Re: [PATCH] dnsmasq: 2.76test10 with latest patches (001-004)

28 Feb 2016

Hi,
I merged this patch and the one after.
Please give this version a good test as it is a pre-release version.
You can maintain a branch where you integrate all new changes, but I
think it is not required to send every single one to the mailing list.
It creates a bit of noise and I think that unfortunately nobody is
testing every single one any ways. Which is sad.
Can we have maybe one aggregated patch after every release of a Core
Update? So we always have the latest version of dnsmasq in the updates?
Best,
-Michael
On Fri, 2016-02-26 at 18:29 +0100, Matthias Fischer wrote:
...
This is 'dnsmasq 2.76test10', based on current 'next', containing
latest patches.
Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer matthias.fischer@ipfire.org
lfs/dnsmasq                                        |   39 +-
 ...TL_parameter_to_--host-record_and_--cname.patch |  265 +++
 ...01-include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch |   41 -
 .../dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch        |  117 ++
 ...subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch |  271 ---
 src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch     |   17 +
 ...h_zones_locally_when_localise_queries_set.patch |   34 -
 .../dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch        |  136 ++
 .../004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-option.patch   |   38 -
 ...ution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch |   50 -
 ...page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch |   35 -
 ...gned_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch |   30 -
 ...6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch |   25 -
 ...pect_the_--no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch |   47 -
 ..._5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch |   26 -
 ...11-Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch |   32 -
 ...12-Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-priv.patch |   48 -
 ...y_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch |   43 -
 ...14-Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch |   39 -
 .../015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-dir.patch  |   38 -
 ...ajor_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch | 2209 ----------

...hing_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch |  612 ------
 ...caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch |  269 ---
 ...lise_RR-filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch |  755 -------
 .../dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch      |  134 --
 ...1-Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch |  133 --
 ..._code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch |  409 ----
 ...023-Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch |   98 -
 ...ning_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.patch |  145 --
 ...EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch |  643 ------
 ...aks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch |  262 ---
 ...obscure_off-by-one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch |   27 -
 .../028-Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch       |   39 -
 .../dnsmasq/029-NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch |   39 -
 34 files changed, 542 insertions(+), 6603 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_
--host-record_and_--cname.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
 create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-
ttl_option.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
 create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
ries_set.patch
 create mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-
mtu_option.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/004-
fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-option.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
--no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/012-
Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-priv.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/015-
Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-dir.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/020-
DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
atch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/027-
Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
 delete mode 100644 src/patches/dnsmasq/029-
NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch

diff --git a/lfs/dnsmasq b/lfs/dnsmasq
index 8058663..29d7895 100644
--- a/lfs/dnsmasq
+++ b/lfs/dnsmasq
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 ####################################################################
###########
 #                                                                   
          #
 # IPFire.org - A linux based
firewall                                         #
-# Copyright (C) 2015  Michael Tremer & Christian
Schmidt                      #
+# Copyright (C) 2016  Michael Tremer & Christian
Schmidt                      #
 #                                                                   
          #
 # This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or
modify        #
 # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
by        #
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 
 include Config
 
-VER        = 2.75
+VER        = 2.76test10
 
 THISAPP    = dnsmasq-$(VER)
 DL_FILE    = $(THISAPP).tar.xz
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ objects = $(DL_FILE)
 
 $(DL_FILE) = $(DL_FROM)/$(DL_FILE)
 
-$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 887236f1ddde6eb57cdb9d01916c9f72
+$(DL_FILE)_MD5 = 4b51474ed6081b18c61407077f254cf7
 
 install : $(TARGET)
 
@@ -73,35 +73,10 @@ $(subst %,%_MD5,$(objects)) :
 $(TARGET) : $(patsubst %,$(DIR_DL)/%,$(objects))
 	@$(PREBUILD)
 	@rm -rf $(DIR_APP) && cd $(DIR_SRC) && tar axf
$(DIR_DL)/$(DL_FILE)

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
ries_set.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
option.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
--no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-
priv.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
dir.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
atch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-
one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-
record_and_--cname.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch

cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i

$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
 	cd $(DIR_APP) && patch -Np1 -i
$(DIR_SRC)/src/patches/dnsmasq-Add-support-to-read-ISC-DHCP-lease-
file.patch
 
 	cd $(DIR_APP) && sed -i src/config.h \
diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-
record_and_--cname.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-record_and_--cname.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86fbc9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-Add_TTL_parameter_to_--host-
record_and_--cname.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+From df3d54f776a3c9b60735b45c0b7fd88b66a2d5c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
+From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 21:03:38 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Add TTL parameter to --host-record and --cname.



+---

man/dnsmasq.8 |   12 ++++++++++--
src/cache.c   |    7 +++++++
src/dnsmasq.h |    2 ++
src/option.c  |   46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
src/rfc1035.c |    6 +++++-
5 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)


+diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
+index b782eaf..7bc1394 100644
+--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
++++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
+@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ zone files: the port, weight and priority
numbers are in a different

order. More than one SRV record for a given service/domain is

allowed,

all that match are returned.
.TP

+-.B --host-record=<name>[,<name>....],[<IPv4-address>],[<IPv6-
address>]
++.B --host-record=<name>[,<name>....],[<IPv4-address>],[<IPv6-
address>][,<TTL>]

Add A, AAAA and PTR records to the DNS. This adds one or more names

to

the DNS with associated IPv4 (A) and IPv6 (AAAA) records. A name

may

appear in more than one

+@@ -546,6 +546,10 @@ is in effect. Short and long names may appear
in the same

.B host-record,
eg.
.B --host-record=laptop,laptop.thekelleys.org,192.168.0.1,1234::100

++
++If the time-to-live is given, it overrides the default, which is
zero
++or the value of --local-ttl. The value is a positive integer and
gives 
++the time-to-live in seconds.

.TP
.B -Y, --txt-record=<name>[[,<text>],<text>]
Return a TXT DNS record. The value of TXT record is a set of

strings,
+@@ -559,7 +563,7 @@ Return a PTR DNS record.

.B --naptr-

record=<name>,<order>,<preference>,<flags>,<service>,<regexp>[,<repla
cement>]

Return an NAPTR DNS record, as specified in RFC3403.
.TP

+-.B --cname=<cname>,<target>
++.B --cname=<cname>,<target>[,<TTL>]

Return a CNAME record which indicates that <cname> is really
<target>. There are significant limitations on the target; it must

be a

DNS name which is known to dnsmasq from /etc/hosts (or additional

+@@ -568,6 +572,10 @@ hosts files), from DHCP, from --interface-name
or from another

If the target does not satisfy this
criteria, the whole cname is ignored. The cname must be unique, but

it

is permissable to have more than one cname pointing to the same

target.
++
++If the time-to-live is given, it overrides the default, which is
zero
++or the value of -local-ttl. The value is a positive integer and
gives 
++the time-to-live in seconds.

.TP
.B --dns-rr=<name>,<RR-number>,[<hex data>]
Return an arbitrary DNS Resource Record. The number is the type of

the
+diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
+index a9eaa65..4ecd535 100644
+--- a/src/cache.c
++++ b/src/cache.c
+@@ -778,6 +778,7 @@ static void add_hosts_cname(struct crec *target)
+ 	(crec = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec))))
+       {
+ 	crec->flags = F_FORWARD | F_IMMORTAL | F_NAMEP | F_CONFIG |
F_CNAME;
++	crec->ttd = a->ttl;
+ 	crec->name.namep = a->alias;
+ 	crec->addr.cname.target.cache = target;
+ 	crec->addr.cname.uid = target->uid;
+@@ -981,6 +982,7 @@ int read_hostsfile(char *filename, unsigned int
index, int cache_size, struct cr
+ 		  strcat(cache->name.sname, ".");
+ 		  strcat(cache->name.sname, domain_suffix);
+ 		  cache->flags = flags;
++		  cache->ttd = daemon->local_ttl;
+ 		  add_hosts_entry(cache, &addr, addrlen, index,
rhash, hashsz);
+ 		  name_count++;
+ 		}
+@@ -988,6 +990,7 @@ int read_hostsfile(char *filename, unsigned int
index, int cache_size, struct cr
+ 		{
+ 		  strcpy(cache->name.sname, canon);
+ 		  cache->flags = flags;
++		  cache->ttd = daemon->local_ttl;
+ 		  add_hosts_entry(cache, &addr, addrlen, index,
rhash, hashsz);
+ 		  name_count++;
+ 		}
+@@ -1057,6 +1060,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
+ 	  ((cache = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec)))))
+ 	{
+ 	  cache->flags = F_FORWARD | F_NAMEP | F_CNAME | F_IMMORTAL
| F_CONFIG;
++	  cache->ttd = a->ttl;
+ 	  cache->name.namep = a->alias;
+ 	  cache->addr.cname.target.int_name = intr;
+ 	  cache->addr.cname.uid = SRC_INTERFACE;
+@@ -1071,6 +1075,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
+ 	(cache->addr.ds.keydata = blockdata_alloc(ds->digest, ds-
...
digestlen)))
+       {
+ 	cache->flags = F_FORWARD | F_IMMORTAL | F_DS | F_CONFIG |
F_NAMEP;
++	cache->ttd = daemon->local_ttl;
+ 	cache->name.namep = ds->name;
+ 	cache->addr.ds.keylen = ds->digestlen;
+ 	cache->addr.ds.algo = ds->algo;
+@@ -1095,6 +1100,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
+ 	    (cache = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec))))
+ 	  {
+ 	    cache->name.namep = nl->name;
++	    cache->ttd = hr->ttl;
+ 	    cache->flags = F_HOSTS | F_IMMORTAL | F_FORWARD |
F_REVERSE | F_IPV4 | F_NAMEP | F_CONFIG;
+ 	    add_hosts_entry(cache, (struct all_addr *)&hr->addr,
INADDRSZ, SRC_CONFIG, (struct crec **)daemon->packet, revhashsz);
+ 	  }
+@@ -1103,6 +1109,7 @@ void cache_reload(void)
+ 	    (cache = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct crec))))
+ 	  {
+ 	    cache->name.namep = nl->name;
++	    cache->ttd = hr->ttl;
+ 	    cache->flags = F_HOSTS | F_IMMORTAL | F_FORWARD |
F_REVERSE | F_IPV6 | F_NAMEP | F_CONFIG;
+ 	    add_hosts_entry(cache, (struct all_addr *)&hr->addr6,
IN6ADDRSZ, SRC_CONFIG, (struct crec **)daemon->packet, revhashsz);
+ 	  }
+diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
+index 6d1c5ae..6344df5 100644
+--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
+@@ -308,6 +308,7 @@ struct ptr_record {

};

+

struct cname {

++  int ttl;
+   char *alias, *target;
+   struct cname *next;

};

+@@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ struct auth_zone {
+ 
+

struct host_record {

++  int ttl;
+   struct name_list {
+     char *name;
+     struct name_list *next;
+diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
+index c98bdc9..7c5e6bc 100644
+--- a/src/option.c
++++ b/src/option.c
+@@ -448,20 +448,20 @@ static struct {
+   { LOPT_GEN_NAMES, ARG_DUP, "[=tag:<tag>]", gettext_noop("Generate
hostnames based on MAC address for nameless clients."), NULL},
+   { LOPT_PROXY, ARG_DUP, "[=<ipaddr>]...", gettext_noop("Use these
DHCP relays as full proxies."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_RELAY, ARG_DUP, "<local-addr>,<server>[,<interface>]",
gettext_noop("Relay DHCP requests to a remote server"), NULL},
+-  { LOPT_CNAME, ARG_DUP, "<alias>,<target>", gettext_noop("Specify
alias name for LOCAL DNS name."), NULL },
++  { LOPT_CNAME, ARG_DUP, "<alias>,<target>[,<ttl>]",
gettext_noop("Specify alias name for LOCAL DNS name."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_PXE_PROMT, ARG_DUP, "<prompt>,[<timeout>]",
gettext_noop("Prompt to send to PXE clients."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_PXE_SERV, ARG_DUP, "<service>", gettext_noop("Boot service
for PXE menu."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_TEST, 0, NULL, gettext_noop("Check configuration
syntax."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_ADD_MAC, ARG_DUP, "[=base64|text]", gettext_noop("Add
requestor's MAC address to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_ADD_SBNET, ARG_ONE, "<v4 pref>[,<v6 pref>]",
gettext_noop("Add specified IP subnet to forwarded DNS queries."),
NULL },
+-   { LOPT_CPE_ID, ARG_ONE, "<text>", gettext_noop("Add client
identification to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
++  { LOPT_CPE_ID, ARG_ONE, "<text>", gettext_noop("Add client
identification to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_DNSSEC, OPT_DNSSEC_PROXY, NULL, gettext_noop("Proxy DNSSEC
validation results from upstream nameservers."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_INCR_ADDR, OPT_CONSEC_ADDR, NULL, gettext_noop("Attempt to
allocate sequential IP addresses to DHCP clients."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_CONNTRACK, OPT_CONNTRACK, NULL, gettext_noop("Copy
connection-track mark from queries to upstream connections."), NULL
},
+   { LOPT_FQDN, OPT_FQDN_UPDATE, NULL, gettext_noop("Allow DHCP
clients to do their own DDNS updates."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_RA, OPT_RA, NULL, gettext_noop("Send router-advertisements 
for interfaces doing DHCPv6"), NULL },
+   { LOPT_DUID, ARG_ONE, "<enterprise>,<duid>",
gettext_noop("Specify DUID_EN-type DHCPv6 server DUID"), NULL },
+-  { LOPT_HOST_REC, ARG_DUP, "<name>,<address>",
gettext_noop("Specify host (A/AAAA and PTR) records"), NULL },
++  { LOPT_HOST_REC, ARG_DUP, "<name>,<address>[,<ttl>]",
gettext_noop("Specify host (A/AAAA and PTR) records"), NULL },
+   { LOPT_RR, ARG_DUP, "<name>,<RR-number>,[<data>]",
gettext_noop("Specify arbitrary DNS resource record"), NULL },
+   { LOPT_CLVERBIND, OPT_CLEVERBIND, NULL, gettext_noop("Bind to
interfaces in use - check for new interfaces"), NULL },
+   { LOPT_AUTHSERV, ARG_ONE, "<NS>,<interface>",
gettext_noop("Export local names to global DNS"), NULL },
+@@ -3692,12 +3692,15 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
+     case LOPT_CNAME: /* --cname */
+       {
+ 	struct cname *new;
+-	char *alias;
+-	char *target;
++	char *alias, *target, *ttls;
++	int ttl = -1;
+ 
+ 	if (!(comma = split(arg)))
+ 	  ret_err(gen_err);
+ 	
++	if ((ttls = split(comma)) && !atoi_check(ttls, &ttl))
++	  ret_err(_("bad TTL"));
++	
+ 	alias = canonicalise_opt(arg);
+ 	target = canonicalise_opt(comma);
+ 	    
+@@ -3713,6 +3716,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char
*errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
+ 	    daemon->cnames = new;
+ 	    new->alias = alias;
+ 	    new->target = target;
++	    new->ttl = ttl;
+ 	  }
+       
+ 	break;
+@@ -3913,14 +3917,22 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
+       {
+ 	struct host_record *new = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct
host_record));
+ 	memset(new, 0, sizeof(struct host_record));
+-	
++	new->ttl = -1;
++
+ 	if (!arg || !(comma = split(arg)))
+ 	  ret_err(_("Bad host-record"));
+ 	
+ 	while (arg)
+ 	  {
+ 	    struct all_addr addr;
+-	    if (inet_pton(AF_INET, arg, &addr))
++	    char *dig;
++
++	    for (dig = arg; *dig != 0; dig++)
++	      if (*dig < '0' || *dig > '9')
++		break;
++	    if (*dig == 0)
++	      new->ttl = atoi(arg);
++	    else if (inet_pton(AF_INET, arg, &addr))
+ 	      new->addr = addr.addr.addr4;

#ifdef HAVE_IPV6

+ 	    else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, arg, &addr))
+@@ -4601,7 +4613,25 @@ void read_opts(int argc, char **argv, char
*compile_opts)
+ 	    }
+ 	} 
+     }
+-  
++
++  if (daemon->host_records)
++    {
++      struct host_record *hr;
++      
++      for (hr = daemon->host_records; hr; hr = hr->next)
++	if (hr->ttl == -1)
++	  hr->ttl = daemon->local_ttl;
++    }
++
++  if (daemon->cnames)
++    {
++      struct cname *cn;
++      
++      for (cn = daemon->cnames; cn; cn = cn->next)
++	if (cn->ttl == -1)
++	  cn->ttl = daemon->local_ttl;
++    }
++
+   if (daemon->if_addrs)
+     {  
+       struct iname *tmp;
+diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
+index 9c0ddb5..3535a71 100644
+--- a/src/rfc1035.c
++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
+@@ -1169,9 +1169,13 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec
*crecp, time_t now)
+   /* Return 0 ttl for DHCP entries, which might change
+      before the lease expires. */
+ 
+-  if  (crecp->flags & (F_IMMORTAL | F_DHCP))
++  if (crecp->flags & F_DHCP)
+     return daemon->local_ttl;
+   
++  /* Immortal entries other than DHCP are local, and hold TTL in
TTD field. */
++  if (crecp->flags & F_IMMORTAL)
++    return crecp->ttd;
++
+   /* Return the Max TTL value if it is lower then the actual TTL */
+   if (daemon->max_ttl == 0 || ((unsigned)(crecp->ttd - now) <
daemon->max_ttl))
+     return crecp->ttd - now;
+-- 
+1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a2557a..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/001-
include_0_0_0_0_8_in_DNS_rebind_checks.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From d2aa7dfbb6d1088dcbea9fecc61b9293b320eb95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2015 21:52:12 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Include 0.0.0.0/8 in DNS rebind checks.





CHANGELOG     |    7 +++++++
src/rfc1035.c |    3 ++-
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)


-diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
-index 901da47..3f4026d 100644
---- a/CHANGELOG
-+++ b/CHANGELOG
-@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
-+version 2.76
-+            Include 0.0.0.0/8 in DNS rebind checks. This range 
-+	    translates to hosts on  the local network, or, at 
-+	    least, 0.0.0.0 accesses the local host, so could
-+	    be targets for DNS rebinding. See RFC 5735 section 3 
-+	    for details. Thanks to Stephen RÃ¶ttger for the bug
report.
-+

version 2.75

-             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
- 	    dhcp-script is configured. Thanks to Adrian Davey for
-diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
-index 56647b0..29e9e65 100644
---- a/src/rfc1035.c
-+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
-@@ -728,7 +728,8 @@ int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int
ban_localhost)
-   in_addr_t ip_addr = ntohl(addr.s_addr);
- 
-   return
--    (((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000) && ban_localhost)  /*
127.0.0.0/8    (loopback) */ || 
-+    (((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000) && ban_localhost)  /*
127.0.0.0/8    (loopback) */ ||
-+    ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x00000000)  /* RFC 5735 section 3.
"here" network */ ||
-     ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xC0A80000)  /* 192.168.0.0/16
(private)  */ ||
-     ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x0A000000)  /*
10.0.0.0/8     (private)  */ ||
-     ((ip_addr & 0xFFF00000) == 0xAC100000)  /*
172.16.0.0/12  (private)  */ ||
--- 
-1.7.10.4
diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45e3b9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-Add_--dhcp-ttl_option.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+From 832e47beab95c2918b5264f0504f2fe6fe523e4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
+From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 21:24:45 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Add --dhcp-ttl option.



+---

man/dnsmasq.8 |    5 ++++-
src/dnsmasq.h |    2 +-
src/option.c  |   13 +++++++++++--
src/rfc1035.c |    2 +-
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)


+diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
+index 7bc1394..2bcce20 100644
+--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
++++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
+@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ in the same way as for DHCP-derived names. Note
that this does not

apply to domain names in cnames, PTR records, TXT records etc.
.TP
.B -T, --local-ttl=<time>

+-When replying with information from /etc/hosts or the DHCP leases
++When replying with information from /etc/hosts or configuration or
the DHCP leases

file dnsmasq by default sets the time-to-live field to zero,

meaning

that the requester should not itself cache the information. This is
the correct thing to do in almost all situations. This option

allows a
+@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ time-to-live (in seconds) to be given for these
replies. This will

reduce the load on the server at the expense of clients using stale
data under some circumstances.
.TP

++.B --dhcp-ttl=<time>
++As for --local-ttl, but affects only replies with information from
DHCP leases. If both are given, --dhcp-ttl applies for DHCP
information, and --local-ttl for others. Setting this to zero
eliminates the effect of --local-ttl for DHCP.
++.TP

.B --neg-ttl=<time>
Negative replies from upstream servers normally contain time-to-

live

information in SOA records which dnsmasq uses for caching. If the

+diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
+index 6344df5..9f73c3b 100644
+--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
+@@ -955,7 +955,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
+   int max_logs;  /* queue limit */
+   int cachesize, ftabsize;
+   int port, query_port, min_port, max_port;
+-  unsigned long local_ttl, neg_ttl, max_ttl, min_cache_ttl,
max_cache_ttl, auth_ttl;
++  unsigned long local_ttl, neg_ttl, max_ttl, min_cache_ttl,
max_cache_ttl, auth_ttl, dhcp_ttl, use_dhcp_ttl;
+   char *dns_client_id;
+   struct hostsfile *addn_hosts;
+   struct dhcp_context *dhcp, *dhcp6;
+diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
+index 7c5e6bc..3f6d162 100644
+--- a/src/option.c
++++ b/src/option.c
+@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ struct myoption {

#define LOPT_MAXPORT       345
#define LOPT_CPE_ID        346
#define LOPT_SCRIPT_ARP    347

++#define LOPT_DHCPTTL       348
+

#ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG
static const struct option opts[] =

+@@ -319,6 +320,7 @@ static const struct myoption opts[] =
+     { "quiet-ra", 0, 0, LOPT_QUIET_RA },
+     { "dns-loop-detect", 0, 0, LOPT_LOOP_DETECT },
+     { "script-arp", 0, 0, LOPT_SCRIPT_ARP },
++    { "dhcp-ttl", 1, 0 , LOPT_DHCPTTL },
+     { NULL, 0, 0, 0 }
+   };
+ 
+@@ -485,9 +487,10 @@ static struct {
+   { LOPT_QUIET_DHCP, OPT_QUIET_DHCP, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log
routine DHCP."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_QUIET_DHCP6, OPT_QUIET_DHCP6, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not
log routine DHCPv6."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_QUIET_RA, OPT_QUIET_RA, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not log
RA."), NULL },
+-  { LOPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, OPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, NULL,
gettext_noop("Accept queries only from directly-connected networks"),
NULL },
+-  { LOPT_LOOP_DETECT, OPT_LOOP_DETECT, NULL, gettext_noop("Detect
and remove DNS forwarding loops"), NULL },
++  { LOPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, OPT_LOCAL_SERVICE, NULL,
gettext_noop("Accept queries only from directly-connected
networks."), NULL },
++  { LOPT_LOOP_DETECT, OPT_LOOP_DETECT, NULL, gettext_noop("Detect
and remove DNS forwarding loops."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_IGNORE_ADDR, ARG_DUP, "<ipaddr>", gettext_noop("Ignore DNS
responses containing ipaddr."), NULL }, 
++  { LOPT_DHCPTTL, ARG_ONE, "<ttl>", gettext_noop("Set TTL in DNS
responses with DHCP-derived addresses."), NULL }, 
+   { 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL }

};

+ 
+@@ -2580,6 +2583,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char
*errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
+     case LOPT_MINCTTL: /* --min-cache-ttl */
+     case LOPT_MAXCTTL: /* --max-cache-ttl */
+     case LOPT_AUTHTTL: /* --auth-ttl */
++    case LOPT_DHCPTTL: /* --dhcp-ttl */
+       {
+ 	int ttl;
+ 	if (!atoi_check(arg, &ttl))
+@@ -2598,6 +2602,11 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
+ 	  daemon->max_cache_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
+ 	else if (option == LOPT_AUTHTTL)
+ 	  daemon->auth_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
++	else if (option == LOPT_DHCPTTL)
++	  {
++	    daemon->dhcp_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
++	    daemon->use_dhcp_ttl = 1;
++	  }
+ 	else
+ 	  daemon->local_ttl = (unsigned long)ttl;
+ 	break;
+diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
+index 3535a71..8f1e3b4 100644
+--- a/src/rfc1035.c
++++ b/src/rfc1035.c
+@@ -1170,7 +1170,7 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec
*crecp, time_t now)
+      before the lease expires. */
+ 
+   if (crecp->flags & F_DHCP)
+-    return daemon->local_ttl;
++    return daemon->use_dhcp_ttl ? daemon->dhcp_ttl : daemon-
...
local_ttl;
+   
+   /* Immortal entries other than DHCP are local, and hold TTL in
TTD field. */
+   if (crecp->flags & F_IMMORTAL)
+-- 
+1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2d3d6e4..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/002-
enhance_add_subnet_to_allow_arbitary_subnet_addresses.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
-From a7369bef8abd241c3d85633fa9c870943f091e76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Ed Bardsley ebardsley@google.com
-Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2015 21:17:18 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Enhance --add-subnet to allow arbitary subnet
addresses.





CHANGELOG     |    4 ++++
man/dnsmasq.8 |   32 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------
src/dnsmasq.h |   13 ++++++++++---
src/option.c  |   59

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----

src/rfc1035.c |   39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
5 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
-index 3f4026d..bbc2834 100644
---- a/CHANGELOG
-+++ b/CHANGELOG
-@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ version 2.76
- 	    least, 0.0.0.0 accesses the local host, so could
- 	    be targets for DNS rebinding. See RFC 5735 section 3 
- 	    for details. Thanks to Stephen RÃ¶ttger for the bug
report.
-+
-+	    Enhance --add-subnet to allow arbitrary subnet
addresses.
-+            Thanks to Ed Barsley for the patch.
-+	
-

version 2.75

-             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
-diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
-index c8913b5..a23c898 100644
---- a/man/dnsmasq.8
-+++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
-@@ -604,17 +604,27 @@ experimental. Also note that exposing MAC
addresses in this way may

have security and privacy implications. The warning about caching
given for --add-subnet applies to --add-mac too.
.TP

--.B --add-subnet[[=<IPv4 prefix length>],<IPv6 prefix length>]
--Add the subnet address of the requestor to the DNS queries which
are
--forwarded upstream. The amount of the address forwarded depends on
the
--prefix length parameter: 32 (128 for IPv6) forwards the whole
address,
--zero forwards none of it but still marks the request so that no
--upstream nameserver will add client address information either. The
--default is zero for both IPv4 and IPv6. Note that upstream
nameservers
--may be configured to return different results based on this
--information, but the dnsmasq cache does not take account. If a
dnsmasq
--instance is configured such that different results may be
encountered,
--caching should be disabled.
-+.B --add-subnet[[=[<IPv4 address>/]<IPv4 prefix length>][,[<IPv6
address>/]<IPv6 prefix length>]]
-+Add a subnet address to the DNS queries which are forwarded
-+upstream. If an address is specified in the flag, it will be used,
-+otherwise, the address of the requestor will be used. The amount of
-+the address forwarded depends on the prefix length parameter: 32
(128
-+for IPv6) forwards the whole address, zero forwards none of it but
-+still marks the request so that no upstream nameserver will add
client
-+address information either. The default is zero for both IPv4 and
-+IPv6. Note that upstream nameservers may be configured to return
-+different results based on this information, but the dnsmasq cache
-+does not take account. If a dnsmasq instance is configured such
that
-+different results may be encountered, caching should be disabled.
-+
-+For example,
-+.B --add-subnet=24,96
-+will add the /24 and /96 subnets of the requestor for IPv4 and IPv6
requestors, respectively.
-+.B --add-subnet=1.2.3.4/24
-+will add 1.2.3.0/24 for IPv4 requestors and ::/0 for IPv6
requestors.
-+.B --add-subnet=1.2.3.4/24,1.2.3.4/24
-+will add 1.2.3.0/24 for both IPv4 and IPv6 requestors.
-+

.TP
.B -c, --cache-size=<cachesize>
Set the size of dnsmasq's cache. The default is 150 names. Setting

the cache size to zero disables caching.
-diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
-index cf1a782..f42acdb 100644
---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
-+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
-@@ -541,6 +541,13 @@ struct iname {
-   struct iname *next;

};

- 
-+/* subnet parameters from command line */
-+struct mysubnet {
-+  union mysockaddr addr;
-+  int addr_used;
-+  int mask;
-+};
-+

/* resolv-file parms from command-line */
struct resolvc {

-   struct resolvc *next;
-@@ -935,9 +942,9 @@ extern struct daemon {
-   struct auth_zone *auth_zones;
-   struct interface_name *int_names;
-   char *mxtarget;
--  int addr4_netmask;
--  int addr6_netmask;
--  char *lease_file; 
-+  struct mysubnet *add_subnet4;
-+  struct mysubnet *add_subnet6;
-+  char *lease_file;
-   char *username, *groupname, *scriptuser;
-   char *luascript;
-   char *authserver, *hostmaster;
-diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
-index ecc2619..746cd11 100644
---- a/src/option.c
-+++ b/src/option.c
-@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ static struct {
-   { LOPT_PXE_SERV, ARG_DUP, "<service>", gettext_noop("Boot service
for PXE menu."), NULL },
-   { LOPT_TEST, 0, NULL, gettext_noop("Check configuration
syntax."), NULL },
-   { LOPT_ADD_MAC, OPT_ADD_MAC, NULL, gettext_noop("Add requestor's
MAC address to forwarded DNS queries."), NULL },
--  { LOPT_ADD_SBNET, ARG_ONE, "<v4 pref>[,<v6 pref>]",
gettext_noop("Add requestor's IP subnet to forwarded DNS queries."),
NULL },
-+  { LOPT_ADD_SBNET, ARG_ONE, "<v4 pref>[,<v6 pref>]",
gettext_noop("Add specified IP subnet to forwarded DNS queries."),
NULL },
-   { LOPT_DNSSEC, OPT_DNSSEC_PROXY, NULL, gettext_noop("Proxy DNSSEC
validation results from upstream nameservers."), NULL },
-   { LOPT_INCR_ADDR, OPT_CONSEC_ADDR, NULL, gettext_noop("Attempt to
allocate sequential IP addresses to DHCP clients."), NULL },
-   { LOPT_CONNTRACK, OPT_CONNTRACK, NULL, gettext_noop("Copy
connection-track mark from queries to upstream connections."), NULL
},
-@@ -722,6 +722,20 @@ static void do_usage(void)
-

#define ret_err(x) do { strcpy(errstr, (x)); return 0; } while (0)

- 
-+static char *parse_mysockaddr(char *arg, union mysockaddr *addr) 
-+{
-+  if (inet_pton(AF_INET, arg, &addr->in.sin_addr) > 0)
-+    addr->sa.sa_family = AF_INET;
-+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
-+  else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, arg, &addr->in6.sin6_addr) > 0)
-+    addr->sa.sa_family = AF_INET6;
-+#endif
-+  else
-+    return _("bad address");
-+   
-+  return NULL;
-+}
-+

char *parse_server(char *arg, union mysockaddr *addr, union

mysockaddr *source_addr, char *interface, int *flags)

