Development April 2024

development@lists.ipfire.org

10 participants
35 discussions

Re: Enable eBPF XDP/TC kernel feature for IPFire
by Michael Tremer 25 Apr '24

25 Apr '24

Hello, Please make sure you keep the list copied. > On 24 Apr 2024, at 20:55, Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Apr 24, 2024 at 8:28 AM Michael Tremer > <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org> wrote: >> >> Hello, >> >>> On 19 Apr 2024, at 02:17, Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li(a)gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 2:13 PM Michael Tremer >>> <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hello Vincent, >>>> >>>>> On 18 Apr 2024, at 16:21, Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li(a)gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Apr 18, 2024 at 1:57 AM Michael Tremer >>>>> <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hello, >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 17 Apr 2024, at 23:36, Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li(a)gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2024 at 9:07 AM Michael Tremer >>>>>>> <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hello Vincent, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 10 Apr 2024, at 19:01, Vincent Li <vincent.mc.li(a)gmail.com> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 8:17 AM Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hello Vincent, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> thank you for your e-mail and the proposal. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Adolf, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Please see my reply inline >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Apr 10, 2024 at 2:04 AM Adolf Belka <adolf.belka(a)ipfire.org> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Vincent, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I am not very familiar at all with this type of stuff but one thing that I noticed is that in the image you provided a link to, the XDP section has a line labelled XDP_TX which completely bypasses the whole Netfilter section which doesn't seem to be a good idea to me. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> XDP_TX is to redirect the packet out after processing the packet at >>>>>>>>>>> XDP stage, yes, netfilter will not see these packets. >>>>>>>>>>> for example for DDoS SYN flood attack scenario, when the SYN packet >>>>>>>>>>> is received, XDP program can generate SYN+ACK with syncookie and send >>>>>>>>>>> the SYN+ACK out, netfilter/Linux tcp stack knows nothing about it, >>>>>>>>>>> which actually saves host CPU cycles to process the SYN in >>>>>>>>>>> netfilter/TCP stack, which is actually good thing. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Also, XDP_DROP, XDP_PASS, XDP_TX action is depending on the XDP >>>>>>>>>>> program attached to the network interface, so it is the XDP program >>>>>>>>>>> author decide what to do with the packet, if no XDP program attached >>>>>>>>>>> to the network interface, everything works as usual, no interference >>>>>>>>>>> from XDP. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> If my understanding of this is correct, then this would lead to the exact >>>>>>>>>> opposite of what IPFire is designed to do. Rather than having packets >>>>>>>>>> processed below any level of operating system influence, the objective of >>>>>>>>>> IPFire in particular and firewalls in general is to control network traffic, >>>>>>>>>> which inherently requires thorough visibility on it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kernel still has the traffic statistics processed by XDP program and >>>>>>>>> store in eBPF maps so the user space program can query and view. you >>>>>>>>> can still view XDP as part of the firewall except it processes packets >>>>>>>>> early at the driver layer for efficiency. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I would like to understand what your need is to use XDP. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As Peter has stated, your system will pass packets with this, but 90% of the features that IPFire has won’t work any more: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> * Connection Tracking won’t be up to date >>>>>>>> * QoS won’t be able to categorise packets correctly and won’t be able to do its job >>>>>>>> * The IPS won’t be able to inspect any data >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think I did not explain the XDP use case clearly, for now, most XDP >>>>>>> use cases and particularly my use case is to do DDoS protection at >>>>>>> the earliest packet receiving path in high efficiency since XDP works >>>>>>> inside the network driver. the things you mentioned above would work >>>>>>> fine even if the packets go through XDP program, yes XDP program can >>>>>>> drop, modify, reflect the packet, but in non-DDoS packet senario, XDP >>>>>>> simply passes the packet to Linux as if nothing happened. so it is up >>>>>>> to the XDP program logic, also even if ipfire has the kernel feature >>>>>>> enabled, users still need to attach XDP program to the interface, if >>>>>>> no XDP program is attached to the interface, nothing is in the way to >>>>>>> stop packet flowing to IPfire filtering. >>>>>>> Again this diagram is great to describe the packet path >>>>>>> https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/Netfilter-packet-flow.s…, >>>>>>> so the XDP_PASS action from XDP program is to pass packet to Linux as >>>>>>> usual. from the same diagram, you also see "AF_PACKET", right? that is >>>>>>> where tcpdump taking place to capture packet for network >>>>>>> troubleshooting, but tcpdump would not stops all the scenario above >>>>>>> you mentioned working, actually tcpdump is based on classic BPF >>>>>>> technology, the XDP/eBPF is to extended classic BPF technology, it not >>>>>>> only can clone (packet capture), but can also drop, redirect. Please >>>>>>> read more about eBPF/XDP in general if you would like, many online >>>>>>> resources explain better than me :) > Those three are just a few, but >>>>>>> they are commonly used features of IPFire and without them, it would >>>>>>> not be what it is. