17 13:34:05.747221843 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +README.systemd +-------------- @@ -708,9 +707,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/README.systemd.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/README.systemd +start during boot and not after first SNMP trap arrives. Same rules as for snmpd +applies then. \ No newline at end of file -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/sd-daemon.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/sd-daemon.c ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/sd-daemon.c.systemd 2012-11-12 10:18:46.109369497 +0100 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/sd-daemon.c 2012-11-12 10:18:46.109369497 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/sd-daemon.c.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/sd-daemon.c +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/sd-daemon.c.MPGqYh 2015-02-17 13:34:05.747221843 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/sd-daemon.c 2015-02-17 13:34:05.747221843 +0100 @@ -0,0 +1,532 @@ +/* + * Systemd integration parts. @@ -1244,9 +1243,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/sd-daemon.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/sd-da +} + +#endif /* ! NETSNMP_NO_SYSTEMD */ -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPDomain.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPDomain.c ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPDomain.c.systemd 2012-10-10 00:28:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPDomain.c 2012-11-12 10:19:41.767217067 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPDomain.c.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPDomain.c +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPDomain.c.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPDomain.c 2015-02-17 13:34:05.748221842 +0100 @@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ #include <net-snmp/library/snmpTCPBaseDomain.h> #include <net-snmp/library/tools.h> @@ -1326,9 +1325,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPDomain.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7. } /* -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPIPv6Domain.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPIPv6Domain.c ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPIPv6Domain.c.systemd 2012-10-10 00:28:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPIPv6Domain.c 2012-11-12 10:20:32.019078971 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPIPv6Domain.c.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPIPv6Domain.c +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPIPv6Domain.c.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPIPv6Domain.c 2015-02-17 13:34:05.748221842 +0100 @@ -49,6 +49,10 @@ #include <net-snmp/library/snmpTCPBaseDomain.h> #include <net-snmp/library/tools.h> @@ -1409,9 +1408,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpTCPIPv6Domain.c.systemd net-snmp- } /* -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c.systemd 2012-10-10 00:28:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c 2012-11-12 10:22:30.279750750 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c 2015-02-17 13:36:22.744123462 +0100 @@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ #include <net-snmp/library/snmpSocketBaseDomain.h> @@ -1420,10 +1419,10 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c.systemd net-s +#include <net-snmp/library/sd-daemon.h> +#endif + - #if (defined(linux) && defined(IP_PKTINFO)) \ - || defined(IP_RECVDSTADDR) && HAVE_STRUCT_MSGHDR_MSG_CONTROL \ - && HAVE_STRUCT_MSGHDR_MSG_FLAGS -@@ -67,6 +71,7 @@ netsnmp_udpipv4base_transport(struct soc + #if defined(HAVE_IP_PKTINFO) || defined(HAVE_IP_RECVDSTADDR) + int netsnmp_udpipv4_recvfrom(int s, void *buf, int len, struct sockaddr *from, + socklen_t *fromlen, struct sockaddr *dstip, +@@ -64,6 +68,7 @@ netsnmp_udpipv4base_transport(struct soc char *client_socket = NULL; netsnmp_indexed_addr_pair addr_pair; socklen_t local_addr_len; @@ -1431,7 +1430,7 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c.systemd net-s #ifdef NETSNMP_NO_LISTEN_SUPPORT if (local) -@@ -91,7 +96,20 @@ netsnmp_udpipv4base_transport(struct soc +@@ -88,7 +93,20 @@ netsnmp_udpipv4base_transport(struct soc free(str); } @@ -1453,17 +1452,16 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c.systemd net-s DEBUGMSGTL(("UDPBase", "openned socket %d as local=%d\n", t->sock, local)); if (t->sock < 0) { netsnmp_transport_free(t); -@@ -141,13 +159,15 @@ netsnmp_udpipv4base_transport(struct soc - DEBUGMSGTL(("netsnmp_udp", "set IP_RECVDSTADDR\n")); +@@ -151,12 +169,14 @@ netsnmp_udpipv4base_transport(struct soc + } } - #endif + #endif /* !defined(WIN32) */ - rc = bind(t->sock, (struct sockaddr *) addr, - sizeof(struct sockaddr)); - if (rc != 0) { - netsnmp_socketbase_close(t); - netsnmp_transport_free(t); - return NULL; -- } + if (!socket_initialized) { + rc = bind(t->sock, (struct sockaddr *) addr, + sizeof(struct sockaddr)); @@ -1472,13 +1470,12 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv4BaseDomain.c.systemd net-s + netsnmp_transport_free(t); + return NULL; + } -+ } + } t->data = NULL; t->data_length = 0; - #else /* NETSNMP_NO_LISTEN_SUPPORT */ -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c.systemd 2012-10-10 00:28:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c 2012-11-12 10:23:19.713603003 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c 2015-02-17 13:37:16.256087147 +0100 @@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ static const struct in6_addr in6addr_any #include <net-snmp/library/snmpSocketBaseDomain.h> #include <net-snmp/library/tools.h> @@ -1520,8 +1517,8 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c.systemd net-snmp- netsnmp_transport_free(t); return NULL; @@ -242,13 +259,14 @@ netsnmp_udp6_transport(struct sockaddr_i - } - } + } + } #endif - - rc = bind(t->sock, (struct sockaddr *) addr, @@ -1541,9 +1538,9 @@ diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c.systemd net-snmp- } t->local = (unsigned char*)malloc(18); if (t->local == NULL) { -diff -up net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUnixDomain.c.systemd net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUnixDomain.c ---- net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUnixDomain.c.systemd 2012-10-10 00:28:58.000000000 +0200 -+++ net-snmp-5.7.2/snmplib/transports/snmpUnixDomain.c 2012-11-12 10:24:02.803466358 +0100 +diff -up net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUnixDomain.c.MPGqYh net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUnixDomain.c +--- net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUnixDomain.c.MPGqYh 2014-12-08 21:23:22.000000000 +0100 ++++ net-snmp-5.7.3/snmplib/transports/snmpUnixDomain.c 2015-02-17 13:34:05.749221841 +0100 @@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ #include <net-snmp/library/system.h> /* mkdirhier */ #include <net-snmp/library/tools.h> -- 2.7.4