{

-   int source_port = 0, serv_port = NAMESERVER_PORT;
-@@ -1585,7 +1599,7 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg, char
*errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
- 	    li = match_suffix->next;
- 	    free(match_suffix->suffix);
- 	    free(match_suffix);
--	  }    
-+	  }
- 	break;
-       }
- 
-@@ -1593,10 +1607,45 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
-       set_option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET);
-       if (arg)
- 	{
-+          char *err, *end;
- 	  comma = split(arg);
--	  if (!atoi_check(arg, &daemon->addr4_netmask) || 
--	      (comma && !atoi_check(comma, &daemon-
...
addr6_netmask)))
--	     ret_err(gen_err);
-+
-+          struct mysubnet* new = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct
mysubnet));
-+          if ((end = split_chr(arg, '/')))
-+	    {
-+	      /* has subnet+len */
-+	      err = parse_mysockaddr(arg, &new->addr);
-+	      if (err)
-+		ret_err(err);
-+	      if (!atoi_check(end, &new->mask))
-+		ret_err(gen_err);
-+	      new->addr_used = 1;
-+	    } 
-+	  else if (!atoi_check(arg, &new->mask))
-+	    ret_err(gen_err);
-+	    
-+          daemon->add_subnet4 = new;
-+
-+          new = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct mysubnet));
-+          if (comma)
-+            {
-+              if ((end = split_chr(comma, '/')))
-+                {
-+                  /* has subnet+len */
-+                  err = parse_mysockaddr(comma, &new->addr);
-+                  if (err)
-+                    ret_err(err);
-+                  if (!atoi_check(end, &new->mask))
-+                    ret_err(gen_err);
-+                  new->addr_used = 1;
-+                }
-+              else
-+                {
-+                  if (!atoi_check(comma, &new->mask))
-+                    ret_err(gen_err);
-+                }
-+            }
-+          daemon->add_subnet6 = new;
- 	}
-       break;
- 
-diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
-index 29e9e65..6a51b30 100644
---- a/src/rfc1035.c
-+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
-@@ -629,26 +629,47 @@ struct subnet_opt {

#endif
};

- 
-+static void *get_addrp(union mysockaddr *addr, const short family) 
-+{
-+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
-+  if (family == AF_INET6)
-+    return &addr->in6.sin6_addr;
-+#endif
-+
-+  return &addr->in.sin_addr;
-+}
-+

static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct subnet_opt *opt, union

mysockaddr *source)

{

-   /* http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-vandergaast-edns-client-subne
t-02 */
-   
-   int len;
-   void *addrp;
-+  int sa_family = source->sa.sa_family;
-

#ifdef HAVE_IPV6

-   if (source->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
-     {
--      opt->family = htons(2);
--      opt->source_netmask = daemon->addr6_netmask;
--      addrp = &source->in6.sin6_addr;
-+      opt->source_netmask = daemon->add_subnet6->mask;
-+      if (daemon->add_subnet6->addr_used) 
-+	{
-+	  sa_family = daemon->add_subnet6->addr.sa.sa_family;
-+	  addrp = get_addrp(&daemon->add_subnet6->addr, sa_family);
-+	} 
-+      else 
-+	addrp = &source->in6.sin6_addr;
-     }
-   else

#endif

-     {
--      opt->family = htons(1);
--      opt->source_netmask = daemon->addr4_netmask;
--      addrp = &source->in.sin_addr;
-+      opt->source_netmask = daemon->add_subnet4->mask;
-+      if (daemon->add_subnet4->addr_used)
-+	{
-+	  sa_family = daemon->add_subnet4->addr.sa.sa_family;
-+	  addrp = get_addrp(&daemon->add_subnet4->addr, sa_family);
-+	} 
-+      else 
-+	addrp = &source->in.sin_addr;
-     }
-   
-   opt->scope_netmask = 0;
-@@ -656,6 +677,11 @@ static size_t calc_subnet_opt(struct subnet_opt
*opt, union mysockaddr *source)
-   
-   if (opt->source_netmask != 0)
-     {
-+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
-+      opt->family = htons(sa_family == AF_INET6 ? 2 : 1);
-+#else
-+      opt->family = htons(1);
-+#endif
-       len = ((opt->source_netmask - 1) >> 3) + 1;
-       memcpy(opt->addr, addrp, len);
-       if (opt->source_netmask & 7)
-@@ -2335,4 +2361,3 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
-   
-   return len;

}

--
--- 
-1.7.10.4
diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f04f943
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-Update_CHANGELOG.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+X-Git-Url: http://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=dnsmasq.git;a=blobdiff
_plain;f=CHANGELOG;h=6d9ba490488f80ef565f459cef3c110bdf31212c;hp=1435
4f2506a7fbf8360cd32c96e1d7ce1bfeb3f9;hb=e06e6e34bffd781b7cefa49b25fb8
ae863654ca2;hpb=832e47beab95c2918b5264f0504f2fe6fe523e4c



+diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
+index 14354f2..6d9ba49 100644
+--- a/CHANGELOG
++++ b/CHANGELOG
+@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ version 2.76
+ 	    (ie xx::0 to xx::ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff) 
+ 	    Thanks to Laurent Bendel for spotting this problem.
+ 
++	    Add support for a TTL parameter in --host-record and
++	    --cname.
++
++	    Add --dhcp-ttl option.
+

version 2.75

+             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
ries_set.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
ries_set.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cfbcdfb..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/003-
dont_answer_non_auth_queries_for_auth_zones_locally_when_localise_que
ries_set.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From 3a3965ac21b1b759eab8799b6edb09195b671306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Sun, 9 Aug 2015 17:45:06 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Don't answer non-auth queries for auth zones
locally when

--localise-queries set.




src/forward.c |    4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
-index 2731b90..b76a974 100644
---- a/src/forward.c
-+++ b/src/forward.c
-@@ -1365,7 +1365,7 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
time_t now)
-

#ifdef HAVE_AUTH

-       /* find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and answer
them directly */
--      if (!auth_dns)
-+      if (!auth_dns && !option_bool(OPT_LOCALISE))
- 	for (zone = daemon->auth_zones; zone; zone = zone->next)
- 	  if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
- 	    {
-@@ -1904,7 +1904,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
now,
-

#ifdef HAVE_AUTH

- 	  /* find queries for zones we're authoritative for, and
answer them directly */
--	  if (!auth_dns)
-+	  if (!auth_dns && !option_bool(OPT_LOCALISE))
- 	    for (zone = daemon->auth_zones; zone; zone = zone-
...
next)
- 	      if (in_zone(zone, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
- 		{
--- 
-1.7.10.4
diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c06705a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-Add_--tftp-mtu_option.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+From bec366b4041df72b559e713f1c924177676e6eb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
+From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
+Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 22:03:26 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Add --tftp-mtu option.



+---

CHANGELOG     |    4 ++++
man/dnsmasq.8 |    4 ++++
src/dnsmasq.h |    2 +-
src/option.c  |   10 +++++++++-
src/tftp.c    |   14 ++++++++++++--
5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)


+diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
+index 6d9ba49..9218b8c 100644
+--- a/CHANGELOG
++++ b/CHANGELOG
+@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ version 2.76
+ 
+ 	    Add --dhcp-ttl option.
+ 
++	    Add --tftp-mtu option. Thanks to Patrick McLean for
the 
++	    initial patch.
++
++

version 2.75

+             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
+ 	    dhcp-script is configured. Thanks to Adrian Davey for
+diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
+index 2bcce20..3cf48cd 100644
+--- a/man/dnsmasq.8
++++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
+@@ -1810,6 +1810,10 @@ require about (2*n) + 10 descriptors. If

.B --tftp-port-range
is given, that can affect the number of concurrent connections.
.TP

++.B --tftp-mtu=<mtu size>
++Use size as the ceiling of the MTU supported by the intervening
network when 
++negotiating TFTP blocksize, overriding the MTU setting of the local
interface  if it is larger.
++.TP

.B --tftp-no-blocksize
Stop the TFTP server from negotiating the "blocksize" option with a
client. Some buggy clients request this option but then behave

badly
+diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
+index 9f73c3b..280ad9d 100644
+--- a/src/dnsmasq.h
++++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
+@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ extern struct daemon {
+   struct dhcp_netid_list *dhcp_ignore, *dhcp_ignore_names,
*dhcp_gen_names; 
+   struct dhcp_netid_list *force_broadcast, *bootp_dynamic;
+   struct hostsfile *dhcp_hosts_file, *dhcp_opts_file,
*dynamic_dirs;
+-  int dhcp_max, tftp_max;
++  int dhcp_max, tftp_max, tftp_mtu;
+   int dhcp_server_port, dhcp_client_port;
+   int start_tftp_port, end_tftp_port; 
+   unsigned int min_leasetime;
+diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
+index 3f6d162..765965f 100644
+--- a/src/option.c
++++ b/src/option.c
+@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ struct myoption {

#define LOPT_CPE_ID        346
#define LOPT_SCRIPT_ARP    347
#define LOPT_DHCPTTL       348

+-
++#define LOPT_TFTP_MTU      349
++

#ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG
static const struct option opts[] =
#else

+@@ -244,6 +245,7 @@ static const struct myoption opts[] =
+     { "tftp-unique-root", 0, 0, LOPT_APREF },
+     { "tftp-root", 1, 0, LOPT_PREFIX },
+     { "tftp-max", 1, 0, LOPT_TFTP_MAX },
++    { "tftp-mtu", 1, 0, LOPT_TFTP_MTU },
+     { "tftp-lowercase", 0, 0, LOPT_TFTP_LC },
+     { "ptr-record", 1, 0, LOPT_PTR },
+     { "naptr-record", 1, 0, LOPT_NAPTR },
+@@ -432,6 +434,7 @@ static struct {
+   { LOPT_SECURE, OPT_TFTP_SECURE, NULL, gettext_noop("Allow access
only to files owned by the user running dnsmasq."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_TFTP_NO_FAIL, OPT_TFTP_NO_FAIL, NULL, gettext_noop("Do not
terminate the service if TFTP directories are inaccessible."), NULL
},
+   { LOPT_TFTP_MAX, ARG_ONE, "<integer>", gettext_noop("Maximum
number of conncurrent TFTP transfers (defaults to %s)."), "#" },
++  { LOPT_TFTP_MTU, ARG_ONE, "<integer>", gettext_noop("Maximum MTU
to use for TFTP transfers."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_NOBLOCK, OPT_TFTP_NOBLOCK, NULL, gettext_noop("Disable the
TFTP blocksize extension."), NULL },
+   { LOPT_TFTP_LC, OPT_TFTP_LC, NULL, gettext_noop("Convert TFTP
filenames to lowercase"), NULL },
+   { LOPT_TFTPPORTS, ARG_ONE, "<start>,<end>",
gettext_noop("Ephemeral port range for use by TFTP transfers."), NULL
},
+@@ -2625,6 +2628,11 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
+ 	ret_err(gen_err);
+       break;  
+ 
++    case LOPT_TFTP_MTU:  /*  --tftp-mtu */
++      if (!atoi_check(arg, &daemon->tftp_mtu))
++	ret_err(gen_err);
++      break;
++
+     case LOPT_PREFIX: /* --tftp-prefix */
+       comma = split(arg);
+       if (comma)
+diff --git a/src/tftp.c b/src/tftp.c
+index 00ed2fc..dc4aa85 100644
+--- a/src/tftp.c
++++ b/src/tftp.c
+@@ -103,8 +103,10 @@ void tftp_request(struct listener *listen,
time_t now)
+       if (listen->iface)
+ 	{
+ 	  addr = listen->iface->addr;
+-	  mtu = listen->iface->mtu;
+ 	  name = listen->iface->name;
++	  mtu = listen->iface->mtu;
++	  if (daemon->tftp_mtu != 0 && daemon->tftp_mtu < mtu)
++	    mtu = daemon->tftp_mtu;
+ 	}
+       else
+ 	{
+@@ -234,9 +236,17 @@ void tftp_request(struct listener *listen,
time_t now)
+ 
+       strncpy(ifr.ifr_name, name, IF_NAMESIZE);
+       if (ioctl(listen->tftpfd, SIOCGIFMTU, &ifr) != -1)
+-	mtu = ifr.ifr_mtu;      
++	{
++	  mtu = ifr.ifr_mtu;  
++	  if (daemon->tftp_mtu != 0 && daemon->tftp_mtu < mtu)
++	    mtu = daemon->tftp_mtu;    
++	}
+     }
+ 
++  /* Failed to get interface mtu - can use configured value. */
++  if (mtu == 0)
++    mtu = daemon->tftp_mtu;
++
+   if (name)
+     {
+       /* check for per-interface prefix */ 
+-- 
+1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
option.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
option.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 492ada9..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/004-fix_behaviour_of_empty_dhcp-
option.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 23:08:39 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix behaviour of empty dhcp-option=option6:dns-
server, which

should inhibit sending option.




src/rfc3315.c |    9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
-index 2665d0d..3f1f9ee 100644
---- a/src/rfc3315.c
-+++ b/src/rfc3315.c
-@@ -1320,15 +1320,16 @@ static struct dhcp_netid *add_options(struct
state *state, int do_refresh)
-       
-       if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_REFRESH_TIME)
- 	done_refresh = 1;
-+       
-+      if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
-+	done_dns = 1;
-       
--      if (opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6)
-+      /* Empty DNS_SERVER option will not set DHOPT_ADDR6 */
-+      if ((opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6) || opt_cfg->opt ==
OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
- 	{
- 	  int len, j;
- 	  struct in6_addr *a;
- 	  
--	  if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
--	    done_dns = 1;
--	  
- 	  for (a = (struct in6_addr *)opt_cfg->val, len = opt_cfg-
...
len, j = 0;
- 	       j < opt_cfg->len; j += IN6ADDRSZ, a++)
- 	    if ((IN6_IS_ADDR_ULA_ZERO(a) &&
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(state->ula_addr)) ||
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c7cee60..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/005-
suggest_solution_to_ENOMEM_error_with_IPv6_multicast.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-From 9cdcfe9f19ffd45bac4e5b459879bf7c50a287ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2015 22:38:08 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Suggest solution to ENOMEM error with IPv6
multicast.





src/network.c |   13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/network.c b/src/network.c
-index a1d90c8..819302f 100644
---- a/src/network.c
-+++ b/src/network.c
-@@ -1076,23 +1076,30 @@ void join_multicast(int dienow)
- 	    
- 	    if ((daemon->doing_dhcp6 || daemon->relay6) &&
- 		setsockopt(daemon->dhcp6fd, IPPROTO_IPV6,
IPV6_JOIN_GROUP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) == -1)
--	      err = 1;
-+	      err = errno;
- 	    
- 	    inet_pton(AF_INET6, ALL_SERVERS,
&mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
- 	    
- 	    if (daemon->doing_dhcp6 && 
- 		setsockopt(daemon->dhcp6fd, IPPROTO_IPV6,
IPV6_JOIN_GROUP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) == -1)
--	      err = 1;
-+	      err = errno;
- 	    
- 	    inet_pton(AF_INET6, ALL_ROUTERS,
&mreq.ipv6mr_multiaddr);
- 	    
- 	    if (daemon->doing_ra &&
- 		setsockopt(daemon->icmp6fd, IPPROTO_IPV6,
IPV6_JOIN_GROUP, &mreq, sizeof(mreq)) == -1)
--	      err = 1;
-+	      err = errno;
- 	    
- 	    if (err)
- 	      {
- 		char *s = _("interface %s failed to join DHCPv6
multicast group: %s");
-+		errno = err;
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_LINUX_NETWORK
-+		if (errno == ENOMEM)
-+		  my_syslog(LOG_ERR, _("try increasing
/proc/sys/net/core/optmem_max"));
-+#endif
-+
- 		if (dienow)
- 		  die(s, iface->name, EC_BADNET);
- 		else
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 19c76e6..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/006-
clarify_man_page_on_RDNSS_set_in_router_advertisement.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 20fd11e11a9d09edcea94de135396ae1541fbbab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2015 22:48:13 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Clarify man page on RDNSS set in router
advertisement.





man/dnsmasq.8 |    6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/man/dnsmasq.8 b/man/dnsmasq.8
-index a23c898..d51b10f 100644
---- a/man/dnsmasq.8
-+++ b/man/dnsmasq.8
-@@ -1687,15 +1687,15 @@ creation are handled by a different
protocol. When DHCP is in use,

only a subset of this is needed, and dnsmasq can handle it, using
existing DHCP configuration to provide most data. When RA is

enabled,

dnsmasq will advertise a prefix for each dhcp-range, with default

--router and recursive DNS server as the relevant link-local address
on 
--the machine running dnsmasq. By default, he "managed address" bits
are set, and
-+router  as the relevant link-local address on 
-+the machine running dnsmasq. By default, the "managed address" bits
are set, and

the "use SLAAC" bit is reset. This can be changed for individual
subnets with the mode keywords described in
.B --dhcp-range.
RFC6106 DNS parameters are included in the advertisements. By

default,

the relevant link-local address of the machine running dnsmasq is

sent

as recursive DNS server. If provided, the DHCPv6 options dns-server

and
--domain-search are used for RDNSS and DNSSL.
-+domain-search are used for the DNS server (RDNSS) and the domain
serach list (DNSSL).

.TP
.B --ra-param=<interface>,[high|low],[[<ra-interval>],<router

lifetime>]

Set non-default values for router advertisements sent via an

--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 832a22e..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/007-
handle_signed_dangling_CNAME_replies_to_DS_queries.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From 6de81f1250fd323c9155de065d5a9dc200a6f20b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Wed, 9 Sep 2015 22:51:13 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Handle signed dangling CNAME replies to DS queries.





src/dnssec.c |    7 ++-----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 4deda24..67ce486 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -1232,11 +1232,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
-    
-   /* If we return STAT_NO_SIG, name contains the name of the DS
query */
-   if (val == STAT_NO_SIG)
--    {
--      *keyname = 0;
--      return val;
--    }
-+    return val;
-+  
-   /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as
the DS, we'll
-      loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS
answer comes
-      from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fdccd0e..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/008-
DHCPv6_option_56_does_not_hold_an_address_list.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From 102208df695e886a3086754d32bf7f8c541fbe46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 21:50:00 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] DHCPv6 option 56 does not hold an address list.
(RFC 5908).





src/dhcp-common.c |    2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)


-diff --git a/src/dhcp-common.c b/src/dhcp-common.c
-index bc48f41..8fc171a 100644
---- a/src/dhcp-common.c
-+++ b/src/dhcp-common.c
-@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ static const struct opttab_t opttab6[] = {
-   { "sntp-server", 31,  OT_ADDR_LIST },
-   { "information-refresh-time", 32, OT_TIME },
-   { "FQDN", 39, OT_INTERNAL | OT_RFC1035_NAME },
--  { "ntp-server", 56,  OT_ADDR_LIST },
-+  { "ntp-server", 56,  0 },
-   { "bootfile-url", 59, OT_NAME },
-   { "bootfile-param", 60, OT_CSTRING },
-   { NULL, 0, 0 }
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
--no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-
Respect_the_--no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2014fdb..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/009-Respect_the_
--no_resolv_flag_in_inotify_code.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From 77607cbea0ad0f876dfb79c8b2c121ee400d57d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 23:08:43 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Respect the --no-resolv flag in inotify code.





CHANGELOG        |    7 ++++++-
debian/changelog |    6 ++++++
src/inotify.c    |    3 +++
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)


-diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
-index bbc2834..d6e309f 100644
---- a/CHANGELOG
-+++ b/CHANGELOG
-@@ -7,8 +7,13 @@ version 2.76
- 
- 	    Enhance --add-subnet to allow arbitrary subnet
addresses.
-             Thanks to Ed Barsley for the patch.
-+
-+	    Respect the --no-resolv flag in inotify code. Fixes bug
-+	    which caused dnsmasq to fail to start if a resolv-file 
-+	    was a dangling symbolic link, even of --no-resolv set.
-+	    Thanks to Alexander Kurtz for spotting the problem.
-+
- 	
--

version 2.75

-             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
- 	    dhcp-script is configured. Thanks to Adrian Davey for
-diff --git a/src/inotify.c b/src/inotify.c
-index 52d412f..ef05c58 100644
---- a/src/inotify.c
-+++ b/src/inotify.c
-@@ -90,6 +90,9 @@ void inotify_dnsmasq_init()
-   
-   if (daemon->inotifyfd == -1)
-     die(_("failed to create inotify: %s"), NULL, EC_MISC);
-+
-+  if (option_bool(OPT_NO_RESOLV))
-+    return;
-   
-   for (res = daemon->resolv_files; res; res = res->next)
-     {
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 281697f..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/010-
Rationalise_5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From 27b78d990b7cd901866ad6f1a17b9d633a95fdce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Sat, 26 Sep 2015 21:40:45 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Rationalise
5e3e464ac4022ee0b3794513abe510817e2cf3ca





src/rfc3315.c |    3 +--
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/rfc3315.c b/src/rfc3315.c
-index 3f1f9ee..3ed8623 100644
---- a/src/rfc3315.c
-+++ b/src/rfc3315.c
-@@ -1324,8 +1324,7 @@ static struct dhcp_netid *add_options(struct
state *state, int do_refresh)
-       if (opt_cfg->opt == OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
- 	done_dns = 1;
-       
--      /* Empty DNS_SERVER option will not set DHOPT_ADDR6 */
--      if ((opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6) || opt_cfg->opt ==
OPTION6_DNS_SERVER)
-+      if (opt_cfg->flags & DHOPT_ADDR6)
- 	{
- 	  int len, j;
- 	  struct in6_addr *a;
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 631495f..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/011-
Catch_errors_from_sendmsg_in_DHCP_code.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 98079ea89851da1df4966dfdfa1852a98da02912 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2015 20:30:32 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Catch errors from sendmsg in DHCP code.  Logs,
eg,  iptables

DROPS of dest 255.255.255.255




src/dhcp.c |    7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)


-diff --git a/src/dhcp.c b/src/dhcp.c
-index e6fceb1..1c85e42 100644
---- a/src/dhcp.c
-+++ b/src/dhcp.c
-@@ -452,8 +452,13 @@ void dhcp_packet(time_t now, int pxe_fd)

#endif

-   
-   while(retry_send(sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0)));
-+
-+  /* This can fail when, eg, iptables DROPS destination
255.255.255.255 */
-+  if (errno != 0)
-+    my_syslog(MS_DHCP | LOG_WARNING, _("Error sending DHCP packet
to %s: %s"),
-+	      inet_ntoa(dest.sin_addr), strerror(errno));

}

-- 
-+

/* check against secondary interface addresses */
static int check_listen_addrs(struct in_addr local, int if_index,

char *label,
- 			      struct in_addr netmask, struct
in_addr broadcast, void *vparam)
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-Update_list_of_subnet_for_
--bogus-priv.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-
Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-priv.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3ba98fc..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/012-Update_list_of_subnet_for_--bogus-
priv.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-From 90477fb79420a34124b66ebd808c578817a30e4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2015 21:21:32 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Update list of subnet for --bogus-priv



-RFC6303 specifies & recommends following zones not be forwarded
-to globally facing servers.
-+------------------------------+-----------------------+
-| Zone                         | Description           |
-+------------------------------+-----------------------+
-| 0.IN-ADDR.ARPA               | IPv4 "THIS" NETWORK   |
-| 127.IN-ADDR.ARPA             | IPv4 Loopback NETWORK |
-| 254.169.IN-ADDR.ARPA         | IPv4 LINK LOCAL       |
-| 2.0.192.IN-ADDR.ARPA         | IPv4 TEST-NET-1       |
-| 100.51.198.IN-ADDR.ARPA      | IPv4 TEST-NET-2       |
-| 113.0.203.IN-ADDR.ARPA       | IPv4 TEST-NET-3       |
-| 255.255.255.255.IN-ADDR.ARPA | IPv4 BROADCAST        |
-+------------------------------+-----------------------+



-Signed-off-by: Kevin Darbyshire-Bryant <kevin@darbyshire-bryant.me.u
k>


src/rfc1035.c |    8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
-index 6a51b30..4eb1772 100644
---- a/src/rfc1035.c
-+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
-@@ -756,10 +756,14 @@ int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int
ban_localhost)
-   return
-     (((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x7F000000) && ban_localhost)  /*
127.0.0.0/8    (loopback) */ ||
-     ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x00000000)  /* RFC 5735 section 3.
"here" network */ ||
--    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xC0A80000)  /* 192.168.0.0/16
(private)  */ ||
-     ((ip_addr & 0xFF000000) == 0x0A000000)  /*
10.0.0.0/8     (private)  */ ||
-     ((ip_addr & 0xFFF00000) == 0xAC100000)  /*
172.16.0.0/12  (private)  */ ||
--    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xA9FE0000)  /* 169.254.0.0/16
(zeroconf) */ ;
-+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xC0A80000)  /* 192.168.0.0/16
(private)  */ ||
-+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFF0000) == 0xA9FE0000)  /* 169.254.0.0/16
(zeroconf) */ ||
-+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xC0000200)  /*
192.0.2.0/24   (test-net) */ ||
-+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xC6336400)  /*
198.51.100.0/24(test-net) */ ||
-+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFF00) == 0xCB007100)  /* 203.0.113.0/24
(test-net) */ ||
-+    ((ip_addr & 0xFFFFFFFF) == 0xFFFFFFFF)  /* 255.255.255.255/32
(broadcast)*/ ;

}

-

static unsigned char *do_doctor(unsigned char *p, int count, struct

dns_header *header, size_t qlen, char *name, int *doctored)
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 736cf38..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/013-
Fix_crash_when_empty_address_from_DNS_overlays_A_record_from.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 41a8d9e99be9f2cc8b02051dd322cb45e0faac87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: =?utf8?q?Edwin=20T=C3=B6r=C3=B6k?= <edwin+ml-cerowrt@etorok.ne
t>
-Date: Sat, 14 Nov 2015 17:45:48 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix crash when empty address from DNS overlays A
record from

hosts.




CHANGELOG   |    5 +++++
src/cache.c |    2 +-
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)


-diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG
-index d6e309f..93c73d0 100644
---- a/CHANGELOG
-+++ b/CHANGELOG
-@@ -13,6 +13,11 @@ version 2.76
- 	    was a dangling symbolic link, even of --no-resolv set.
- 	    Thanks to Alexander Kurtz for spotting the problem.
- 
-+	    Fix crash when an A or AAAA record is defined locally,
-+	    in a hosts file, and an upstream server sends a reply
-+	    that the same name is empty. Thanks to Edwin TÃ¶rÃ¶k
for
-+	    the patch.
-+
-

version 2.75

-             Fix reversion on 2.74 which caused 100% CPU use when a 
-diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
-index 178d654..1b76b67 100644
---- a/src/cache.c
-+++ b/src/cache.c
-@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ struct crec *cache_insert(char *name, struct
all_addr *addr,
- 	 existing record is for an A or AAAA and
- 	 the record we're trying to insert is the same, 
- 	 just drop the insert, but don't error the whole process.
*/
--      if ((flags & (F_IPV4 | F_IPV6)) && (flags & F_FORWARD))
-+      if ((flags & (F_IPV4 | F_IPV6)) && (flags & F_FORWARD) &&
addr)
- 	{
- 	  if ((flags & F_IPV4) && (new->flags & F_IPV4) &&
- 	      new->addr.addr.addr.addr4.s_addr == addr-
...
addr.addr4.s_addr)
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8b17431..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/014-
Handle_unknown_DS_hash_algos_correctly.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 67ab3285b5d9a1b1e20e034cf272867fdab8a0f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2015 23:20:47 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Handle unknown DS hash algos correctly.



-When we can validate a DS RRset, but don't speak the hash algo it
-contains, treat that the same as an NSEC/3 proving that the DS
-doesn't exist. 4025 5.2

src/dnssec.c |   13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 67ce486..b4dc14e 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -1005,6 +1005,19 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
-   if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
-     return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
-   
-+  /* 4035 5.2 
-+     If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed
in an
-+     authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported
-+     authentication path leading from the parent to the child.  The
-+     resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an
-+     authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists,  */
-+  for (recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1,
name, now, F_DS))
-+    if (hash_find(ds_digest_name(recp1->addr.ds.digest)))
-+      break;
-+  
-+  if (!recp1)
-+    return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
-+
-   /* NOTE, we need to find ONE DNSKEY which matches the DS */
-   for (valid = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0 && !valid; j
--) 
-     {
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
dir.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
dir.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a9102c1..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/015-Fix_crash_at_start_up_with_conf-
dir.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From 0007ee90646a5a78a96ee729932e89d31c69513a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2015 21:47:41 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix crash at start up with conf-dir=/path,*



-Thanks to Brian Carpenter and American Fuzzy Lop for finding the
bug.


src/option.c |   14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/option.c b/src/option.c
-index 746cd11..71beb98 100644
---- a/src/option.c
-+++ b/src/option.c
-@@ -1515,10 +1515,16 @@ static int one_opt(int option, char *arg,
char *errstr, char *gen_err, int comma
- 		li = opt_malloc(sizeof(struct list));
- 		if (*arg == '*')
- 		  {
--		    li->next = match_suffix;
--		    match_suffix = li;
--		    /* Have to copy: buffer is overwritten */
--		    li->suffix = opt_string_alloc(arg+1);
-+		    /* "*" with no suffix is a no-op */
-+		    if (arg[1] == 0)
-+		      free(li);
-+		    else
-+		      {
-+			li->next = match_suffix;
-+			match_suffix = li;
-+			/* Have to copy: buffer is overwritten */
-+			li->suffix = opt_string_alloc(arg+1);
-+		      }
- 		  }
- 		else
- 		  {
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f25066..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/016-
Major_rationalisation_of_DNSSEC_validation.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2209 +0,0 @@
-From 9a31b68b59adcac01016d4026d906b69c4216c01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 10:20:39 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Major rationalisation of DNSSEC validation.



