On Tue, 2015-06-02 at 18:32 +0200, IT Superhack wrote:
Hello Michael,
Michael Tremer:
On Mon, 2015-06-01 at 09:13 +0200, IT Superhack wrote:
Hello Michael,
Michael Tremer:
On Sun, 2015-05-31 at 22:11 +0200, Stefan Schantl wrote:
Hello Timmothy,
thanks for your hard work and sending us the patches. I've noticed you already have read through the "Submiting Patches" guide on the wiki (http://wiki.ipfire.org/devel/submit-patches).
In order for an easy apply of your modifications please re-send them to the list with the patchfile attached to the mail.
No, no attachments.
http://wiki.ipfire.org/devel/submit-patches#no_mime_no_links_no_compre
ssion_no_attachments_just_plain_text As
Stefan already estimated, I've read those wiki pages. But I've uploaded the patch to nopaste.ipfire.org due to cryappy line breaks done by my mail program (I guess it has something to do with PGP, but I don't know it for sure.).
Yes, most MUAs scramble the content of the emails quite a lot. If you set it to send a text email (which is a must on mailing lists any way) they do not tend to do that any more.
Indeed, they do. :-(
It is probably best to use git send-email because of these broken MUAs.
This does not work for me, but it seems to be an issue related to my installation, i will check that later.
So, if you like, I can attach the patch to an email, but I really can't guarantee that it arrives correctly.
You can try sending emails to yourself to test your setup and look at the result.
I did several times, the solution was to set PGP to "PGP/MIME" instead of signing inline.
Also no pseudonyms.
What is that supposed to mean?
We are legally required to have the real name of the author of a patch and a working email address.
The reasons behind that are quite a lot and have been discussed a couple of times on this list.
All the big Open Source projects I know require this, too.
Ah, I see.
I get that this entire process might be a bit difficult for a start but there has been put a lot of thought into it why we are doing it this way.
Both aspects are right: It is complicated to clone the git branch, make patchfiles, working with git (first time!) and so on. But those things seem to be useful for you developers.
Git is really complicated for beginners. Once you get used to it you will never want to use anything else. There are a lot of really nice howtos on the web and YouTube.
The patch format is so important because it saves a lot of work at the maintainers' part and you can probably describe best what your patch is supposed to fix and so on.
So, here finally is my patch: Signed-off-by: Timmothy Wilson itsuperhack@web.de
Could you please provide any sort of proof that this is not a pseudonym?
diff --git a/config/httpd/vhosts.d/ipfire-interface-ssl.conf b/config/httpd/vhosts.d/ipfire-interface-ssl.conf index daac757..b4ad035 100644 --- a/config/httpd/vhosts.d/ipfire-interface-ssl.conf +++ b/config/httpd/vhosts.d/ipfire-interface-ssl.conf @@ -9,10 +9,11 @@ TransferLog /var/log/httpd/access_log SSLEngine on SSLProtocol all -SSLv2 -SSLv3
- SSLCipherSuite
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128:AES256:HIGH:!RC4:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!3DES:!MD5:!PSK
- SSLCipherSuite
ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:kEDH+AESGCM:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:AES256-SHA:HIGH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!EXPORT:!DES:!3DES:!RC4:!MD5:!PSK:!aECDH:!EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:!EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:!KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA
I did not get from the description of the patch why these cipher suites are added at the end. They should not be allowed any way as they contain DES and some other ciphers that have been forbidden before.