2 4

[PATCH] ntp: Do not use an RPATH.
by Stefan Schantl 12 Jan '17

12 Jan '17

Fixes #11243. Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl(a)ipfire.org> --- ntp/ntp.nm | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ntp/ntp.nm b/ntp/ntp.nm index 780ad01..ad4b046 100644 --- a/ntp/ntp.nm +++ b/ntp/ntp.nm @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ name = ntp version = %{ver_major}.8 ver_major = 4.2 -release = 2 +release = 3 groups = System/Daemons url = http://www.ntp.org/ @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ build configure_options += \ --sysconfdir=%{sysconfdir}/ntp/crypto \ --with-openssl-libdir=%{libdir} \ + --without-rpath \ --enable-all-clocks \ --enable-parse-clocks \ --enable-ntp-signd=%{localstatedir}/run/ntp_signd -- 2.7.4

2 4

[PATCH] intltool: Enable testsuite.
by Stefan Schantl 12 Jan '17

12 Jan '17

Signed-off-by: Stefan Schantl <stefan.schantl(a)ipfire.org> --- intltool/intltool.nm | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/intltool/intltool.nm b/intltool/intltool.nm index 1f0311c..a217ea3 100644 --- a/intltool/intltool.nm +++ b/intltool/intltool.nm @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ name = intltool version = 0.51.0 -release = 1 +release = 2 arch = noarch groups = Localization/Tools @@ -29,7 +29,18 @@ build end configure_options += \ - --mandir=/usr/share/man + --mandir=%{mandir} + + test + if ! make check; then + find . -type f -name 'test-suite.log' | while read trs; do + echo "BEGIN " ${trs}; cat ${trs} 1>&2; + done + + echo "Exiting abnormally due to make check failure above" 1>&2 + exit 1 + fi + end end packages -- 2.7.4