-Much gnarly special-case code removed and replaced with correct
-general implementaion. Checking of zone-status moved to DNSSEC code,
-where it should be, vastly simplifying query-forwarding code.

src/dnsmasq.h |   19 +-
src/dnssec.c  |  926 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------



src/forward.c |  741 ++++++++++-----------------------------------
3 files changed, 653 insertions(+), 1033 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
-index f42acdb..023a1cf 100644
---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
-+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
-@@ -586,12 +586,8 @@ struct hostsfile {

#define STAT_NEED_KEY           5
#define STAT_TRUNCATED          6
#define STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD    7

--#define STAT_NO_SIG             8
--#define STAT_NO_DS              9
--#define STAT_NO_NS             10
--#define STAT_NEED_DS_NEG       11
--#define STAT_CHASE_CNAME       12
--#define STAT_INSECURE_DS       13
-+#define STAT_OK                 8
-+#define STAT_ABANDONED          9
-

#define FREC_NOREBIND           1
#define FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED  2

-@@ -601,8 +597,7 @@ struct hostsfile {

#define FREC_AD_QUESTION       32
#define FREC_DO_QUESTION       64
#define FREC_ADDED_PHEADER    128

--#define FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN     256
--#define FREC_TEST_PKTSZ       512
-+#define FREC_TEST_PKTSZ       256
-

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
#define HASH_SIZE 20 /* SHA-1 digest size */

-@@ -626,9 +621,7 @@ struct frec {

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC

-   int class, work_counter;
-   struct blockdata *stash; /* Saved reply, whilst we validate */
--  struct blockdata *orig_domain; /* domain of original query,
whilst
--				    we're seeing is if in unsigned
domain */
--  size_t stash_len, name_start, name_len;
-+  size_t stash_len;
-   struct frec *dependent; /* Query awaiting internally-generated
DNSKEY or DS query */
-   struct frec *blocking_query; /* Query which is blocking us. */

#endif

-@@ -1162,8 +1155,8 @@ int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char
*name, char **cut);

size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct dns_header *header, char *end,

char *name, int class, int type, union mysockaddr *addr, int
edns_pktsz);

int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,

size_t n, char *name, char *keyname, int class);

int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,

size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class);
--int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int *class, int *neganswer,
int *nons);
--int dnssec_chase_cname(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname);
-+int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int *class,
-+			  int check_unsigned, int *neganswer, int
*nons);

int dnskey_keytag(int alg, int flags, unsigned char *rdata, int

rdlen);

size_t filter_rrsigs(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen);
unsigned char* hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t

plen, char *name);
-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index b4dc14e..de7b335 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -65,8 +65,10 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
-     case 8: return "sha256";
-     case 10: return "sha512";
-     case 12: return "gosthash94";
-+#ifndef NO_NETTLE_ECC
-     case 13: return "sha256";
-     case 14: return "sha384";
-+#endif
-     default: return NULL;
-     }

}

-@@ -592,30 +594,30 @@ static int get_rdata(struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, unsigned char *end,
-     }

}

- 
--static int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *sz, int
new)
-+static int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int
new)

{

-   unsigned char **p;
--  int new_sz = *sz;
--  
--  if (new_sz > new)
-+  int old = *szp;
-+
-+  if (old >= new+1)
-     return 1;
- 
-   if (new >= 100)
-     return 0;
- 
--  new_sz += 5;
-+  new += 5;
-   
--  if (!(p = whine_malloc((new_sz) * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
-+  if (!(p = whine_malloc(new * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
-     return 0;  
-   
--  if (*wkspc)
-+  if (old != 0 && *wkspc)
-     {
--      memcpy(p, *wkspc, *sz * sizeof(unsigned char **));
-+      memcpy(p, *wkspc, old * sizeof(unsigned char **));
-       free(*wkspc);
-     }
-   
-   *wkspc = p;
--  *sz = new_sz;
-+  *szp = new;
- 
-   return 1;

}

-@@ -706,47 +708,28 @@ static void sort_rrset(struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, u16 *rr_desc, int
-     } while (swap);

}

- 
--/* Validate a single RRset (class, type, name) in the supplied DNS
reply 
--   Return code:
--   STAT_SECURE   if it validates.
--   STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD if it validates and is the result of
wildcard expansion.
--   (In this case *wildcard_out points to the "body" of the wildcard
within name.) 
--   STAT_NO_SIG no RRsigs found.
--   STAT_INSECURE RRset empty.
--   STAT_BOGUS    signature is wrong, bad packet.
--   STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
returned in keyname)
--
--   if key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
given in the params of those names,
--   otherwise find the key in the cache.
-+static unsigned char **rrset = NULL, **sigs = NULL;
- 
--   name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
trashed.
--*/
--static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, int class, int type, 
--			  char *name, char *keyname, char
**wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen, int algo_in, int
keytag_in)
-+/* Get pointers to RRset menbers and signature(s) for same.
-+   Check signatures, and return keyname associated in keyname. */
-+static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
int class, int type, 
-+			 char *name, char *keyname, int *sigcnt,
int *rrcnt)

{

--  static unsigned char **rrset = NULL, **sigs = NULL;
--  static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0;
--  
-+  static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0; 
-   unsigned char *p;
--  int rrsetidx, sigidx, res, rdlen, j, name_labels;
--  struct crec *crecp = NULL;
--  int type_covered, algo, labels, orig_ttl, sig_expiration,
sig_inception, key_tag;
--  u16 *rr_desc = get_desc(type);
-- 
--  if (wildcard_out)
--    *wildcard_out = NULL;
--  
-+  int rrsetidx, sigidx, j, rdlen, res;
-+  int name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
-+  int gotkey = 0;
-+
-   if (!(p = skip_questions(header, plen)))
-     return STAT_BOGUS;
--  
--  name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
- 
--  /* look for RRSIGs for this RRset and get pointers to each RR in
the set. */
-+   /* look for RRSIGs for this RRset and get pointers to each RR in
the set. */
-   for (rrsetidx = 0, sigidx = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount) +
ntohs(header->nscount); 
-        j != 0; j--) 
-     {
-       unsigned char *pstart, *pdata;
--      int stype, sclass;
-+      int stype, sclass, algo, type_covered, labels,
sig_expiration, sig_inception;
- 
-       pstart = p;
-       
-@@ -762,14 +745,14 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
-       GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
-       
-       if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
--	return STAT_BOGUS; 
-+	return 0; 
-       
-       if (res == 1 && sclass == class)
- 	{
- 	  if (stype == type)
- 	    {
- 	      if (!expand_workspace(&rrset, &rrset_sz, rrsetidx))
--		return STAT_BOGUS; 
-+		return 0; 
- 	      
- 	      rrset[rrsetidx++] = pstart;
- 	    }
-@@ -777,14 +760,54 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
- 	  if (stype == T_RRSIG)
- 	    {
- 	      if (rdlen < 18)
--		return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */ 
-+		return 0; /* bad packet */ 
- 	      
- 	      GETSHORT(type_covered, p);
-+	      algo = *p++;
-+	      labels = *p++;
-+	      p += 4; /* orig_ttl */
-+	      GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
-+	      GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
-+	      p += 2; /* key_tag */
- 	      
--	      if (type_covered == type)
-+	      if (gotkey)
-+		{
-+		  /* If there's more than one SIG, ensure they all
have same keyname */
-+		  if (extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 0, 0)
!= 1)
-+		    return 0;
-+		}
-+	      else
-+		{
-+		  gotkey = 1;
-+		  
-+		  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1,
0))
-+		    return 0;
-+		  
-+		  /* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name
field MUST equal
-+		     the name of the zone containing the RRset. We
can't tell that
-+		     for certain, but we can check that  the RRset
name is equal to
-+		     or encloses the signers name, which should be
enough to stop 
-+		     an attacker using signatures made with the key
of an unrelated 
-+		     zone he controls. Note that the root key is
always allowed. */
-+		  if (*keyname != 0)
-+		    {
-+		      char *name_start;
-+		      for (name_start = name;
!hostname_isequal(name_start, keyname); )
-+			if ((name_start = strchr(name_start, '.')))
-+			  name_start++; /* chop a label off and try
again */
-+			else
-+			  return 0;
-+		    }
-+		}
-+		  
-+	      /* Don't count signatures for algos we don't support
*/
-+	      if (check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration)
&&
-+		  labels <= name_labels &&
-+		  type_covered == type && 
-+		  algo_digest_name(algo))
- 		{
- 		  if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx))
--		    return STAT_BOGUS; 
-+		    return 0; 
- 		  
- 		  sigs[sigidx++] = pdata;
- 		} 
-@@ -794,17 +817,45 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
- 	}
-       
-       if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	return 0;
-     }
-   
--  /* RRset empty */
--  if (rrsetidx == 0)
--    return STAT_INSECURE; 
-+  *sigcnt = sigidx;
-+  *rrcnt = rrsetidx;
-+
-+  return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/* Validate a single RRset (class, type, name) in the supplied DNS
reply 
-+   Return code:
-+   STAT_SECURE   if it validates.
-+   STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD if it validates and is the result of
wildcard expansion.
-+   (In this case *wildcard_out points to the "body" of the wildcard
within name.) 
-+   STAT_BOGUS    signature is wrong, bad packet.
-+   STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
returned in keyname)
-+   STAT_NEED_DS  need DS to complete validation (name is returned
in keyname)
-+
-+   if key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
given in the params of those names,
-+   otherwise find the key in the cache.
- 
--  /* no RRSIGs */
--  if (sigidx == 0)
--    return STAT_NO_SIG; 
-+   name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
trashed.
-+
-+   Call explore_rrset first to find and count RRs and sigs.
-+*/
-+static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, int class, int type, int sigidx, int rrsetidx, 
-+			  char *name, char *keyname, char
**wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen, int algo_in, int
keytag_in)
-+{
-+  unsigned char *p;
-+  int rdlen, j, name_labels;
-+  struct crec *crecp = NULL;
-+  int algo, labels, orig_ttl, key_tag;
-+  u16 *rr_desc = get_desc(type);
-+ 
-+  if (wildcard_out)
-+    *wildcard_out = NULL;
-   
-+  name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
-+
-   /* Sort RRset records into canonical order. 
-      Note that at this point keyname and daemon->workspacename
buffs are
-      unused, and used as workspace by the sort. */
-@@ -828,44 +879,16 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
-       algo = *p++;
-       labels = *p++;
-       GETLONG(orig_ttl, p);
--      GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
--      GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
-+      p += 8; /* sig_expiration, sig_inception already checked */
-       GETSHORT(key_tag, p);
-       
-       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
- 	return STAT_BOGUS;
- 
--      /* RFC 4035 5.3.1 says that the Signer's Name field MUST
equal
--	 the name of the zone containing the RRset. We can't tell
that
--	 for certain, but we can check that  the RRset name is
equal to
--	 or encloses the signers name, which should be enough to
stop 
--	 an attacker using signatures made with the key of an
unrelated 
--	 zone he controls. Note that the root key is always
allowed. */
--      if (*keyname != 0)
--	{
--	  int failed = 0;
--	  
--	  for (name_start = name; !hostname_isequal(name_start,
keyname); )
--	    if ((name_start = strchr(name_start, '.')))
--	      name_start++; /* chop a label off and try again */
--	    else
--	      {
--		failed = 1;
--		break;
--	      }
--	  /* Bad sig, try another */
--	  if (failed)
--	    continue;
--	}
--      
--      /* Other 5.3.1 checks */
--      if (!check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration) ||
--	  labels > name_labels ||
--	  !(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
-+      if (!(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
- 	  !hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
- 	continue;
-+      
-       /* OK, we have the signature record, see if the relevant
DNSKEY is in the cache. */
-       if (!key && !(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now,
F_DNSKEY)))
- 	return STAT_NEED_KEY;
-@@ -971,10 +994,11 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, in

/* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY

query.
-    Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
-    return codes:
--         STAT_SECURE   At least one valid DNSKEY found and in
cache.
--	 STAT_BOGUS    No DNSKEYs found, which  can be validated
with DS,
--	               or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not valid,
bad packet.
--	 STAT_NEED_DS  DS records to validate a key not found, name
in keyname 
-+         STAT_OK           Done, key(s) in cache.
-+	 STAT_BOGUS        No DNSKEYs found, which  can be
validated with DS,
-+	                   or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not
valid, bad packet.
-+	 STAT_NEED_DS      DS records to validate a key not found,
name in keyname 
-+	 STAT_NEED_DNSKEY  DNSKEY records to validate a key not
found, name in keyname

*/
int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,

size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)

{

-@@ -1001,23 +1025,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
-       return STAT_NEED_DS;
-     }
-   
--  /* If we've cached that DS provably doesn't exist, result must be
INSECURE */
--  if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
--    return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--  
--  /* 4035 5.2 
--     If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed
in an
--     authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported
--     authentication path leading from the parent to the child.  The
--     resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an
--     authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists,  */
--  for (recp1 = crecp; recp1; recp1 = cache_find_by_name(recp1,
name, now, F_DS))
--    if (hash_find(ds_digest_name(recp1->addr.ds.digest)))
--      break;
--  
--  if (!recp1)
--    return STAT_INSECURE_DS;
-   /* NOTE, we need to find ONE DNSKEY which matches the DS */
-   for (valid = 0, j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0 && !valid; j
--) 
-     {
-@@ -1070,7 +1077,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	  void *ctx;
- 	  unsigned char *digest, *ds_digest;
- 	  const struct nettle_hash *hash;
--	  
-+	  int sigcnt, rrcnt;
-+
- 	  if (recp1->addr.ds.algo == algo && 
- 	      recp1->addr.ds.keytag == keytag &&
- 	      recp1->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
-@@ -1088,10 +1096,14 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	      
- 	      from_wire(name);
- 	      
--	      if (recp1->addr.ds.keylen == (int)hash->digest_size
&&
-+	      if (!(recp1->flags & F_NEG) &&
-+		  recp1->addr.ds.keylen == (int)hash->digest_size
&&
- 		  (ds_digest = blockdata_retrieve(recp1-
...
addr.key.keydata, recp1->addr.ds.keylen, NULL)) &&
- 		  memcmp(ds_digest, digest, recp1->addr.ds.keylen)
== 0 &&
--		  validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class,
T_DNSKEY, name, keyname, NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo, keytag) ==
STAT_SECURE)
-+		  explore_rrset(header, plen, class, T_DNSKEY,
name, keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt) &&
-+		  sigcnt != 0 && rrcnt != 0 &&
-+		  validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class,
T_DNSKEY, sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname, 
-+				 NULL, key, rdlen - 4, algo,
keytag) == STAT_SECURE)
- 		{
- 		  valid = 1;
- 		  break;
-@@ -1112,7 +1124,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	{
- 	  /* Ensure we have type, class  TTL and length */
- 	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
--	    return STAT_INSECURE; /* bad packet */
-+	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
- 	  
- 	  GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
- 	  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
-@@ -1198,7 +1210,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
-       
-       /* commit cache insert. */
-       cache_end_insert();
--      return STAT_SECURE;
-+      return STAT_OK;
-     }
- 
-   log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DNSKEY");
-@@ -1207,12 +1219,14 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
-

/* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DS query

-    Put all DSs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
-+   Also handles replies which prove that there's no DS at this
location, 
-+   either because the zone is unsigned or this isn't a zone cut.
These are
-+   cached too.
-    return codes:
--   STAT_SECURE      At least one valid DS found and in cache.
--   STAT_NO_DS       It's proved there's no DS here.
--   STAT_NO_NS       It's proved there's no DS _or_ NS here.
-+   STAT_OK          At least one valid DS found and in cache.
-    STAT_BOGUS       no DS in reply or not signed, fails validation,
bad packet.
-    STAT_NEED_KEY    DNSKEY records to validate a DS not found, name
in keyname
-+   STAT_NEED_DS     DS record needed.

*/

-

int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,

size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)
-@@ -1230,7 +1244,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
-   if (qtype != T_DS || qclass != class)
-     val = STAT_BOGUS;
-   else
--    val = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
NULL, &neganswer, &nons);
-+    val = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons);
-   /* Note dnssec_validate_reply() will have cached positive answers
*/
-   
-   if (val == STAT_INSECURE)
-@@ -1242,22 +1256,21 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
-   
-   if (!(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
-     val = STAT_BOGUS;
--   
--  /* If we return STAT_NO_SIG, name contains the name of the DS
query */
--  if (val == STAT_NO_SIG)
--    return val;
-   
-   /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as
the DS, we'll
-      loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS
answer comes
-      from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
--  if (val == STAT_BOGUS ||  (val == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
-+  if (val == STAT_BOGUS || (val == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
-     {
-       log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS");
-       return STAT_BOGUS;
-     }
-+  
-+  if (val != STAT_SECURE)
-+    return val;
- 
-   /* By here, the answer is proved secure, and a positive answer
has been cached. */
--  if (val == STAT_SECURE && neganswer)
-+  if (neganswer)
-     {
-       int rdlen, flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK;
-       unsigned long ttl, minttl = ULONG_MAX;
-@@ -1317,15 +1330,14 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
- 	  
- 	  cache_end_insert();  
- 	  
--	  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, nons ? "no
delegation" : "no DS");
-+	  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "no DS");
- 	}
--      return nons ? STAT_NO_NS : STAT_NO_DS; 
-     }
- 
--  return val;
-+  return STAT_OK;

}

- 
-+

/* 4034 6.1 */
static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const char *b)
{

-@@ -1452,7 +1464,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
-   int mask = 0x80 >> (type & 0x07);
- 
-   if (nons)
--    *nons = 0;
-+    *nons = 1;
-   
-   /* Find NSEC record that proves name doesn't exist */
-   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
-@@ -1480,9 +1492,22 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
- 	  /* rdlen is now length of type map, and p points to it */
- 	  
- 	  /* If we can prove that there's no NS record, return that
information. */
--	  if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] & (0x80 >>
T_NS)) == 0)
--	    *nons = 1;
-+	  if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] & (0x80 >>
T_NS)) != 0)
-+	    *nons = 0;
- 	  
-+	  if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
-+	    {
-+	      /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's
a CNAME is should 
-+		 have been returned. */
-+	      if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
-+		return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	      
-+	      /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we
have the
-+		 DS from the wrong side of the delegation. */
-+	      if (type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) != 0)
-+		return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	    }
-+
- 	  while (rdlen >= 2)
- 	    {
- 	      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-@@ -1586,7 +1611,7 @@ static int base32_decode(char *in, unsigned
char *out)

static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct dns_header *header, size_t

plen, int digest_len, unsigned char *digest, int type,
- 				char *workspace1, char *workspace2,
unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count, int *nons)

{

--  int i, hash_len, salt_len, base32_len, rdlen;
-+  int i, hash_len, salt_len, base32_len, rdlen, flags;
-   unsigned char *p, *psave;
- 
-   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
-@@ -1599,7 +1624,9 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
- 	p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
- 	GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
- 	psave = p;
--	p += 4; /* algo, flags, iterations */
-+	p++; /* algo */
-+	flags = *p++; /* flags */
-+	p += 2; /* iterations */
- 	salt_len = *p++; /* salt_len */
- 	p += salt_len; /* salt */
- 	hash_len = *p++; /* p now points to next hashed name */
-@@ -1626,16 +1653,29 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
- 		  return 0;
- 		
- 		/* If we can prove that there's no NS record,
return that information. */
--		if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] &
(0x80 >> T_NS)) == 0)
--		  *nons = 1;
-+		if (nons && rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0 && (p[2] &
(0x80 >> T_NS)) != 0)
-+		  *nons = 0;
- 		
-+		if (rdlen >= 2 && p[0] == 0)
-+		  {
-+		    /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if
there's a CNAME is should 
-+		       have been returned. */
-+		    if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
-+		      return 0;
-+		    
-+		    /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then
we have the
-+		       DS from the wrong side of the delegation. */
-+		    if (type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) !=
0)
-+		      return 0;
-+		  }
-+
- 		while (rdlen >= 2)
- 		  {
- 		    if (p[0] == type >> 8)
- 		      {
- 			/* Does the NSEC3 say our type exists? */
- 			if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask)
!= 0)
--			  return STAT_BOGUS;
-+			  return 0;
- 			
- 			break; /* finshed checking */
- 		      }
-@@ -1643,7 +1683,7 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
- 		    rdlen -= p[1];
- 		    p +=  p[1];
- 		  }
-+		
- 		return 1;
- 	      }
- 	    else if (rc < 0)
-@@ -1651,16 +1691,27 @@ static int check_nsec3_coverage(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, int dige
- 		/* Normal case, hash falls between NSEC3 name-hash
and next domain name-hash,
- 		   wrap around case, name-hash falls between NSEC3
name-hash and end */
- 		if (memcmp(p, digest, digest_len) >= 0 ||
memcmp(workspace2, p, digest_len) >= 0)
--		  return 1;
-+		  {
-+		    if ((flags & 0x01) && nons) /* opt out */
-+		      *nons = 0;
-+
-+		    return 1;
-+		  }
- 	      }
- 	    else 
- 	      {
- 		/* wrap around case, name falls between start and
next domain name */
- 		if (memcmp(workspace2, p, digest_len) >= 0 &&
memcmp(p, digest, digest_len) >= 0)
--		  return 1;
-+		  {
-+		    if ((flags & 0x01) && nons) /* opt out */
-+		      *nons = 0;
-+
-+		    return 1;
-+		  }
- 	      }
- 	  }
-       }
-+
-   return 0;

}

- 
-@@ -1673,7 +1724,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-   char *closest_encloser, *next_closest, *wildcard;
-   
-   if (nons)
--    *nons = 0;
-+    *nons = 1;
-   
-   /* Look though the NSEC3 records to find the first one with 
-      an algorithm we support (currently only algo == 1).
-@@ -1813,16 +1864,81 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-   
-   return STAT_SECURE;

}

--    
--/* Validate all the RRsets in the answer and authority sections of
the reply (4035:3.2.3) */
--/* Returns are the same as validate_rrset, plus the class if the
missing key is in *class */
-+
-+/* Check signing status of name.
-+   returns:
-+   STAT_SECURE zone is signed.
-+   STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
-+   STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname.
-+   
-+   name returned unaltered.
-+*/
-+static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t
now)
-+{
-+  int name_start = strlen(name);
-+  struct crec *crecp;
-+  char *p;
-+  
-+  while (1)
-+    {
-+      strcpy(keyname, &name[name_start]);
-+      
-+      if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
-+	return STAT_NEED_DS;
-+      else
-+	do 
-+	  {
-+	    if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
-+	      {
-+		/* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
existance of NS record.
-+		   F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
there's no DS record here,
-+		   but that's because there's no NS record either,
ie this isn't the start
-+		   of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below
a node is unsigned when
-+		   we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no
DS record.
-+		*/	  
-+		if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
-+		  {
-+		    if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
-+		      return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */
-+		  }
-+		else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest) ||
!algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
-+		  return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
insecure */
-+	      }
-+	  }
-+	while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
F_DS)));
-+      
-+      if (name_start == 0)
-+	break;
-+
-+      for (p = &name[name_start-2]; (*p != '.') && (p != name); p
--);
-+      
-+      if (p != name)
-+        p++;
-+      
-+      name_start = p - name;
-+    } 
-+
-+  return STAT_SECURE;
-+}
-+       
-+/* Validate all the RRsets in the answer and authority sections of
the reply (4035:3.2.3) 
-+   Return code:
-+   STAT_SECURE   if it validates.
-+   STAT_INSECURE at least one RRset not validated, because in
unsigned zone.
-+   STAT_BOGUS    signature is wrong, bad packet, no validation
where there should be.
-+   STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
returned in keyname, class in *class)
-+   STAT_NEED_DS  need DS to complete validation (name is returned
in keyname) 
-+*/

int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,

size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, 
--			  int *class, int *neganswer, int *nons)
-+			  int *class, int check_unsigned, int
*neganswer, int *nons)

{

--  unsigned char *ans_start, *qname, *p1, *p2, **nsecs;
--  int type1, class1, rdlen1, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype;
--  int i, j, rc, nsec_count, cname_count = CNAME_CHAIN;
--  int nsec_type = 0, have_answer = 0;
-+  static unsigned char **targets = NULL;
-+  static int target_sz = 0;
-+
-+  unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2, **nsecs;
-+  int type1, class1, rdlen1, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype,
targetidx;
-+  int i, j, rc, nsec_count;
-+  int nsec_type;
- 
-   if (neganswer)
-     *neganswer = 0;
-@@ -1833,70 +1949,51 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
-   if (RCODE(header) != NXDOMAIN && RCODE(header) != NOERROR)
-     return STAT_INSECURE;
- 
--  qname = p1 = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
-+  p1 = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
-   
-+   /* Find all the targets we're looking for answers to.
-+     The zeroth array element is for the query, subsequent ones
-+     for CNAME targets, unless the query is for a CNAME. */
-+
-+  if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, 0))
-+    return STAT_BOGUS;
-+  
-+  targets[0] = p1;
-+  targetidx = 1;
-+   
-   if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 4))
-     return STAT_BOGUS;
-+  
-   GETSHORT(qtype, p1);
-   GETSHORT(qclass, p1);
-   ans_start = p1;
--  if (qtype == T_ANY)
--    have_answer = 1;
-  
--  /* Can't validate an RRISG query */
-+  /* Can't validate an RRSIG query */
-   if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
-     return STAT_INSECURE;
-- 
-- cname_loop:
--  for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) 
--    {
--      /* leave pointer to missing name in qname */
--           
--      if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 0, 10)))
--	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--      
--      GETSHORT(type2, p1); 
--      GETSHORT(class2, p1);
--      p1 += 4; /* TTL */
--      GETSHORT(rdlen2, p1);
--      if (rc == 1 && qclass == class2)
--	{
--	  /* Do we have an answer for the question? */
--	  if (type2 == qtype)
--	    {
--	      have_answer = 1;
--	      break;
--	    }
--	  else if (type2 == T_CNAME)
--	    {
--	      qname = p1;
--	      
--	      /* looped CNAMES */
--	      if (!cname_count-- || !extract_name(header, plen,
&p1, name, 1, 0))
--		return STAT_BOGUS;
--	       
--	      p1 = ans_start;
--	      goto cname_loop;
--	    }
--	}
--      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen2))
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
--    }
--   
--  if (neganswer && !have_answer)
--    *neganswer = 1;
-   
--  /* No data, therefore no sigs */
--  if (ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) == 0)
--    {
--      *keyname = 0;
--      return STAT_NO_SIG;
--    }
-+  if (qtype != T_CNAME)
-+    for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) 
-+      {
-+	if (!(p1 = skip_name(p1, header, plen, 10)))
-+	  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+	
-+	GETSHORT(type2, p1); 
-+	p1 += 6; /* class, TTL */
-+	GETSHORT(rdlen2, p1);  
-+	
-+	if (type2 == T_CNAME)
-+	  {
-+	    if (!expand_workspace(&targets, &target_sz, targetidx))
-+	      return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	    
-+	    targets[targetidx++] = p1; /* pointer to target name */
-+	  }
-+	
-+	if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen2))
-+	  return STAT_BOGUS;
-+      }
-+  
-   for (p1 = ans_start, i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) +
ntohs(header->nscount); i++)
-     {
-       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, name, 1, 10))
-@@ -1931,7 +2028,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	  /* Not done, validate now */
- 	  if (j == i)
- 	    {
--	      int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, type_covered;
-+	      int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, type_covered, sigcnt,
rrcnt;
- 	      unsigned char *psave;
- 	      struct all_addr a;
- 	      struct blockdata *key;
-@@ -1939,143 +2036,186 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now,
struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	      char *wildname;
- 	      int have_wildcard = 0;
- 
--	      rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class1, type1,
name, keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
--	      
--	      if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
--		{
--		  have_wildcard = 1;
--		  /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with a
different
--		     answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove this
--		     hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
--		     the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check that
here. */
--		  if (!nsec_type && !(nsec_type =
find_nsec_records(header, plen, &nsecs, &nsec_count, class1)))
--		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad packet */
--		  
--		  if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
--		    rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen,
nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type1,
NULL);
--		  else
--		    rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen,
nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, 
--						   keyname, name,
type1, wildname, NULL);
--		  
--		  if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
--		    return rc;
--		} 
--	      else if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
--		{
--		  if (class)
--		    *class = class1; /* Class for DS or DNSKEY */
-+	      if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name,
keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt))
-+		return STAT_BOGUS;
- 
--		  if (rc == STAT_NO_SIG)
-+	      /* No signatures for RRset. We can be configured to
assume this is OK and return a INSECURE result. */
-+	      if (sigcnt == 0)
-+		{
-+		  if (check_unsigned)
- 		    {
--		      /* If we dropped off the end of a CNAME
chain, return
--			 STAT_NO_SIG and the last name is keyname.
This is used for proving non-existence
--			 if DS records in CNAME chains. */
--		      if (cname_count == CNAME_CHAIN || i <
ntohs(header->ancount)) 
--			/* No CNAME chain, or no sig in answer
section, return empty name. */
--			*keyname = 0;
--		      else if (!extract_name(header, plen, &qname,
keyname, 1, 0))
--			return STAT_BOGUS;
-+		      rc = zone_status(name, class1, keyname, now);
-+		      if (rc == STAT_SECURE)
-+			rc = STAT_BOGUS;
-+		       if (class)
-+			 *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_DNSKEY */
- 		    }
-- 
-+		  else 
-+		    rc = STAT_INSECURE; 
-+		  
- 		  return rc;
- 		}
- 	      
--	      /* Cache RRsigs in answer section, and if we just
validated a DS RRset, cache it */
--	      cache_start_insert();
-+	      /* explore_rrset() gives us key name from sigs in
keyname.
-+		 Can't overwrite name here. */
-+	      strcpy(daemon->workspacename, keyname);
-+	      rc = zone_status(daemon->workspacename, class1,
keyname, now);
-+	      if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
-+		{
-+		  /* Zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset
*/
-+		  if (class)
-+		    *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_DNSKEY */
-+		  return rc;
-+		} 
-+	      
-+	      rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class1, type1,
sigcnt, rrcnt, name, keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
- 	      
--	      for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header-
...
ancount); j++)
-+	      if (rc == STAT_BOGUS || rc == STAT_NEED_KEY || rc ==
STAT_NEED_DS)
- 		{
--		  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name,
0, 10)))
--		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+		  if (class)
-+		    *class = class1; /* Class for DS or DNSKEY */
-+		  return rc;
-+		} 
-+	      else 
-+		{
-+		  /* rc is now STAT_SECURE or STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD
*/
-+		 
-+		  /* Note if we've validated either the answer to
the question
-+		     or the target of a CNAME. Any not noted will
need NSEC or
-+		     to be in unsigned space. */
-+
-+		  for (j = 0; j <targetidx; j++)
-+		    if ((p2 = targets[j]))
-+		      {
-+			if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2,
name, 0, 10)))
-+			  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+			
-+			if (class1 == qclass && rc == 1 && (type1
== T_CNAME || type1 == qtype || qtype == T_ANY ))
-+			  targets[j] = NULL;
-+		      }
-+			    
-+		  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
-+		    {
-+		      have_wildcard = 1;
- 		      
--		  GETSHORT(type2, p2);
--		  GETSHORT(class2, p2);
--		  GETLONG(ttl, p2);
--		  GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
--		       
--		  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
--		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--		  
--		  if (class2 == class1 && rc == 1)
--		    { 
--		      psave = p2;
-+		      /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with
a different
-+			 answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
this
-+			 hasn't happened, the answer must prove
that
-+			 the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check
that here. */
-+		      if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header,
plen, &nsecs, &nsec_count, class1)))
-+			return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad
packet */
-+		      
-+		      /* Note that we may not yet have validated
the NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets. Since the check
-+			 below returns either SECURE or BOGUS,
that's not a problem. If the RRsets later fail
-+			 we'll return BOGUS then. */
- 
--		      if (type1 == T_DS && type2 == T_DS)
--			{
--			  if (rdlen2 < 4)
--			    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--			  
--			  GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
--			  algo = *p2++;
--			  digest = *p2++;
--			  
--			  /* Cache needs to known class for DNSSEC
stuff */
--			  a.addr.dnssec.class = class2;
--			  
--			  if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p2,
rdlen2 - 4)))
--			    {
--			      if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name, &a,
now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
--				blockdata_free(key);
--			      else
--				{
--				  a.addr.keytag = keytag;
--				  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
--				  crecp->addr.ds.digest = digest;
--				  crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
--				  crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
--				  crecp->addr.ds.keytag = keytag;
--				  crecp->addr.ds.keylen = rdlen2 -
4; 
--				} 
--			    }
--			}
--		      else if (type2 == T_RRSIG)
--			{
--			  if (rdlen2 < 18)
--			    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+		      if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
-+			rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen,
nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type1,
NULL);
-+		      else
-+			rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header,
plen, nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, 
-+						       keyname,
name, type1, wildname, NULL);
-+		      
-+		      if (rc == STAT_BOGUS)
-+			return rc;
-+		    } 
-+		  
-+		  /* Cache RRsigs in answer section, and if we just
validated a DS RRset, cache it */
-+		  /* Also note if the RRset is the answer to the
question, or the target of a CNAME */
-+		  cache_start_insert();
-+		  
-+		  for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header-
...
ancount); j++)
-+		    {
-+		      if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2,
name, 0, 10)))
-+			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+		      
-+		      GETSHORT(type2, p2);
-+		      GETSHORT(class2, p2);
-+		      GETLONG(ttl, p2);
-+		      GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
-+		      
-+		      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
-+			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+		      
-+		      if (class2 == class1 && rc == 1)
-+			{ 
-+			  psave = p2;
-
--			  GETSHORT(type_covered, p2);
--			  if (type_covered == type1 && 
--			      (type_covered == T_A || type_covered
== T_AAAA ||
--			       type_covered == T_CNAME ||
type_covered == T_DS || 
--			       type_covered == T_DNSKEY ||
type_covered == T_PTR)) 
-+			  if (type1 == T_DS && type2 == T_DS)
- 			    {
--			      a.addr.dnssec.type = type_covered;
--			      a.addr.dnssec.class = class1;
-+			      if (rdlen2 < 4)
-+				return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
- 			      
--			      algo = *p2++;
--			      p2 += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl,
expiration, inception */
- 			      GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
-+			      algo = *p2++;
-+			      digest = *p2++;
-+			      
-+			      /* Cache needs to known class for
DNSSEC stuff */
-+			      a.addr.dnssec.class = class2;
- 			      
--			      /* We don't cache sigs for wildcard
answers, because to reproduce the
--				 answer from the cache will require
one or more NSEC/NSEC3 records 
--				 which we don't cache. The lack of
the RRSIG ensures that a query for
--				 this RRset asking for a secure
answer will always be forwarded. */
--			      if (!have_wildcard && (key =
blockdata_alloc((char*)psave, rdlen2)))
-+			      if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p2,
rdlen2 - 4)))
- 				{
--				  if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name,
&a, now, ttl,  F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
-+				  if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name,
&a, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
- 				    blockdata_free(key);
- 				  else
- 				    {
--				      crecp->addr.sig.keydata =
key;
--				      crecp->addr.sig.keylen =
rdlen2;
--				      crecp->addr.sig.keytag =
keytag;
--				      crecp->addr.sig.type_covered
= type_covered;
--				      crecp->addr.sig.algo = algo;
-+				      a.addr.keytag = keytag;
-+				      log_query(F_NOEXTRA |
F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
-+				      crecp->addr.ds.digest =
digest;
-+				      crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
-+				      crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
-+				      crecp->addr.ds.keytag =
keytag;
-+				      crecp->addr.ds.keylen =
rdlen2 - 4; 
-+				    } 
-+				}
-+			    }
-+			  else if (type2 == T_RRSIG)
-+			    {
-+			      if (rdlen2 < 18)
-+				return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+			      
-+			      GETSHORT(type_covered, p2);
-+			      
-+			      if (type_covered == type1 && 
-+				  (type_covered == T_A ||
type_covered == T_AAAA ||
-+				   type_covered == T_CNAME ||
type_covered == T_DS || 
-+				   type_covered == T_DNSKEY ||
type_covered == T_PTR)) 
-+				{
-+				  a.addr.dnssec.type =
type_covered;
-+				  a.addr.dnssec.class = class1;
-+				  
-+				  algo = *p2++;
-+				  p2 += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl,
expiration, inception */
-+				  GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
-+				  
-+				  /* We don't cache sigs for
wildcard answers, because to reproduce the
-+				     answer from the cache will
require one or more NSEC/NSEC3 records 
-+				     which we don't cache. The lack
of the RRSIG ensures that a query for
-+				     this RRset asking for a secure
answer will always be forwarded. */
-+				  if (!have_wildcard && (key =
blockdata_alloc((char*)psave, rdlen2)))
-+				    {
-+				      if (!(crecp =
cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl,  F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
-+					blockdata_free(key);
-+				      else
-+					{
-+					  crecp->addr.sig.keydata =
key;
-+					  crecp->addr.sig.keylen =
rdlen2;
-+					  crecp->addr.sig.keytag =
keytag;
-+					  crecp-
...
addr.sig.type_covered = type_covered;
-+					  crecp->addr.sig.algo =
algo;
-+					}
- 				    }
- 				}
- 			    }
-+			  
-+			  p2 = psave;
- 			}
- 		      
--		      p2 = psave;
-+		      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
-+			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
- 		    }
- 		  
--		  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
--		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+		  cache_end_insert();
- 		}
--		  
--	      cache_end_insert();
- 	    }
- 	}
- 
-@@ -2083,143 +2223,49 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now,
struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	return STAT_BOGUS;
-     }
- 
--  /* OK, all the RRsets validate, now see if we have a NODATA or
NXDOMAIN reply */
--  if (have_answer)
--    return STAT_SECURE;
--     
--  /* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, prove that (name, class1, type1)
can't exist */
--  /* First marshall the NSEC records, if we've not done it
previously */
--  if (!nsec_type && !(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen,
&nsecs, &nsec_count, qclass)))
--    {
--      /* No NSEC records. If we dropped off the end of a CNAME
chain, return
--	 STAT_NO_SIG and the last name is keyname. This is used for
proving non-existence
--	 if DS records in CNAME chains. */
--      if (cname_count == CNAME_CHAIN) /* No CNAME chain, return
empty name. */
--	*keyname = 0;
--      else if (!extract_name(header, plen, &qname, keyname, 1, 0))
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
--      return STAT_NO_SIG; /* No NSECs, this is probably a dangling
CNAME pointing into
--			     an unsigned zone. Return STAT_NO_SIG
to cause this to be proved. */
--    }
--   
--  /* Get name of missing answer */
--  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &qname, name, 1, 0))
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
--  
--  if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
--    return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
--  else
--    return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, NULL, nons);
--}
--/* Chase the CNAME chain in the packet until the first record which
_doesn't validate.
--   Needed for proving answer in unsigned space.
--   Return STAT_NEED_* 
--          STAT_BOGUS - error
--          STAT_INSECURE - name of first non-secure record in name 
--*/
--int dnssec_chase_cname(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname)
--{
--  unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
--  int type, class, qclass, rdlen, j, rc;
--  int cname_count = CNAME_CHAIN;
--  char *wildname;
--  /* Get question */
--  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4))
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
--  
--  p +=2; /* type */
--  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
--  while (1)
--    {
--      for (j = ntohs(header->ancount); j != 0; j--) 
--	{
--	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
--	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--	  
--	  GETSHORT(type, p); 
--	  GETSHORT(class, p);
--	  p += 4; /* TTL */
--	  GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
--	  /* Not target, loop */
--	  if (rc == 2 || qclass != class)
--	    {
--	      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
--		return STAT_BOGUS;
--	      continue;
--	    }
--	  
--	  /* Got to end of CNAME chain. */
--	  if (type != T_CNAME)
--	    return STAT_INSECURE;
--	  
--	  /* validate CNAME chain, return if insecure or need more
data */
--	  rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class, type, name,
keyname, &wildname, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
--	   
--	  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
--	    {
--	      int nsec_type, nsec_count, i;
--	      unsigned char **nsecs;
--	      /* An attacker can replay a wildcard answer with a
different
--		 answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove this
--		 hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
--		 the genuine record doesn't exist. Check that here.
*/
--	      if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen,
&nsecs, &nsec_count, class)))
--		return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad packet */
--	      
--	      /* Note that we're called here because something
didn't validate in validate_reply,
--		 so we can't assume that any NSEC records have been
validated. We do them by steam here */
--
--	      for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
--		{
--		  unsigned char *p1 = nsecs[i];
--		  
--		  if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon-
...
workspacename, 1, 0))
--		    return STAT_BOGUS;
--		  rc = validate_rrset(now, header, plen, class,
nsec_type, daemon->workspacename, keyname, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
-+  /* OK, all the RRsets validate, now see if we have a missing
answer or CNAME target. */
-+  for (j = 0; j <targetidx; j++)
-+    if ((p2 = targets[j]))
-+      {
-+	if (neganswer)
-+	  *neganswer = 1;
- 
--		  /* NSECs can't be wildcards. */
--		  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
--		    rc = STAT_BOGUS;
-+	if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p2, name, 1, 10))
-+	  return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+	    
-+	/* NXDOMAIN or NODATA reply, unanswered question is (name,
qclass, qtype) */
- 
--		  if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
-+	/* For anything other than a DS record, this situation is
OK if either
-+	   the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's a NSEC
records. */
-+	if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen, &nsecs,
&nsec_count, qclass)))
-+	  {
-+	    /* Empty DS without NSECS */
-+	    if (qtype == T_DS)
-+	      return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	    else
-+	      {
-+		rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
-+		if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
-+		  {
-+		    if (class)
-+		      *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_DNSKEY */
- 		    return rc;
--		}
--	      if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
--		rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type, NULL);
--	      else
--		rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, 
--					       keyname, name, type,
wildname, NULL);
--	      
--	      if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
--		return rc;
--	    }
--	  
--	  if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
--	    {
--	      if (rc == STAT_NO_SIG)
--		rc = STAT_INSECURE;
--	      return rc;
--	    }
-+		  } 
-+		
-+		return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
-+	      }
-+	  }
- 
--	  /* Loop down CNAME chain/ */
--	  if (!cname_count-- || 
--	      !extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 0) ||
--	      !(p = skip_questions(header, plen)))
--	    return STAT_BOGUS;
--	  
--	  break;
--	}
-+	  if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
-+	  rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
-+	else
-+	  rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, NULL, nons);
- 
--      /* End of CNAME chain */
--      return STAT_INSECURE;	
--    }
-+	if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
-+	  return rc;
-+      }
-+  
-+  return STAT_SECURE;