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you. I am very familiar with how Netfilter works, including BPF and XDP. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think your diagram just proves my point when I say that everything is going to bypass the OS. That is the long arrow at the bottom. >>>>>> >>>>> I think you refer to the XDP_TX action to bypass the whole OS, for >>>>> IPFire, this is not recommended >>>> >>>> I think it is safe to assume that this is the core feature of XDP is what most people mean when they refer to it. >>>> >>>>>> At least I am assuming that you are interested in forwarding packets instead of going the “XDP_PASS” route, because for that you don’t need XDP? >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> For IPFire, XDP_PASS action is recommended because we don't want to >>>>> bypass the OS, we only want to drop DDoS packet at the driver, the >>>>> good packet passes through the OS as usual. >>>> >>>> You did not make at clear at all that your goal is to implement SYNPROXY with BPF. >>>> >>>> You still do not want to bypass the OS, you just want to bypass Netfilter. So let’s maybe try to be more clear with what we are referring to so that we will save many roundtrips. >>>> >>> >>> I assumed everyone knows what I was talking about in my first email >>> with the https://netdevconf.info/0x15/slides/30/Netdev%200x15%20Accelerating%20synpr…, >>> apparently I failed :) >> >> Well, I don’t think it is very efficient to ask people to read through a long presentation to find the thing that you want. You should briefly explain it in your own words and link further references. >> >>>>>> I think you still haven’t explained what your goal is on a lower level. DoS protection is incredibly broad and that does not strictly require XDP. What kind of XDP program are you interested in using? >>>>>> >>>>> use XDP to stop DoS has low overhead, save OS cycles, I have IPFire >>>>> KVM instance, if I run TCP SYN flood the IPFire, the IPFire ssh >>>>> session, WeUI session because sluggish and unresponsive, but with XDP, >>>>> it is almost like nothing happening, IPFire is responsive all the time >>>>> during flood attack. >>>> >>>> Could you describe your test scenario more, please? >>>> >>>> The Linux kernel is already using SYN cookies whenever it cannot keep up with processing all SYN packets that it receives. That can be configured with net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog which is set to 256 on my system. That should be low enough to trigger the mechanism. >>>> >>> yes, that is for protection for services listening on the Linux host itself. >> >> Ah okay, I wasn’t aware that we were talking about port forwardings. >> >>>> Using a KVM-virtualised machine is probably not the best way to deploy this in production as interrupts are expensive and you are competing for compute power with other machines on the host. But I am sure this is just your test environment. >>>> >>> This is my hobby project so I used KVM, but also I used a virtual >>> machine for the client starting SYN flood, so it is comparable. If I >>> can afford a physical server with 10/25G NIC and a client machine with >>> the same capability, the result will likely be the same. >> >> I highly doubt that as virtual machines are not very good at interrupt handling. >> >>>>> these are the XDP program I am interested in using >>>>> https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/… >>>> >>>> Okay, so this does not DoS protect in a strict sense. It just moves the part of SYNPROXY into the driver. I believe this is your primary goal here. >>>> >>> right, it does what SYNPROXY does, but way more efficiently, page 24 >>> of above xdp pdf link shows result. >> >> It does, but it also does less. >> >>> >>>>> https://github.com/NLnetLabs/XDPeriments >>>>> >>>>> I had ported them to xdp-tools >>>>> https://github.com/vincentmli/xdp-tools/tree/vli-xdp-synproxy so >>>>> xdp-tools loader program could attach multiple XDP programs to red0 >>>>> interface to stop various DDoS attack >>>> >>>> Thank you for sharing this. >>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As far as I am aware, IPFire is currently able to handle 25 GBit/sec. on >>>>>>>>>> the right hardware, and SYN flooding attacks are not a major threat to >>>>>>>>>> IPFire users, given that we have historically implemented some fine-tuning >>>>>>>>>> to make such attacks less viable. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> DDoS attacks to IPFire users do not happen now does not mean it will >>>>>>>>> not happen in the future, SYN flood is just one scenario, so better be >>>>>>>>> prepared than sorry later :) One IPFire user had asked for help >>>>>>>>> https://community.ipfire.org/t/filter-out-ddos-attacks-anyone-can-help-me-p… >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is this only about SYN flooding? >>>>>>>> for layer 4 TCP DDoS, the most common scenario is SYN flooding, ACK flooding, RST flooding. all these flooding can be stopped by SYN cookie that is already built in the Linux TCP host stack, but IPFire is a middle box firewall, the packet destination endpoint is not IPFire, but the host/green network port forwarded by IPFire, so that is where the netfilter SYNPROXY module plays in, I don't see SYNPROXY module being referenced anywhere in IPFire, so even without XDP, I still recommend IPFire provides user option to use SYNPROXY for TCP SYN/ACK/RST flood attack >>>>>>>>> I have studied IPFire, I do not see relevant SYN flooding or DDoS >>>>>>>>> tuning, where is it? netfilter with SYNPROXY module? or the TCP stack >>>>>>>>> syncookie implementation, or suricata ddos rules...etc? keep in mind >>>>>>>>> all these are handled in software, no hardware acceleration. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, IPFire runs in software. We cannot use hardware acceleration because it is designed to pass packets and not to do what we are doing here. >>>>>>> hardware acceleration probably is not the right word here for XDP >>>>>>> because XDP is actually still in the software driver, not inside the >>>>>>> hardware, though there is one hardware vendor that supports running >>>>>>> XDP byte code inside the hardware itself for true hardware >>>>>>> acceleration, but that is not common. again XDP does not interfere >>>>>>> with the IPfire filter except in DDoS scenarios, users can have the >>>>>>> option to drop the packet early in the network driver without >>>>>>> consuming IPfire CPU/memory resource. > >>>>>> >>>>>> But do you have any kind of system out there that is under constant fire and the OS cannot cope? What kind of packet rates or bandwidth are we talking about? >>>>> >>>>> I don't have IPFire in production since I am just starting to know >>>>> about the IPFire project. My day time job is enterprise network >>>>> engineer supporting fortune 500 enterprise customer with our >>>>> enterprise product (BIG-IP) which handles 10G/25G/40G or even 100G >>>>> throughput with FPGA, we often has enterprise customer under DDoS >>>>> attack, and sometime my day time job is to simulate such high >>>>> bandwidth attack in lab to see if enterprise product handles well or >>>>> not. I don't think IPFire can handle such flood attack since I know >>>>> the limitation of netfilter ( with more than 20 years of working with >>>>> Linux networking :)) >>>> >>>> Do you have any figures how much your test environment can handle now compared to a stock IPFire without your changes? >>>> >>> I don't, but I think the xdp pdf link I referred to should answer, if >>> the performance is not significant, the kernel community would not >>> accept such feature. >> >> I don’t think that that is a true statement. Not everything is about performance. >> >> And if something works in a lab with a for-purpose built kernel does not exactly mean that this is true for IPFire. I am sure that in all sorts of tests, there are is no NAT involved which quite likely is always involved in a standard IPFire setup - that is how port forwardings work. Therefore it would be good to have real figures. > > I will see if I can do some testing on real hardware with NAT port forwarding > >> >>>>>>>> IPFire uses SYN cookies by default for all incoming connections. We currently do not use the SYNPROXY module, but that is simply because there has not been any demand for it. If this suits your use-case I would rather implement that than XDP. >>>>>>> home users very unlikely would have this demand because there isn't >>>>>>> much gain for attackers who would use DDoS to attack home users. For >>>>>>> small/medium size businesses, attackers could start DDoS because >>>>>>> business could be impacted and lose profit when under DDoS attack, >>>>>>> many businesses choose cloud DDoS providers if they could not afford >>>>>>> DDoS protection devices. XDP DDoS protection on IPFire provides DDoS >>>>>>> protection on inexpensive commodity hardware. There are already a lot >>>>>>> of open source XDP programs out there, including XDP SYNCookie from >>>>>>> Linux kernel source, I have ported it to xdp-tool repo and ported >>>>>>> xdp-tool to IPfire. >>>>>> >>>>>> Maybe share this code on the list here so that people understand better what you are looking for. >>>>>> >>>>> see above link I shared >>>>> >>>>>> I am still not sure what kind of changes you are asking us to make. >>>>>> >>>>> actually the asking is minimum, turn on the kernel config feature >>>>> for eBPF for networking >>>> >>>> You say as a minimum, but you have not asked this before. Usually we handle this in the way that people send an email with a description of their feature and if there is generally an option to include this in the distribution. If agreed, then you can work on some code and send it to this list. >>>> >>> yep, should have asked this in the beginning. >> >> Yes, you should also have sent your code that you have been working on and sent a link to your YouTube channel (https://www.youtube.com/@BPFireOS) where you explain your feature in detail. That would have helped a lot to understand where you were actually going with this instead of us trying to fill in the blanks. >> >>>>> CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=y >>>>> CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO=y >>>>> CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y >>>>> CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_DWARF4=y >>>>> CONFIG_BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF=y >>>> >>>> We don’t need any of those debugging symbols in production. They are actually really large and will make the kernel slower. >>>> >>> the debug symbols is required during build time for kernel image, but >>> can be stripped after BTF is generated for kernel image >> >> How much extra build time does generating the debug information add? >> > > I did not measure with and without debug info, my impression is it is > not significantly long that I would have noticed, I can definitely > measure. > >>>> I have just posted a suggestion to the list as we are going to ship a fresh kernel with the next Core Update: >>>> >>>> https://lists.ipfire.org/hyperkitty/list/development@lists.ipfire.org/threa… >>>> >>>>> I