2 3

[PATCH] squidguard: Update to 1.5-beta
by Matthias Fischer 31 Dec '16

31 Dec '16

Changelog: "Release 1.5 2010-09-09 Fixed inconsistent blocking (bug 59). Replaced defined routine in sgDB.c 2010-09-08 Added Russian translation from Vladimir Ipatov to squidGuard.cgi.in. 2009-10-19 Fixed two bypass problems with URLs which length is close to the limit defined by MAX_BUF. The resulting proxy line exceeds this limit and causes either squid or squidGuard to properly block a site. 2009-10-15 Fixed a problem with very long URLs. SquidGuard will go into emergency mode when a overlong URLs are encountered. The emergency mode causes an entire stop of blocking. This is not appropriate in this situation. 2009-09-30 Added patch by beber and gentoo (thank you!) to fix a problem when cross compiling (bug 56). 2009-09-27 Added patch by gentoo to fix alocal warnings (bug 57). 2009-09-15 Added a feature to send log messages to syslog based on the patch from Jun Jiang (thank you). (bug 42) In order to use syslog you have to run configure with the new option "--with-syslog". In the configuration file you need to add a line "syslog enable". If any other value but "enable" is used syslog is disabled and logging to squidGuard.log takes place as usual. The following log level are used: DEBUG, NOTICE, WARN, ERROR and EMERG. The local4 syslog facility is used by default. If you want to change this, use the configure option "--with-syslog-facility=<facility>". 2009-09-12 Anonymized passwords (for connecting to the ldap or mysql server) written to logfiles when squidGuard is starting. Added two configure options for choosing different location for the LDAP include and library files. 2009-08-25 Added patch to check IP addresses against LDAP. Patch by Denis Bonnenfant (bug 41) - thank you. 2009-08-23 Added patch to allow quoted strings in the configuration file (bug 53). For more information see README.QuotedStrings. Thanks to Iain Fothergill for providing the patch. Removed the fix for usernames starting with a number because it breaks the time declarations. 2009-05-08 Added patch by INL to enable blocking against DNS based blacklists (bug 55). Fixed re-opened bug 12: a problem with regular expressions. An entry like "www\.google\.de" did not block www.google.de which it was supposed to do. Solving this issue solved bug 46 as well. 2009-03-08 Fixed bug 52: Sometimes squidGuard crashes with an overflow error message for vsprintf. Thanks to Dirk Schoebel for suggesting the proper fix. Fixed bug 49: Using numeric username made squidGuard goes into emergency mode. This has been fixed. Usernames can now start with a number, be numeric and can additionally contain the following characters: @,à,é,è,ñ,á,ì,í,ò,ó,ù,ú." Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer <matthias.fischer(a)ipfire.org> --- lfs/squidguard | 34 ++++-- .../01_squidguard-1.5-beta_db_v4_up.patch | 14 +++ .../02_squidguard-1.5-beta_helper-protocol.patch | 125 +++++++++++++++++++++ ..._squidguard-1.5-beta_remove-debug-logging.patch | 66 +++++++++++ .../04_squidguard-1.5-beta_stdout-always.patch | 76 +++++++++++++ ...ions-unused_variables-noinput_and_nounput.patch | 56 +++++++++ src/patches/squidguard/06_squidguard_version.patch | 8 ++ 7 files changed, 370 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) create mode 100644 src/patches/squidguard/01_squidguard-1.5-beta_db_v4_up.patch create mode 100644 src/patches/squidguard/02_squidguard-1.5-beta_helper-protocol.patch create mode 100644 src/patches/squidguard/03_squidguard-1.5-beta_remove-debug-logging.patch create mode 100644 src/patches/squidguard/04_squidguard-1.5-beta_stdout-always.patch create mode 100644 src/patches/squidguard/05_squidguard-1.5-beta_fixes_htunescape-size_t-ldap_functions-unused_variables-noinput_and_nounput.patch create mode 100644 src/patches/squidguard/06_squidguard_version.patch diff --git a/lfs/squidguard b/lfs/squidguard index a48c25cbe..e3fd0c4e4 100644 --- a/lfs/squidguard +++ b/lfs/squidguard @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ ############################################################################### # # # IPFire.org - A linux based firewall # -# Copyright (C) 2007 Michael Tremer & Christian Schmidt # +# Copyright (C) 2007-2016 IPFire Team <info(a)ipfire.org> # # # # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify # # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ include Config -VER = 1.4.1 +VER = 1.5-beta THISAPP = squidGuard-$(VER) DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.gz @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE) $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE) -$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 9ae7b62a63631bb2dd1f474cf2bbe4dc +$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 85216992d14acb29d6f345608f21f268 install : $(TARGET) @@ -70,12 +70,28 @@ $(subst %,%_MD5,$(objects)) : $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) @$(PREBUILD) @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar zxf $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squidguard-1.4-squid-helper-protocol.patch - cd $(DIR_APP) && ./configure --prefix=/usr --datadir=/usr/share \ - --sysconfdir=/etc --localstatedir=/var --infodir=/usr/info --mandir=/usr/man \ + + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squidguard/01_squidguard-1.5-beta_db_v4_up.patch + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squidguard/02_squidguard-1.5-beta_helper-protocol.patch + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squidguard/03_squidguard-1.5-beta_remove-debug-logging.patch + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squidguard/04_squidguard-1.5-beta_stdout-always.patch + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squidguard/05_squidguard-1.5-beta_fixes_htunescape-size_t-ldap_functions-unused_variables-noinput_and_nounput.patch + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squidguard/06_squidguard_version.patch + cd $(DIR_APP) && ./configure \ + --prefix=/usr \ + --datadir=/usr/share \ + --sysconfdir=/etc \ + --localstatedir=/var \ + --infodir=/usr/info \ + --mandir=/usr/man \ --with-sg-config=/var/ipfire/urlfilter/squidGuard.conf \ - --with-sg-logdir=/var/log/squidGuard --with-sg-dbhome=/var/lib/squidguard \ - --with-db=/usr --with-db-inc=/usr/include --with-db-lib=/usr/lib + --with-sg-logdir=/var/log/squidGuard \ + --with-syslog=yes \ + --with-sg-dbhome=/var/lib/squidguard \ + --with-db=/usr \ + --with-db-inc=/usr/include \ + --with-db-lib=/usr/lib + cd $(DIR_APP) && make cd $(DIR_APP) && make install @@ -91,7 +107,7 @@ $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) chmod 755 /var/ipfire/urlfilter/bin/prebuild.pl cp -f $(DIR_CONF)/urlfilter/autoupdate.pl /var/ipfire/urlfilter/bin/autoupdate.pl chmod 755 /var/ipfire/urlfilter/bin/autoupdate.pl - echo "1.7.1" > /var/ipfire/urlfilter/version + echo "1.5-beta" > /var/ipfire/urlfilter/version # Wrapper cp -f $(DIR_CONF)/urlfilter/redirect_wrapper /usr/sbin diff --git a/src/patches/squidguard/01_squidguard-1.5-beta_db_v4_up.patch b/src/patches/squidguard/01_squidguard-1.5-beta_db_v4_up.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bc50efd68 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/patches/squidguard/01_squidguard-1.5-beta_db_v4_up.patch @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +Make BerkeleyDB version 4.7 and higher working. + +diff -Nur a/src/sgDb.c b/src/sgDb.c +--- a/src/sgDb.c 2010-09-09 12:35:22.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/src/sgDb.c 2013-11-23 10:05:55.000000000 +0100 +@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ + } + } + #endif +-#if DB_VERSION_MAJOR == 4 ++#if DB_VERSION_MAJOR >= 4 + if(globalUpdate || createdb || (dbfile != NULL && stat(dbfile,&st))){ + flag = DB_CREATE; + if(createdb) diff --git a/src/patches/squidguard/02_squidguard-1.5-beta_helper-protocol.patch b/src/patches/squidguard/02_squidguard-1.5-beta_helper-protocol.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a2f9177f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/patches/squidguard/02_squidguard-1.5-beta_helper-protocol.patch @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ + +From Jeffries Amos http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3978#c5 + +--- squidGuard-1.5-beta.orig/src/main.c 2013-12-12 11:47:31.000000000 +1300 ++++ squidGuard-1.5-beta.orig/src/main.c 2013-12-12 11:50:38.000000000 +1300 +@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ + sgReloadConfig(); + } + if(failsafe_mode) { +- puts(""); ++ puts("ERR message=\"squidGuard failsafe mode\""); + fflush(stdout); + if(sig_hup){ + sgReloadConfig(); +@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ + } + if(parseLine(buf,&squidInfo) != 1){ + sgLogError("ERROR: Error parsing squid line: %s",buf); +- puts(""); ++ puts("BH message=\"squidGuard error parsing squid line\""); + } + else { + src = Source; +@@ -206,14 +206,14 @@ + acl = sgAclCheckSource(src); + if((redirect = sgAclAccess(src,acl,&squidInfo)) == NULL){ + if(src == NULL || src->cont_search == 0){ +- puts(""); ++ puts("ERR"); + break; + } else + if(src->next != NULL){ + src = src->next; + continue; + } else { +- puts(""); ++ puts("ERR"); + break; + } + } else { +@@ -228,6 +228,10 @@ + fprintf(stdout,"%s %s/%s %s %s\n",redirect,squidInfo.src, + squidInfo.srcDomain,squidInfo.ident, + squidInfo.method); ++ if (isdigit(redirect[0]) && isdigit(redirect[1]) && isdigit(redirect[2]) && redirect[3]==':') { ++ fprintf(stdout,"OK status=%c%c%c url=\"%s\"\n", redirect[0], redirect[1], redirect[2], &redirect[4]); ++ } else ++ fprintf(stdout,"OK rewrite-url=\"%s\"\n",redirect); + /* sgLogDebug("DEBUG: %s %s/%s %s %s\n",redirect,squidInfo.src,squidInfo.srcDomain,squidInfo.ident,squidInfo.method); */ + break; + } +--- squidGuard-1.5-beta.orig/src/main.c.in 2013-12-12 11:47:31.000000000 +1300 ++++ squidGuard-1.5-beta.orig/src/main.c.in 2013-12-12 11:53:18.000000000 +1300 +@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ + sgReloadConfig(); + } + if(failsafe_mode) { +- puts(""); ++ puts("ERR message=\"squidGuard failsafe mode\""); + fflush(stdout); + if(sig_hup){ + sgReloadConfig(); +@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ + } + if(parseLine(buf,&squidInfo) != 1){ + sgLogError("ERROR: Error parsing squid line: %s",buf); +- puts(""); ++ puts("BH message=\"squidGuard error parsing squid line\""); + } + else { + src = Source; +@@ -206,14 +206,14 @@ + acl = sgAclCheckSource(src); + if((redirect = sgAclAccess(src,acl,&squidInfo)) == NULL){ + if(src == NULL || src->cont_search == 0){ +- puts(""); ++ puts("ERR"); + break; + } else + if(src->next != NULL){ + src = src->next; + continue; + } else { +- puts(""); ++ puts("ERR"); + break; + } + } else { +@@ -225,9 +225,11 @@ + squidInfo.ident[0] = '-'; + squidInfo.ident[1] = '\0'; + } +- fprintf(stdout,"%s %s/%s %s %s\n",redirect,squidInfo.src, +- squidInfo.srcDomain,squidInfo.ident, +- squidInfo.method); ++ if (isdigit(redirect[0]) && isdigit(redirect[1]) && isdigit(redirect[2]) && redirect[3]==':') { ++ fprintf(stdout,"OK status=%c%c%c url=\"%s\"\n", redirect[0], redirect[1], redirect[2], &redirect[4]); ++ } else ++ fprintf(stdout,"OK rewrite-url=\"%s\"\n",redirect); ++ + /* sgLogDebug("DEBUG: %s %s/%s %s %s\n",redirect,squidInfo.src,squidInfo.srcDomain,squidInfo.ident,squidInfo.method); */ + break; + } +--- squidGuard-1.5-beta.orig/src/sgDiv.c 2013-12-12 11:47:31.000000000 +1300 ++++ squidGuard-1.5-beta.orig/src/sgDiv.c 2013-12-12 11:48:36.000000000 +1300 +@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ + } + sgLogError("ERROR: Going into emergency mode"); + while(fgets(buf, MAX_BUF, stdin) != NULL){ +- puts(""); ++ puts("ERR"); + fflush(stdout); + } + sgLogError("ERROR: Ending emergency mode, stdin empty"); +--- squidGuard-1.5-beta.orig/src/sgDiv.c.in 2013-12-12 11:47:31.000000000 +1300 ++++ squidGuard-1.5-beta.orig/src/sgDiv.c.in 2013-12-12 11:48:36.000000000 +1300 +@@ -782,7 +782,7 @@ + } + sgLogError("ERROR: Going into emergency mode"); + while(fgets(buf, MAX_BUF, stdin) != NULL){ +- puts(""); ++ puts("ERR"); + fflush(stdout); + } + sgLogError("ERROR: Ending emergency mode, stdin empty"); diff --git a/src/patches/squidguard/03_squidguard-1.5-beta_remove-debug-logging.patch b/src/patches/squidguard/03_squidguard-1.5-beta_remove-debug-logging.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ba2840bac --- /dev/null +++ b/src/patches/squidguard/03_squidguard-1.5-beta_remove-debug-logging.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +--- a/src/sg.y.in 2014-04-14 16:23:39.183396677 +0200 ++++ b/src/sg.y.in 2014-04-14 16:24:19.000000000 +0200 +@@ -795,9 +795,9 @@ + { + struct Source *sp; + sp = lastSource; +- ++/* DEBUG + @NOLOG1@ sgLogError("DEBUG: sgSourceLdapIpSearch called with: %s", url); @NOLOG2@ +- ++*/ + if(!ldap_is_ldap_url(url)) { + sgLogError("%s: can't parse LDAP url %s",progname, url); + return; +@@ -1311,10 +1311,12 @@ + } + sp->domainlistDb = (struct sgDb *) sgCalloc(1,sizeof(struct sgDb)); + sp->domainlistDb->type=SGDBTYPE_DOMAINLIST; ++/* DEBUG + sgLogError("init domainlist %s",sp->domainlist); ++*/ + sgDbInit(sp->domainlistDb,sp->domainlist); + if(sp->domainlistDb->entries == 0) { /* empty database */ +- sgLogError("domainlist empty, removed from memory"); ++ sgLogError("domainlist %s empty, removed from memory",sp->domainlist); + sgFree(sp->domainlistDb); + sp->domainlistDb = NULL; + } +@@ -1356,10 +1356,12 @@ + } + sp->urllistDb = (struct sgDb *) sgCalloc(1,sizeof(struct sgDb)); + sp->urllistDb->type=SGDBTYPE_URLLIST; ++/* DEBUG + sgLogError("init urllist %s",sp->urllist); ++*/ + sgDbInit(sp->urllistDb,sp->urllist); + if(sp->urllistDb->entries == 0) { /* empty database */ +- sgLogError("urllist empty, removed from memory"); ++ sgLogError("urllist empty %s, removed from memory",sp->urllist); + sgFree(sp->urllistDb); + sp->urllistDb = NULL; + } +@@ -2773,9 +2773,9 @@ + char *interval; + struct UserInfo *userinfo; + static struct UserInfo info; +- ++/* DEBUG + @NOLOG1@ sgLogError("DEBUG: sgFindUser called with: %s", ident); @NOLOG2@ +- ++*/ + /* defined in the userDB? */ + if(defined(src->userDb, ident, (char **) &userinfo) == 1) { + #ifdef HAVE_LIBLDAP +--- a/src/sgDb.c 2014-04-17 08:53:29.961367395 +0200 ++++ b/src/sgDb.c 2014-04-17 08:53:58.000000000 +0200 +@@ -48,7 +48,9 @@ + strcat(dbfile,".db"); + if(stat(dbfile,&st) == 0){ + if(!createdb){ ++/* DEBUG + sgLogNotice("INFO: loading dbfile %s",dbfile); ++*/ + } + } else { + if(!createdb){ diff --git a/src/patches/squidguard/04_squidguard-1.5-beta_stdout-always.patch b/src/patches/squidguard/04_squidguard-1.5-beta_stdout-always.