}

- 
- 
-diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
-index b76a974..dd22a62 100644
---- a/src/forward.c
-+++ b/src/forward.c
-@@ -23,15 +23,6 @@ static struct frec
*lookup_frec_by_sender(unsigned short id,

static unsigned short get_id(void);
static void free_frec(struct frec *f);

- 
--#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
--static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int status, struct
dns_header *header, size_t n, 
--			   int class, char *name, char *keyname,
struct server *server, int *keycount);
--static int do_check_sign(struct frec *forward, int status, time_t
now, char *name, char *keyname);
--static int send_check_sign(struct frec *forward, time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, 
--			   char *name, char *keyname);
--#endif
--

/* Send a UDP packet with its source address set as "source"

-    unless nowild is true, when we just send it with the kernel
default */

int send_from(int fd, int nowild, char *packet, size_t len,

-@@ -825,236 +816,142 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
now)

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC

-       if (server && option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(forward-
...
flags & FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED))
- 	{
--	  int status;
-+	  int status = 0;
- 
- 	  /* We've had a reply already, which we're validating.
Ignore this duplicate */
- 	  if (forward->blocking_query)
- 	    return;
--	  if (header->hb3 & HB3_TC)
--	    {
--	      /* Truncated answer can't be validated.
-+	  
-+	   /* Truncated answer can't be validated.
- 		 If this is an answer to a DNSSEC-generated query,
we still
- 		 need to get the client to retry over TCP, so
return
- 		 an answer with the TC bit set, even if the actual
answer fits.
- 	      */
--	      status = STAT_TRUNCATED;
--	    }
--	  else if (forward->flags & FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY)
--	    status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, daemon-
...
namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
--	  else if (forward->flags & FREC_DS_QUERY)
--	    {
--	      status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, daemon-
...
namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
--	      /* Provably no DS, everything below is insecure, even
if signatures are offered */
--	      if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
--		/* We only cache sigs when we've validated a reply.
--		   Avoid caching a reply with sigs if there's a
vaildated break in the 
--		   DS chain, so we don't return replies from cache
missing sigs. */
--              	status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--	      else if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
--                {
--                  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
--                    {
--		      status = send_check_sign(forward, now,
header, n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
--		      if (status == STAT_INSECURE)
--			status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--		    }
--		  else
--		    status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--		}
--              else if (status == STAT_NO_NS)
--		status = STAT_BOGUS;
--	    }
--	  else if (forward->flags & FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN)
--	    {
--	      status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, daemon-
...
namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
--	      if (status != STAT_NEED_KEY)
--		status = do_check_sign(forward, status, now,
daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
--	    }
--	  else
-+	  if (header->hb3 & HB3_TC)
-+	    status = STAT_TRUNCATED;
-+	  
-+	  while (1)
- 	    {
--	      status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n,
daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class, NULL, NULL);
--	      if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
-+	      /* As soon as anything returns BOGUS, we stop and
unwind, to do otherwise
-+		 would invite infinite loops, since the answers to
DNSKEY and DS queries
-+		 will not be cached, so they'll be repeated. */
-+	      if (status != STAT_BOGUS && status != STAT_TRUNCATED
&& status != STAT_ABANDONED)
- 		{
--		  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
--		    status = send_check_sign(forward, now, header,
n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
-+		  if (forward->flags & FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY)
-+		    status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n,
daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
-+		  else if (forward->flags & FREC_DS_QUERY)
-+		    status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
- 		  else
--		    status = STAT_INSECURE;
-+		    status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n,
daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class, 
-+						   option_bool(OPT_
DNSSEC_NO_SIGN), NULL, NULL);
- 		}
--	    }
--	  /* Can't validate, as we're missing key data. Put this
--	     answer aside, whilst we get that. */     
--	  if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status == STAT_NEED_DS_NEG
|| status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
--	    {
--	      struct frec *new, *orig;
--	      
--	      /* Free any saved query */
--	      if (forward->stash)
--		blockdata_free(forward->stash);
--	      
--	      /* Now save reply pending receipt of key data */
--	      if (!(forward->stash = blockdata_alloc((char
*)header, n)))
--		return;
--	      forward->stash_len = n;
- 	      
--	    anotherkey:	      
--	      /* Find the original query that started it all.... */
--	      for (orig = forward; orig->dependent; orig = orig-
...
dependent);
--
--	      if (--orig->work_counter == 0 || !(new =
get_new_frec(now, NULL, 1)))
--		status = STAT_INSECURE;
--	      else
-+	      /* Can't validate, as we're missing key data. Put
this
-+		 answer aside, whilst we get that. */     
-+	      if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status ==
STAT_NEED_KEY)
- 		{
--		  int fd;
--		  struct frec *next = new->next;
--		  *new = *forward; /* copy everything, then
overwrite */
--		  new->next = next;
--		  new->blocking_query = NULL;
--		  new->sentto = server;
--		  new->rfd4 = NULL;
--		  new->orig_domain = NULL;
--#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
--		  new->rfd6 = NULL;
--#endif
--		  new->flags &= ~(FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY | FREC_DS_QUERY
| FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN);
-+		  struct frec *new, *orig;
- 		  
--		  new->dependent = forward; /* to find query
awaiting new one. */
--		  forward->blocking_query = new; /* for garbage
cleaning */
--		  /* validate routines leave name of required
record in daemon->keyname */
--		  if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
--		    {
--		      new->flags |= FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY; 
--		      nn = dnssec_generate_query(header, ((char *)
header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
--						 daemon->keyname,
forward->class, T_DNSKEY, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
--		    }
--		  else 
--		    {
--		      if (status == STAT_NEED_DS_NEG)
--			new->flags |= FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN;
--		      else
--			new->flags |= FREC_DS_QUERY;
--		      nn = dnssec_generate_query(header,((char *)
header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
--						 daemon->keyname,
forward->class, T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
--		    }
--		  if ((hash = hash_questions(header, nn, daemon-
...
namebuff)))
--		    memcpy(new->hash, hash, HASH_SIZE);
--		  new->new_id = get_id();
--		  header->id = htons(new->new_id);
--		  /* Save query for retransmission */
--		  if (!(new->stash = blockdata_alloc((char
*)header, nn)))
-+		  /* Free any saved query */
-+		  if (forward->stash)
-+		    blockdata_free(forward->stash);
-+		  
-+		  /* Now save reply pending receipt of key data */
-+		  if (!(forward->stash = blockdata_alloc((char
*)header, n)))
- 		    return;
--		      
--		  new->stash_len = nn;
-+		  forward->stash_len = n;
- 		  
--		  /* Don't resend this. */
--		  daemon->srv_save = NULL;
-+		  /* Find the original query that started it
all.... */
-+		  for (orig = forward; orig->dependent; orig =
orig->dependent);
- 		  
--		  if (server->sfd)
--		    fd = server->sfd->fd;
-+		  if (--orig->work_counter == 0 || !(new =
get_new_frec(now, NULL, 1)))
-+		    status = STAT_ABANDONED;
- 		  else
- 		    {
--		      fd = -1;
-+		      int fd;
-+		      struct frec *next = new->next;
-+		      *new = *forward; /* copy everything, then
overwrite */
-+		      new->next = next;
-+		      new->blocking_query = NULL;
-+		      new->sentto = server;
-+		      new->rfd4 = NULL;

#ifdef HAVE_IPV6

--		      if (server->addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
-+		      new->rfd6 = NULL;
-+#endif
-+		      new->flags &= ~(FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY |
FREC_DS_QUERY);
-+		      
-+		      new->dependent = forward; /* to find query
awaiting new one. */
-+		      forward->blocking_query = new; /* for garbage
cleaning */
-+		      /* validate routines leave name of required
record in daemon->keyname */
-+		      if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
-+			{
-+			  new->flags |= FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY; 
-+			  nn = dnssec_generate_query(header, ((char
*) header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
-+						     daemon-
...
keyname, forward->class, T_DNSKEY, &server->addr, server-
edns_pktsz);
-+			}
-+		      else 
- 			{
--			  if (new->rfd6 || (new->rfd6 =
allocate_rfd(AF_INET6)))
--			    fd = new->rfd6->fd;
-+			  new->flags |= FREC_DS_QUERY;
-+			  nn = dnssec_generate_query(header,((char
*) header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz,
-+						     daemon-
...
keyname, forward->class, T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
- 			}
-+		      if ((hash = hash_questions(header, nn,
daemon->namebuff)))
-+			memcpy(new->hash, hash, HASH_SIZE);
-+		      new->new_id = get_id();
-+		      header->id = htons(new->new_id);
-+		      /* Save query for retransmission */
-+		      new->stash = blockdata_alloc((char *)header,
nn);
-+		      new->stash_len = nn;
-+		      
-+		      /* Don't resend this. */
-+		      daemon->srv_save = NULL;
-+		      
-+		      if (server->sfd)
-+			fd = server->sfd->fd;
- 		      else
-+			{
-+			  fd = -1;
-+#ifdef HAVE_IPV6
-+			  if (server->addr.sa.sa_family ==
AF_INET6)
-+			    {
-+			      if (new->rfd6 || (new->rfd6 =
allocate_rfd(AF_INET6)))
-+				fd = new->rfd6->fd;
-+			    }
-+			  else

#endif

-+			    {
-+			      if (new->rfd4 || (new->rfd4 =
allocate_rfd(AF_INET)))
-+				fd = new->rfd4->fd;
-+			    }
-+			}
-+		      
-+		      if (fd != -1)
- 			{
--			  if (new->rfd4 || (new->rfd4 =
allocate_rfd(AF_INET)))
--			    fd = new->rfd4->fd;
-+			  while (retry_send(sendto(fd, (char
*)header, nn, 0, 
-+						   &server-
...
addr.sa,
-+						   sa_len(&server-
...
addr))));
-+			  server->queries++;
- 			}
--		    }
--		  
--		  if (fd != -1)
--		    {
--		      while (retry_send(sendto(fd, (char *)header,
nn, 0, 
--					       &server->addr.sa, 
--					       sa_len(&server-
...
addr))));
--		      server->queries++;
--		    }
--		  
-+		    }		  
- 		  return;
- 		}
--	    }
- 	  
--	  /* Ok, we reached far enough up the chain-of-trust that
we can validate something.
--	     Now wind back down, pulling back answers which
wouldn't previously validate
--	     and validate them with the new data. Note that if an
answer needs multiple
--	     keys to validate, we may find another key is needed,
in which case we set off
--	     down another branch of the tree. Once we get to the
original answer 
--	     (FREC_DNSSEC_QUERY not set) and it validates, return
it to the original requestor. */
--	  while (forward->dependent)
--	    {
-+	      /* Validated original answer, all done. */
-+	      if (!forward->dependent)
-+		break;
-+	      
-+	      /* validated subsdiary query, (and cached result)
-+		 pop that and return to the previous query we were
working on. */
- 	      struct frec *prev = forward->dependent;
- 	      free_frec(forward);
- 	      forward = prev;
- 	      forward->blocking_query = NULL; /* already gone */
- 	      blockdata_retrieve(forward->stash, forward-
...
stash_len, (void *)header);
- 	      n = forward->stash_len;
--	      
--	      if (status == STAT_SECURE)
--		{
--		  if (forward->flags & FREC_DNSKEY_QUERY)
--		    status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n,
daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
--		  else if (forward->flags & FREC_DS_QUERY)
--		    {
--		      status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
--		       /* Provably no DS, everything below is
insecure, even if signatures are offered */
--		      if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
--			/* We only cache sigs when we've validated
a reply.
--			   Avoid caching a reply with sigs if
there's a vaildated break in the 
--			   DS chain, so we don't return replies
from cache missing sigs. */
--			status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--		       else if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
--			 {
--			   if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
--			     {
--			       status = send_check_sign(forward,
now, header, n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname); 
--			       if (status == STAT_INSECURE)
--				 status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--			     }
--			   else
--			     status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--			 }
--		       else if (status == STAT_NO_NS)
--			 status = STAT_BOGUS;
--		    }
--		  else if (forward->flags & FREC_CHECK_NOSIGN)
--		    {
--		      status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, forward->class);
--		      if (status != STAT_NEED_KEY)
--			status = do_check_sign(forward, status,
now, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
--		    }
--		  else
--		    {
--		      status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header,
n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname, &forward->class, NULL, NULL);	
--		      if (status == STAT_NO_SIG)
--			{
--			  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
--			    status = send_check_sign(forward, now,
header, n, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname);
--			  else
--			    status = STAT_INSECURE;
--			}
--		    }
--	       
--		  if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status ==
STAT_NEED_DS_NEG || status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
--		    goto anotherkey;
--		}
- 	    }
-+	
-
- 	  no_cache_dnssec = 0;
--	  if (status == STAT_INSECURE_DS)
--	    {
--	      /* We only cache sigs when we've validated a reply.
--		 Avoid caching a reply with sigs if there's a
vaildated break in the 
--		 DS chain, so we don't return replies from cache
missing sigs. */
--	      status = STAT_INSECURE;
--	      no_cache_dnssec = 1;
--	    }
- 	  
- 	  if (status == STAT_TRUNCATED)
- 	    header->hb3 |= HB3_TC;
-@@ -1062,7 +959,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
now)
- 	    {
- 	      char *result, *domain = "result";
- 	      
--	      if (forward->work_counter == 0)
-+	      if (status == STAT_ABANDONED)
- 		{
- 		  result = "ABANDONED";
- 		  status = STAT_BOGUS;
-@@ -1072,7 +969,7 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
now)
- 	      
- 	      if (status == STAT_BOGUS && extract_request(header,
n, daemon->namebuff, NULL))
- 		domain = daemon->namebuff;
-+	      
- 	      log_query(F_KEYTAG | F_SECSTAT, domain, NULL,
result);
- 	    }
- 	  
-@@ -1415,315 +1312,49 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
time_t now)

}

-

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC

--
--/* UDP: we've got an unsigned answer, return STAT_INSECURE if we
can prove there's no DS
--   and therefore the answer shouldn't be signed, or STAT_BOGUS if
it should be, or 
--   STAT_NEED_DS_NEG and keyname if we need to do the query. */
--static int send_check_sign(struct frec *forward, time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, 
--			   char *name, char *keyname)
--{
--  int status = dnssec_chase_cname(now, header, plen, name,
keyname);
--  
--  if (status != STAT_INSECURE)
--    return status;
--  /* Store the domain we're trying to check. */
--  forward->name_start = strlen(name);
--  forward->name_len = forward->name_start + 1;
--  if (!(forward->orig_domain = blockdata_alloc(name, forward-
...
name_len)))
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
--  
--  return do_check_sign(forward, 0, now, name, keyname);
--}
-- 
--/* We either have a a reply (header non-NULL, or we need to start
by looking in the cache */ 
--static int do_check_sign(struct frec *forward, int status, time_t
now, char *name, char *keyname)
--{
--  /* get domain we're checking back from blockdata store, it's
stored on the original query. */
--  while (forward->dependent && !forward->orig_domain)
--    forward = forward->dependent;
--  blockdata_retrieve(forward->orig_domain, forward->name_len,
name);
--  
--  while (1)
--    {
--      char *p;
--      if (status == 0)
--	{
--	  struct crec *crecp;
--	  /* Haven't received answer, see if in cache */
--	  if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, &name[forward-
...
name_start], now, F_DS)))
--	    {
--	      /* put name of DS record we're missing into keyname
*/
--	      strcpy(keyname, &name[forward->name_start]);
--	      /* and wait for reply to arrive */
--	      return STAT_NEED_DS_NEG;
--	    }
--	  /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
existance of NS record */ 
--	  if (!(crecp->flags & F_NEG))
--	    status = STAT_SECURE;
--	  else if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
--	    status = STAT_NO_DS;
--	  else
--	    status = STAT_NO_NS;
--	}
--      
--      /* Have entered non-signed part of DNS tree. */ 
--      if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
--	return forward->dependent ? STAT_INSECURE_DS :
STAT_INSECURE;
--
--      if (status == STAT_BOGUS)
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
--      if (status == STAT_NO_SIG && *keyname != 0)
--	{
--	  /* There is a validated CNAME chain that doesn't end in a
DS record. Start 
--	     the search again in that domain. */
--	  blockdata_free(forward->orig_domain);
--	  forward->name_start = strlen(keyname);
--	  forward->name_len = forward->name_start + 1;
--	  if (!(forward->orig_domain = blockdata_alloc(keyname,
forward->name_len)))
--	    return STAT_BOGUS;
--	  
--	  strcpy(name, keyname);
--	  status = 0; /* force to cache when we iterate. */
--	  continue;
--	}
--      
--      /* There's a proven DS record, or we're within a zone, where
there doesn't need
--	 to be a DS record. Add a name and try again.
--	 If we've already tried the whole name, then fail */
--      if (forward->name_start == 0)
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
--      
--      for (p = &name[forward->name_start-2]; (*p != '.') && (p !=
name); p--);
--      
--      if (p != name)
--	p++;
--      
--      forward->name_start = p - name;
--      status = 0; /* force to cache when we iterate. */
--    }
--}
--/* Move down from the root, until we find a signed non-existance of
a DS, in which case
--   an unsigned answer is OK, or we find a signed DS, in which case
there should be 
--   a signature, and the answer is BOGUS */
--static int  tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, int class, char *name, 
--					char *keyname, struct
server *server, int *keycount)
--{
--  size_t m;
--  unsigned char *packet, *payload;
--  u16 *length;
--  int status, name_len;
--  struct blockdata *block;
--  char *name_start;
--  /* Get first insecure entry in CNAME chain */
--  status = tcp_key_recurse(now, STAT_CHASE_CNAME, header, plen,
class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
--  if (status == STAT_BOGUS)
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
--  
--  if (!(packet = whine_malloc(65536 + MAXDNAME + RRFIXEDSZ +
sizeof(u16))))
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
--  
--  payload = &packet[2];
--  header = (struct dns_header *)payload;
--  length = (u16 *)packet;
--  /* Stash the name away, since the buffer will be trashed when we
recurse */
--  name_len = strlen(name) + 1;
--  name_start = name + name_len - 1;
--  
--  if (!(block = blockdata_alloc(name, name_len)))
--    {
--      free(packet);
--      return STAT_BOGUS;
--    }
--  while (1)
--    {
--      unsigned char c1, c2;
--      struct crec *crecp;
--      if (--(*keycount) == 0)
--	{
--	  free(packet);
--	  blockdata_free(block);
--	  return STAT_BOGUS;    
--	}
--      
--      while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name_start, now,
F_DS)))
--	{      
--	  if ((crecp->flags & F_NEG) && (crecp->flags &
F_DNSSECOK))
--	    {
--	      /* Found a secure denial of DS - delegation is indeed
insecure */
--	      free(packet);
--	      blockdata_free(block);
--	      return STAT_INSECURE;
--	    }
--      
--	  /* Here, either there's a secure DS, or no NS and no DS,
and therefore no delegation.
--	     Add another label and continue. */
-- 
--	  if (name_start == name)
--	    {
--	      free(packet);
--	      blockdata_free(block);
--	      return STAT_BOGUS; /* run out of labels */
--	    }
--	  
--	  name_start -= 2;
--	  while (*name_start != '.' && name_start != name) 
--	    name_start--;
--	  if (name_start != name)
--	    name_start++;
--	}
--
--      /* Can't find it in the cache, have to send a query */
--      m = dnssec_generate_query(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
name_start, class, T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
--      
--      *length = htons(m);
--      
--      if (read_write(server->tcpfd, packet, m + sizeof(u16), 0) &&
--	  read_write(server->tcpfd, &c1, 1, 1) &&
--	  read_write(server->tcpfd, &c2, 1, 1) &&
--	  read_write(server->tcpfd, payload, (c1 << 8) | c2, 1))
--	{
--	  m = (c1 << 8) | c2;
--	  
--	  /* Note this trashes all three name workspaces */
--	  status = tcp_key_recurse(now, STAT_NEED_DS_NEG, header,
m, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
--	  
--	  if (status == STAT_NO_DS)
--	    {
--	      /* Found a secure denial of DS - delegation is indeed
insecure */
--	      free(packet);
--	      blockdata_free(block);
--	      return STAT_INSECURE;
--	    }
--	  
--	  if (status == STAT_NO_SIG && *keyname != 0)
--	    {
--	      /* There is a validated CNAME chain that doesn't end
in a DS record. Start 
--		 the search again in that domain. */
--	      blockdata_free(block);
--	      name_len = strlen(keyname) + 1;
--	      name_start = name + name_len - 1;
--	      
--	      if (!(block = blockdata_alloc(keyname, name_len)))
--		return STAT_BOGUS;
--	      
--	      strcpy(name, keyname);
--	      continue;
--	    }
--	  
--	  if (status == STAT_BOGUS)
--	    {
--	      free(packet);
--	      blockdata_free(block);
--	      return STAT_BOGUS;
--	    }
--	  
--	  /* Here, either there's a secure DS, or no NS and no DS,
and therefore no delegation.
--	     Add another label and continue. */
--	  
--	  /* Get name we're checking back. */
--	  blockdata_retrieve(block, name_len, name);
--	  
--	  if (name_start == name)
--	    {
--	      free(packet);
--	      blockdata_free(block);
--	      return STAT_BOGUS; /* run out of labels */
--	    }
--	  
--	  name_start -= 2;
--	  while (*name_start != '.' && name_start != name) 
--	    name_start--;
--	  if (name_start != name)
--	    name_start++;
--	}
--      else
--	{
--	  /* IO failure */
--	  free(packet);
--	  blockdata_free(block);
--	  return STAT_BOGUS; /* run out of labels */
--	}
--    }
--}

static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int status, struct

dns_header *header, size_t n, 
- 			   int class, char *name, char *keyname,
struct server *server, int *keycount)