have a working fork of IPFire >>>>> https://github.com/vincentmli/BPFire/tree/bpfire, the discussion here >>>>> is I want to share that great technology with the IPFire community and >>>>> contribute that to IPFire. >>>> >>>> I was entirely unaware that you have written any code here. And I was also entirely unaware what your goal was. Thankfully we are on the same page now. >>>> >>>> Since I didn’t know that you have written some code, I implemented a classic SYN proxy using Netfilter this afternoon: >>>> >>>> https://lists.ipfire.org/hyperkitty/list/development@lists.ipfire.org/threa… >>>> >>>> I believe that this does what you want to do, although it does not use BPF/XDP. However, it has the advantage that it can be enabled on a per rule basis and does not have to be globally enabled for all incoming connection to that host. How could BPF/XDP be integrated into this without losing that functionality? >>>> >>> enabled kernel config feature for XDP does not mean all incoming >>> traffic will be processed by XDP, the incoming traffic will only be >>> processed if there is XDP program bytecode/machine code attached to >>> the incoming network interface, so it is up to what individual XDP >>> program does >>> >>> for example XDP program below, it does nothing, simply pass every >>> packet/connection to the netfilter/OS >>> >>> SEC("xdp") >>> int xdp_pass(struct xdp_md *ctx) >>> { >>> return XDP_PASS; >>> } >>> >>> another XDP program example to drop packet to port 5555 >>> >>> SEC("xdp") >>> int xdp_drop(struct xdp_md *ctx) >>> { >>> ... code to parse the raw packet header.. >>> if tcp->dest == 5555 >>> return XDP_DROP; >>> >>> } >>> >>> so you could attach none or many XDP programs to the network >>> interface, the XDP program developers have to write the XDP program >>> based on what users want. >>> >>> The XDP synproxy program is more complicated than the above example, >>> but it also only does filtering on a per port basis and configurable >>> by user. >>> >>> for example snippet of the code: >>> >>> /* Pass to upper stack if port requires no syncookie handling */ >>> if (!check_port_allowed(bpf_ntohs(hdr->tcp->dest))) >>> return XDP_PASS; >>> >>> so for example if user only want port 80 syn flood protected by the >>> XDP syncookie program , user can add port 80 to the ebpf map that >>> function check_port_allowed looks up ( in my fork I already added >>> IPFire UI option for user to do that), for all other ports, XDP >>> program does nothing about it, simply pass it to netfilter/OS. >> >> Well, this does answer my question then… This solution cannot be enabled individually per rule, but only globally for all traffic that hits the firewall on a certain port. That is not exactly selling this. >> > I am not sure I understand what you mean by per rule, you mean iptable > rules for iptables SYNPROXY module or just iptable rules. for XDP > SYNPROXY to work, it also does require setup iptable rule for each > port that requires XDP SYNPROXY. In the web UI, you can define firewall rules. Those. They might generate more than one iptables rule, but generally that is what I am interested in. You can combine SYNPROXY with other features that we have like country filtering and so on. So there are huge benefits there. The XDP approach that you have been taking seems to take over the entire port no matter where the packet is coming from which makes this solution less flexible. -Michael >> -Michael >> >>> >>>> Best, >>>> -Michael >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Vincent >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> -Michael >>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -Michael >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Why not give IPFire users the options when the options already exist >>>>>>>>> in the IPFire kernel? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Therefore, I - personally - neither see the necessity nor benefit of pursuing >>>>>>>>>> this proposal at this time. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thanks, and best regards, >>>>>>>>>> Peter Müller >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't understand what the difference is between XDP_PASS and XDP_TX but I would expect that nothing should be allowed to bypass the netfilter section unless it is being dropped or rejected already by the XDP process. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> XDP_PASS is to pass the packet to netfilter/TCP stack as usual after >>>>>>>>>>> XDP program packet processing, XDP_TX is to redirect the packet back >>>>>>>>>>> out through the same network interface after XDP program packet >>>>>>>>>>> processing. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Regards, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Adolf. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 09/04/2024 19:36, Vincent Li wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I have been working on enabling eBPF XDP/TC kernel feature for IPFire, >>>>>>>>>>>>> please refer to >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/Netfilter-packet-flow.s… >>>>>>>>>>>>> for where XDP fit in Linux network datapath, XDP will not interfere >>>>>>>>>>>>> with existing IPFire firewall rules. XDP is especially good at DDoS >>>>>>>>>>>>> packet filtering at high speed, see >>>>>>>>>>>>> https://netdevconf.info/0x15/slides/30/Netdev%200x15%20Accelerating%20synpr… >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think we only need to enable XDP/TC network filtering capability >>>>>>>>>>>>> without eBPF tracing capability which some users are concerned about >>>>>>>>>>>>> potential host security information leaks. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Please let me know what you think, thanks! >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vincent