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8e2d0c75a --- /dev/null +++ b/src/patches/squidguard/04_squidguard-1.5-beta_stdout-always.patch @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +Original input to stdout, to be useable with multiple redirectors +when option -f is given on squidGuard start +We have to remember the raw original URL as the URL is modified for testing +purpose. So the exisiting HTML entities like %3F (?), %26 (&), %3D (=) etc. are changed +which breaks the URL for further processing if it is send to stdout like we do it for the +redirector chain (THIS patch). +diff -Nur a/src/main.c.in b/src/main.c.in +--- a/src/main.c.in 2009-09-27 21:41:50.000000000 +0200 ++++ b/src/main.c.in 2013-06-01 21:18:55.000000000 +0200 +@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ + char **globalEnvp ; + int globalDebugTimeDelta = 0; + int globalDebug = 0; ++int globalFullStdout = 0; + int globalPid = 0; + int globalUpdate = 0; + int passthrough = 0; +@@ -89,6 +90,7 @@ + struct Acl *acl; + struct timeval start_time,ready_time,stop_time; + char buf[MAX_BUF]; ++ char origraw[MAX_BUF]; + char *redirect,tmp[MAX_BUF]; + char *configFile = NULL; + time_t t; +@@ -101,11 +102,14 @@ + #ifdef USE_SYSLOG + openlog("squidGuard", LOG_PID | LOG_NDELAY | LOG_CONS, LOG_@LOGFAC@); + #endif +- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hbduPC:t:c:v")) != EOF) ++ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hbdfuPC:t:c:v")) != EOF) + switch (ch) { + case 'd': + globalDebug = 1; + break; ++ case 'f': ++ globalFullStdout = 1; ++ break; + case 'c': + configFile = optarg; + break; +@@ -192,6 +193,8 @@ + } + continue; + } ++ strcpy(origraw,buf); ++ if (strlen(origraw) && (origraw[strlen(origraw)-1] == '\n')) origraw[strlen(origraw)-1] = 0; + if(parseLine(buf,&squidInfo) != 1){ + sgLogError("ERROR: Error parsing squid line: %s",buf); + puts("BH message=\"squidGuard error parsing squid line\""); +@@ -206,7 +210,12 @@ + acl = sgAclCheckSource(src); + if((redirect = sgAclAccess(src,acl,&squidInfo)) == NULL){ + if(src == NULL || src->cont_search == 0){ ++ if (globalFullStdout) { ++ puts(origraw); ++ } ++ else { + puts("ERR"); ++ } + break; + } else + if(src->next != NULL){ +@@ -213,7 +214,12 @@ + src = src->next; + continue; + } else { ++ if (globalFullStdout) { ++ puts(origraw); ++ } ++ else { + puts("ERR"); ++ } + break; + } + } else { diff --git a/src/patches/squidguard/05_squidguard-1.5-beta_fixes_htunescape-size_t-ldap_functions-unused_variables-noinput_and_nounput.patch b/src/patches/squidguard/05_squidguard-1.5-beta_fixes_htunescape-size_t-ldap_functions-unused_variables-noinput_and_nounput.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..33732deea --- /dev/null +++ b/src/patches/squidguard/05_squidguard-1.5-beta_fixes_htunescape-size_t-ldap_functions-unused_variables-noinput_and_nounput.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +--- a/src/sg.l Sat Jan 30 13:51:12 2016 ++++ b/src/sg.l Sat Jan 30 14:01:28 2016 +@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ + + %} + ++%option noinput ++%option nounput + ignore [,\t\r ]+ + s [\t ] + d [0-9] +--- a/src/sg.y.in Sat Jan 30 13:52:26 2016 ++++ b/src/sg.y.in Sat Jan 30 14:00:50 2016 +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + + #ifdef HAVE_LIBLDAP + #include "lber.h" ++#define LDAP_DEPRECATED 1 + #include "ldap.h" + #endif + +@@ -1097,7 +1098,6 @@ + foundip = 1; + unblockedip = 1; + if(s->ipquota.seconds != 0){ +- struct IpInfo uq; + time_t t = time(NULL) + globalDebugTimeDelta; + sgLogError("status %d time %d lasttime %d consumed %d", ipquota->status, ipquota->time, ipquota->last, ipquota->consumed); + sgLogError("renew %d seconds %d", s->ipquota.renew, s->ipquota.seconds); +@@ -1157,7 +1157,6 @@ + founduser = 1; + unblockeduser = 1; + if(s->userquota.seconds != 0){ +- struct UserInfo uq; + time_t t = time(NULL) + globalDebugTimeDelta; + //sgLogError("status %d time %d lasttime %d consumed %d", userquota->status, userquota->time, userquota->last, userquota->consumed); + //sgLogError("renew %d seconds %d", s->userquota.renew, s->userquota.seconds); +--- a/src/sgDiv.c.in Sat Jan 30 13:52:10 2016 ++++ b/src/sgDiv.c.in Sat Jan 30 13:59:16 2016 +@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ + + #include "sg.h" + #include "sgEx.h" ++#include "HTEscape.h" + + /* #define METEST 8; */ + +@@ -692,7 +693,7 @@ + struct UserInfo *userquota; + if(defined(s->userDb, req->ident, (char **) &userquota) == 1){ + char qbuf[150]; +- sprintf(qbuf, "%d-%d-%d-%d-%d-%d", s->userquota.renew, s->userquota.seconds, userquota->status, userquota->time, userquota->last, userquota->consumed); ++ sprintf(qbuf, "%d-%d-%d-%d-%d-%d", s->userquota.renew, (int)s->userquota.seconds, userquota->status, (int)userquota->time, (int)userquota->last, userquota->consumed); + strcat(buf, qbuf); + } else { + strcat(buf, "noquota"); diff --git a/src/patches/squidguard/06_squidguard_version.patch b/src/patches/squidguard/06_squidguard_version.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..351804c49 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/patches/squidguard/06_squidguard_version.patch @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +--- a/src/version.h Thu Apr 17 17:00:48 2008 ++++ b/src/version.h Fri May 08 20:44:48 2009 +@@ -16,4 +16,4 @@ + (GPL) along with this program. + */ + +-#define VERSION "1.5-alpha" ++#define VERSION "1.5-beta" -- 2.11.0