{

-   /* Recurse up the key heirarchy */
-   int new_status;
-+  unsigned char *packet = NULL;
-+  size_t m; 
-+  unsigned char *payload = NULL;
-+  struct dns_header *new_header = NULL;
-+  u16 *length = NULL;
-+  unsigned char c1, c2;
- 
--  /* limit the amount of work we do, to avoid cycling forever on
loops in the DNS */
--  if (--(*keycount) == 0)
--    return STAT_INSECURE;
--  
--  if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
--    new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, name,
keyname, class);
--  else if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status == STAT_NEED_DS_NEG)
-+  while (1)
-     {
--      new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, name,
keyname, class);
--      if (status == STAT_NEED_DS)
-+      /* limit the amount of work we do, to avoid cycling forever
on loops in the DNS */
-+      if (--(*keycount) == 0)
-+	new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
-+      else if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
-+	new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n, name,
keyname, class);
-+      else if (status == STAT_NEED_DS)
-+	new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n, name,
keyname, class);
-+      else 
-+	new_status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n, name,
keyname, &class, option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN), NULL, NULL);
-+      
-+      if (new_status != STAT_NEED_DS && new_status !=
STAT_NEED_KEY)
-+	break;
-+
-+      /* Can't validate because we need a key/DS whose name now in
keyname.
-+	 Make query for same, and recurse to validate */
-+      if (!packet)
- 	{
--	  if (new_status == STAT_NO_DS)
--	    new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--	  if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
--	   {
--	     if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
--	       {
--		 new_status = tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now,
header, n, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
--		 if (new_status == STAT_INSECURE)
--		   new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--	       }
--	     else
--	       new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--	   }
--	  else if (new_status == STAT_NO_NS)
--	    new_status = STAT_BOGUS;
-+	  packet = whine_malloc(65536 + MAXDNAME + RRFIXEDSZ +
sizeof(u16));
-+	  payload = &packet[2];
-+	  new_header = (struct dns_header *)payload;
-+	  length = (u16 *)packet;
- 	}
--    }
--  else if (status == STAT_CHASE_CNAME)
--    new_status = dnssec_chase_cname(now, header, n, name, keyname);
--  else 
--    {
--      new_status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, n, name,
keyname, &class, NULL, NULL);
-       
--      if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
-+      if (!packet)
- 	{
--	  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
--	    new_status = tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now, header,
n, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
--	  else
--	    new_status = STAT_INSECURE;
-+	  new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
-+	  break;
- 	}
--    }
--  /* Can't validate because we need a key/DS whose name now in
keyname.
--     Make query for same, and recurse to validate */
--  if (new_status == STAT_NEED_DS || new_status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
--    {
--      size_t m; 
--      unsigned char *packet = whine_malloc(65536 + MAXDNAME +
RRFIXEDSZ + sizeof(u16));
--      unsigned char *payload = &packet[2];
--      struct dns_header *new_header = (struct dns_header *)payload;
--      u16 *length = (u16 *)packet;
--      unsigned char c1, c2;
--       
--      if (!packet)
--	return STAT_INSECURE;
--    another_tcp_key:
-+	 
-       m = dnssec_generate_query(new_header, ((char *) new_header) +
65536, keyname, class, 
- 				new_status == STAT_NEED_KEY ?
T_DNSKEY : T_DS, &server->addr, server->edns_pktsz);
-       
-@@ -1733,65 +1364,22 @@ static int tcp_key_recurse(time_t now, int
status, struct dns_header *header, si
- 	  !read_write(server->tcpfd, &c1, 1, 1) ||
- 	  !read_write(server->tcpfd, &c2, 1, 1) ||
- 	  !read_write(server->tcpfd, payload, (c1 << 8) | c2, 1))
--	new_status = STAT_INSECURE;
--      else
- 	{
--	  m = (c1 << 8) | c2;
--	  
--	  new_status = tcp_key_recurse(now, new_status, new_header,
m, class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
--	  
--	  if (new_status == STAT_SECURE)
--	    {
--	      /* Reached a validated record, now try again at this
level.
--		 Note that we may get ANOTHER NEED_* if an answer
needs more than one key.
--		 If so, go round again. */
--	      
--	      if (status == STAT_NEED_KEY)
--		new_status = dnssec_validate_by_ds(now, header, n,
name, keyname, class);
--	      else if (status == STAT_NEED_DS || status ==
STAT_NEED_DS_NEG)
--		{
--		  new_status = dnssec_validate_ds(now, header, n,
name, keyname, class);
--		  if (status == STAT_NEED_DS)
--		    {
--		      if (new_status == STAT_NO_DS)
--			new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--		      else if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
--			{
--			  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
--			    {
--			      new_status =
tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now, header, n, class, name, keyname,
server, keycount); 
--			      if (new_status == STAT_INSECURE)
--				new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--			    }
--			  else
--			    new_status = STAT_INSECURE_DS;
--			}
--		      else if (new_status == STAT_NO_NS)
--			new_status = STAT_BOGUS;
--		    }
--		}
--	      else if (status == STAT_CHASE_CNAME)
--		new_status = dnssec_chase_cname(now, header, n,
name, keyname);
--	      else 
--		{
--		  new_status = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header,
n, name, keyname, &class, NULL, NULL);
--		  
--		  if (new_status == STAT_NO_SIG)
--		    {
--		      if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_NO_SIGN))
--			new_status =
tcp_check_for_unsigned_zone(now, header, n, class, name, keyname,
server, keycount);
--		      else
--			new_status = STAT_INSECURE;
--		    }
--		}
--	      
--	      if (new_status == STAT_NEED_DS || new_status ==
STAT_NEED_KEY)
--		goto another_tcp_key;
--	    }
-+	  new_status = STAT_ABANDONED;
-+	  break;
- 	}
-+
-+      m = (c1 << 8) | c2;
-       
--      free(packet);
-+      new_status = tcp_key_recurse(now, new_status, new_header, m,
class, name, keyname, server, keycount);
-+      
-+      if (new_status != STAT_OK)
-+	break;
-     }
-+
-+  if (packet)
-+    free(packet);
-+    
-   return new_status;

}
#endif

-@@ -2075,19 +1663,10 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
now,
- 		      if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) &&
!checking_disabled)
- 			{
- 			  int keycount = DNSSEC_WORK; /* Limit to
number of DNSSEC questions, to catch loops and avoid filling cache.
*/
--			  int status = tcp_key_recurse(now,
STAT_TRUNCATED, header, m, 0, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname,
last_server, &keycount);
-+			  int status = tcp_key_recurse(now,
STAT_OK, header, m, 0, daemon->namebuff, daemon->keyname,
last_server, &keycount);
- 			  char *result, *domain = "result";
--			  if (status == STAT_INSECURE_DS)
--			    {
--			      /* We only cache sigs when we've
validated a reply.
--				 Avoid caching a reply with sigs if
there's a vaildated break in the 
--				 DS chain, so we don't return
replies from cache missing sigs. */
--			      status = STAT_INSECURE;
--			      no_cache_dnssec = 1;
--			    }
- 			  
--			  if (keycount == 0)
-+			  if (status == STAT_ABANDONED)
- 			    {
- 			      result = "ABANDONED";
- 			      status = STAT_BOGUS;
-@@ -2179,7 +1758,6 @@ static struct frec *allocate_frec(time_t now)
-       f->dependent = NULL;
-       f->blocking_query = NULL;
-       f->stash = NULL;
--      f->orig_domain = NULL;

#endif

-       daemon->frec_list = f;
-     }
-@@ -2248,12 +1826,6 @@ static void free_frec(struct frec *f)
-       f->stash = NULL;
-     }
- 
--  if (f->orig_domain)
--    {
--      blockdata_free(f->orig_domain);
--      f->orig_domain = NULL;
--    }
-   /* Anything we're waiting on is pointless now, too */
-   if (f->blocking_query)
-     free_frec(f->blocking_query);
-@@ -2281,14 +1853,23 @@ struct frec *get_new_frec(time_t now, int
*wait, int force)
-       target = f;
-     else 
-       {
--	if (difftime(now, f->time) >= 4*TIMEOUT)
--	  {
--	    free_frec(f);
--	    target = f;
--	  }
--	if (!oldest || difftime(f->time, oldest->time) <= 0)
--	  oldest = f;
-+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
-+	    /* Don't free DNSSEC sub-queries here, as we may end up
with
-+	       dangling references to them. They'll go when their
"real" query 
-+	       is freed. */
-+	    if (!f->dependent)
-+#endif
-+	      {
-+		if (difftime(now, f->time) >= 4*TIMEOUT)
-+		  {
-+		    free_frec(f);
-+		    target = f;
-+		  }
-+	     
-+	    
-+		if (!oldest || difftime(f->time, oldest->time) <=
0)
-+		  oldest = f;
-+	      }
-       }
- 
-   if (target)
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5ffaf97..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/017-
Abandon_caching_RRSIGs_and_returning_them_from_cache.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,612 +0,0 @@
-From 93be5b1e023b0c661e1ec2cd6d811a8ec9055c49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 12:04:40 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Abandon caching RRSIGs and returning them from
cache.



-The list of exceptions to being able to locally answer
-cached data for validated records when DNSSEC data is requested
-was getting too long, so don't ever do that. This means
-that the cache no longer has to hold RRSIGS and allows
-us to lose lots of code. Note that cached validated
-answers are still returned as long as do=0

src/cache.c   |   38 ++---------
src/dnsmasq.h |   10 +--
src/dnssec.c  |   94 ++++-----------------------
src/rfc1035.c |  197 ++++++--------------------------------------



4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 297 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/cache.c b/src/cache.c
-index 1b76b67..51ba7cc 100644
---- a/src/cache.c
-+++ b/src/cache.c
-@@ -189,12 +189,7 @@ static void cache_hash(struct crec *crecp)

static void cache_blockdata_free(struct crec *crecp)
{

-   if (crecp->flags & F_DNSKEY)
--    {
--      if (crecp->flags & F_DS)
--	blockdata_free(crecp->addr.sig.keydata);
--      else
--	blockdata_free(crecp->addr.key.keydata);
--    }
-+    blockdata_free(crecp->addr.key.keydata);
-   else if ((crecp->flags & F_DS) && !(crecp->flags & F_NEG))
-     blockdata_free(crecp->addr.ds.keydata);

}

-@@ -369,13 +364,8 @@ static struct crec *cache_scan_free(char *name,
struct all_addr *addr, time_t no
- 		}
-

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC

--	      /* Deletion has to be class-sensitive for DS, DNSKEY,
RRSIG, also 
--		 type-covered sensitive for  RRSIG */
--	      if ((flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) &&
--		  (flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) == (crecp->flags &
(F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) &&
--		  crecp->uid == addr->addr.dnssec.class &&
--		  (!((flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY)) == (F_DS |
F_DNSKEY)) || 
--		   crecp->addr.sig.type_covered == addr-
...
addr.dnssec.type))
-+	      /* Deletion has to be class-sensitive for DS and
DNSKEY */
-+	      if ((flags & crecp->flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) &&
crecp->uid == addr->addr.dnssec.class)
- 		{
- 		  if (crecp->flags & F_CONFIG)
- 		    return crecp;
-@@ -532,13 +522,9 @@ struct crec *cache_insert(char *name, struct
all_addr *addr,
- 	    struct all_addr free_addr = new->addr.addr;;
-

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC

--	    /* For DNSSEC records, addr holds class and
type_covered for RRSIG */
-+	    /* For DNSSEC records, addr holds class. */
- 	    if (new->flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY))
--	      {
--		free_addr.addr.dnssec.class = new->uid;
--		if ((new->flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY)) == (F_DS |
F_DNSKEY))
--		  free_addr.addr.dnssec.type = new-
...
addr.sig.type_covered;
--	      }
-+	      free_addr.addr.dnssec.class = new->uid;

#endif

- 	    
- 	    free_avail = 1; /* Must be free space now. */
-@@ -653,9 +639,6 @@ struct crec *cache_find_by_name(struct crec
*crecp, char *name, time_t now, unsi
- 	  if (!is_expired(now, crecp) &&
!is_outdated_cname_pointer(crecp))
- 	    {
- 	      if ((crecp->flags & F_FORWARD) && 
--#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
--		  (((crecp->flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) == (prot &
(F_DNSKEY | F_DS))) || (prot & F_NSIGMATCH)) &&
--#endif
- 		  (crecp->flags & prot) &&
- 		  hostname_isequal(cache_get_name(crecp), name))
- 		{
-@@ -713,9 +696,6 @@ struct crec *cache_find_by_name(struct crec
*crecp, char *name, time_t now, unsi
- 
-   if (ans && 
-       (ans->flags & F_FORWARD) &&
--#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
--      (((ans->flags & (F_DNSKEY | F_DS)) == (prot & (F_DNSKEY |
F_DS))) || (prot & F_NSIGMATCH)) &&
--#endif
-       (ans->flags & prot) &&     
-       hostname_isequal(cache_get_name(ans), name))
-     return ans;
-@@ -1472,11 +1452,7 @@ void dump_cache(time_t now)

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC

- 	    else if (cache->flags & F_DS)
- 	      {
--		if (cache->flags & F_DNSKEY)
--		  /* RRSIG */
--		  sprintf(a, "%5u %3u %s", cache->addr.sig.keytag,
--			  cache->addr.sig.algo, querystr("", cache-
...
addr.sig.type_covered));
--		else if (!(cache->flags & F_NEG))
-+		if (!(cache->flags & F_NEG))
- 		  sprintf(a, "%5u %3u %3u", cache->addr.ds.keytag,
- 			  cache->addr.ds.algo, cache-
...
addr.ds.digest);
- 	      }
-@@ -1502,8 +1478,6 @@ void dump_cache(time_t now)
- 	    else if (cache->flags & F_CNAME)
- 	      t = "C";

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC

--	    else if ((cache->flags & (F_DS | F_DNSKEY)) == (F_DS |
F_DNSKEY))
--	      t = "G"; /* DNSKEY and DS set -> RRISG */
- 	    else if (cache->flags & F_DS)
- 	      t = "S";
- 	    else if (cache->flags & F_DNSKEY)
-diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
-index 023a1cf..4344cae 100644
---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
-+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
-@@ -398,14 +398,9 @@ struct crec {
-       unsigned char algo;
-       unsigned char digest; 
-     } ds; 
--    struct {
--      struct blockdata *keydata;
--      unsigned short keylen, type_covered, keytag;
--      char algo;
--    } sig;
-   } addr;
-   time_t ttd; /* time to die */
--  /* used as class if DNSKEY/DS/RRSIG, index to source for F_HOSTS
*/
-+  /* used as class if DNSKEY/DS, index to source for F_HOSTS */
-   unsigned int uid; 
-   unsigned short flags;
-   union {
-@@ -445,8 +440,7 @@ struct crec {

#define F_SECSTAT   (1u<<24)
#define F_NO_RR     (1u<<25)
#define F_IPSET     (1u<<26)

--#define F_NSIGMATCH (1u<<27)
--#define F_NOEXTRA   (1u<<28)
-+#define F_NOEXTRA   (1u<<27)
-

/* Values of uid in crecs with F_CONFIG bit set. */
#define SRC_INTERFACE 0

-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index de7b335..1ae03a6 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -1004,7 +1004,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch

{

-   unsigned char *psave, *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
-   struct crec *crecp, *recp1;
--  int rc, j, qtype, qclass, ttl, rdlen, flags, algo, valid, keytag,
type_covered;
-+  int rc, j, qtype, qclass, ttl, rdlen, flags, algo, valid, keytag;
-   struct blockdata *key;
-   struct all_addr a;
- 
-@@ -1115,7 +1115,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 
-   if (valid)
-     {
--      /* DNSKEY RRset determined to be OK, now cache it and the
RRsigs that sign it. */
-+      /* DNSKEY RRset determined to be OK, now cache it. */
-       cache_start_insert();
-       
-       p = skip_questions(header, plen);
-@@ -1155,7 +1155,10 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 		  if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
- 		    {
- 		      if (!(recp1 = cache_insert(name, &a, now,
ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DNSSECOK)))
--			blockdata_free(key);
-+			{
-+			  blockdata_free(key);
-+			  return STAT_BOGUS;
-+			}
- 		      else
- 			{
- 			  a.addr.keytag = keytag;
-@@ -1169,38 +1172,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 			}
- 		    }
- 		}
--	      else if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
--		{
--		  /* RRSIG, cache if covers DNSKEY RRset */
--		  if (rdlen < 18)
--		    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--		  
--		  GETSHORT(type_covered, p);
--		  
--		  if (type_covered == T_DNSKEY)
--		    {
--		      a.addr.dnssec.class = class;
--		      a.addr.dnssec.type = type_covered;
--		      
--		      algo = *p++;
--		      p += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl, expiration,
inception */
--		      GETSHORT(keytag, p);	
--		      if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)psave,
rdlen)))
--			{
--			  if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name, &a, now,
ttl,  F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
--			    blockdata_free(key);
--			  else
--			    {
--			      crecp->addr.sig.keydata = key;
--			      crecp->addr.sig.keylen = rdlen;
--			      crecp->addr.sig.keytag = keytag;
--			      crecp->addr.sig.type_covered =
type_covered;
--			      crecp->addr.sig.algo = algo;
--			    }
--			}
--		    }
--		}
--	      
-+	      	      
- 	      p = psave;
- 	    }
- 
-@@ -1326,7 +1298,8 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
- 	  cache_start_insert();
- 	  
- 	  a.addr.dnssec.class = class;
--	  cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl, flags);
-+	  if (!cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl, flags))
-+	    return STAT_BOGUS;
- 	  
- 	  cache_end_insert();  
- 	  
-@@ -2028,14 +2001,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	  /* Not done, validate now */
- 	  if (j == i)
- 	    {
--	      int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, type_covered, sigcnt,
rrcnt;
-+	      int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, sigcnt, rrcnt;
- 	      unsigned char *psave;
- 	      struct all_addr a;
- 	      struct blockdata *key;
- 	      struct crec *crecp;
- 	      char *wildname;
--	      int have_wildcard = 0;
-+	      
- 	      if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name,
keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt))
- 		return STAT_BOGUS;
- 
-@@ -2096,8 +2068,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 			    
- 		  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
- 		    {
--		      have_wildcard = 1;
--		      
- 		      /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with
a different
- 			 answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
this
- 			 hasn't happened, the answer must prove
that
-@@ -2119,7 +2089,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 			return rc;
- 		    } 
- 		  
--		  /* Cache RRsigs in answer section, and if we just
validated a DS RRset, cache it */
-+		  /* If we just validated a DS RRset, cache it */
- 		  /* Also note if the RRset is the answer to the
question, or the target of a CNAME */
- 		  cache_start_insert();
- 		  
-@@ -2168,45 +2138,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 				    } 
- 				}
- 			    }
--			  else if (type2 == T_RRSIG)
--			    {
--			      if (rdlen2 < 18)
--				return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--			      
--			      GETSHORT(type_covered, p2);
--			      
--			      if (type_covered == type1 && 
--				  (type_covered == T_A ||
type_covered == T_AAAA ||
--				   type_covered == T_CNAME ||
type_covered == T_DS || 
--				   type_covered == T_DNSKEY ||
type_covered == T_PTR)) 
--				{
--				  a.addr.dnssec.type =
type_covered;
--				  a.addr.dnssec.class = class1;
--				  
--				  algo = *p2++;
--				  p2 += 13; /* labels, orig_ttl,
expiration, inception */
--				  GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
--				  
--				  /* We don't cache sigs for
wildcard answers, because to reproduce the
--				     answer from the cache will
require one or more NSEC/NSEC3 records 
--				     which we don't cache. The lack
of the RRSIG ensures that a query for
--				     this RRset asking for a secure
answer will always be forwarded. */
--				  if (!have_wildcard && (key =
blockdata_alloc((char*)psave, rdlen2)))
--				    {
--				      if (!(crecp =
cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl,  F_FORWARD | F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
--					blockdata_free(key);
--				      else
--					{
--					  crecp->addr.sig.keydata =
key;
--					  crecp->addr.sig.keylen =
rdlen2;
--					  crecp->addr.sig.keytag =
keytag;
--					  crecp-
...
addr.sig.type_covered = type_covered;
--					  crecp->addr.sig.algo =
algo;
--					}
--				    }
--				}
--			    }
--			  
-+
- 			  p2 = psave;
- 			}
- 		      
-diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
-index 4eb1772..def8fa0 100644
---- a/src/rfc1035.c
-+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
-@@ -1275,11 +1275,9 @@ int check_for_local_domain(char *name, time_t
now)
-   struct naptr *naptr;
- 
-   /* Note: the call to cache_find_by_name is intended to find any
record which matches
--     ie A, AAAA, CNAME, DS. Because RRSIG records are marked by
setting both F_DS and F_DNSKEY,
--     cache_find_by name ordinarily only returns records with an
exact match on those bits (ie
--     for the call below, only DS records). The F_NSIGMATCH bit
changes this behaviour */
-+     ie A, AAAA, CNAME. */
- 
--  if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_IPV4 | F_IPV6
| F_CNAME | F_DS | F_NO_RR | F_NSIGMATCH)) &&
-+  if ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, name, now, F_IPV4 | F_IPV6
| F_CNAME |F_NO_RR)) &&
-       (crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP | F_CONFIG)))
-     return 1;
-   
-@@ -1566,9 +1564,11 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
-       GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
-       
-       if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
--	*do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
-+	{
-+	  *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
-+	  *ad_reqd = 1;
-+	}
- 
--      *ad_reqd = 1;
-       dryrun = 1;
-     }
- 
-@@ -1636,98 +1636,6 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 	    }
- 	}
- 
--#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
--      if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && (qtype == T_DNSKEY ||
qtype == T_DS))
--	{
--	  int gotone = 0;
--	  struct blockdata *keydata;
--	  /* Do we have RRSIG? Can't do DS or DNSKEY otherwise. */
--	  if (sec_reqd)
--	    {
--	      crecp = NULL;
--	      while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name, now,
F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
--		if (crecp->uid == qclass && crecp-
...
addr.sig.type_covered == qtype)
--		  break;
--	    }
--	  
--	  if (!sec_reqd || crecp)
--	    {
--	      if (qtype == T_DS)
--		{
--		  crecp = NULL;
--		  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name,
now, F_DS)))
--		    if (crecp->uid == qclass)
--		      {
--			gotone = 1; 
--			if (!dryrun)
--			  {
--			    if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
--			      {
--				if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
--				  nxdomain = 1;
--				log_query(F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL,
"no DS");	
--			      }
--			    else if ((keydata =
blockdata_retrieve(crecp->addr.ds.keydata, crecp->addr.ds.keylen,
NULL)))
--			      {			     	
   	      
--				struct all_addr a;
--				a.addr.keytag =  crecp-
...
addr.ds.keytag;
--				log_query(F_KEYTAG | (crecp->flags
& F_CONFIG), name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
--				if (add_resource_record(header,
limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp, 
--							crec_ttl(cr
ecp, now), &nameoffset,
--							T_DS,
qclass, "sbbt", 
--							crecp-
...
addr.ds.keytag, crecp->addr.ds.algo,
--							crecp-
...
addr.ds.digest, crecp->addr.ds.keylen, keydata))
--				  anscount++;
--			      } 
--			  }
--		      }
--		}
--	      else /* DNSKEY */
--		{
--		  crecp = NULL;
--		  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name,
now, F_DNSKEY)))
--		    if (crecp->uid == qclass)
--		      {
--			gotone = 1;
--			if (!dryrun && (keydata =
blockdata_retrieve(crecp->addr.key.keydata, crecp->addr.key.keylen,
NULL)))
--			  {			     		
         
--			    struct all_addr a;
--			    a.addr.keytag =  crecp-
...
addr.key.keytag;
--			    log_query(F_KEYTAG | (crecp->flags &
F_CONFIG), name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u");
--			    if (add_resource_record(header, limit,
&trunc, nameoffset, &ansp, 
--						    crec_ttl(crecp,
now), &nameoffset,
--						    T_DNSKEY,
qclass, "sbbt", 
--						    crecp-
...
addr.key.flags, 3, crecp->addr.key.algo, crecp->addr.key.keylen,
keydata))
--			      anscount++;
--			  }
--		      }
--		}
--	    }
--	  
--	  /* Now do RRSIGs */
--	  if (gotone)
--	    {
--	      ans = 1;
--	      auth = 0;
--	      if (!dryrun && sec_reqd)
--		{
--		  crecp = NULL;
--		  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, name,
now, F_DNSKEY | F_DS)))
--		    if (crecp->uid == qclass && crecp-
...
addr.sig.type_covered == qtype &&
--			(keydata = blockdata_retrieve(crecp-
...
addr.sig.keydata, crecp->addr.sig.keylen, NULL)))
--		      {
--			add_resource_record(header, limit, &trunc,
nameoffset, &ansp, 
--					    crec_ttl(crecp, now),
&nameoffset,
--					    T_RRSIG, qclass, "t",
crecp->addr.sig.keylen, keydata);
--			anscount++;
--		      }
--		}
--	    }
--	}
--#endif	     
--      
-       if (qclass == C_IN)
- 	{
- 	  struct txt_record *t;
-@@ -1736,6 +1644,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 	    if ((t->class == qtype || qtype == T_ANY) &&
hostname_isequal(name, t->name))
- 	      {
- 		ans = 1;
-+		sec_data = 0;
- 		if (!dryrun)
- 		  {
- 		    log_query(F_CONFIG | F_RRNAME, name, NULL,
"<RR>");
-@@ -1792,6 +1701,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 	      
- 	      if (intr)
- 		{
-+		  sec_data = 0;
- 		  ans = 1;
- 		  if (!dryrun)
- 		    {
-@@ -1805,6 +1715,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 	      else if (ptr)
- 		{
- 		  ans = 1;
-+		  sec_data = 0;
- 		  if (!dryrun)
- 		    {
- 		      log_query(F_CONFIG | F_RRNAME, name, NULL,
"<PTR>");
-@@ -1819,38 +1730,8 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 		}
- 	      else if ((crecp = cache_find_by_addr(NULL, &addr,
now, is_arpa)))
- 		{
--		  if (!(crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
F_CONFIG)) && sec_reqd)
--		    {
--		      if (!option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) ||
((crecp->flags & F_NEG) && (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
--			crecp = NULL;
--#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
--		      else if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
--			{
--			  int gotsig = 0;
--			  struct crec *rr_crec = NULL;
--			  while ((rr_crec =
cache_find_by_name(rr_crec, name, now, F_DS | F_DNSKEY)))
--			    {
--			      if (rr_crec->addr.sig.type_covered ==
T_PTR && rr_crec->uid == C_IN)
--				{
--				  char *sigdata =
blockdata_retrieve(rr_crec->addr.sig.keydata, rr_crec-
...
addr.sig.keylen, NULL);
--				  gotsig = 1;
--				  
--				  if (!dryrun && 
--				      add_resource_record(header,
limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp, 
--							  rr_crec-
...
ttd - now, &nameoffset,
--							  T_RRSIG,
C_IN, "t", crecp->addr.sig.keylen, sigdata))
--				    anscount++;
--				}
--			    } 
--			  
--			  if (!gotsig)
--			    crecp = NULL;
--			}
--#endif
--		    }
--		  if (crecp)
-+		  /* Don't use cache when DNSSEC data required. */
-+		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
- 		    {
- 		      do 
- 			{ 
-@@ -1860,19 +1741,19 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 			  
- 			  if (!(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
- 			    sec_data = 0;
--			  
-+			   
-+			  ans = 1;
-+			   
- 			  if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
- 			    {
--			      ans = 1;
- 			      auth = 0;
- 			      if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
- 				nxdomain = 1;
- 			      if (!dryrun)
- 				log_query(crecp->flags &
~F_FORWARD, name, &addr, NULL);
- 			    }
--			  else if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS |
F_DHCP)) || !sec_reqd || option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
-+			  else
- 			    {
--			      ans = 1;
- 			      if (!(crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS |
F_DHCP)))
- 				auth = 0;
- 			      if (!dryrun)
-@@ -1892,6 +1773,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 	      else if (is_rev_synth(is_arpa, &addr, name))
- 		{
- 		  ans = 1;
-+		  sec_data = 0;
- 		  if (!dryrun)
- 		    {
- 		      log_query(F_CONFIG | F_REVERSE | is_arpa,
name, &addr, NULL); 
-@@ -1908,6 +1790,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 		{
- 		  /* if not in cache, enabled and private IPV4
address, return NXDOMAIN */
- 		  ans = 1;
-+		  sec_data = 0;
- 		  nxdomain = 1;
- 		  if (!dryrun)
- 		    log_query(F_CONFIG | F_REVERSE | F_IPV4 | F_NEG
| F_NXDOMAIN, 
-@@ -1955,6 +1838,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 		  if (i == 4)
- 		    {
- 		      ans = 1;
-+		      sec_data = 0;
- 		      if (!dryrun)
- 			{
- 			  addr.addr.addr4.s_addr = htonl(a);
-@@ -1993,6 +1877,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 				continue;

#endif

- 			      ans = 1;	
-+			      sec_data = 0;
- 			      if (!dryrun)
- 				{
- 				  gotit = 1;
-@@ -2032,48 +1917,8 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 		      crecp = save;
- 		    }
- 
--		  /* If the client asked for DNSSEC and we can't
provide RRSIGs, either
--		     because we've not doing DNSSEC or the cached
answer is signed by negative,
--		     don't answer from the cache, forward instead.
*/
--		  if (!(crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
F_CONFIG)) && sec_reqd)
--		    {
--		      if (!option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) ||
((crecp->flags & F_NEG) && (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
--			crecp = NULL;
--#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
--		      else if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
--			{
--			  /* We're returning validated data, need
to return the RRSIG too. */
--			  struct crec *rr_crec = NULL;
--			  int sigtype = type;
--			  /* The signature may have expired even
though the data is still in cache, 
--			     forward instead of answering from
cache if so. */
--			  int gotsig = 0;
--			  
--			  if (crecp->flags & F_CNAME)
--			    sigtype = T_CNAME;
--			  
--			  while ((rr_crec =
cache_find_by_name(rr_crec, name, now, F_DS | F_DNSKEY)))
--			    {
--			      if (rr_crec->addr.sig.type_covered ==
sigtype && rr_crec->uid == C_IN)
--				{
--				  char *sigdata =
blockdata_retrieve(rr_crec->addr.sig.keydata, rr_crec-
...
addr.sig.keylen, NULL);
--				  gotsig = 1;
--				  
--				  if (!dryrun && 
--				      add_resource_record(header,
limit, &trunc, nameoffset, &ansp, 
--							  rr_crec-
...
ttd - now, &nameoffset,
--							  T_RRSIG,
C_IN, "t", rr_crec->addr.sig.keylen, sigdata))
--				    anscount++;
--				}
--			    }
--			  
--			  if (!gotsig)
--			    crecp = NULL;
--			}
--#endif
--		    }
--		  if (crecp)
-+		  /* If the client asked for DNSSEC  don't use
cached data. */
-+		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
- 		    do
- 		      { 
- 			/* don't answer wildcard queries with data
not from /etc/hosts
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ff055f7..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/018-
Move_code_which_caches_DS_records_to_a_more_logical_place.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,269 +0,0 @@
-From d64c81fff7faf4392b688223ef3a617c5c07e7dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 16:11:06 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Move code which caches DS records to a more logical
place.





src/dnssec.c |  179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------



1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 89 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 1ae03a6..359231f 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -1204,7 +1204,10 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch

int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,

size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)

{

-   unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
--  int qtype, qclass, val, i, neganswer, nons;
-+  int qtype, qclass, rc, i, neganswer, nons;
-+  int aclass, atype, rdlen;
-+  unsigned long ttl;
-+  struct all_addr a;
- 
-   if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
-       !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
-@@ -1214,40 +1217,100 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
-   GETSHORT(qclass, p);
- 
-   if (qtype != T_DS || qclass != class)
--    val = STAT_BOGUS;
-+    rc = STAT_BOGUS;
-   else
--    val = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons);
-+    rc = dnssec_validate_reply(now, header, plen, name, keyname,
NULL, 0, &neganswer, &nons);
-   /* Note dnssec_validate_reply() will have cached positive answers
*/
-   
--  if (val == STAT_INSECURE)
--    val = STAT_BOGUS;
-+  if (rc == STAT_INSECURE)
-+    rc = STAT_BOGUS;
-+ 
-   p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
-   extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 1, 4);
-   p += 4; /* qtype, qclass */
-   
--  if (!(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, plen)))
--    val = STAT_BOGUS;
--  
-   /* If the key needed to validate the DS is on the same domain as
the DS, we'll
-      loop getting nowhere. Stop that now. This can happen of the DS
answer comes
-      from the DS's zone, and not the parent zone. */
--  if (val == STAT_BOGUS || (val == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
-+  if (rc == STAT_BOGUS || (rc == STAT_NEED_KEY &&
hostname_isequal(name, keyname)))
-     {
-       log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "BOGUS DS");
-       return STAT_BOGUS;
-     }
-   
--  if (val != STAT_SECURE)
--    return val;
--  /* By here, the answer is proved secure, and a positive answer
has been cached. */
--  if (neganswer)
-+  if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
-+    return rc;
-+   
-+  if (!neganswer)
-     {
--      int rdlen, flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK;
--      unsigned long ttl, minttl = ULONG_MAX;
--      struct all_addr a;
-+      cache_start_insert();
-+      
-+      for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++)
-+	{
-+	  if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p, name, 0, 10)))
-+	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+	  
-+	  GETSHORT(atype, p);
-+	  GETSHORT(aclass, p);
-+	  GETLONG(ttl, p);
-+	  GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
-+	  
-+	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-+	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+	  
-+	  if (aclass == class && atype == T_DS && rc == 1)
-+	    { 
-+	      int algo, digest, keytag;
-+	      unsigned char *psave = p;
-+	      struct blockdata *key;
-+	      struct crec *crecp;
- 
-+	      if (rdlen < 4)
-+		return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+	      
-+	      GETSHORT(keytag, p);
-+	      algo = *p++;
-+	      digest = *p++;
-+	      
-+	      /* Cache needs to known class for DNSSEC stuff */
-+	      a.addr.dnssec.class = class;
-+	      
-+	      if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p, rdlen - 4)))
-+		{
-+		  if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name, &a, now, ttl,
F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
-+		    {
-+		      blockdata_free(key);
-+		      return STAT_BOGUS;
-+		    }
-+		  else
-+		    {
-+		      a.addr.keytag = keytag;
-+		      log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM,
name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
-+		      crecp->addr.ds.digest = digest;
-+		      crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
-+		      crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
-+		      crecp->addr.ds.keytag = keytag;
-+		      crecp->addr.ds.keylen = rdlen - 4; 
-+		    } 
-+		}
-+	      
-+	      p = psave;
-+	      
-+	      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-+		return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+	    }
-+	  
-+	  cache_end_insert();
-+	}
-+    }
-+  else
-+    {
-+      int flags = F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_NEG | F_DNSSECOK;
-+      unsigned long minttl = ULONG_MAX;
-+      
-+      if (!(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header,
plen)))
-+	return STAT_BOGUS;
-+      
-       if (RCODE(header) == NXDOMAIN)
- 	flags |= F_NXDOMAIN;
-       
-@@ -1261,20 +1324,20 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
- 	  if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 0)))
- 	    return STAT_BOGUS;
- 	  
--	  GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
--	  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
-+	  GETSHORT(atype, p); 
-+	  GETSHORT(aclass, p);
- 	  GETLONG(ttl, p);
- 	  GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
-+	  
- 	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
- 	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--	    
--	  if (qclass != class || qtype != T_SOA)
-+	  
-+	  if (aclass != class || atype != T_SOA)
- 	    {
- 	      p += rdlen;
- 	      continue;
- 	    }
--           
-+	  
- 	  if (ttl < minttl)
- 	    minttl = ttl;
- 	  
-@@ -1306,7 +1369,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
- 	  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_UPSTREAM, name, NULL, "no DS");
- 	}
-     }
-+      
-   return STAT_OK;