1 0

[RFC PATCH] kernel: Enable XDP
by Michael Tremer 24 Apr '24

24 Apr '24

https://lists.ipfire.org/hyperkitty/list/development@lists.ipfire.org/threa… Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org> --- config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire | 11 ++++++++++- config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire | 13 ++++++++++++- config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire | 11 ++++++++++- 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire b/config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire index b85d7add9..3d8282ac6 100644 --- a/config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire +++ b/config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire @@ -93,9 +93,12 @@ CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_BPF_JIT=y # # BPF subsystem # -# CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL is not set +CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=y CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y +CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y CONFIG_BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON=y +CONFIG_BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF=y +# CONFIG_BPF_PRELOAD is not set # end of BPF subsystem CONFIG_PREEMPT_BUILD=y @@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ CONFIG_TREE_SRCU=y CONFIG_TASKS_RCU_GENERIC=y CONFIG_TASKS_RCU=y CONFIG_TASKS_RUDE_RCU=y +CONFIG_TASKS_TRACE_RCU=y CONFIG_RCU_STALL_COMMON=y CONFIG_RCU_NEED_SEGCBLIST=y # end of RCU Subsystem @@ -179,6 +183,7 @@ CONFIG_PROC_PID_CPUSET=y CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=y CONFIG_CGROUP_CPUACCT=y CONFIG_CGROUP_PERF=y +# CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF is not set # CONFIG_CGROUP_MISC is not set # CONFIG_CGROUP_DEBUG is not set CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA=y @@ -1036,6 +1041,8 @@ CONFIG_XFRM_ESP=m CONFIG_XFRM_IPCOMP=m CONFIG_NET_KEY=m CONFIG_NET_KEY_MIGRATE=y +CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS=y +CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS_DIAG=m CONFIG_NET_HANDSHAKE=y CONFIG_INET=y CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST=y @@ -1144,6 +1151,7 @@ CONFIG_NETFILTER_SKIP_EGRESS=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK=m CONFIG_NETFILTER_FAMILY_BRIDGE=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_FAMILY_ARP=y +CONFIG_NETFILTER_BPF_LINK=y # CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_HOOK is not set CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_ACCT=m CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_QUEUE=m @@ -6466,6 +6474,7 @@ CONFIG_HID_ZYDACRON=m # # HID-BPF support # +# CONFIG_HID_BPF is not set # end of HID-BPF support # diff --git a/config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire b/config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire index 2bd39e7de..fd2172a25 100644 --- a/config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire +++ b/config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire @@ -103,8 +103,13 @@ CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT=y # # BPF subsystem # -# CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL is not set +CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=y CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y +CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y +CONFIG_BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON=y +CONFIG_BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF=y +# CONFIG_BPF_PRELOAD is not set +# CONFIG_BPF_LSM is not set # end of BPF subsystem CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY_BUILD=y @@ -139,6 +144,7 @@ CONFIG_TREE_RCU=y CONFIG_TREE_SRCU=y CONFIG_TASKS_RCU_GENERIC=y CONFIG_TASKS_RUDE_RCU=y +CONFIG_TASKS_TRACE_RCU=y CONFIG_RCU_STALL_COMMON=y CONFIG_RCU_NEED_SEGCBLIST=y # end of RCU Subsystem @@ -180,6 +186,7 @@ CONFIG_PROC_PID_CPUSET=y CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=y CONFIG_CGROUP_CPUACCT=y CONFIG_CGROUP_PERF=y +# CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF is not set # CONFIG_CGROUP_MISC is not set # CONFIG_CGROUP_DEBUG is not set CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA=y @@ -826,6 +833,8 @@ CONFIG_XFRM_ESP=m CONFIG_XFRM_IPCOMP=m CONFIG_NET_KEY=m CONFIG_NET_KEY_MIGRATE=y +CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS=y +CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS_DIAG=m CONFIG_NET_HANDSHAKE=y CONFIG_INET=y CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST=y @@ -934,6 +943,7 @@ CONFIG_NETFILTER_SKIP_EGRESS=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_FAMILY_BRIDGE=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_FAMILY_ARP=y +CONFIG_NETFILTER_BPF_LINK=y # CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_HOOK is not set CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_ACCT=m CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_QUEUE=m @@ -7383,6 +7393,7 @@ CONFIG_BRANCH_PROFILE_NONE=y # CONFIG_PROFILE_ANNOTATED_BRANCHES is not set # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_IO_TRACE is not set CONFIG_UPROBE_EVENTS=y +CONFIG_BPF_EVENTS=y CONFIG_DYNAMIC_EVENTS=y CONFIG_PROBE_EVENTS=y CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD=y diff --git a/config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire b/config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire index 8ce66cb4f..ec3bca2e7 100644 --- a/config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire +++ b/config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire @@ -113,9 +113,12 @@ CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_BPF_JIT=y # # BPF subsystem # -# CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL is not set +CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=y CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y +CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON=y CONFIG_BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON=y +CONFIG_BPF_UNPRIV_DEFAULT_OFF=y +# CONFIG_BPF_PRELOAD is not set # end of BPF subsystem CONFIG_PREEMPT_BUILD=y @@ -156,6 +159,7 @@ CONFIG_TREE_SRCU=y CONFIG_TASKS_RCU_GENERIC=y CONFIG_TASKS_RCU=y CONFIG_TASKS_RUDE_RCU=y +CONFIG_TASKS_TRACE_RCU=y CONFIG_RCU_STALL_COMMON=y CONFIG_RCU_NEED_SEGCBLIST=y # end of RCU Subsystem @@ -199,6 +203,7 @@ CONFIG_PROC_PID_CPUSET=y CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=y CONFIG_CGROUP_CPUACCT=y CONFIG_CGROUP_PERF=y +# CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF is not set # CONFIG_CGROUP_MISC is not set # CONFIG_CGROUP_DEBUG is not set CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA=y @@ -1099,6 +1104,8 @@ CONFIG_XFRM_ESP=m CONFIG_XFRM_IPCOMP=m CONFIG_NET_KEY=m CONFIG_NET_KEY_MIGRATE=y +CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS=y +CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS_DIAG=m CONFIG_NET_HANDSHAKE=y CONFIG_INET=y CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST=y @@ -1207,6 +1214,7 @@ CONFIG_NETFILTER_SKIP_EGRESS=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_FAMILY_BRIDGE=y CONFIG_NETFILTER_FAMILY_ARP=y +CONFIG_NETFILTER_BPF_LINK=y # CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_HOOK is not set CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_ACCT=m CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_QUEUE=m @@ -5861,6 +5869,7 @@ CONFIG_HID_SENSOR_HUB=m # # HID-BPF support # +# CONFIG_HID_BPF is not set # end of HID-BPF support # -- 2.39.2