1 0

[PATCH] Use a better naming scheme for physical devices.
by Jonatan Schlag 31 Dec '16

31 Dec '16

Instead of orange0phys we should use orangephys0 this patch implements the necessary changes. Signed-off-by: Jonatan Schlag <jonatan.schlag(a)ipfire.org> --- config/udev/network-hotplug-bridges | 3 ++- config/udev/network-hotplug-rename | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/config/udev/network-hotplug-bridges b/config/udev/network-hotplug-bridges index ff6d20a..229d45e 100644 --- a/config/udev/network-hotplug-bridges +++ b/config/udev/network-hotplug-bridges @@ -26,7 +26,8 @@ eval $(/usr/local/bin/readhash /var/ipfire/ethernet/settings) detect_zone() { - local intf="${INTERFACE%0*}" + local intf="${INTERFACE%?}" + intf="${intf%phys}" intf="${intf^^}" local zone diff --git a/config/udev/network-hotplug-rename b/config/udev/network-hotplug-rename index 294bb78..3a482d2 100644 --- a/config/udev/network-hotplug-rename +++ b/config/udev/network-hotplug-rename @@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ for zone in ${ZONES}; do # print the name to which udev will rename it. case "${!mode}" in bridge) - echo "${!device}phys" + echo "${!device%0}phys0" ;; macvtap) @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ for zone in ${ZONES}; do logger -t network "MACVTAP mode is not supported for wireless devices" echo "${!device}" else - echo "${!device}phys" + echo "${!device%0}phys0" fi ;; -- 2.7.4