}

- 
-@@ -2001,11 +2064,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	  /* Not done, validate now */
- 	  if (j == i)
- 	    {
--	      int ttl, keytag, algo, digest, sigcnt, rrcnt;
--	      unsigned char *psave;
--	      struct all_addr a;
--	      struct blockdata *key;
--	      struct crec *crecp;
-+	      int sigcnt, rrcnt;
- 	      char *wildname;
- 	      
- 	      if (!explore_rrset(header, plen, class1, type1, name,
keyname, &sigcnt, &rrcnt))
-@@ -2032,6 +2091,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 		 Can't overwrite name here. */
- 	      strcpy(daemon->workspacename, keyname);
- 	      rc = zone_status(daemon->workspacename, class1,
keyname, now);
-+
- 	      if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
- 		{
- 		  /* Zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset
*/
-@@ -2088,65 +2148,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 		      if (rc == STAT_BOGUS)
- 			return rc;
- 		    } 
--		  
--		  /* If we just validated a DS RRset, cache it */
--		  /* Also note if the RRset is the answer to the
question, or the target of a CNAME */
--		  cache_start_insert();
--		  
--		  for (p2 = ans_start, j = 0; j < ntohs(header-
...
ancount); j++)
--		    {
--		      if (!(rc = extract_name(header, plen, &p2,
name, 0, 10)))
--			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--		      
--		      GETSHORT(type2, p2);
--		      GETSHORT(class2, p2);
--		      GETLONG(ttl, p2);
--		      GETSHORT(rdlen2, p2);
--		      
--		      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
--			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--		      
--		      if (class2 == class1 && rc == 1)
--			{ 
--			  psave = p2;
--			  
--			  if (type1 == T_DS && type2 == T_DS)
--			    {
--			      if (rdlen2 < 4)
--				return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--			      
--			      GETSHORT(keytag, p2);
--			      algo = *p2++;
--			      digest = *p2++;
--			      
--			      /* Cache needs to known class for
DNSSEC stuff */
--			      a.addr.dnssec.class = class2;
--			      
--			      if ((key = blockdata_alloc((char*)p2,
rdlen2 - 4)))
--				{
--				  if (!(crecp = cache_insert(name,
&a, now, ttl, F_FORWARD | F_DS | F_DNSSECOK)))
--				    blockdata_free(key);
--				  else
--				    {
--				      a.addr.keytag = keytag;
--				      log_query(F_NOEXTRA |
F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
--				      crecp->addr.ds.digest =
digest;
--				      crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
--				      crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
--				      crecp->addr.ds.keytag =
keytag;
--				      crecp->addr.ds.keylen =
rdlen2 - 4; 
--				    } 
--				}
--			    }
--			  p2 = psave;
--			}
--		      
--		      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p2, plen, rdlen2))
--			return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
--		    }
--		  
--		  cache_end_insert();
- 		}
- 	    }
- 	}
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-
Generalise_RR-filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0a4942a..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/019-Generalise_RR-
filtering_code_for_use_with_EDNS0.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,755 +0,0 @@
-From c2bcd1e183bcc5fdd63811c045355fc57e36ecfd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 17:25:21 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Generalise RR-filtering code, for use with EDNS0.





Makefile       |    3 +-
bld/Android.mk |    2 +-
src/dnsmasq.h  |    5 +
src/dnssec.c   |  307 +------------------------------------------



src/forward.c  |    2 +-
src/rrfilter.c |  339

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

6 files changed, 349 insertions(+), 309 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/rrfilter.c


-diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
-index 4c87ea9..b664160 100644
---- a/Makefile
-+++ b/Makefile
-@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ objs = cache.o rfc1035.o util.o option.o forward.o
network.o \
-        dnsmasq.o dhcp.o lease.o rfc2131.o netlink.o dbus.o bpf.o \
-        helper.o tftp.o log.o conntrack.o dhcp6.o rfc3315.o \
-        dhcp-common.o outpacket.o radv.o slaac.o auth.o ipset.o \
--       domain.o dnssec.o blockdata.o tables.o loop.o inotify.o
poll.o
-+       domain.o dnssec.o blockdata.o tables.o loop.o inotify.o \
-+       poll.o rrfilter.o
-

hdrs = dnsmasq.h config.h dhcp-protocol.h dhcp6-protocol.h \

-        dns-protocol.h radv-protocol.h ip6addr.h
-diff --git a/bld/Android.mk b/bld/Android.mk
-index 5364ee7..67b9c4b 100644
---- a/bld/Android.mk
-+++ b/bld/Android.mk
-@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ LOCAL_SRC_FILES :=  bpf.c cache.c dbus.c dhcp.c
dnsmasq.c \
- 		    dhcp6.c rfc3315.c dhcp-common.c outpacket.c \
- 		    radv.c slaac.c auth.c ipset.c domain.c \
- 	            dnssec.c dnssec-openssl.c blockdata.c tables.c
\
--		    loop.c inotify.c poll.c
-+		    loop.c inotify.c poll.c rrfilter.c
-

LOCAL_MODULE := dnsmasq

- 
-diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
-index 4344cae..39a930c 100644
---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
-+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
-@@ -1513,3 +1513,8 @@ int poll_check(int fd, short event);

void poll_listen(int fd, short event);
int do_poll(int timeout);

- 
-+/* rrfilter.c */
-+size_t rrfilter(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int mode);
-+u16 *rrfilter_desc(int type);
-+int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int new);
-+
-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 359231f..fa3eb81 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -507,50 +507,6 @@ static int check_date_range(unsigned long
date_start, unsigned long date_end)
-     && serial_compare_32(curtime, date_end) == SERIAL_LT;

}

- 
--static u16 *get_desc(int type)
--{
--  /* List of RRtypes which include domains in the data.
--     0 -> domain
--     integer -> no of plain bytes
--     -1 -> end
--     zero is not a valid RRtype, so the final entry is returned for
--     anything which needs no mangling.
--  */
--  
--  static u16 rr_desc[] = 
--    { 
--      T_NS, 0, -1, 
--      T_MD, 0, -1,
--      T_MF, 0, -1,
--      T_CNAME, 0, -1,
--      T_SOA, 0, 0, -1,
--      T_MB, 0, -1,
--      T_MG, 0, -1,
--      T_MR, 0, -1,
--      T_PTR, 0, -1,
--      T_MINFO, 0, 0, -1,
--      T_MX, 2, 0, -1,
--      T_RP, 0, 0, -1,
--      T_AFSDB, 2, 0, -1,
--      T_RT, 2, 0, -1,
--      T_SIG, 18, 0, -1,
--      T_PX, 2, 0, 0, -1,
--      T_NXT, 0, -1,
--      T_KX, 2, 0, -1,
--      T_SRV, 6, 0, -1,
--      T_DNAME, 0, -1,
--      0, -1 /* wildcard/catchall */
--    }; 
--  
--  u16 *p = rr_desc;
--  
--  while (*p != type && *p != 0)
--    while (*p++ != (u16)-1);
--  return p+1;
--}

/* Return bytes of canonicalised rdata, when the return value is

zero, the remaining 
-    data, pointed to by *p, should be used raw. */

static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,

unsigned char *end, char *buff, int bufflen,
-@@ -594,34 +550,6 @@ static int get_rdata(struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, unsigned char *end,
-     }

}

- 
--static int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int
new)
--{
--  unsigned char **p;
--  int old = *szp;
--  if (old >= new+1)
--    return 1;
--  if (new >= 100)
--    return 0;
--  new += 5;
--  
--  if (!(p = whine_malloc(new * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
--    return 0;  
--  
--  if (old != 0 && *wkspc)
--    {
--      memcpy(p, *wkspc, old * sizeof(unsigned char **));
--      free(*wkspc);
--    }
--  
--  *wkspc = p;
--  *szp = new;
--  return 1;
--}

/* Bubble sort the RRset into the canonical order.

-    Note that the byte-streams from two RRs may get unsynced:
consider 
-    RRs which have two domain-names at the start and then other
data.
-@@ -849,7 +777,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
-   int rdlen, j, name_labels;
-   struct crec *crecp = NULL;
-   int algo, labels, orig_ttl, key_tag;
--  u16 *rr_desc = get_desc(type);
-+  u16 *rr_desc = rrfilter_desc(type);
-  
-   if (wildcard_out)
-     *wildcard_out = NULL;
-@@ -2266,239 +2194,6 @@ size_t dnssec_generate_query(struct
dns_header *header, char *end, char *name, i
-   return ret;

}

- 
--/* Go through a domain name, find "pointers" and fix them up based
on how many bytes
--   we've chopped out of the packet, or check they don't point into
an elided part.  */
--static int check_name(unsigned char **namep, struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
--{
--  unsigned char *ansp = *namep;
--  while(1)
--    {
--      unsigned int label_type;
--      
--      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 1))
--	return 0;
--
--      label_type = (*ansp) & 0xc0;
--      if (label_type == 0xc0)
--	{
--	  /* pointer for compression. */
--	  unsigned int offset;
--	  int i;
--	  unsigned char *p;
--	  
--	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
--	    return 0;
--	  offset = ((*ansp++) & 0x3f) << 8;
--	  offset |= *ansp++;
--	  p = offset + (unsigned char *)header;
--	  
--	  for (i = 0; i < rr_count; i++)
--	    if (p < rrs[i])
--	      break;
--	    else
--	      if (i & 1)
--		offset -= rrs[i] - rrs[i-1];
--	  /* does the pointer end up in an elided RR? */
--	  if (i & 1)
--	    return 0;
--	  /* No, scale the pointer */
--	  if (fixup)
--	    {
--	      ansp -= 2;
--	      *ansp++ = (offset >> 8) | 0xc0;
--	      *ansp++ = offset & 0xff;
--	    }
--	  break;
--	}
--      else if (label_type == 0x80)
--	return 0; /* reserved */
--      else if (label_type == 0x40)
--	{
--	  /* Extended label type */
--	  unsigned int count;
--	  
--	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
--	    return 0;
--	  
--	  if (((*ansp++) & 0x3f) != 1)
--	    return 0; /* we only understand bitstrings */
--	  
--	  count = *(ansp++); /* Bits in bitstring */
--	  
--	  if (count == 0) /* count == 0 means 256 bits */
--	    ansp += 32;
--	  else
--	    ansp += ((count-1)>>3)+1;
--	}
--      else
--	{ /* label type == 0 Bottom six bits is length */
--	  unsigned int len = (*ansp++) & 0x3f;
--	  
--	  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, ansp, plen, len))
--	    return 0;
--	  if (len == 0)
--	    break; /* zero length label marks the end. */
--	}
--    }
--  *namep = ansp;
--  return 1;
--}
--/* Go through RRs and check or fixup the domain names contained
within */
--static int check_rrs(unsigned char *p, struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
--{
--  int i, type, class, rdlen;
--  unsigned char *pp;
--  
--  for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
ntohs(header->arcount); i++)
--    {
--      pp = p;
--      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
--	return 0;
--      
--      GETSHORT(type, p); 
--      GETSHORT(class, p);
--      p += 4; /* TTL */
--      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
--      if (type != T_NSEC && type != T_NSEC3 && type != T_RRSIG)
--	{
--	  /* fixup name of RR */
--	  if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup, rrs, rr_count))
--	    return 0;
--	  
--	  if (class == C_IN)
--	    {
--	      u16 *d;
-- 
--	      for (pp = p, d = get_desc(type); *d != (u16)-1; d++)
--		{
--		  if (*d != 0)
--		    pp += *d;
--		  else if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup,
rrs, rr_count))
--		    return 0;
--		}
--	    }
--	}
--      
--      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
--	return 0;
--    }
--  
--  return 1;
--}
--
--size_t filter_rrsigs(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen)
--{
--  static unsigned char **rrs;
--  static int rr_sz = 0;
--  
--  unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
--  int i, rdlen, qtype, qclass, rr_found, chop_an, chop_ns, chop_ar;
--  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
--      !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
--    return plen;
--  
--  GETSHORT(qtype, p);
--  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
--  /* First pass, find pointers to start and end of all the records
we wish to elide:
--     records added for DNSSEC, unless explicity queried for */
--  for (rr_found = 0, chop_ns = 0, chop_an = 0, chop_ar = 0, i = 0; 
--       i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
ntohs(header->arcount);
--       i++)
--    {
--      unsigned char *pstart = p;
--      int type, class;
--      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
--	return plen;
--      
--      GETSHORT(type, p); 
--      GETSHORT(class, p);
--      p += 4; /* TTL */
--      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
--      
--      if ((type == T_NSEC || type == T_NSEC3 || type == T_RRSIG)
&& 
--	  (type != qtype || class != qclass))
--	{
--	  if (!expand_workspace(&rrs, &rr_sz, rr_found + 1))
--	    return plen; 
--
--	  rrs[rr_found++] = pstart;
--	  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
--	    return plen;
--	  
--	  rrs[rr_found++] = p;
--	  
--	  if (i < ntohs(header->ancount))
--	    chop_an++;
--	  else if (i < (ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header-
...
ancount)))
--	    chop_ns++;
--	  else
--	    chop_ar++;
--	}
--      else if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
--	return plen;
--    }
--  
--  /* Nothing to do. */
--  if (rr_found == 0)
--    return plen;
--  /* Second pass, look for pointers in names in the records we're
keeping and make sure they don't
--     point to records we're going to elide. This is theoretically
possible, but unlikely. If
--     it happens, we give up and leave the answer unchanged. */
--  p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
--  
--  /* question first */
--  if (!check_name(&p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
--    return plen;
--  p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
--  
--  /* Now answers and NS */
--  if (!check_rrs(p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
--    return plen;
--  
--  /* Third pass, elide records */
--  for (p = rrs[0], i = 1; i < rr_found; i += 2)
--    {
--      unsigned char *start = rrs[i];
--      unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
((unsigned char *)(header+1)) + plen;
--      
--      memmove(p, start, end-start);
--      p += end-start;
--    }
--     
--  plen = p - (unsigned char *)header;
--  header->ancount = htons(ntohs(header->ancount) - chop_an);
--  header->nscount = htons(ntohs(header->nscount) - chop_ns);
--  header->arcount = htons(ntohs(header->arcount) - chop_ar);
--  /* Fourth pass, fix up pointers in the remaining records */
--  p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
--  
--  check_name(&p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
--  p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
--  
--  check_rrs(p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
--  
--  return plen;
--}

unsigned char* hash_questions(struct dns_header *header, size_t

plen, char *name)

{

-   int q;
-diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
-index dd22a62..3e801c8 100644
---- a/src/forward.c
-+++ b/src/forward.c
-@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header
*header, time_t now, struct server
- 
-   /* If the requestor didn't set the DO bit, don't return DNSSEC
info. */
-   if (!do_bit)
--    n = filter_rrsigs(header, n);
-+    n = rrfilter(header, n, 1);

#endif

- 
-   /* do this after extract_addresses. Ensure NODATA reply and
remove
-diff --git a/src/rrfilter.c b/src/rrfilter.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..ae12261
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/src/rrfilter.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,339 @@
-+/* dnsmasq is Copyright (c) 2000-2015 Simon Kelley
-+
-+   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify
-+   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
published by
-+   the Free Software Foundation; version 2 dated June, 1991, or
-+   (at your option) version 3 dated 29 June, 2007.
-+ 
-+   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-+   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-+   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-+   GNU General Public License for more details.
-+     
-+   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
License
-+   along with this program.  If not, see http://www.gnu.org/licens
es/.
-+*/
-+
-+/* Code to safely remove RRs from an DNS answer */ 
-+
-+#include "dnsmasq.h"
-+
-+/* Go through a domain name, find "pointers" and fix them up based
on how many bytes
-+   we've chopped out of the packet, or check they don't point into
an elided part.  */
-+static int check_name(unsigned char **namep, struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
-+{
-+  unsigned char *ansp = *namep;
-+
-+  while(1)
-+    {
-+      unsigned int label_type;
-+      
-+      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 1))
-+	return 0;
-+      
-+      label_type = (*ansp) & 0xc0;
-+
-+      if (label_type == 0xc0)
-+	{
-+	  /* pointer for compression. */
-+	  unsigned int offset;
-+	  int i;
-+	  unsigned char *p;
-+	  
-+	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
-+	    return 0;
-+
-+	  offset = ((*ansp++) & 0x3f) << 8;
-+	  offset |= *ansp++;
-+
-+	  p = offset + (unsigned char *)header;
-+	  
-+	  for (i = 0; i < rr_count; i++)
-+	    if (p < rrs[i])
-+	      break;
-+	    else
-+	      if (i & 1)
-+		offset -= rrs[i] - rrs[i-1];
-+
-+	  /* does the pointer end up in an elided RR? */
-+	  if (i & 1)
-+	    return 0;
-+
-+	  /* No, scale the pointer */
-+	  if (fixup)
-+	    {
-+	      ansp -= 2;
-+	      *ansp++ = (offset >> 8) | 0xc0;
-+	      *ansp++ = offset & 0xff;
-+	    }
-+	  break;
-+	}
-+      else if (label_type == 0x80)
-+	return 0; /* reserved */
-+      else if (label_type == 0x40)
-+	{
-+	  /* Extended label type */
-+	  unsigned int count;
-+	  
-+	  if (!CHECK_LEN(header, ansp, plen, 2))
-+	    return 0;
-+	  
-+	  if (((*ansp++) & 0x3f) != 1)
-+	    return 0; /* we only understand bitstrings */
-+	  
-+	  count = *(ansp++); /* Bits in bitstring */
-+	  
-+	  if (count == 0) /* count == 0 means 256 bits */
-+	    ansp += 32;
-+	  else
-+	    ansp += ((count-1)>>3)+1;
-+	}
-+      else
-+	{ /* label type == 0 Bottom six bits is length */
-+	  unsigned int len = (*ansp++) & 0x3f;
-+	  
-+	  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, ansp, plen, len))
-+	    return 0;
-+
-+	  if (len == 0)
-+	    break; /* zero length label marks the end. */
-+	}
-+    }
-+
-+  *namep = ansp;
-+
-+  return 1;
-+}
-+
-+/* Go through RRs and check or fixup the domain names contained
within */
-+static int check_rrs(unsigned char *p, struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, int fixup, unsigned char **rrs, int rr_count)
-+{
-+  int i, j, type, class, rdlen;
-+  unsigned char *pp;
-+  
-+  for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
ntohs(header->arcount); i++)
-+    {
-+      pp = p;
-+
-+      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
-+	return 0;
-+      
-+      GETSHORT(type, p); 
-+      GETSHORT(class, p);
-+      p += 4; /* TTL */
-+      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
-+
-+      /* If this RR is to be elided, don't fix up its contents */
-+      for (j = 0; j < rr_count; j += 2)
-+	if (rrs[j] == pp)
-+	  break;
-+
-+      if (j >= rr_count)
-+	{
-+	  /* fixup name of RR */
-+	  if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup, rrs, rr_count))
-+	    return 0;
-+	  
-+	  if (class == C_IN)
-+	    {
-+	      u16 *d;
-+ 
-+	      for (pp = p, d = rrfilter_desc(type); *d != (u16)-1;
d++)
-+		{
-+		  if (*d != 0)
-+		    pp += *d;
-+		  else if (!check_name(&pp, header, plen, fixup,
rrs, rr_count))
-+		    return 0;
-+		}
-+	    }
-+	}
-+      
-+      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-+	return 0;
-+    }
-+  
-+  return 1;
-+}
-+	
-+
-+/* mode is 0 to remove EDNS0, 1 to filter DNSSEC RRs */
-+size_t rrfilter(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, int mode)
-+{
-+  static unsigned char **rrs;
-+  static int rr_sz = 0;
-+
-+  unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
-+  int i, rdlen, qtype, qclass, rr_found, chop_an, chop_ns, chop_ar;
-+
-+  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) != 1 ||
-+      !(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 4)))
-+    return plen;
-+  
-+  GETSHORT(qtype, p);
-+  GETSHORT(qclass, p);
-+
-+  /* First pass, find pointers to start and end of all the records
we wish to elide:
-+     records added for DNSSEC, unless explicity queried for */
-+  for (rr_found = 0, chop_ns = 0, chop_an = 0, chop_ar = 0, i = 0; 
-+       i < ntohs(header->ancount) + ntohs(header->nscount) +
ntohs(header->arcount);
-+       i++)
-+    {
-+      unsigned char *pstart = p;
-+      int type, class;
-+
-+      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
-+	return plen;
-+      
-+      GETSHORT(type, p); 
-+      GETSHORT(class, p);
-+      p += 4; /* TTL */
-+      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
-+        
-+      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-+	return plen;
-+
-+      /* Don't remove the answer. */
-+      if (i < ntohs(header->ancount) && type == qtype && class ==
qclass)
-+	continue;
-+      
-+      if (mode == 0) /* EDNS */
-+	{
-+	  /* EDNS mode, remove T_OPT from additional section only
*/
-+	  if (i < (ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header->ancount)) 
|| type != T_OPT)
-+	    continue;
-+	}
-+      else if (type != T_NSEC && type != T_NSEC3 && type !=
T_RRSIG)
-+	/* DNSSEC mode, remove SIGs and NSECs from all three
sections. */
-+	continue;
-+      
-+      
-+      if (!expand_workspace(&rrs, &rr_sz, rr_found + 1))
-+	return plen; 
-+      
-+      rrs[rr_found++] = pstart;
-+      rrs[rr_found++] = p;
-+      
-+      if (i < ntohs(header->ancount))
-+	chop_an++;
-+      else if (i < (ntohs(header->nscount) + ntohs(header-
...
ancount)))
-+	chop_ns++;
-+      else
-+	chop_ar++;
-+    }
-+  
-+  /* Nothing to do. */
-+  if (rr_found == 0)
-+    return plen;
-+
-+  /* Second pass, look for pointers in names in the records we're
keeping and make sure they don't
-+     point to records we're going to elide. This is theoretically
possible, but unlikely. If
-+     it happens, we give up and leave the answer unchanged. */
-+  p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
-+  
-+  /* question first */
-+  if (!check_name(&p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
-+    return plen;
-+  p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
-+  
-+  /* Now answers and NS */
-+  if (!check_rrs(p, header, plen, 0, rrs, rr_found))
-+    return plen;
-+  
-+  /* Third pass, elide records */
-+  for (p = rrs[0], i = 1; i < rr_found; i += 2)
-+    {
-+      unsigned char *start = rrs[i];
-+      unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
((unsigned char *)(header+1)) + plen;
-+      
-+      memmove(p, start, end-start);
-+      p += end-start;
-+    }
-+     
-+  plen = p - (unsigned char *)header;
-+  header->ancount = htons(ntohs(header->ancount) - chop_an);
-+  header->nscount = htons(ntohs(header->nscount) - chop_ns);
-+  header->arcount = htons(ntohs(header->arcount) - chop_ar);
-+
-+  /* Fourth pass, fix up pointers in the remaining records */
-+  p = (unsigned char *)(header+1);
-+  
-+  check_name(&p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
-+  p += 4; /* qclass, qtype */
-+  
-+  check_rrs(p, header, plen, 1, rrs, rr_found);
-+  
-+  return plen;
-+}
-+
-+/* This is used in the DNSSEC code too, hence it's exported */
-+u16 *rrfilter_desc(int type)
-+{
-+  /* List of RRtypes which include domains in the data.
-+     0 -> domain
-+     integer -> no of plain bytes
-+     -1 -> end
-+
-+     zero is not a valid RRtype, so the final entry is returned for
-+     anything which needs no mangling.
-+  */
-+  
-+  static u16 rr_desc[] = 
-+    { 
-+      T_NS, 0, -1, 
-+      T_MD, 0, -1,
-+      T_MF, 0, -1,
-+      T_CNAME, 0, -1,
-+      T_SOA, 0, 0, -1,
-+      T_MB, 0, -1,
-+      T_MG, 0, -1,
-+      T_MR, 0, -1,
-+      T_PTR, 0, -1,
-+      T_MINFO, 0, 0, -1,
-+      T_MX, 2, 0, -1,
-+      T_RP, 0, 0, -1,
-+      T_AFSDB, 2, 0, -1,
-+      T_RT, 2, 0, -1,
-+      T_SIG, 18, 0, -1,
-+      T_PX, 2, 0, 0, -1,
-+      T_NXT, 0, -1,
-+      T_KX, 2, 0, -1,
-+      T_SRV, 6, 0, -1,
-+      T_DNAME, 0, -1,
-+      0, -1 /* wildcard/catchall */
-+    }; 
-+  
-+  u16 *p = rr_desc;
-+  
-+  while (*p != type && *p != 0)
-+    while (*p++ != (u16)-1);
-+
-+  return p+1;
-+}
-+
-+int expand_workspace(unsigned char ***wkspc, int *szp, int new)
-+{
-+  unsigned char **p;
-+  int old = *szp;
-+
-+  if (old >= new+1)
-+    return 1;
-+
-+  if (new >= 100)
-+    return 0;
-+
-+  new += 5;
-+  
-+  if (!(p = whine_malloc(new * sizeof(unsigned char **))))
-+    return 0;  
-+  
-+  if (old != 0 && *wkspc)
-+    {
-+      memcpy(p, *wkspc, old * sizeof(unsigned char **));
-+      free(*wkspc);
-+    }
-+  
-+  *wkspc = p;
-+  *szp = new;
-+
-+  return 1;
-+}
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ffb412b..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/020-DNSSEC_validation_tweak.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-From 2dbba34b2c1289a108f876c78b84889f2a93115d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2015 13:41:58 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] DNSSEC validation tweak.



-A zone which has at least one key with an algorithm we don't
-support should be considered as insecure.

src/dnssec.c |   82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------



1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index fa3eb81..dc563e0 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -763,10 +763,10 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, int class, int
-    STAT_NEED_KEY need DNSKEY to complete validation (name is
returned in keyname)
-    STAT_NEED_DS  need DS to complete validation (name is returned
in keyname)
- 
--   if key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
given in the params of those names,
-+   If key is non-NULL, use that key, which has the algo and tag
given in the params of those names,
-    otherwise find the key in the cache.
- 
--   name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
trashed.
-+   Name is unchanged on exit. keyname is used as workspace and
trashed.
- 
-    Call explore_rrset first to find and count RRs and sigs.

*/

-@@ -919,6 +919,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
-   return STAT_BOGUS;

}

-  
-+

/* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY

query.
-    Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
-    return codes:
-@@ -1831,15 +1832,15 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-

/* Check signing status of name.

-    returns:
--   STAT_SECURE zone is signed.
--   STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
--   STAT_NEED_DS require DS record of name returned in keyname.
--   
-+   STAT_SECURE      zone is signed.
-+   STAT_INSECURE    zone proved unsigned.
-+   STAT_NEED_DS     require DS record of name returned in keyname.
-+   STAT_NEED_DNSKEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in
keyname.
-    name returned unaltered.