3 5

Enable eBPF XDP/TC kernel feature for IPFire
by Vincent Li 24 Apr '24

24 Apr '24

Hi, I have been working on enabling eBPF XDP/TC kernel feature for IPFire, please refer to https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/Netfilter-packet-flow.s… for where XDP fit in Linux network datapath, XDP will not interfere with existing IPFire firewall rules. XDP is especially good at DDoS packet filtering at high speed, see https://netdevconf.info/0x15/slides/30/Netdev%200x15%20Accelerating%20synpr… I think we only need to enable XDP/TC network filtering capability without eBPF tracing capability which some users are concerned about potential host security information leaks. Please let me know what you think, thanks! Vincent

4 12

[PATCH 1/2] libhtp: Update to 0.5.48
by Michael Tremer 24 Apr '24

24 Apr '24

https://github.com/OISF/libhtp/releases/tag/0.5.48 Signed-off-by: Michael Tremer <michael.tremer(a)ipfire.org> --- lfs/libhtp | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/lfs/libhtp b/lfs/libhtp index cbd4cb093..d3b56dcb2 100644 --- a/lfs/libhtp +++ b/lfs/libhtp @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ include Config -VER = 0.5.47 +VER = 0.5.48 THISAPP = libhtp-$(VER) DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.gz @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE) $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE) -$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = a2a126052ea528b84dfffd7926a80e633f649968bf098e3ff0f49d441821723a4d3f78f0f15d530e9ce9e393c6173aceced8c0d863afecbe65c736e4ab874a03 +$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 56eeef3524ffeac593c251846196d09e0ccfacd9aadd03b35061fd1fe6a245d1374c338581b4f7bee67255797740f4e282344fc10bf3d0c0fdf824f159380053 install : $(TARGET) -- 2.39.2

1 1

[PATCH] kmod: Update to 32
by Peter Müller 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

Changelog according to the tarball's NEWS file: - Improvements - Use any hash algo known by kernel/openssl instead of keep needing to update the mapping - Teach kmod to load modprobe.d/depmod.d configuration from ${prefix}/lib and allow it to be overriden during build with --with-distconfdir=DIR - Make kernel modules directory configurable. This allows distro to make kmod use only files from /usr regardless of having a compat symlink in place. - Install kmod.pc containing the features selected at build time. - Install all tools and symlinks by default. Previously kmod relied on distro packaging to set up the symlinks in place like modprobe, depmod, lsmod, etc. Now those symlinks are created by kmod itself and they are always placed in $bindir. - Bug Fixes - Fix warnings due to -Walloc-size - Others - Drop python bindings. Those were not update in ages and not compatible with latest python releases. - Cleanup test infra, dropping what was not used anymore - Drop experimental tools `kmod insert` / `kmod remove`. Building those was protected by a configure option never set by distros. They also didn't gain enough traction to replace the older interfaces via modprobe/insmod/rmmod. Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> --- config/rootfiles/common/kmod | 2 +- lfs/kmod | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/config/rootfiles/common/kmod b/config/rootfiles/common/kmod index 1a0432169..ed30ab10d 100644 --- a/config/rootfiles/common/kmod +++ b/config/rootfiles/common/kmod @@ -9,6 +9,6 @@ sbin/rmmod #usr/lib/libkmod.la #usr/lib/libkmod.so usr/lib/libkmod.so.2 -usr/lib/libkmod.so.2.4.1 +usr/lib/libkmod.so.2.4.2 #usr/lib/pkgconfig/libkmod.pc #usr/share/bash-completion/completions/kmod diff --git a/lfs/kmod b/lfs/kmod index 643573d33..2719083e5 100644 --- a/lfs/kmod +++ b/lfs/kmod @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ include Config -VER = 31 +VER = 32 THISAPP = kmod-$(VER) DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.xz @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE) $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE) -$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 0dc8572da570315cf0aadd87fa7e83d0f88dea91c8566749e6f3004f9a6df916dce337ca99ea5929d41f45b408c1e3effa50f9d24615d7fa28688150a5ce91cf +$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 5b5dac4639406549b23bb1da44bedd86a42885304ef4c7c67344dc8fd70b9e0ca3f83d033c6b80f6e00371d7188e205f4b68fadc56a9ddbf9d6a9d28e9b1e9a4 install : $(TARGET) -- 2.35.3