1 0

[PATCH] Use MAC addresses to define a slave
by Jonatan Schlag 31 Dec '16

31 Dec '16

It is now also possible to use the MAC address to define a slave of a bridge. Simply add the mac address to the ZONE_SLAVES=''. --- config/udev/network-hotplug-bridges | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/config/udev/network-hotplug-bridges b/config/udev/network-hotplug-bridges index ff6d20a..514b45d 100644 --- a/config/udev/network-hotplug-bridges +++ b/config/udev/network-hotplug-bridges @@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ detect_zone() { # Try to find out if this INTERFACE is a slave of a zone local slave for slave in $(get_value "${zone}_SLAVES"); do - if [ "${INTERFACE}" = "${slave}" ]; then + + #Compare if the mac address matches or if the name matches + if ([ "$(</sys/class/net/${INTERFACE}/address)" = "${slave}" ] || [ "${INTERFACE}" = "${slave}" ]); then echo "${zone}" return 0 fi -- 2.7.4

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[PATCH 1/4] udev: Do not use MACVTAP for any wireless devices
by Jonatan Schlag 29 Dec '16

29 Dec '16

Fixes #11179 Signed-off-by: Jonatan Schlag <jonatan.schlag(a)ipfire.org> --- config/udev/network-hotplug-rename | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/config/udev/network-hotplug-rename b/config/udev/network-hotplug-rename index aaae641..1f8d5e1 100644 --- a/config/udev/network-hotplug-rename +++ b/config/udev/network-hotplug-rename @@ -67,11 +67,21 @@ for zone in ${ZONES}; do # If a matching interface has been found we will # print the name to which udev will rename it. - if [ "${!mode}" = "macvtap" ]; then - echo "${!device}phys" - else - echo "${!device}" - fi + case "${!mode}" in + macvtap) + # MACVTAP mode doesn't work for WiFi devices + if [ -d "/sys/class/net/${INTERFACE}/phy80211" ]; then + logger -t network "MACVTAP mode is not supported for wireless devices" + echo "${!device}" + else + echo "${!device}phys" + fi + ;; + + *) + echo "${!device}" + ;; + esac exit 0 done -- 2.7.4

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[PATCH] squid 3.5.23: latest patch (14129)
by Matthias Fischer 27 Dec '16

27 Dec '16

Seems to be a serious one. "Bug #3940 pt2: Make 'cache deny' do what is documented". (Duplicate of Bug 3783) For details see: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3940 Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer <matthias.fischer(a)ipfire.org> --- lfs/squid | 1 + src/patches/squid/squid-3.5-14129.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/patches/squid/squid-3.5-14129.patch diff --git a/lfs/squid b/lfs/squid index db02367e5..00152080c 100644 --- a/lfs/squid +++ b/lfs/squid @@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ $(subst %,%_MD5,$(objects)) : $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) @$(PREBUILD) @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar xaf $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) + cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np0 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squid/squid-3.5-14129.patch cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np0 -i $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/squid-3.5.23-fix-max-file-descriptors.patch cd $(DIR_APP) && autoreconf -vfi diff --git a/src/patches/squid/squid-3.5-14129.patch b/src/patches/squid/squid-3.5-14129.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b930aca91 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/patches/squid/squid-3.5-14129.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +------------------------------------------------------------ +revno: 14129 +revision-id: squid3(a)treenet.co.nz-20161226022200-u1dnvhu0rdby78u2 +parent: squid3(a)treenet.co.nz-20161216043137-lsk9s4fq21sqsdfo +fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3940 +committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3(a)treenet.co.nz> +branch nick: 3.5 +timestamp: Mon 2016-12-26 15:22:00 +1300 +message: + Bug 3940 pt2: Make 'cache deny' do what is documented + + Instead of overriding whatever cacheability was previously set to + (including changing non-cacheables to be cacheable) actually + prevent both cache read and write. +------------------------------------------------------------ +# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90) +# revision_id: squid3(a)treenet.co.nz-20161226022200-u1dnvhu0rdby78u2 +# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/3.5 +# testament_sha1: 579020c4bb34961317f8fd0498393aba4a797b14 +# timestamp: 2016-12-26 02:23:14 +0000 +# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/3.5 +# base_revision_id: squid3(a)treenet.co.nz-20161216043137-\ +# lsk9s4fq21sqsdfo +# +# Begin patch +=== modified file 'src/client_side_request.cc' +--- src/client_side_request.cc 2016-09-23 15:28:42 +0000 ++++ src/client_side_request.cc 2016-12-26 02:22:00 +0000 +@@ -1407,7 +1407,10 @@ + ClientRequestContext::checkNoCacheDone(const allow_t &answer) + { + acl_checklist = NULL; +- http->request->flags.cachable = (answer == ACCESS_ALLOWED); ++ if (answer == ACCESS_DENIED) { ++ http->request->flags.noCache = true; // dont read reply from cache ++ http->request->flags.cachable = false; // dont store reply into cache ++ } + http->doCallouts(); + } + + -- 2.11.0

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