*/
static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t

now)

{

--  int name_start = strlen(name);
-+  int secure_ds, name_start = strlen(name);
-   struct crec *crecp;
-   char *p;
-   
-@@ -1850,27 +1851,52 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int
class, char *keyname, time_t now)
-       if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
- 	return STAT_NEED_DS;
-       else
--	do 
--	  {
--	    if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
--	      {
--		/* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
existance of NS record.
--		   F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
there's no DS record here,
--		   but that's because there's no NS record either,
ie this isn't the start
--		   of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below
a node is unsigned when
--		   we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no
DS record.
--		*/	  
--		if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
--		  {
--		    if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
--		      return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */
--		  }
--		else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest) ||
!algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
--		  return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
insecure */
--	      }
--	  }
--	while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
F_DS)));
--      
-+	{
-+	  secure_ds = 0;
-+	  
-+	  do 
-+	    {
-+	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
-+		{
-+		  /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
existance of NS record.
-+		     F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
there's no DS record here,
-+		     but that's because there's no NS record
either, ie this isn't the start
-+		     of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree
below a node is unsigned when
-+		     we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's
no DS record.
-+		  */	  
-+		  if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
-+		    {
-+		      if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
-+			return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here
*/
-+		    }
-+		  else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest)
|| !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
-+		    return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
insecure */
-+		  else
-+		    secure_ds = 1;
-+		}
-+	    }
-+	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
F_DS)));
-+	}
-+
-+      if (secure_ds)
-+	{
-+	  /* We've found only DS records that attest to the DNSKEY
RRset in the zone, so we believe
-+	     that RRset is good. Furthermore the DNSKEY whose hash
is proved by the DS record is
-+	     one we can use. However the DNSKEY RRset may contain
more than one key and
-+	     one of the other keys may use an algorithm we don't
support. If that's 
-+	     the case the zone is insecure for us. */
-+	  
-+	  if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now,
F_DNSKEY)))
-+	    return STAT_NEED_KEY;
-+
-+	  do 
-+	    {
-+	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
!algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.key.algo))
-+		return STAT_INSECURE;
-+	    }
-+	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
F_DNSKEY)));
-+	}
-+
-       if (name_start == 0)
- 	break;
- 
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c3c74cc..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/021-
Tweaks_to_EDNS0_handling_in_DNS_replies.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,133 +0,0 @@
-From dd4ad9ac7ea6d51dcc34a1f2cd2da14efbb87714 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:44:58 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Tweaks to EDNS0 handling in DNS replies.





src/dnssec.c  |   20 +++++++++-----------
src/rfc1035.c |   57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------



2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index dc563e0..012b2a6 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -2129,18 +2129,16 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	    /* Empty DS without NSECS */
- 	    if (qtype == T_DS)
- 	      return STAT_BOGUS;
--	    else
-+	    
-+	    rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
-+	    if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
- 	      {
--		rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
--		if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
--		  {
--		    if (class)
--		      *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_DNSKEY */
--		    return rc;
--		  }
--		return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
--	      }
-+		if (class)
-+		  *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_DNSKEY */
-+		return rc;
-+	      } 
-+	    
-+	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
- 	  }
- 
- 	  if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
-diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
-index def8fa0..188d05f 100644
---- a/src/rfc1035.c
-+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
-@@ -1539,7 +1539,13 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
-   int nxdomain = 0, auth = 1, trunc = 0, sec_data = 1;
-   struct mx_srv_record *rec;
-   size_t len;
-- 
-+  
-+  if (ntohs(header->ancount) != 0 ||
-+      ntohs(header->nscount) != 0 ||
-+      ntohs(header->qdcount) == 0 || 
-+      OPCODE(header) != QUERY )
-+    return 0;
-+  
-   /* Don't return AD set if checking disabled. */
-   if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
-     sec_data = 0;
-@@ -1548,33 +1554,32 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
-   *ad_reqd = header->hb4 & HB4_AD;
-   *do_bit = 0;
- 
--  /* If there is an RFC2671 pseudoheader then it will be
overwritten by
-+  /* If there is an  additional data section then it will be
overwritten by
-      partial replies, so we have to do a dry run to see if we can
answer
--     the query. We check to see if the do bit is set, if so we
always
--     forward rather than answering from the cache, which doesn't
include
--     security information, unless we're in DNSSEC validation mode.
*/
-+     the query. */
- 
--  if (find_pseudoheader(header, qlen, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
--    { 
--      unsigned short flags;
--      
--      have_pseudoheader = 1;
-+  if (ntohs(header->arcount) != 0)
-+    {
-+      dryrun = 1;
- 
--      pheader += 4; /* udp size, ext_rcode */
--      GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
--      
--      if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
--	{
--	  *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
--	  *ad_reqd = 1;
-+      /* If there's an additional section, there might be an
EDNS(0) pseudoheader */
-+      if (find_pseudoheader(header, qlen, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
-+	{ 
-+	  unsigned short flags;
-+	  
-+	  have_pseudoheader = 1;
-+	  
-+	  pheader += 4; /* udp size, ext_rcode */
-+	  GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
-+	  
-+	  if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
-+	    {
-+	      *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
-+	      *ad_reqd = 1;
-+	    }
- 	}
--      dryrun = 1;
-     }
- 
--  if (ntohs(header->qdcount) == 0 || OPCODE(header) != QUERY )
--    return 0;
--  
-   for (rec = daemon->mxnames; rec; rec = rec->next)
-     rec->offset = 0;
-   
-@@ -1730,8 +1735,12 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 		}
- 	      else if ((crecp = cache_find_by_addr(NULL, &addr,
now, is_arpa)))
- 		{
--		  /* Don't use cache when DNSSEC data required. */
--		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
-+		  /* Don't use cache when DNSSEC data required,
unless we know that
-+		     the zone is unsigned, which implies that we're
doing
-+		     validation. */
-+		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
F_CONFIG)) || 
-+		      !sec_reqd || 
-+		      (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(crecp-
...
flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
- 		    {
- 		      do 
- 			{ 
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 60503e9..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/022-Tidy_up_DNSSEC_non-
existence_code_Check_zone_status_is_NSEC_proof_bad.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,409 +0,0 @@
-From b40f26c0199235073abc37e1e1d6ed93bed372f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 11:57:26 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Tidy up DNSSEC non-existence code. Check zone
status is NSEC

proof bad.




src/dnssec.c |  207 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------



1 file changed, 90 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 012b2a6..ddae497 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -1367,59 +1367,6 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const
char *b)
-     }

}

- 
--/* Find all the NSEC or NSEC3 records in a reply.
--   return an array of pointers to them. */
--static int find_nsec_records(struct dns_header *header, size_t
plen, unsigned char ***nsecsetp, int *nsecsetl, int class_reqd)
--{
--  static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL;
--  static int nsecset_sz = 0;
--  
--  int type_found = 0;
--  unsigned char *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
--  int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found;
--  /* Move to NS section */
--  if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header,
plen)))
--    return 0;
--  
--  for (nsecs_found = 0, i = ntohs(header->nscount); i != 0; i--)
--    {
--      unsigned char *pstart = p;
--      
--      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
--	return 0;
--      
--      GETSHORT(type, p); 
--      GETSHORT(class, p);
--      p += 4; /* TTL */
--      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
--      if (class == class_reqd && (type == T_NSEC || type ==
T_NSEC3))
--	{
--	  /* No mixed NSECing 'round here, thankyouverymuch */
--	  if (type_found == T_NSEC && type == T_NSEC3)
--	    return 0;
--	  if (type_found == T_NSEC3 && type == T_NSEC)
--	    return 0;
--	  type_found = type;
--	  if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz,
nsecs_found))
--	    return 0; 
--	  
--	  nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
--	}
--      
--      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
--	return 0;
--    }
--  
--  *nsecsetp = nsecset;
--  *nsecsetl = nsecs_found;
--  
--  return type_found;
--}

static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header,

size_t plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count,
- 				    char *workspace1, char
*workspace2, char *name, int type, int *nons)

{

-@@ -1436,12 +1383,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
-     {
-       p = nsecs[i];
-       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10))
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	return 0;
-       p += 8; /* class, type, TTL */
-       GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
-       psave = p;
-       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 10))
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	return 0;
-       
-       rc = hostname_cmp(workspace1, name);
-       
-@@ -1449,7 +1396,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
- 	{
- 	  /* 4035 para 5.4. Last sentence */
- 	  if (type == T_NSEC || type == T_RRSIG)
--	    return STAT_SECURE;
-+	    return 1;
- 
- 	  /* NSEC with the same name as the RR we're testing, check
- 	     that the type in question doesn't appear in the type
map */
-@@ -1465,24 +1412,24 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
- 	      /* A CNAME answer would also be valid, so if there's
a CNAME is should 
- 		 have been returned. */
- 	      if ((p[2] & (0x80 >> T_CNAME)) != 0)
--		return STAT_BOGUS;
-+		return 0;
- 	      
- 	      /* If the SOA bit is set for a DS record, then we
have the
- 		 DS from the wrong side of the delegation. */
- 	      if (type == T_DS && (p[2] & (0x80 >> T_SOA)) != 0)
--		return STAT_BOGUS;
-+		return 0;
- 	    }
- 
- 	  while (rdlen >= 2)
- 	    {
- 	      if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
--		return STAT_BOGUS;
-+		return 0;
- 	      
- 	      if (p[0] == type >> 8)
- 		{
- 		  /* Does the NSEC say our type exists? */
- 		  if (offset < p[1] && (p[offset+2] & mask) != 0)
--		    return STAT_BOGUS;
-+		    return 0;
- 		  
- 		  break; /* finshed checking */
- 		}
-@@ -1491,24 +1438,24 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, unsi
- 	      p +=  p[1];
- 	    }
- 	  
--	  return STAT_SECURE;
-+	  return 1;
- 	}
-       else if (rc == -1)
- 	{
- 	  /* Normal case, name falls between NSEC name and next
domain name,
- 	     wrap around case, name falls between NSEC name (rc ==
-1) and end */
- 	  if (hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >= 0 ||
hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0)
--	    return STAT_SECURE;
-+	    return 1;
- 	}
-       else 
- 	{
- 	  /* wrap around case, name falls between start and next
domain name */
- 	  if (hostname_cmp(workspace1, workspace2) >= 0 &&
hostname_cmp(workspace2, name) >=0 )
--	    return STAT_SECURE;
-+	    return 1;
- 	}
-     }
-   
--  return STAT_BOGUS;
-+  return 0;

}

-

/* return digest length, or zero on error */

-@@ -1701,7 +1648,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
-     {
-       if (!(p = skip_name(nsecs[i], header, plen, 15)))
--	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+	return 0; /* bad packet */
-       
-       p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
-       algo = *p++;
-@@ -1712,14 +1659,14 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
- 
-   /* No usable NSEC3s */
-   if (i == nsec_count)
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
-+    return 0;
- 
-   p++; /* flags */
-   GETSHORT (iterations, p);
-   salt_len = *p++;
-   salt = p;
-   if (!CHECK_LEN(header, salt, plen, salt_len))
--    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+    return 0; /* bad packet */
-     
-   /* Now prune so we only have NSEC3 records with same iterations,
salt and algo */
-   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
-@@ -1730,7 +1677,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-       nsecs[i] = NULL; /* Speculative, will be restored if OK. */
-       
-       if (!(p = skip_name(nsec3p, header, plen, 15)))
--	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+	return 0; /* bad packet */
-       
-       p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
-       
-@@ -1747,7 +1694,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
- 	continue;
-       
-       if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p, plen, salt_len))
--	return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
-+	return 0; /* bad packet */
- 
-       if (memcmp(p, salt, salt_len) != 0)
- 	continue;
-@@ -1758,13 +1705,13 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
- 
-   /* Algo is checked as 1 above */
-   if (!(hash = hash_find("sha1")))
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
-+    return 0;
- 
-   if ((digest_len = hash_name(name, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len,
iterations)) == 0)
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
-+    return 0;
-   
-   if (check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type,
workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, nons))
--    return STAT_SECURE;
-+    return 1;
- 
-   /* Can't find an NSEC3 which covers the name directly, we need
the "closest encloser NSEC3" 
-      or an answer inferred from a wildcard record. */
-@@ -1780,14 +1727,14 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
- 	break;
- 
-       if ((digest_len = hash_name(closest_encloser, &digest, hash,
salt, salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	return 0;
-       
-       for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
- 	if ((p = nsecs[i]))
- 	  {
- 	    if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 0)
||
- 		!(base32_len = base32_decode(workspace1, (unsigned
char *)workspace2)))
--	      return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	      return 0;
- 	  
- 	    if (digest_len == base32_len &&
- 		memcmp(digest, workspace2, digest_len) == 0)
-@@ -1802,32 +1749,81 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-   while ((closest_encloser = strchr(closest_encloser, '.')));
-   
-   if (!closest_encloser)
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
-+    return 0;
-   
-   /* Look for NSEC3 that proves the non-existence of the next-
closest encloser */
-   if ((digest_len = hash_name(next_closest, &digest, hash, salt,
salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
-+    return 0;
- 
-   if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest, type,
workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL))
--    return STAT_BOGUS;
-+    return 0;
-   
-   /* Finally, check that there's no seat of wildcard synthesis */
-   if (!wildname)
-     {
-       if (!(wildcard = strchr(next_closest, '.')) || wildcard ==
next_closest)
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	return 0;
-       
-       wildcard--;
-       *wildcard = '*';
-       
-       if ((digest_len = hash_name(wildcard, &digest, hash, salt,
salt_len, iterations)) == 0)
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	return 0;
-       
-       if (!check_nsec3_coverage(header, plen, digest_len, digest,
type, workspace1, workspace2, nsecs, nsec_count, NULL))
--	return STAT_BOGUS;
-+	return 0;
-     }
-   
--  return STAT_SECURE;
-+  return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t
plen, char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass, char
*wildname, int *nons)
-+{
-+  static unsigned char **nsecset = NULL;
-+  static int nsecset_sz = 0;
-+  
-+  int type_found = 0;
-+  unsigned char *p = skip_questions(header, plen);
-+  int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found;
-+  
-+  /* Move to NS section */
-+  if (!p || !(p = skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header,
plen)))
-+    return 0;
-+  
-+  for (nsecs_found = 0, i = ntohs(header->nscount); i != 0; i--)
-+    {
-+      unsigned char *pstart = p;
-+      
-+      if (!(p = skip_name(p, header, plen, 10)))
-+	return 0;
-+      
-+      GETSHORT(type, p); 
-+      GETSHORT(class, p);
-+      p += 4; /* TTL */
-+      GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
-+
-+      if (class == qclass && (type == T_NSEC || type == T_NSEC3))
-+	{
-+	  /* No mixed NSECing 'round here, thankyouverymuch */
-+	  if (type_found != 0 && type_found != type)
-+	    return 0;
-+
-+	  type_found = type;
-+
-+	  if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz,
nsecs_found))
-+	    return 0; 
-+	  
-+	  nsecset[nsecs_found++] = pstart;
-+	}
-+      
-+      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-+	return 0;
-+    }
-+  
-+  if (type_found == T_NSEC)
-+    return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset,
nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
-+  else
-+    return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset,
nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname,
nons);

}

-

/* Check signing status of name.

-@@ -1925,10 +1921,9 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
-   static unsigned char **targets = NULL;
-   static int target_sz = 0;
- 
--  unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2, **nsecs;
-+  unsigned char *ans_start, *p1, *p2;
-   int type1, class1, rdlen1, type2, class2, rdlen2, qclass, qtype,
targetidx;
--  int i, j, rc, nsec_count;
--  int nsec_type;
-+  int i, j, rc;
- 
-   if (neganswer)
-     *neganswer = 0;
-@@ -2080,28 +2075,15 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 			  targets[j] = NULL;
- 		      }
- 			    
--		  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD)
--		    {
--		      /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with
a different
--			 answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
this
--			 hasn't happened, the answer must prove
that
--			 the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check
that here. */
--		      if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header,
plen, &nsecs, &nsec_count, class1)))
--			return STAT_BOGUS; /* No NSECs or bad
packet */
--		      
--		      /* Note that we may not yet have validated
the NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets. Since the check
--			 below returns either SECURE or BOGUS,
that's not a problem. If the RRsets later fail
--			 we'll return BOGUS then. */
--		      if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
--			rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen,
nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, type1,
NULL);
--		      else
--			rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header,
plen, nsecs, nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, 
--						       keyname,
name, type1, wildname, NULL);
--		      
--		      if (rc == STAT_BOGUS)
--			return rc;
--		    } 
-+		   /* An attacker replay a wildcard answer with a
different
-+		      answer and overlay a genuine RR. To prove
this
-+		      hasn't happened, the answer must prove that
-+		      the gennuine record doesn't exist. Check that
here. 
-+		      Note that we may not yet have validated the
NSEC/NSEC3 RRsets. 
-+		      That's not a problem since if the RRsets
later fail
-+		      we'll return BOGUS then. */
-+		  if (rc == STAT_SECURE_WILDCARD &&
!prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name, type1, class1,
wildname, NULL))
-+		    return STAT_BOGUS;
- 		}
- 	    }
- 	}
-@@ -2124,14 +2106,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 
- 	/* For anything other than a DS record, this situation is
OK if either
- 	   the answer is in an unsigned zone, or there's a NSEC
records. */
--	if (!(nsec_type = find_nsec_records(header, plen, &nsecs,
&nsec_count, qclass)))
-+	if (!prove_non_existence(header, plen, keyname, name,
qtype, qclass, NULL, nons))
- 	  {
- 	    /* Empty DS without NSECS */
- 	    if (qtype == T_DS)
- 	      return STAT_BOGUS;
- 	    
--	    rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now);
--	    if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
-+	    if ((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)) !=
STAT_SECURE)
- 	      {
- 		if (class)
- 		  *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_DNSKEY */
-@@ -2140,14 +2121,6 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	    
- 	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* signed zone, no NSECs */
- 	  }
--	  if (nsec_type == T_NSEC)
--	  rc = prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecs,
nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
--	else
--	  rc = prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecs,
nsec_count, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, NULL, nons);
--
--	if (rc != STAT_SECURE)
--	  return rc;
-       }
-   
-   return STAT_SECURE;
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index eda6fbd..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/023-
Fix_brace_botch_in_dnssec_validate_ds.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-From 3b799c826db05fc2da1c6d15cbe372e394209d27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 16:58:04 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix brace botch in dnssec_validate_ds()
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit



-Thanks to MichaÅ‚ KÄ™pieÅ„ for spotting this.

src/dnssec.c |   34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index ddae497..1f8c954 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -923,11 +923,11 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, in

/* The DNS packet is expected to contain the answer to a DNSKEY

query.
-    Put all DNSKEYs in the answer which are valid into the cache.
-    return codes:
--         STAT_OK           Done, key(s) in cache.
--	 STAT_BOGUS        No DNSKEYs found, which  can be
validated with DS,
--	                   or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not
valid, bad packet.
--	 STAT_NEED_DS      DS records to validate a key not found,
name in keyname 
--	 STAT_NEED_DNSKEY  DNSKEY records to validate a key not
found, name in keyname 
-+         STAT_OK        Done, key(s) in cache.
-+	 STAT_BOGUS     No DNSKEYs found, which  can be validated
with DS,
-+	                or self-sign for DNSKEY RRset is not valid,
bad packet.
-+	 STAT_NEED_DS   DS records to validate a key not found,
name in keyname 
-+	 STAT_NEED_KEY  DNSKEY records to validate a key not found,
name in keyname

*/
int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct dns_header *header,

size_t plen, char *name, char *keyname, int class)

{

-@@ -1224,13 +1224,13 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
- 		}
- 	      
- 	      p = psave;
--	      
--	      if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
--		return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
- 	    }
--	  
--	  cache_end_insert();
-+	  if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen))
-+	    return STAT_BOGUS; /* bad packet */
- 	}
-+
-+      cache_end_insert();
-+
-     }
-   else
-     {
-@@ -1828,10 +1828,10 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
-

/* Check signing status of name.

-    returns:
--   STAT_SECURE      zone is signed.
--   STAT_INSECURE    zone proved unsigned.
--   STAT_NEED_DS     require DS record of name returned in keyname.
--   STAT_NEED_DNSKEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in
keyname.
-+   STAT_SECURE   zone is signed.
-+   STAT_INSECURE zone proved unsigned.
-+   STAT_NEED_DS  require DS record of name returned in keyname.
-+   STAT_NEED_KEY require DNSKEY record of name returned in keyname.
-    name returned unaltered.

*/
static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t

now)
-@@ -2028,7 +2028,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 		      if (rc == STAT_SECURE)
- 			rc = STAT_BOGUS;
- 		       if (class)
--			 *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_DNSKEY */
-+			 *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_KEY */
- 		    }
- 		  else 
- 		    rc = STAT_INSECURE; 
-@@ -2045,7 +2045,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 		{
- 		  /* Zone is insecure, don't need to validate RRset
*/
- 		  if (class)
--		    *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_DNSKEY */
-+		    *class = class1; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_KEY */
- 		  return rc;
- 		} 
- 	      
-@@ -2115,7 +2115,7 @@ int dnssec_validate_reply(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 	    if ((rc = zone_status(name, qclass, keyname, now)) !=
STAT_SECURE)
- 	      {
- 		if (class)
--		  *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or
NEED_DNSKEY */
-+		  *class = qclass; /* Class for NEED_DS or NEED_KEY
*/
- 		return rc;
- 	      } 
- 	    
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
atch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
atch
deleted file mode 100644
index abcae5c..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/024-
Do_a_better_job_of_determining_which_DNSSEC_sig_algos_are_supported.p
atch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-From 14a4ae883d51130d33da7133287e8867c64bab65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 17:23:03 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Do a better job of determining which DNSSEC sig
algos are

supported.




src/dnssec.c |   52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------



1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 1f8c954..82394ee 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -65,10 +65,9 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
-     case 8: return "sha256";
-     case 10: return "sha512";
-     case 12: return "gosthash94";
--#ifndef NO_NETTLE_ECC
-     case 13: return "sha256";
-     case 14: return "sha384";
--#endif
-+
-     default: return NULL;
-     }

}

-@@ -129,13 +128,15 @@ static int hash_init(const struct nettle_hash
*hash, void **ctxp, unsigned char

}

-

static int dnsmasq_rsa_verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned

int key_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
--			      unsigned char *digest, int algo)
-+			      unsigned char *digest, size_t
digest_len, int algo)

{

-   unsigned char *p;
-   size_t exp_len;
-   
-   static struct rsa_public_key *key = NULL;
-   static mpz_t sig_mpz;
-+
-+  (void)digest_len;
-   
-   if (key == NULL)
-     {
-@@ -181,7 +182,7 @@ static int dnsmasq_rsa_verify(struct blockdata
*key_data, unsigned int key_len,

}

-

static int dnsmasq_dsa_verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned

int key_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
--			      unsigned char *digest, int algo)
-+			      unsigned char *digest, size_t
digest_len, int algo)

{

-   unsigned char *p;
-   unsigned int t;
-@@ -189,6 +190,8 @@ static int dnsmasq_dsa_verify(struct blockdata
*key_data, unsigned int key_len,
-   static struct dsa_public_key *key = NULL;
-   static struct dsa_signature *sig_struct;
-   
-+  (void)digest_len;
-+
-   if (key == NULL)
-     {
-       if (!(sig_struct = whine_malloc(sizeof(struct
dsa_signature))) || 
-@@ -292,26 +295,45 @@ static int dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify(struct
blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len

}
#endif

- 
--static int verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
--		  unsigned char *digest, size_t digest_len, int
algo)
-+static int (*verify_func(int algo))(struct blockdata *key_data,
unsigned int key_len, unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
-+				    unsigned char *digest, size_t
digest_len, int algo)

{

--  (void)digest_len;
-+    
-+  /* Enure at runtime that we have support for this digest */
-+  if (!hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo)))
-+    return NULL;
-+  
-+  /* This switch defines which sig algorithms we support, can't
introspect Nettle for that. */
-   switch (algo)
-     {
-     case 1: case 5: case 7: case 8: case 10:
--      return dnsmasq_rsa_verify(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len,
digest, algo);
-+      return dnsmasq_rsa_verify;
-       
-     case 3: case 6: 
--      return dnsmasq_dsa_verify(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len,
digest, algo);
-+      return dnsmasq_dsa_verify;
-

#ifndef NO_NETTLE_ECC

-     case 13: case 14:
--      return dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len,
digest, digest_len, algo);
-+      return dnsmasq_ecdsa_verify;

#endif

-     }
-   
--  return 0;
-+  return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+static int verify(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
-+		  unsigned char *digest, size_t digest_len, int
algo)
-+{
-+
-+  int (*func)(struct blockdata *key_data, unsigned int key_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
-+	      unsigned char *digest, size_t digest_len, int algo);
-+  
-+  func = verify_func(algo);
-+  
-+  if (!func)
-+    return 0;
-+
-+  return (*func)(key_data, key_len, sig, sig_len, digest,
digest_len, algo);

}

-

/* Convert from presentation format to wire format, in place.

-@@ -732,7 +754,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, int class, int
- 	      if (check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration)
&&
- 		  labels <= name_labels &&
- 		  type_covered == type && 
--		  algo_digest_name(algo))
-+		  verify_func(algo))
- 		{
- 		  if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx))
- 		    return 0; 
-@@ -1865,7 +1887,7 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class,
char *keyname, time_t now)
- 		      if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
- 			return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here
*/
- 		    }
--		  else if (!ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest)
|| !algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
-+		  else if (!hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp-
...
addr.ds.digest)) || !verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
- 		    return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
insecure */
- 		  else
- 		    secure_ds = 1;
-@@ -1887,7 +1909,7 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class,
char *keyname, time_t now)
- 
- 	  do 
- 	    {
--	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
!algo_digest_name(crecp->addr.key.algo))
-+	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
!verify_func(crecp->addr.key.algo))
- 		return STAT_INSECURE;
- 	    }
- 	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
F_DNSKEY)));
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c016e73..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/025-
Major_tidy_up_of_EDNS0_handling_and_computation_use_of_udp.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,643 +0,0 @@
-From fa14bec83b2db010fd076910fddab56957b9375d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 17:12:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Major tidy up of EDNS0 handling and computation/use
of udp

packet size.




src/auth.c     |    8 ++-
src/dnsmasq.h  |    7 ++-
src/dnssec.c   |    1 -
src/forward.c  |  184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----



src/netlink.c  |    3 +-
src/rfc1035.c  |   81 +++++++------------------
src/rrfilter.c |    2 +-
7 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/auth.c b/src/auth.c
-index 2b0b7d6..85bd5e7 100644
---- a/src/auth.c
-+++ b/src/auth.c
-@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char *name,
char **cut)

}

- 
- 
--size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t
qlen, time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, int local_query) 
-+size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t
qlen, time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, 
-+		   int local_query, int do_bit, int
have_pseudoheader)

{

-   char *name = daemon->namebuff;
-   unsigned char *p, *ansp;
-@@ -820,6 +821,11 @@ size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header,
char *limit, size_t qlen, time_t n
-   header->ancount = htons(anscount);
-   header->nscount = htons(authcount);
-   header->arcount = htons(0);
-+
-+  /* Advertise our packet size limit in our reply */
-+  if (have_pseudoheader)
-+    return add_pseudoheader(header,  ansp - (unsigned char
*)header, (unsigned char *)limit, daemon->edns_pktsz, 0, NULL, 0,
do_bit);
-+
-   return ansp - (unsigned char *)header;

}

-   
-diff --git a/src/dnsmasq.h b/src/dnsmasq.h
-index 39a930c..abb34c5 100644
---- a/src/dnsmasq.h
-+++ b/src/dnsmasq.h
-@@ -1113,7 +1113,7 @@ int extract_addresses(struct dns_header
*header, size_t qlen, char *namebuff,
- 		      int no_cache, int secure, int *doctored);

size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit,

size_t qlen,  
- 		      struct in_addr local_addr, struct in_addr
local_netmask, 
--		      time_t now, int *ad_reqd, int *do_bit);
-+		      time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int
have_pseudoheader);

int check_for_bogus_wildcard(struct dns_header *header, size_t

qlen, char *name, 
- 			     struct bogus_addr *addr, time_t now);

int check_for_ignored_address(struct dns_header *header, size_t

qlen, struct bogus_addr *baddr);
-@@ -1123,6 +1123,8 @@ int check_for_local_domain(char *name, time_t
now);

unsigned int questions_crc(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,

char *buff);

size_t resize_packet(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,

- 		  unsigned char *pheader, size_t hlen);
-+size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
unsigned char *limit, 
-+			unsigned short udp_sz, int optno, unsigned
char *opt, size_t optlen, int set_do);

size_t add_mac(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *limit,

union mysockaddr *l3);

size_t add_source_addr(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char

*limit, union mysockaddr *source);

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC

-@@ -1141,7 +1143,8 @@ int private_net(struct in_addr addr, int
ban_localhost);

/* auth.c */
#ifdef HAVE_AUTH
size_t answer_auth(struct dns_header *header, char *limit, size_t

qlen, 
--		   time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, int
local_query);
-+		   time_t now, union mysockaddr *peer_addr, int
local_query,
-+		   int do_bit, int have_pseudoheader);

int in_zone(struct auth_zone *zone, char *name, char **cut);
#endif

- 
-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 82394ee..299ca64 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
-     case 12: return "gosthash94";
-     case 13: return "sha256";
-     case 14: return "sha384";
-     default: return NULL;
-     }

}

-diff --git a/src/forward.c b/src/forward.c
-index 3e801c8..041353c 100644
---- a/src/forward.c
-+++ b/src/forward.c
-@@ -244,7 +244,6 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
mysockaddr *udpaddr,
-   void *hash = &crc;

#endif

-  unsigned int gotname = extract_request(header, plen, daemon-
...
namebuff, NULL);
-- unsigned char *pheader;
- 
-  (void)do_bit;
- 
-@@ -264,7 +263,8 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
mysockaddr *udpaddr,
- 	 there's no point retrying the query, retry the key query
instead...... */
-       if (forward->blocking_query)
- 	{
--	  int fd;
-+	  int fd, is_sign;
-+	  unsigned char *pheader;
- 	  
- 	  forward->flags &= ~FREC_TEST_PKTSZ;
- 	  
-@@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
mysockaddr *udpaddr,
- 	  blockdata_retrieve(forward->stash, forward->stash_len,
(void *)header);
- 	  plen = forward->stash_len;
- 	  
--	  if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, &pheader,
NULL))
--	    PUTSHORT((forward->flags & FREC_TEST_PKTSZ) ?
SAFE_PKTSZ : forward->sentto->edns_pktsz, pheader);
-+	  if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, &pheader,
&is_sign) && !is_sign)
-+	    PUTSHORT(SAFE_PKTSZ, pheader);
- 
- 	  if (forward->sentto->addr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET) 
- 	    log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_DNSSEC | F_IPV4, "retry",
(struct all_addr *)&forward->sentto->addr.in.sin_addr, "dnssec");
-@@ -394,32 +394,40 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
mysockaddr *udpaddr,
-       forward->log_id = daemon->log_id;
-       
-       if (option_bool(OPT_ADD_MAC))
--	plen = add_mac(header, plen, ((char *) header) + daemon-
...
packet_buff_sz, &forward->source);
--      
-+	{
-+	  size_t new = add_mac(header, plen, ((char *) header) +
daemon->packet_buff_sz, &forward->source);
-+	  if (new != plen)
-+	    {
-+	      plen = new;
-+	      forward->flags |= FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
-+	    }
-+	}
-+
-       if (option_bool(OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET))
- 	{
- 	  size_t new = add_source_addr(header, plen, ((char *)
header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz, &forward->source); 
- 	  if (new != plen)
- 	    {
- 	      plen = new;
--	      forward->flags |= FREC_HAS_SUBNET;
-+	      forward->flags |= FREC_HAS_SUBNET |
FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
- 	    }
- 	}
-

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC

-       if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
- 	{
--	  size_t new_plen = add_do_bit(header, plen, ((char *)
header) + daemon->packet_buff_sz);
-+	  size_t new = add_do_bit(header, plen, ((char *) header) +
daemon->packet_buff_sz);
- 	 
-+	  if (new != plen)
-+	    forward->flags |= FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
-+
-+	  plen = new;
-+	      
- 	  /* For debugging, set Checking Disabled, otherwise, have
the upstream check too,
- 	     this allows it to select auth servers when one is
returning bad data. */
- 	  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_DEBUG))
- 	    header->hb4 |= HB4_CD;
- 
--	  if (new_plen != plen)
--	    forward->flags |= FREC_ADDED_PHEADER;
--	  plen = new_plen;
- 	}

#endif

-       
-@@ -469,10 +477,23 @@ static int forward_query(int udpfd, union
mysockaddr *udpaddr,
- 		    }

#endif

- 		}
--	      if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL, &pheader,
NULL))
--		PUTSHORT((forward->flags & FREC_TEST_PKTSZ) ?
SAFE_PKTSZ : start->edns_pktsz, pheader);
- 	      
-+#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
-+	      if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !do_bit)
-+		{
-+		  /* Difficult one here. If our client didn't send
EDNS0, we will have set the UDP
-+		     packet size to 512. But that won't provide
space for the RRSIGS in many cases.
-+		     The RRSIGS will be stripped out before the
answer goes back, so the packet should
-+		     shrink again. So, if we added a do-bit, bump
the udp packet size to the value
-+		     known to be OK for this server. Maybe check
returned size after stripping and set
-+		     the truncated bit? */		  
-+		  unsigned char *pheader;
-+		  int is_sign;
-+		  if (find_pseudoheader(header, plen, NULL,
&pheader, &is_sign))
-+		    PUTSHORT(start->edns_pktsz, pheader);
-+		}
-+#endif
-+
- 	      if (retry_send(sendto(fd, (char *)header, plen, 0,
- 				    &start->addr.sa,
- 				    sa_len(&start->addr))))
-@@ -563,30 +584,34 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header
*header, time_t now, struct server
-     }