SSLHonorCipherOrder on SSLCertificateFile /etc/httpd/server.crt SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/httpd/server.key
SSLOpenSSLConfCmd DHParameters "/etc/httpd/dhparams.pem"
<Directory /srv/web/ipfire/html> Options ExecCGI
@@ -59,33 +60,33 @@ Require user dial admin </Directory> <Files ~ ".(cgi|shtml?)$">
- SSLOptions +StdEnvVars
SSLOptions +StdEnvVars</Files> <Directory /srv/web/ipfire/cgi-bin>
- SSLOptions +StdEnvVars
SSLOptions +StdEnvVars</Directory> SetEnv HOME /home/nobody SetEnvIf User-Agent ".*MSIE.*" \
- nokeepalive ssl-unclean-shutdown \
- downgrade-1.0 force-response-1.0
nokeepalive ssl-unclean-shutdown \downgrade-1.0 force-response-1.0
- "%t %h %{SSL_PROTOCOL}x %{SSL_CIPHER}x "%r" %b"
"%t %h %{SSL_PROTOCOL}x %{SSL_CIPHER}x \"%r\" %b"Alias /updatecache/ /var/updatecache/
- <Directory /var/updatecache>
Options ExecCGIAllowOverride NoneOrder deny,allowAllow from all</Directory>
<Directory /var/updatecache>Options ExecCGIAllowOverride NoneOrder deny,allowAllow from all</Directory>Alias /repository/ /var/urlrepo/
- <Directory /var/urlrepo>
Options ExecCGIAllowOverride NoneOrder deny,allowAllow from all</Directory>
<Directory /var/urlrepo>Options ExecCGIAllowOverride NoneOrder deny,allowAllow from all</Directory>
It would also have been nice to have an extra patch just for re-indentation.
Alias /proxy-reports/ /var/log/sarg/ <Directory /var/log/sarg>@@ -96,4 +97,4 @@ AuthUserFile /var/ipfire/auth/users Require user admin </Directory> -</VirtualHost> +</VirtualHost> \ No newline at end of file
Please do not remove the newline at the end of files.
diff --git a/src/scripts/httpscert b/src/scripts/httpscert index e20f789..61abcda 100644 --- a/src/scripts/httpscert +++ b/src/scripts/httpscert @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ case "$1" in /usr/bin/openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in \ /etc/httpd/server.csr -signkey /etc/httpd/server.key -out \ /etc/httpd/server.crt
- echo "Generating prime numbers...";
- /usr/bin/openssl dhparam -out /etc/httpd/dhparams.pem 2048; ;; read) if [ -f /etc/httpd/server.key -a -f /etc/httpd/server.crt -a -f
/etc/httpd/server.csr ]; then
Do you have any benchmarks about how long this approximately takes to generate? I estimate this taking hours on some hardware.
Please let me know if there are any issues or the patch didn't arrived correctly. Please also note my comments below about how to distribute and apply the patch.
You can check if the patch made its way through here:
http://patchwork.ipfire.org/project/ipfire/list/
What comments below? I could not find any.
Best, -Michael
-Michael
Best regards, Timmothy Wilson
Best, -Michael
Thanks in advance,
-Stefan
Changes: [1] Forbid the use of weak DH cipher suites in Apache. [2] Tell Apache to use a custom bunch of prime numbers. [3] Updated "httpscert" in order to generate those prime numbers.
Those changes are supposed to fix a vulnerability called "logjam" in Apache. "Logjam" is a recently discovered vulnerability in the Diffie-Hellman-Key-Exchange. Affected are TLS/SSL connectiones, VPNs and other services which are relying on DH as well.
References: [Bug #10856]: https://bugzilla.ipfire.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10856 [Further Information]: https://weakdh.org/ [Further Information (german)]: http://www.heise.de/security/meldung/Logjam-Attacke-Verschluesselung
-von
-zehntausenden-Servern-gefaehrdet-2657502.html
Please find the patch here: http://nopaste.ipfire.org/view/r8QWUyQF
However, the patch can't applied to IPFire systems without creating unique prime numbers, since the configuration file of Apache expects the presence of a file called "/etc/httpd/dhparams.pem", if this one does not exist, Apache will likely crash. Please make sure to generate prime numbers by Pakfire during a upgrade:
/usr/bin/openssl dhparam -out /etc/httpd/dhparams.pem 2048;
This is still the case, please make sure to run this command after an upgrade.
I'm estimating that other software components of IPFire are still vulnerable to Lojgam (IPSec?). As soon as I have more information about this, I will roll out new patches.
Best regards, Timmothy Wilson _______________________________________________ Development mailing list Development@lists.ipfire.org http://lists.ipfire.org/mailman/listinfo/development
_______________________________________________ Development mailing list Development@lists.ipfire.org http://lists.ipfire.org/mailman/listinfo/development
_______________________________________________ Development mailing list Development@lists.ipfire.org http://lists.ipfire.org/mailman/listinfo/development
Best regards, Timmothy Wilson