2 1

[PATCH] strongSwan: Update to 5.9.14
by Peter Müller 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

Please see https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/releases/tag/5.9.14 for the changelog of this version. Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> --- lfs/strongswan | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/lfs/strongswan b/lfs/strongswan index d002290f7..9b2a5bc9f 100644 --- a/lfs/strongswan +++ b/lfs/strongswan @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ ############################################################################### # # # IPFire.org - A linux based firewall # -# Copyright (C) 2007-2023 IPFire Team <info(a)ipfire.org> # +# Copyright (C) 2007-2024 IPFire Team <info(a)ipfire.org> # # # # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify # # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ include Config -VER = 5.9.13 +VER = 5.9.14 THISAPP = strongswan-$(VER) DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.bz2 @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE) $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE) -$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 1d60864a557cf14e84c62d4c04ae64eb24331e2576c157b276cf13691ac2a7f5d1b92925e4c3e6ab51dc1f6f64aeb7c60ffb16309673a9f78a73f652cb24da8c +$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 8b64903cfa087d42ae0895e7c11a2fcbd9c6a4a4241548d947753e081a4a4e3c5946e5cf4bbd326840e596e51c61554146f007e6882f11c874454b9480f6f7a6 install : $(TARGET) -- 2.35.3

2 1

[PATCH] Lynis: Update to 3.1.1
by Peter Müller 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

Please see https://cisofy.com/changelog/lynis/#311 for the changelogs since version 3.0.9. Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> --- lfs/lynis | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/lfs/lynis b/lfs/lynis index eb906dbeb..38ebac9c6 100644 --- a/lfs/lynis +++ b/lfs/lynis @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ ############################################################################### # # # IPFire.org - A linux based firewall # -# Copyright (C) 2007-2023 IPFire Team <info(a)ipfire.org> # +# Copyright (C) 2007-2024 IPFire Team <info(a)ipfire.org> # # # # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify # # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ include Config SUMMARY = Security and System auditing tool -VER = 3.0.9 +VER = 3.1.1 THISAPP = lynis-$(VER) DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.gz @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ DIR_APP = $(DIR_SRC)/$(THISAPP) TARGET = $(DIR_INFO)/$(THISAPP) PROG = lynis -PAK_VER = 13 +PAK_VER = 14 DEPS = @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE) $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE) -$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = dc7912c7d1782c3ffdf369cc7f0f004267bd2a2c408982909e654db14ecfa83ebdbd2f731c3d3ee8864e7de21945b1faa2f9d2845dedf3e742a4c79c62373eda +$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 056e689f00ac0fa74bd1a6dc3915cbd70f28cdb5461e0749b68ce2cf84e425c295425f7bb6d5aeb0208693a0e38290cb90925e392928257c79bc5887f6e58498 install : $(TARGET) -- 2.35.3