#endif

-   
--  /* If upstream is advertising a larger UDP packet size
--     than we allow, trim it so that we don't get overlarge
--     requests for the client. We can't do this for signed packets.
*/
-   if ((pheader = find_pseudoheader(header, n, &plen, &sizep,
&is_sign)))
-     {
--      unsigned short udpsz;
--      unsigned char *psave = sizep;
--
--      GETSHORT(udpsz, sizep);
--      if (!is_sign && udpsz > daemon->edns_pktsz)
--	PUTSHORT(daemon->edns_pktsz, psave);
--      
-       if (check_subnet && !check_source(header, plen, pheader,
query_source))
- 	{
- 	  my_syslog(LOG_WARNING, _("discarding DNS reply: subnet
option mismatch"));
- 	  return 0;
- 	}
-       
--      if (added_pheader)
-+      if (!is_sign)
- 	{
--	  pheader = 0; 
--	  header->arcount = htons(0);
-+	  if (added_pheader)
-+	    {
-+	      /* client didn't send EDNS0, we added one, strip it
off before returning answer. */
-+	      n = rrfilter(header, n, 0);
-+	      pheader = NULL;
-+	    }
-+	  else
-+	    {
-+	      /* If upstream is advertising a larger UDP packet
size
-+		 than we allow, trim it so that we don't get
overlarge
-+		 requests for the client. We can't do this for
signed packets. */
-+	      unsigned short udpsz;
-+	      unsigned char *psave = sizep;
-+	      
-+	      GETSHORT(udpsz, sizep);
-+	      if (udpsz > daemon->edns_pktsz)
-+		PUTSHORT(daemon->edns_pktsz, psave);
-+	    }
- 	}
-     }
-   
-@@ -655,14 +680,16 @@ static size_t process_reply(struct dns_header
*header, time_t now, struct server
-     }
- 
-   if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
--    header->hb4 &= ~HB4_AD;
--  
--  if (!(header->hb4 & HB4_CD) && ad_reqd && cache_secure)
--    header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
--  /* If the requestor didn't set the DO bit, don't return DNSSEC
info. */
--  if (!do_bit)
--    n = rrfilter(header, n, 1);
-+    {
-+      header->hb4 &= ~HB4_AD;
-+      
-+      if (!(header->hb4 & HB4_CD) && ad_reqd && cache_secure)
-+	header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
-+      
-+      /* If the requestor didn't set the DO bit, don't return
DNSSEC info. */
-+      if (!do_bit)
-+	n = rrfilter(header, n, 1);
-+    }

#endif

- 
-   /* do this after extract_addresses. Ensure NODATA reply and
remove
-@@ -761,8 +788,14 @@ void reply_query(int fd, int family, time_t
now)
- 	  if ((nn = resize_packet(header, (size_t)n, pheader,
plen)))
- 	    {
- 	      header->hb3 &= ~(HB3_QR | HB3_AA | HB3_TC);
--	      header->hb4 &= ~(HB4_RA | HB4_RCODE);
--	      forward_query(-1, NULL, NULL, 0, header, nn, now,
forward, 0, 0);
-+	      header->hb4 &= ~(HB4_RA | HB4_RCODE | HB4_CD |
HB4_AD);
-+	      if (forward->flags |= FREC_CHECKING_DISABLED)
-+		header->hb4 |= HB4_CD;
-+	      if (forward->flags |= FREC_AD_QUESTION)
-+		header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
-+	      if (forward->flags & FREC_DO_QUESTION)
-+		add_do_bit(header, nn,  (char *)pheader + plen);
-+	      forward_query(-1, NULL, NULL, 0, header, nn, now,
forward, forward->flags & FREC_AD_QUESTION, forward->flags &
FREC_DO_QUESTION);
- 	      return;
- 	    }
- 	}
-@@ -1007,12 +1040,13 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
time_t now)

{

-   struct dns_header *header = (struct dns_header *)daemon->packet;
-   union mysockaddr source_addr;
--  unsigned short type;
-+  unsigned char *pheader;
-+  unsigned short type, udp_size = PACKETSZ; /* default if no EDNS0
*/
-   struct all_addr dst_addr;
-   struct in_addr netmask, dst_addr_4;
-   size_t m;
-   ssize_t n;
--  int if_index = 0, auth_dns = 0;
-+  int if_index = 0, auth_dns = 0, do_bit = 0, have_pseudoheader =
0;

#ifdef HAVE_AUTH

-   int local_auth = 0;

#endif

-@@ -1279,10 +1313,30 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
time_t now)

#endif

-     }
-   
-+  if (find_pseudoheader(header, (size_t)n, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
-+    { 
-+      unsigned short flags;
-+      
-+      have_pseudoheader = 1;
-+      GETSHORT(udp_size, pheader);
-+      pheader += 2; /* ext_rcode */
-+      GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
-+      
-+      if (flags & 0x8000)
-+	do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
-+	
-+      /* If the client provides an EDNS0 UDP size, use that to
limit our reply.
-+	 (bounded by the maximum configured). If no EDNS0, then it
-+	 defaults to 512 */
-+      if (udp_size > daemon->edns_pktsz)
-+	udp_size = daemon->edns_pktsz;
-+    }
-+

#ifdef HAVE_AUTH

-   if (auth_dns)
-     {
--      m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + daemon-
...
packet_buff_sz, (size_t)n, now, &source_addr, local_auth);
-+      m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + udp_size,
(size_t)n, now, &source_addr, 
-+		      local_auth, do_bit, have_pseudoheader);
-       if (m >= 1)
- 	{
- 	  send_from(listen->fd, option_bool(OPT_NOWILD) ||
option_bool(OPT_CLEVERBIND),
-@@ -1293,9 +1347,13 @@ void receive_query(struct listener *listen,
time_t now)
-   else

#endif

-     {
--      int ad_reqd, do_bit;
--      m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + daemon-
...
packet_buff_sz, (size_t)n,
--			 dst_addr_4, netmask, now, &ad_reqd,
&do_bit);
-+      int ad_reqd = do_bit;
-+       /* RFC 6840 5.7 */
-+      if (header->hb4 & HB4_AD)
-+	ad_reqd = 1;
-+
-+      m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + udp_size,
(size_t)n, 
-+			 dst_addr_4, netmask, now, ad_reqd, do_bit,
have_pseudoheader);
-       
-       if (m >= 1)
- 	{
-@@ -1397,7 +1455,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
now,

#ifdef HAVE_AUTH

-   int local_auth = 0;

#endif

--  int checking_disabled, ad_question, do_bit, added_pheader = 0;
-+  int checking_disabled, do_bit, added_pheader = 0,
have_pseudoheader = 0;
-   int check_subnet, no_cache_dnssec = 0, cache_secure = 0,
bogusanswer = 0;
-   size_t m;
-   unsigned short qtype;
-@@ -1414,6 +1472,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
now,
-   union mysockaddr peer_addr;
-   socklen_t peer_len = sizeof(union mysockaddr);
-   int query_count = 0;
-+  unsigned char *pheader;
- 
-   if (getpeername(confd, (struct sockaddr *)&peer_addr, &peer_len)
== -1)
-     return packet;
-@@ -1508,15 +1567,35 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
now,
-       else
- 	dst_addr_4.s_addr = 0;
-       
-+      do_bit = 0;
-+
-+      if (find_pseudoheader(header, (size_t)size, NULL, &pheader,
NULL))
-+	{ 
-+	  unsigned short flags;
-+	  
-+	  have_pseudoheader = 1;
-+	  pheader += 4; /* udp_size, ext_rcode */
-+	  GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
-+      
-+	  if (flags & 0x8000)
-+	    do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
-+	}
-+

#ifdef HAVE_AUTH

-       if (auth_dns)
--	m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
(size_t)size, now, &peer_addr, local_auth);
-+	m = answer_auth(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
(size_t)size, now, &peer_addr, 
-+			local_auth, do_bit, have_pseudoheader);
-       else

#endif

- 	{
--	  /* m > 0 if answered from cache */
--	  m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
(size_t)size, 
--			     dst_addr_4, netmask, now,
&ad_question, &do_bit);
-+	   int ad_reqd = do_bit;
-+	   /* RFC 6840 5.7 */
-+	   if (header->hb4 & HB4_AD)
-+	     ad_reqd = 1;
-+	   
-+	   /* m > 0 if answered from cache */
-+	   m = answer_request(header, ((char *) header) + 65536,
(size_t)size, 
-+			      dst_addr_4, netmask, now, ad_reqd,
do_bit, have_pseudoheader);
- 	  
- 	  /* Do this by steam now we're not in the select() loop */
- 	  check_log_writer(1); 
-@@ -1615,6 +1694,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
now,
- 			    }
-

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC

-+			  added_pheader = 0;			
  
- 			  if (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID))
- 			    {
- 			      size_t new_size = add_do_bit(header,
size, ((char *) header) + 65536);
-@@ -1719,7 +1799,7 @@ unsigned char *tcp_request(int confd, time_t
now,
- 
- 		      m = process_reply(header, now, last_server,
(unsigned int)m, 
- 					option_bool(OPT_NO_REBIND)
&& !norebind, no_cache_dnssec, cache_secure, bogusanswer,
--					ad_question, do_bit,
added_pheader, check_subnet, &peer_addr); 
-+					ad_reqd, do_bit,
added_pheader, check_subnet, &peer_addr); 
- 		      
- 		      break;
- 		    }
-diff --git a/src/netlink.c b/src/netlink.c
-index 753784d..3376d68 100644
---- a/src/netlink.c
-+++ b/src/netlink.c
-@@ -288,7 +288,8 @@ int iface_enumerate(int family, void *parm, int
(*callback)())
- 		rta = RTA_NEXT(rta, len1);
- 	      }
- 
--	    if (inaddr && mac && callback_ok)
-+	    if (!(neigh->ndm_state & (NUD_NOARP | NUD_INCOMPLETE |
NUD_FAILED)) &&
-+		inaddr && mac && callback_ok)
- 	      if (!((*callback)(neigh->ndm_family, inaddr, mac,
maclen, parm)))
- 		callback_ok = 0;
- 	  }
-diff --git a/src/rfc1035.c b/src/rfc1035.c
-index 188d05f..18858a8 100644
---- a/src/rfc1035.c
-+++ b/src/rfc1035.c
-@@ -489,8 +489,8 @@ struct macparm {
-   union mysockaddr *l3;

};

-  
--static size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t
plen, unsigned char *limit, 
--			       int optno, unsigned char *opt,
size_t optlen, int set_do)
-+size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen,
unsigned char *limit, 
-+			unsigned short udp_sz, int optno, unsigned
char *opt, size_t optlen, int set_do)

{

-   unsigned char *lenp, *datap, *p;
-   int rdlen, is_sign;
-@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ static size_t add_pseudoheader(struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, unsigned
- 	return plen;
-       *p++ = 0; /* empty name */
-       PUTSHORT(T_OPT, p);
--      PUTSHORT(SAFE_PKTSZ, p); /* max packet length, this will be
overwritten */
-+      PUTSHORT(udp_sz, p); /* max packet length, 512 if not given
in EDNS0 header */
-       PUTSHORT(0, p);    /* extended RCODE and version */
-       PUTSHORT(set_do ? 0x8000 : 0, p); /* DO flag */
-       lenp = p;
-@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static int filter_mac(int family, char *addrp,
char *mac, size_t maclen, void *p
-   if (!match)
-     return 1; /* continue */
- 
--  parm->plen = add_pseudoheader(parm->header, parm->plen, parm-
...
limit,  EDNS0_OPTION_MAC, (unsigned char *)mac, maclen, 0);
-+  parm->plen = add_pseudoheader(parm->header, parm->plen, parm-
...
limit, PACKETSZ, EDNS0_OPTION_MAC, (unsigned char *)mac, maclen, 0);
-   
-   return 0; /* done */

}

-@@ -603,12 +603,6 @@ size_t add_mac(struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, char *limit, union mysock

{

-   struct macparm parm;
-      
--/* Must have an existing pseudoheader as the only ar-record, 
--   or have no ar-records. Must also not be signed */
--   
--  if (ntohs(header->arcount) > 1)
--    return plen;
-   parm.header = header;
-   parm.limit = (unsigned char *)limit;
-   parm.plen = plen;
-@@ -699,13 +693,13 @@ size_t add_source_addr(struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, char *limit, unio
-   struct subnet_opt opt;
-   
-   len = calc_subnet_opt(&opt, source);
--  return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit,
EDNS0_OPTION_CLIENT_SUBNET, (unsigned char *)&opt, len, 0);
-+  return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit,
PACKETSZ, EDNS0_OPTION_CLIENT_SUBNET, (unsigned char *)&opt, len, 0);

}

-

#ifdef HAVE_DNSSEC
size_t add_do_bit(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen, char

*limit)

{

--  return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit, 0,
NULL, 0, 1);
-+  return add_pseudoheader(header, plen, (unsigned char *)limit,
PACKETSZ, 0, NULL, 0, 1);

}
#endif

- 
-@@ -1525,16 +1519,16 @@ static unsigned long crec_ttl(struct crec
*crecp, time_t now)

/* return zero if we can't answer from cache, or packet size if we

can */

size_t answer_request(struct dns_header *header, char *limit,

size_t qlen,  
- 		      struct in_addr local_addr, struct in_addr
local_netmask, 
--		      time_t now, int *ad_reqd, int *do_bit) 
-+		      time_t now, int ad_reqd, int do_bit, int
have_pseudoheader)

{

-   char *name = daemon->namebuff;
--  unsigned char *p, *ansp, *pheader;
-+  unsigned char *p, *ansp;
-   unsigned int qtype, qclass;
-   struct all_addr addr;
-   int nameoffset;
-   unsigned short flag;
-   int q, ans, anscount = 0, addncount = 0;
--  int dryrun = 0, sec_reqd = 0, have_pseudoheader = 0;
-+  int dryrun = 0;
-   struct crec *crecp;
-   int nxdomain = 0, auth = 1, trunc = 0, sec_data = 1;
-   struct mx_srv_record *rec;
-@@ -1550,35 +1544,11 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
-   if (header->hb4 & HB4_CD)
-     sec_data = 0;
-   
--  /* RFC 6840 5.7 */
--  *ad_reqd = header->hb4 & HB4_AD;
--  *do_bit = 0;
-   /* If there is an  additional data section then it will be
overwritten by
-      partial replies, so we have to do a dry run to see if we can
answer
-      the query. */
-   if (ntohs(header->arcount) != 0)
--    {
--      dryrun = 1;
--      /* If there's an additional section, there might be an
EDNS(0) pseudoheader */
--      if (find_pseudoheader(header, qlen, NULL, &pheader, NULL))
--	{ 
--	  unsigned short flags;
--	  
--	  have_pseudoheader = 1;
--	  
--	  pheader += 4; /* udp size, ext_rcode */
--	  GETSHORT(flags, pheader);
--	  
--	  if ((sec_reqd = flags & 0x8000))
--	    {
--	      *do_bit = 1;/* do bit */ 
--	      *ad_reqd = 1;
--	    }
--	}
--    }
-+    dryrun = 1;
- 
-   for (rec = daemon->mxnames; rec; rec = rec->next)
-     rec->offset = 0;
-@@ -1603,11 +1573,6 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
-       GETSHORT(qtype, p); 
-       GETSHORT(qclass, p);
- 
--      /* Don't filter RRSIGS from answers to ANY queries, even if
do-bit
--	 not set. */
--      if (qtype == T_ANY)
--	*do_bit = 1;
-       ans = 0; /* have we answered this question */
-       
-       if (qtype == T_TXT || qtype == T_ANY)
-@@ -1739,7 +1704,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 		     the zone is unsigned, which implies that we're
doing
- 		     validation. */
- 		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
F_CONFIG)) || 
--		      !sec_reqd || 
-+		      !do_bit || 
- 		      (option_bool(OPT_DNSSEC_VALID) && !(crecp-
...
flags & F_DNSSECOK)))
- 		    {
- 		      do 
-@@ -1927,7 +1892,7 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 		    }
- 
- 		  /* If the client asked for DNSSEC  don't use
cached data. */
--		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
F_CONFIG)) || !sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
-+		  if ((crecp->flags & (F_HOSTS | F_DHCP |
F_CONFIG)) || !do_bit || !(crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK))
- 		    do
- 		      { 
- 			/* don't answer wildcard queries with data
not from /etc/hosts
-@@ -1961,17 +1926,12 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 			
- 			if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
- 			  {
--			    /* We don't cache NSEC records, so if a
DNSSEC-validated negative answer
--			       is cached and the client wants
DNSSEC, forward rather than answering from the cache */
--			    if (!sec_reqd || !(crecp->flags &
F_DNSSECOK))
--			      {
--				ans = 1;
--				auth = 0;
--				if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
--				  nxdomain = 1;
--				if (!dryrun)
--				  log_query(crecp->flags, name,
NULL, NULL);
--			      }
-+			    ans = 1;
-+			    auth = 0;
-+			    if (crecp->flags & F_NXDOMAIN)
-+			      nxdomain = 1;
-+			    if (!dryrun)
-+			      log_query(crecp->flags, name, NULL,
NULL);
- 			  }
- 			else 
- 			  {
-@@ -2209,10 +2169,11 @@ size_t answer_request(struct dns_header
*header, char *limit, size_t qlen,
- 
-   len = ansp - (unsigned char *)header;
-   
-+  /* Advertise our packet size limit in our reply */
-   if (have_pseudoheader)
--    len = add_pseudoheader(header, len, (unsigned char *)limit, 0,
NULL, 0, sec_reqd);
-+    len = add_pseudoheader(header, len, (unsigned char *)limit,
daemon->edns_pktsz, 0, NULL, 0, do_bit);
-   
--  if (*ad_reqd && sec_data)
-+  if (ad_reqd && sec_data)
-     header->hb4 |= HB4_AD;
-   else
-     header->hb4 &= ~HB4_AD;
-diff --git a/src/rrfilter.c b/src/rrfilter.c
-index ae12261..b26b39f 100644
---- a/src/rrfilter.c
-+++ b/src/rrfilter.c
-@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ size_t rrfilter(struct dns_header *header,
size_t plen, int mode)
-   for (p = rrs[0], i = 1; i < rr_found; i += 2)
-     {
-       unsigned char *start = rrs[i];
--      unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
((unsigned char *)(header+1)) + plen;
-+      unsigned char *end = (i != rr_found - 1) ? rrs[i+1] :
((unsigned char *)header) + plen;
-       
-       memmove(p, start, end-start);
-       p += end-start;
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
b/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 910921b..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/026-
More_tweaks_in_handling_unknown_DNSSEC_algorithms.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
-From d67ecac59d58f249707d26e38d49c29b552af4d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 20:44:23 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] More tweaks in handling unknown DNSSEC algorithms.





src/dnssec.c |  128 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------



1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 299ca64..e09f304 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -70,7 +70,17 @@ static char *algo_digest_name(int algo)
-     default: return NULL;
-     }

}

--      
-+  
-+/* http://www.iana.org/assignments/dnssec-nsec3-parameters/dnssec-n
sec3-parameters.xhtml */
-+static char *nsec3_digest_name(int digest)
-+{
-+  switch (digest)
-+    {
-+    case 1: return "sha1";
-+    default: return NULL;
-+    }
-+}
-+

/* Find pointer to correct hash function in nettle library */
static const struct nettle_hash *hash_find(char *name)
{

-@@ -667,7 +677,6 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, int class, int
-   static int rrset_sz = 0, sig_sz = 0; 
-   unsigned char *p;
-   int rrsetidx, sigidx, j, rdlen, res;
--  int name_labels = count_labels(name); /* For 4035 5.3.2 check */
-   int gotkey = 0;
- 
-   if (!(p = skip_questions(header, plen)))
-@@ -678,7 +687,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, int class, int
-        j != 0; j--) 
-     {
-       unsigned char *pstart, *pdata;
--      int stype, sclass, algo, type_covered, labels,
sig_expiration, sig_inception;
-+      int stype, sclass, type_covered;
- 
-       pstart = p;
-       
-@@ -712,12 +721,7 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, int class, int
- 		return 0; /* bad packet */ 
- 	      
- 	      GETSHORT(type_covered, p);
--	      algo = *p++;
--	      labels = *p++;
--	      p += 4; /* orig_ttl */
--	      GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
--	      GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
--	      p += 2; /* key_tag */
-+	      p += 16; /* algo, labels, orig_ttl, sig_expiration,
sig_inception, key_tag */
- 	      
- 	      if (gotkey)
- 		{
-@@ -749,11 +753,8 @@ static int explore_rrset(struct dns_header
*header, size_t plen, int class, int
- 		    }
- 		}
- 		  
--	      /* Don't count signatures for algos we don't support
*/
--	      if (check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration)
&&
--		  labels <= name_labels &&
--		  type_covered == type && 
--		  verify_func(algo))
-+	      
-+	      if (type_covered == type)
- 		{
- 		  if (!expand_workspace(&sigs, &sig_sz, sigidx))
- 		    return 0; 
-@@ -795,7 +796,7 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
- 			  char *name, char *keyname, char
**wildcard_out, struct blockdata *key, int keylen, int algo_in, int
keytag_in)

{

-   unsigned char *p;
--  int rdlen, j, name_labels;
-+  int rdlen, j, name_labels, sig_expiration, sig_inception;
-   struct crec *crecp = NULL;
-   int algo, labels, orig_ttl, key_tag;
-   u16 *rr_desc = rrfilter_desc(type);
-@@ -828,13 +829,16 @@ static int validate_rrset(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, in
-       algo = *p++;
-       labels = *p++;
-       GETLONG(orig_ttl, p);
--      p += 8; /* sig_expiration, sig_inception already checked */
-+      GETLONG(sig_expiration, p);
-+      GETLONG(sig_inception, p);
-       GETSHORT(key_tag, p);
-       
-       if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, keyname, 1, 0))
- 	return STAT_BOGUS;
- 
--      if (!(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
-+      if (!check_date_range(sig_inception, sig_expiration) ||
-+	  labels > name_labels ||
-+	  !(hash = hash_find(algo_digest_name(algo))) ||
- 	  !hash_init(hash, &ctx, &digest))
- 	continue;
-       
-@@ -1112,7 +1116,10 @@ int dnssec_validate_by_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, ch
- 		      else
- 			{
- 			  a.addr.keytag = keytag;
--			  log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u");
-+			  if (verify_func(algo))
-+			    log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u");
-+			  else
-+			    log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DNSKEY keytag %u (not supported)");
- 			  
- 			  recp1->addr.key.keylen = rdlen - 4;
- 			  recp1->addr.key.keydata = key;
-@@ -1235,7 +1242,11 @@ int dnssec_validate_ds(time_t now, struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char
- 		  else
- 		    {
- 		      a.addr.keytag = keytag;
--		      log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG | F_UPSTREAM,
name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
-+		      if (hash_find(ds_digest_name(digest)) &&
verify_func(algo))
-+			log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u");
-+		      else
-+			log_query(F_NOEXTRA | F_KEYTAG |
F_UPSTREAM, name, &a, "DS keytag %u (not supported)");
-+		      
- 		      crecp->addr.ds.digest = digest;
- 		      crecp->addr.ds.keydata = key;
- 		      crecp->addr.ds.algo = algo;
-@@ -1660,7 +1671,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-     *nons = 1;
-   
-   /* Look though the NSEC3 records to find the first one with 
--     an algorithm we support (currently only algo == 1).
-+     an algorithm we support.
- 
-      Take the algo, iterations, and salt of that record
-      as the ones we're going to use, and prune any 
-@@ -1674,7 +1685,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-       p += 10; /* type, class, TTL, rdlen */
-       algo = *p++;
-       
--      if (algo == 1)
-+      if ((hash = hash_find(nsec3_digest_name(algo))))
- 	break; /* known algo */
-     }
- 
-@@ -1724,10 +1735,6 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-       nsecs[i] = nsec3p;
-     }
- 
--  /* Algo is checked as 1 above */
--  if (!(hash = hash_find("sha1")))
--    return 0;
-   if ((digest_len = hash_name(name, &digest, hash, salt, salt_len,
iterations)) == 0)
-     return 0;
-   
-@@ -1843,8 +1850,10 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key
-   
-   if (type_found == T_NSEC)
-     return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset,
nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons);
--  else
-+  else if (type_found == T_NSEC3)
-     return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset,
nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname,
nons);
-+  else
-+    return 0;

}

-

/* Check signing status of name.

-@@ -1857,7 +1866,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, char *key

*/
static int zone_status(char *name, int class, char *keyname, time_t

now)

{

--  int secure_ds, name_start = strlen(name);
-+  int name_start = strlen(name);
-   struct crec *crecp;
-   char *p;
-   
-@@ -1867,51 +1876,40 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int
class, char *keyname, time_t now)
-       
-       if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now, F_DS)))
- 	return STAT_NEED_DS;
-+      
-+       /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-existance
of NS record.
-+	  F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved there's no
DS record here,
-+	  but that's because there's no NS record either, ie this
isn't the start
-+	  of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree below a node
is unsigned when
-+	  we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's no DS
record. */
-+      if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
-+	{
-+	  if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
-+	    return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here */
-+	}
-       else
- 	{
--	  secure_ds = 0;
--	  
-+	  int gotone = 0;
-+
-+	  /* If all the DS records have digest and/or sig algos we
don't support,
-+	     then the zone is insecure. Note that if an algo
-+	     appears in the DS, then RRSIGs for that algo MUST
-+	     exist for each RRset: 4035 para 2.2  So if we find
-+	     a DS here with digest and sig we can do, we're
entitled
-+	     to assume we can validate the zone and if we can't
later,
-+	     because an RRSIG is missing we return BOGUS.
-+	  */
- 	  do 
- 	    {
--	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class)
--		{
--		  /* F_DNSSECOK misused in DS cache records to non-
existance of NS record.
--		     F_NEG && !F_DNSSECOK implies that we've proved
there's no DS record here,
--		     but that's because there's no NS record
either, ie this isn't the start
--		     of a zone. We only prove that the DNS tree
below a node is unsigned when
--		     we prove that we're at a zone cut AND there's
no DS record.
--		  */	  
--		  if (crecp->flags & F_NEG)
--		    {
--		      if (crecp->flags & F_DNSSECOK)
--			return STAT_INSECURE; /* proved no DS here
*/
--		    }
--		  else if (!hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp-
...
addr.ds.digest)) || !verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
--		    return STAT_INSECURE; /* algo we can't use -
insecure */
--		  else
--		    secure_ds = 1;
--		}
-+	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
-+		  hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest))
&&
-+		  verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
-+		gotone = 1;
- 	    }
- 	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
F_DS)));
--	}
--      if (secure_ds)
--	{
--	  /* We've found only DS records that attest to the DNSKEY
RRset in the zone, so we believe
--	     that RRset is good. Furthermore the DNSKEY whose hash
is proved by the DS record is
--	     one we can use. However the DNSKEY RRset may contain
more than one key and
--	     one of the other keys may use an algorithm we don't
support. If that's 
--	     the case the zone is insecure for us. */
--	  
--	  if (!(crecp = cache_find_by_name(NULL, keyname, now,
F_DNSKEY)))
--	    return STAT_NEED_KEY;
- 
--	  do 
--	    {
--	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
!verify_func(crecp->addr.key.algo))
--		return STAT_INSECURE;
--	    }
--	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
F_DNSKEY)));
-+	  if (!gotone)
-+	    return STAT_INSECURE;
- 	}
- 
-       if (name_start == 0)
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-
one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-
Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 031339e..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/027-Nasty_rare_and_obscure_off-by-
one_in_DNSSEC_hostname_cmp.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-From 3e86d316c4bb406ed813aa5256615c8a95cac6d8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 20:50:05 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Nasty, rare and obscure off-by-one in DNSSEC
hostname_cmp().





src/dnssec.c |    4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index e09f304..29848e1 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -1394,8 +1394,8 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const
char *b)
-       if (sb == b)
- 	return 1;
-       
--      ea = sa--;
--      eb = sb--;
-+      ea = --sa;
-+      eb = --sb;
-     }

}

- 
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-
Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f3758fc..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/028-Minor_tweak_to_previous_commit.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From a86fdf437ecc29398f9715ceb5240442a17ac014 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 21:19:20 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Minor tweak to previous commit.





src/dnssec.c |    6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 29848e1..9fa64b6 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -1889,8 +1889,6 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int class,
char *keyname, time_t now)
- 	}
-       else
- 	{
--	  int gotone = 0;
- 	  /* If all the DS records have digest and/or sig algos we
don't support,
- 	     then the zone is insecure. Note that if an algo
- 	     appears in the DS, then RRSIGs for that algo MUST
-@@ -1904,11 +1902,11 @@ static int zone_status(char *name, int
class, char *keyname, time_t now)
- 	      if (crecp->uid == (unsigned int)class &&
- 		  hash_find(ds_digest_name(crecp->addr.ds.digest))
&&
- 		  verify_func(crecp->addr.ds.algo))
--		gotone = 1;
-+		break;
- 	    }
- 	  while ((crecp = cache_find_by_name(crecp, keyname, now,
F_DS)));
- 
--	  if (!gotone)
-+	  if (!crecp)
- 	    return STAT_INSECURE;
- 	}
- 
--- 
-1.7.10.4



diff --git a/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-
NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch b/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-
NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 33219d2..0000000
--- a/src/patches/dnsmasq/029-NSEC3_check_RFC5155_para_8_2.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From ce5732e84fc46d7f99c152f736cfb4ef5ec98a01 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00
2001
-From: Simon Kelley simon@thekelleys.org.uk
-Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2015 21:39:19 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] NSEC3 check: RFC5155 para 8.2





src/dnssec.c |    8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)


-diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c
-index 9fa64b6..486e422 100644
---- a/src/dnssec.c
-+++ b/src/dnssec.c
-@@ -1704,7 +1704,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-   for (i = 0; i < nsec_count; i++)
-     {
-       unsigned char *nsec3p = nsecs[i];
--      int this_iter;
-+      int this_iter, flags;
- 
-       nsecs[i] = NULL; /* Speculative, will be restored if OK. */
-       
-@@ -1716,8 +1716,12 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct
dns_header *header, size_t plen, uns
-       if (*p++ != algo)
- 	continue;
-  
--      p++; /* flags */
-+      flags = *p++; /* flags */
-       
-+      /* 5155 8.2 */
-+      if (flags != 0 && flags != 1)
-+	continue;
-+
-       GETSHORT(this_iter, p);
-       if (this_iter != iterations)
- 	continue;
--- 
-1.7.10.4




    

Re: [PATCH] dnsmasq: 2.76test10 with latest patches (001-004)

Signed-off-by: Matthias Fischer matthias.fischer@ipfire.org

-- }

-doesn't exist. 4025 5.2

-where it should be, vastly simplifying query-forwarding code.

-- }

- continue;

-- return STAT_INSECURE_DS;

- }

- }

- return STAT_BOGUS;

- ans_start = p1;

-- GETSHORT(rdlen2, p1);

-- }

-- }

-- have_wildcard = 1;

-- GETSHORT(type_covered, p2);

--}

-- char *wildname;

-- GETSHORT(qclass, p);

-- GETSHORT(rdlen, p);

-- unsigned char **nsecs;

-- return STAT_BOGUS;

-- }

--#endif

- return;

- no_cache_dnssec = 0;

- domain = daemon->namebuff;

-- return status;

-- forward = forward->dependent;

-- char *p;

-- struct crec *crecp;

-- }

-- return STAT_BOGUS;

-- If we've already tried the whole name, then fail */

--}

-- struct blockdata *block;

-- char *name_start;

-- length = (u16 *)packet;

-- }

-- struct crec *crecp;

-- /* Can't find it in the cache, have to send a query */

--}

-- }

-- return STAT_INSECURE;

- char *result, *domain = "result";

-- }

-- }

-answers are still returned as long as do=0

-- int have_wildcard = 0;

-- struct blockdata *keydata;

-- anscount++;

-- struct crec *rr_crec = NULL;

-- }

-- }

-- val = STAT_BOGUS;

-- return val;

- GETSHORT(rdlen, p);

- }

-- }

-- -1 -> end

-- while (*p++ != (u16)-1);

--}

-- int old = *szp;

-- return 1;

-- return 0;

-- *szp = new;

--}

-- unsigned char *ansp = *namep;

-- label_type = (*ansp) & 0xc0;

-- return 0;

-- offset |= *ansp++;

-- offset -= rrs[i] - rrs[i-1];

-- return 0;

-- return 0;

-- }

-- *namep = ansp;

--}

-- pp = p;

-- GETSHORT(rdlen, p);

- char result, domain = "result";

-- unsigned char ansp = namep;