2 1

[PATCH] Tor: Update to 0.4.8.11
by Peter Müller 23 Apr '24

23 Apr '24

Full changelog according to https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/raw/tor-0.4.8.11/ChangeLog: Changes in version 0.4.8.11 - 2024-04-10 This is a minor release mostly to upgrade the fallbackdir list. Worth noting also that directory authority running this version will now automatically reject relays running the end of life 0.4.7.x version. o Minor feature (authority): - Reject 0.4.7.x series at the authority level. Closes ticket 40896. o Minor feature (dirauth, tor26): - New IP address and keys. o Minor feature (directory authority): - Allow BandwidthFiles "node_id" KeyValue without the dollar sign at the start of the hexdigit, in order to easier database queries combining Tor documents in which the relays fingerprint does not include it. Fixes bug 40891; bugfix on 0.4.7 (all supported versions of Tor). o Minor features (fallbackdir): - Regenerate fallback directories generated on April 10, 2024. o Minor features (geoip data): - Update the geoip files to match the IPFire Location Database, as retrieved on 2024/04/10. o Minor bugfixes (directory authorities): - Add a warning when publishing a vote or signatures to another directory authority fails. Fixes bug 40910; bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha. Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> --- lfs/tor | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/lfs/tor b/lfs/tor index aed30805f..488415902 100644 --- a/lfs/tor +++ b/lfs/tor @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ ############################################################################### # # # IPFire.org - A linux based firewall # -# Copyright (C) 2007-2023 IPFire Team <info(a)ipfire.org> # +# Copyright (C) 2007-2024 IPFire Team <info(a)ipfire.org> # # # # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify # # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ include Config SUMMARY = Anonymizing overlay network for TCP (The onion router) -VER = 0.4.8.10 +VER = 0.4.8.11 THISAPP = tor-$(VER) DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.gz @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ DL_FROM = $(URL_IPFIRE) DIR_APP = $(DIR_SRC)/$(THISAPP) TARGET = $(DIR_INFO)/$(THISAPP) PROG = tor -PAK_VER = 84 +PAK_VER = 85 DEPS = libseccomp @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE) $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE) -$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = ef470664d85e019f6cac2366e934d5dc31b8ae92f121a2b4c8c95f8267abce5ce4413d30a24affa40a069d587212364ae5a7c3cd114488e50a535f01c54c6e77 +$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = b7f5bb855a6f8fe7dfd0e0efe7b48798e9d4642e401641c83554ed0f98fe238a5f303e9466e9e24a7ade63488a745b3c957ed6cc53a2f5e21f5f9c3f78f7fa78 install : $(TARGET) -- 2.35.3

2 1

[PATCH 1/3] linux: Properly load Landlock module
by Peter Müller 22 Apr '24

22 Apr '24

Fixes: #13645 Tested-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Müller <peter.mueller(a)ipfire.org> --- config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire | 2 +- config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire | 2 +- config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire b/config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire index b85d7add9..af8aae163 100644 --- a/config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire +++ b/config/kernel/kernel.config.aarch64-ipfire @@ -8066,7 +8066,7 @@ CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y # CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT is not set # CONFIG_EVM is not set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC=y -CONFIG_LSM="lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" +CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" # # Kernel hardening options diff --git a/config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire b/config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire index 2bd39e7de..ca603ad93 100644 --- a/config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire +++ b/config/kernel/kernel.config.riscv64-ipfire @@ -6745,7 +6745,7 @@ CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y # CONFIG_IMA is not set # CONFIG_EVM is not set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC=y -CONFIG_LSM="lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" +CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" # # Kernel hardening options diff --git a/config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire b/config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire index 8ce66cb4f..fa943a2bb 100644 --- a/config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire +++ b/config/kernel/kernel.config.x86_64-ipfire @@ -7252,7 +7252,7 @@ CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y # CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT is not set # CONFIG_EVM is not set CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC=y -CONFIG_LSM="lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" +CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" # # Kernel hardening options -- 2.35.3

1 2

[PATCH] apache: Update to 2.4.59
by Matthias Fischer 22 Apr '24

22 Apr '24

For details see: https://dlcdn.apache.org/httpd/CHANGES_2.4.59 Fixes CVE-2024-27316 / CVE-2024-24795 / CVE-2023-38709 Previously applied patch (apache-2.4.58_mod_xml2enc_remove_dependency_on_xmlstring_header.patch) has been removed - is now included. Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer <matthias.fischer(a)ipfire.org> --- lfs/apache2 | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/lfs/apache2 b/lfs/apache2 index c1973e6d5..0851471fe 100644 --- a/lfs/apache2 +++ b/lfs/apache2 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ ############################################################################### # # # IPFire.org - A linux based firewall # -# Copyright (C) 2007-2023 IPFire Team <info(a)ipfire.org> # +# Copyright (C) 2007-2024 IPFire Team <info(a)ipfire.org> # # # # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify # # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ include Config -VER = 2.4.58 +VER = 2.4.59 THISAPP = httpd-$(VER) DL_FILE = $(THISAPP).tar.bz2 @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE) $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE) -$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 2105b8fada99f1dda55201ed89ed5326f0edb078d352cbff44f02cde80d129b65b63e07366a9a744ba474be5687fa8d3d2d8ddc64ac914b47166607f3f4a9de2 +$(DL_FILE)_BLAKE2 = 836e3538a120d71c016149397a4efd61ae6acd8a8fb9d2ce117c7d86209c4b40c0be3c464007891f28c58182e9d40a8793abe9e94e642354492954af91d9878c install : $(TARGET) @@ -75,7 +75,6 @@ $(subst %,%_BLAKE2,$(objects)) : $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects)) @$(PREBUILD) @rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar jxf $(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE) - cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 < $(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/apache-2.4.58_mod_xml2enc_remove_dependency_on_xmlstring_header.patch ### Add IPFire's layout, too echo "# IPFire layout" >> $(DIR_APP)/config.layout echo "<Layout IPFire>" >> $(DIR_APP)/config.layout -- 2.34.1

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